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Foreword
Prepared by
Daniel L. Jensen, PhD
Bob was a leader on the forefront of financial reporting during a time of
unprecedented challenge for accounting, auditing, and financial
reporting. Born in New York City in 1953 and raised in New Jersey for
much of his childhood, his father was a well-known commodities
trader who moved the family to Buenos Aires, Argentina, when he was
fourteen years old. He attended an Anglo-Argentine school built on the
English public school model; that led him to England and the
University of Manchester where he took a degree in economics,
graduating at the top of his class in 1974 with first class honors—and a
full head of long hair. During his three years at Manchester, he also
studied accounting under the direction of Sir Bryan Carsberg, later
Secretary General of the International Accounting Standards Committee,
and Professors John Arnold and Tony Hope, all of whom encouraged
him to pursue a career in accounting.
Following graduation he joined Price Waterhouse in Manchester, where
he qualified as a Chartered Accountant. He reports that the United
Kingdom’s low salaries and highly progressive taxes convinced him
and his wife, Louise, to move to the United States in 1978. The following year, he joined the Boston office of Coopers & Lybrand and
shortly thereafter passed the CPA Exam, winning the Gold Medal for
the highest score in Massachusetts and the Elijah Watt Sells Award
nationally. In 1980, he was transferred to the national office in New
York City where he was immersed in both client engagements and
technical research projects. He was named a partner in 1985, becoming
senior technical partner in 1996 and continuing in a similar position at
the merged firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1998.
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Bob’s passion for accounting and for improving the information
provided to financial markets led to his appointment in 2002 as
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, following the
term of Edmund L. Jenkins. Enron Corporation had collapsed in a
financial reporting scandal, WorldCom would shortly follow, and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was in the works. The latter led the Securities and
Exchange Commission to formally re-designate the FASB as the
recognized U.S. accounting standard-setter. As the new FASB Chairman,
Bob led a concerted effort to improve and simplify both the standards
and the process by which they are developed and to pursue
convergence of U.S. and international standards. A central outcome of
this effort was the comprehensive reorganization of U.S. accounting
standards which brought together in a coherent codification some 2000
individual authoritative pronouncements issued by various organizations and agencies over more than half a century.
A second important outcome was the signing of the “Norwalk Agreement” in October 2002, in which the FASB and the IASB agreed in
principle to work toward convergence of their standards. In the years
that followed, joint teams made progress on accounting for stock-based
compensation, business combinations, financial instruments, consolidations, revenue recognition, lease accounting, financial statement
presentation, as well as other standards.
A third among the many important outcomes under Bob’s watch as
chairman was the issuance of a major standard to clarify the general
meaning of fair value in financial reporting. The new standard described
the different techniques for measuring fair value and provided a
framework for related disclosure in the financial statements. The new
standard was intended to improve fair value reporting in areas where it
was already required or permitted and to augment long-existing rules on
lower-of-cost-or-market and asset impairment and has also now become
the basis of the international standard on fair value measurement.
During this period Bob appeared repeatedly before Congressional committees and was a highly effective spokesman for an independent
accounting standard-setting process, free from inappropriate political
intervention or override. In addition, he worked extensively with the
SEC, the PCAOB, the Treasury Department, other national accounting
standard setters, and both U.S. and international bank regulators.
Together with his fellow Board members, he enhanced the outreach to
investors and the input the FASB receives from investors, small and
private companies, not-for-profit entities, and the academic community.
His tenure with the FASB caps a long and extraordinary record of
service to his firm, to the accounting profession, to the capital markets,
and to the public interest. He served as a founding member of the
IASB, a member of the Emerging Issues Task Force, and as chair and
x

member of many other AICPA committees and task forces. He was the
first Chairman of the Transnational Auditors Committee of the
International Federation of Accountants and served as a member of
numerous other committees and advisory boards including the New
York Stock Exchange International Capital Markets Advisory Committee, various SEC and U.S. Treasury advisory committees, and the
Prince of Wales’ International Integrated Reporting Committee.
As an audit partner and leader of his firm’s Corporate Finance
Advisory Services, he worked extensively with major corporations,
investment banks, and private equity funds. As the senior technical
partner of Coopers & Lybrand and PwC, he was responsible for firm
policies on accounting, auditing, and professional matters, resolution of
client practice issues, risk management and practice quality, and firm
publications and communications on accounting, auditing, and professional developments. He also served as a member of PwC’s U.S. and
Global Boards, and as president of the C&L and PwC Foundations, and
as a member of the investment, compensation, finance, and human
capital committees.
Bob has also written extensively on accounting, auditing, finance, and
business subjects. He has authored or coauthored five books and
monographs and over 40 articles published in professional and
academic journals. His books include the influential The ValueReporting
Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings, coauthored with Robert Eccles,
E. Mary Keegan, and David Phillips and published in 2001. In addition,
he has delivered over 40 invited lectures at universities throughout the
United States and in many other countries.
His honors and awards include an honorary doctorate from his alma
mater, the University of Manchester, and recognitions of his
distinguished contributions to accounting and financial management by
many other organizations and institutions.
Currently, he is Executive in Residence on the faculty of Columbia
University Business School. In 2011, he joined the Board of Directors of
Fannie Mae and serves on their audit , nominating and corporate
governance, and strategic initiatives committees and has recently joined
the board of directors and audit committee of Morgan Stanley. In addition, he serves on many other boards and advisory groups including,
the Accounting Standards Oversight Council of Canada, the Financial
Reporting Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales, the Standing Advisory Group of the PCAOB, WebFilings
LLC, AccountAbility, and the Kessler Foundation.
He and his wife, Louise, have two grown children, Michael and Nicole,
and live in South Orange, New Jersey, where he has participated in
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civic and school district budgetary administration. He is the 89th
member of The Accounting Hall of Fame: Robert Henry Herz.

Prepared by Professor Daniel L. Jensen, Deloitte & Touche Emeritus
Professor of Accounting, Department of Accounting & MIS, Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, in honor of
the induction of Robert Herz to the Accounting Hall of Fame.
Professor Jensen is the Director of the Master of Accounting Program in
the Fisher College of Business. His research on cost accounting and
auditing topics has been published in various journals including The
Accounting Review and the Journal of Accounting Research. He has
co-authored two textbooks and edited various books and collections
including six volumes of collected writings in the Accounting Hall of
Fame Series in Accounting History.
From 1993 to 1995, Professor Jensen was Director of Publications for the
American Accounting Association, chaired the Association’s Committee
on Publications, and served on its Executive Committee. He has served
as editor of Issues in Accounting Education and on the editorial boards of
various scholarly journals; in addition, he is a Trustee of the Academy
of Accounting Historians and has served as its president. He has taught
cost accounting and management control courses in the Ohio State
Accounting Honors Program for over twenty years in addition to other
graduate and undergraduate accounting courses, and has chaired the
Accounting Hall of Fame Committee since 1994.
Before joining The Ohio State University in 1980 as the Ernst & Young
Professor of Accounting, Professor Jensen was a member of the
accounting faculties at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
and at Purdue University and served as a visiting professor at Indiana
University at Bloomington. A Certified Public Accountant, he received
his bachelors and masters degrees from the University of Minnesota
(1962, 1964). In 1991, Professor Jensen received the Outstanding Ohio
Accounting Educator Award.
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Preface
I retired as Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) on September 30, 2010. For me, it marked the end of nearly a
decade in accounting standard setting at the highest level, first as a
member of the newly created International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) in 2001–02 and then for more than eight years at the FASB. It
was a fascinating, challenging, and personally very satisfying part of
my career and my life and, more importantly, a period of significant
change, challenge, and opportunity for financial reporting, both in the
United States and internationally.
Soon after leaving the FASB, I was encouraged by a number of parties
to write a book about my years as an accounting standard setter. My
perspective on these matters, they said, would be both informative and
interesting, as I had been involved in and had a “front row seat” on
many of the major developments affecting accounting and financial
reporting during this period: the reporting scandals of 2001 and 2002,
the recent global financial crisis, and efforts at international
convergence of accounting standards. Some even went so far as to say I
had a responsibility to accounting history to share my insights and
views on these events and developments.
Although such encouragement was both flattering and may have had
the intended effect of engendering a bit of a sense of responsibility (or
perhaps better said, guilt), I thought long and hard before committing
to write this book. My prior experiences in authoring books, papers,
and articles had taught me that publishing can be a lengthy and
consuming process. Moreover, upon leaving the FASB, I had quickly
undertaken several new roles and activities in pursuit of new and different challenges. I wrestled for a while with any trade-offs that could
arise in terms of my personal, professional, and business activities, but
in the end, I decided to give this book a go, believing I could provide a

xiii

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

relevant and interesting chronicle of some of the major events, developments, and forces in the world of accounting and financial reporting
during the past decade, along with my perspectives on these matters.
Having made that decision, I then asked myself whether the book
should cover more than my tenure at the FASB and IASB. In other
words, should I get really ambitious and write about my entire
personal life and career to date? On the one hand, I could share
adventures from my childhood in the United States, my teenage years
in Argentina, my years as a student and budding accountant in
England, then as a partner with Coopers & Lybrand and
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and as a husband, and father. On the
other hand, such an autobiography would clearly be a major
undertaking, and some of these experiences, though interesting, would
probably be of little relevance to most of the likely readers of a book
authored by me.
So, I settled on a middle ground. I wrote chapter 1, “My First 49 Years,”
with the intent to summarize my life before accounting—although it is
hard to imagine such a time existed—and my almost three decades in
the profession prior to joining the IASB and FASB. My goal was to
describe some of the key forces, experiences, and people that I believe
have shaped a number of my perspectives as a professional and as a
person. I believe we are, at least in part, products of our background
and experiences, so understanding where a person has been before is
important in understanding where he is now in terms of views, actions,
and dealings with others. Certainly, my international background and
many years in the accounting profession have affected my thinking and
perspectives. I must confess, however, that writing the first chapter was
rather enjoyable. It gave me an opportunity to fondly reminisce about
where I have been, the tremendous professional opportunities I have
been afforded, and the many wonderful people with whom I have been
blessed to share life’s journey.
I then moved on to the core chapters of this book, which cover what I
regard as the more noteworthy events and developments in accounting
standard setting and financial reporting during my years as Chairman
of the FASB. In doing so, and in order to try to communicate key
aspects of these matters, I selected numerous passages from my own
speeches and Congressional testimony and those of many others, as
well excerpts from relevant articles and media accounts and other
publicly available sources.
FASB board and staff members have a common statement in the
opening of speeches and presentations: “The views are my own and do
not represent official positions of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board that are arrived at only after extensive public due process and
deliberations.” Throughout the book, I provide my perspectives on
xiv

various developments, events, and key issues. It is important for
readers to understand that, to the extent I have expressed personal
views, those views are my own. As well, in order to be even-handed, I
have included the perspectives of others on some key issues. I have
certainly found throughout my years that informed and reasonable
people can and often do have differing views on particular matters. So,
I apologize in advance to those readers who may have a different point
of view than mine if you think I have not fully or fairly captured your
perspectives on those issues.
The FASB’s activities are covered on a regular basis by a variety of
media, and its meetings are conducted “in the sunshine” through
webcasts, meeting minutes, project descriptions, summaries of Board
decisions, FASB standards and proposals, and comment letters on Board
projects, all of which are available on FASB’s website. Although the
matters discussed in chapters 2–6 are matters of public information and
not intended to provide a comprehensive history of the activities of the
FASB during my years there or of financial reporting developments
over that period, my hope is that this book will contribute to the
historical understanding of this period in accounting and financial
reporting. I hope that it also makes for interesting reading.
So, which of the multitude of standard-setting activities of the FASB and
events and developments in financial reporting have I chosen to write
about? Chapter 2, “Charting Course,” deals with the key strategic objectives and resulting initiatives we developed early on in my tenure as
Chairman of the FASB. Chapter 3, “Stock Option Controversies—Take
Two,” recounts the background, controversy, and principal events relating
to our exploration of the issues surrounding the accounting for employee
stock options. Chapter 4, “International Convergence,” covers the many
facets and milestones in our convergence efforts with the IASB, as well as
some of the key events in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC’s) ongoing consideration of International Financial Reporting
Standards. In chapter 5, “The Financial Crisis,” I discuss the global
financial crisis, focusing on the financial reporting issues emanating from
it and our standard-setting actions in response to those issues. Chapter 6,
“Complexity,” attempts to address the complexity inherent in accounting
and financial reporting. Finally, in chapter 7, “Looking Back and Moving
Forward,” I review what has been, and what I believe will continue to
be, a period of challenge, change, and opportunity in accounting and
financial reporting and in my life after accounting standard setting. In
doing so, I could not resist the temptation to offer a few modest suggestions to those with continuing responsibility for accounting standards
and the financial reporting system.
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Chapter 1: My First 49
Years
In this book, I focus primarily on the work and key activities of the
FASB during my chairmanship from July 2002 to September 2010 and I
offer my perspectives on these matters and the major forces affecting
the FASB’s work during that period. However, because our background
and experiences help shape our perspectives, actions, and dealings with
others, knowing where a person has come from is important in
understanding that person’s outlook.
So, in this chapter, I will offer a high level sketch of the first 49 years of
my life: the years before accounting—though it’s hard now to imagine
such a time existed—and then the nearly 3 decades I spent in the
profession before joining the FASB. Along with giving readers insight to
my perspectives, this gives me an opportunity to reminisce a bit about
some of the key experiences, forces, and people that have shaped my
life and thinking. I have fond recollections of those years and I feel
blessed to have been afforded tremendous opportunities in life, to have
a wonderful family, and, in the course of my life’s journey, to have
formed many lasting friendships.

Jersey Boy
I was born on June 18, 1953, at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York City.
My father, James Herz, was a native New Yorker and fairly well-known
commodity trader. My mother, Susan Herz, the daughter of a rabbi,
grew up in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, fled with her older brother
to Manchester, England, in 1939, and later joined her parents in
Argentina, where, in 1946, she met my dad who was in Buenos Aires
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working for the U.S. government. They were soon married and moved
to the United States.
I am an only child. My birth was uneventful, except for the following
anecdote my father would ritualistically recount each year on my
birthday. My dad was a lifelong Yankees fan. Back in 1953, it was rare
for husbands to be present at the births of their children. So, on the
evening of my birth, my dad travelled uptown from his work on Wall
Street to Lenox Hill to visit my mom and his new son. Well, Lenox Hill
was the official hospital of the Yankees, and as luck would have it, Joe
DiMaggio, who had retired a couple years prior, was there that
evening. When he saw Mr. DiMaggio, my father, never the bashful one,
went up to him, got his autograph, and briefly chatted with him. From
then on, my birthday became known as the greatest day in the life of
my dad, not because of the birth of his only son but because it was the
day he met the “Yankee Clipper.”
So it was with that twist of fate and good fortune for my dad that my
life began. We lived in New York City until I was about two years old.
Then, as was the case for so many in those days, we moved out to the
suburbs in Maplewood, NJ. I would say we were upper middle class,
and Maplewood was one of the nicer suburbs close to New York City. It
had a lovely village center that has a New England look and feel, a
good school system, and lots of nice tree-lined streets and big houses.
We lived in a five-bedroom colonial on a quiet street. My readers will
soon come to recognize that a lot of my life has revolved around three
places, the New York City area, including Maplewood and its sister
town South Orange; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Manchester, England.
But I’m getting ahead of myself.
We lived in that house in Maplewood for the next 12 years. I went to
the Maplewood-South Orange public schools and had loads of friends.
On our block alone, one of less than 20 houses, were about a dozen
boys within 2 years each side of my age. We were constant after-school
and weekend companions, playing softball, touch-football, half-court
basketball, and other sports and games, depending on the season and
weather. We went to Yankees games, first with our dads but later on
our own, and to Knicks and Rangers games at Madison Square Garden.
We went to Radio City Music Hall and to rock concerts. (I was at the
Beatles concert in Shea Stadium.) We were on the town little league
teams and would go fishing and hunting for salamanders in the
“Reservation” (the 2,000 acre county forest that was only a short
walking distance from our block).
In summer, most of us went to camp. First, it was day camp a bit
further out in New Jersey, and later, I and a number of my classmates
from school went to sleep-away camp (Camp Mah-Kee-Nac in the
Berkshires in western Massachusetts) for eight weeks each summer.
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Before and after the weeks of camp, it was, as words of the Billy Joel
song “Allentown” go, “weekends on the Jersey Shore”—day trips to
Deal, Asbury Park, Point Pleasant, and Long Beach Island; long
weekends in Atlantic City, Wildwood, and Cape May; and February
school breaks in Miami Beach.
Then there was school. Modesty aside, from third grade on, I was
always either top of my class or in the top 2 or 3. I guess I was always
somewhat risk averse (perhaps an early sign of the accountant in me)
and would try to stay ahead of things: doing my homework before
going out to play and reading ahead in textbooks. My mother was
always a source of encouragement and help—verbally testing me the
evening before a big test. In junior high, I got straight As (even some
A+s), was always on the honor roll, and represented the school in math
bowls against neighboring schools. Most of us were Jewish but of the
Reform or Conservative variety, far less observant than orthodox Jews.
We went to Sunday School and midweek Hebrew classes through the
age of 13, until our Bar Mitzvahs liberated us. As was the custom of the
time among our crowd, we all had big Bar and Bat Mitzvah parties, not
only in celebration of our passage into adulthood (or at least the very
early stages of it) but also as a necessary and expected business and
social affair for our parents.
Such was my life until the age of 14; nothing out of the ordinary for the
times and many other such Jersey boys who grew up in the suburbs
during the 1950s and 1960s. I have very fond memories of it, and
ultimately, it was something I wanted and chose to try to replicate for
my kids. But big changes in my life were soon to occur.

Don’t Cry for Me Argentina
One evening in 1968 my father and mother told me we were moving to
Buenos Aires, Argentina. My father, who now worked at Bunge, a
company with large operations in Argentina, was being transferred there.
I think, however, that it also had something to do with my mother and
her desire to be with her parents while they were still alive (and indeed
both her parents died in 1969). I guess the move had been in the works
for a while, but it took me by surprise. I had been to Argentina a couple
times to visit my mom’s family—her parents and her brother and his
wife and some other aunts, uncles, and cousins all lived there. So,
although I was familiar with Buenos Aires and had some good memories
of times with my mom’s family, the news was crushing. Leaving my
lifelong buddies and the home and life that were so familiar and
comfortable was daunting. I did not speak Spanish (and, in fact, had
been taking French lessons in junior high). I did not play soccer, and
there would be no more Yankees games or going to the Jersey Shore.
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But off we went. We quickly settled into an apartment in a high-rise
building in the Belgrano section of Buenos Aires. It was a large twobedroom apartment in a nice area, but it wasn’t Maplewood. Moreover,
I was enrolled in an Anglo-Argentine School—St. Andrews Scots School
in terms of the Anglo part and San Andres in terms of the Argentine
part—that was very much like an English “public” (to Americans,
private) school, and I had to wear a school jacket and tie every day.
Worse yet, it was outside the city and unlike Maplewood where I
walked to school, I now had to take two buses (collectivos) each way to
get to school.
Faced with such a change, one can choose to sink or swim. I chose to
swim. With regard to learning Spanish (or Castellano, the Argentinian
version of Spanish), I guess I went through something similar to what
infants go through. When I arrived in Argentina, I could barely speak a
few words of Spanish. By six months I could get by, and within one
year, I was virtually fluent at a conversational level. At first, school was
a challenge: the curriculum was new and foreign, and the classes were
very different than I was used to. Over time, I adjusted. I made lots of
new friends at school and in a co-ed Jewish youth group my relatives
introduced me to.
Buenos Aires is a beautiful and vibrant city. To this day, along with
London, it is one of my two favorite cities in the world. Perhaps that is
because I have very fond memories of my time there—my “wonder
years” so to speak. The activities of the youth group (el grupo) became
the center of my new life. Again, to this day, I continue some of the
friendships I formed in those years, periodically visiting Buenos Aires
and catching up with friends and their growing families, as well as my
relatives. On weekends, we would go by bus to a club outside the city
in a town called Banfield. It was something like a country club, with a
large swimming pool, tennis courts, soccer, basketball, and volleyball
and a somewhat dilapidated clubhouse with a restaurant. Soccer and
volleyball replaced touch football and softball. During the week, we
would meet at a facility in the city and go out to eat and to movies and
other events—all as a group. We also went on camping trips to various
parts of Argentina, including beautiful locations such as Bariloche in
the southern Andes. In 1971, my final year there, my steady girlfriend
was a member of the group, as were my two best friends and their
steady girlfriends who they went on to marry.
I also travelled to various places in Argentina with my parents: Cordoba,
Mendoza, and the beaches south of Buenos Aires that are in every way
as nice as the New Jersey beaches, such as Mar del Plata, Miramar, and
Villa Gesell. I became a fan of the futbol (to Americans, soccer) team Boca
Juniors and would go to games in La Bombonera stadium.
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Throughout my years in Argentina, the country experienced chronic
and severe hyperinflation and constant devaluations of the currency.
Although painful to observe, it gave me an early understanding of, and
grounding in, a number of economic and financial concepts that would
serve me well in my career.
In short, after several years there, I began to feel like an Argentinian, a
porteño as the inhabitants of Buenos Aires call themselves. But time was
moving on, and another round of change was in store for me.

Rule Britannia
In school in Argentina, my studies were based on the British system,
and I took what are called the “O” (ordinary) and “A” (advanced) level
examinations that are required to get into British universities. So it was
that in August 1971, I left Argentina and went to England to attend the
University of Manchester. I had dabbled with the idea of staying in
Argentina and going to university there, but despite my fondness for
Buenos Aires, my Argentinian friends, and my girlfriend, after some
soul searching, I realized my future did not lie in Argentina. I had also
considered returning to the United States for college and had taken the
SATs, but perhaps largely due to encouragement from my father who
believed a British education and European experience would be good
for my future (not to mention that it would be a lot cheaper than a U.S.
college education—a major plus from my father’s point of view), I
decided to give England a go. I chose Manchester for a few reasons.
First, I was interested in “reading” (studying) economics. My
understanding was that, at that time, the top three English universities
in economics were Cambridge, the London School of Economics, and
the University of Manchester. Getting into Cambridge would have
required another round of examinations and a delay of one year in
starting university. I chose Manchester because of its history as the
cradle of the Industrial Revolution, its reputation for free thinking, and
because my mother had some relatives there.
My father had retired, so my parents accompanied their only child to
Manchester. We settled into a two-bedroom apartment on the second
floor of a house in the Didsbury section of Manchester. I began classes
at the university in September 1971. One of my classmates was a fellow
named Stephen Moss, who would become and remain one of my best
friends in life. Like me, he lived with his parents in an apartment on
the same street in Didsbury. He had lived in Manchester for many
years and, unlike me, he had a car. So, with his help and that of my
relatives, I soon got into the Manchester scene.
Then, in March of 1972, I met the most important person in my life,
Louise, who later became my wife. We met at a youth group whose
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stated purpose was to do voluntary charitable services, but like el grupo
in Buenos Aires, it had a major social aspect to it as well. Stephen Moss
also met his first wife, Leah, Louise’s best friend, that night. By June, I
was going steady with Louise, and Stephen was going steady with Leah.
The four of us became inseparable. I was the best man at Stephen’s wedding to Leah, and he was the best man at Louise’s and mine. We all
remain close friends to this day, despite Stephen and Leah’s breakup in
1990. I was in England until April 1978 when Louise and I moved to
Miami as newlyweds. But again, I’m getting ahead of myself.
I had fun during my three years in university but I also received a solid
education. I did well academically, achieving the prize for top student
each year. In my second year, I took some classes in accounting and
found that I liked the subject and was good at it. My economics courses
gave me a solid grounding in both macro- and microeconomics and
finance, and I saw accounting as a real-world process of capturing the
financial and economic activities of enterprises. In my third year at
university, three influences shaped my decision to take more accounting
courses: the onset of the recession of 1973–74, better job prospects in
accounting than in economics, and encouragement from key faculty
members, such as Bryan Carsberg, John Arnold, and Tony Hope.
In addition to my academic pursuits, I travelled around England and
Europe, both with Stephen and as a member of the University of
Manchester volleyball team—we won the U.K. equivalent of the NCAA
championship in 1972–73. We went to “football” (soccer) games:
Stephen and Leah were “supporters” (fans) of Manchester City, but
Louise was a Manchester United fan. We went to rock concerts and
spent many evenings, if not most, in pubs, some of them local and
some more far afield in the Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Derbyshire
countryside.

The Early Accountant
I graduated from the University of Manchester in June 1974 and joined
the Manchester office of Price Waterhouse (PW) soon after. The British
system is one in which you join as an articled clerk, similar to an
apprenticeship. I spent the first 3 years on a variety of audit engagements. Some were large (Shell Oil, Courtaulds, Ingersoll-Rand, and
Carborundum) and some much smaller (William Birtwistle Damasks
Ltd. and Edgar Pickering Looms Ltd—in those days, Manchester and
the surrounding area were the textile capital of England). I was also
learning how to prepare company tax returns. Though I was paid very
little—my salary the first year was £800, or under $1,500—the firm sent
me for 8 weeks a year to full-time training courses in preparation for
the chartered accountant (CA) examinations. Those exams are, in my
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opinion, much harder and deeper than the U.S. CPA exams. I believe
the early training I received at PW Manchester made me a solid
accountant and sound professional, notwithstanding the frequent liquid
lunches at work.
Looking back on my time with PW in England, some aspects of it now
seem rather quaint and almost Dickensian. As an articled clerk, one
enters into an employment and training contract under a partner. My
partner was a fellow named Charles Godwin, who one year or so after
I joined PW became head of the Manchester office. In addressing or
referring to a partner, we used their initials, not their first or second
names. So, Charles Godwin was CRG, not Charles or Mr. Godwin. All
of the audit managers were male and we generally addressed and
referred to them as Mr. _______. The partners were all on one floor,
with managers and staff on other floors. Two of the more senior career
managers in the Manchester office were Mr. Beech and Mr. Halsall. I
seem to recall that Mr. Beech’s first name was Alan, and Mr. Halsall’s
was Tom, but I could be wrong because we rarely referred to them by
their first names. They were very experienced, salt of the earth
individuals who seemed to have great pride in the profession.
Back in those days, most of the accounting records were kept manually
in large bound books. In some cases, companies had mechanical ledger
card systems, and in a few larger companies and financial institutions,
there were the beginnings of computerized systems. We would leave
tick marks on certain company records as evidence they had been
officially audited or inspected. Our audit working papers were written
in ink, and if you made a mistake, you were not supposed to cross it
out or white it out; instead, you had to rewrite the entire page.
I can still remember quite vividly some of the more colorful experiences
and characters I met while working as a young accountant in England.
I could recount many, but I will spare you by telling about only one of
them. One year, on December 31, I was assigned to observe the
year-end stock taking (inventory count) at a distribution depot of a
company that made ceramic pipes. The depot was in southern Scotland,
just across the English border. I “motored up” the M6 motorway,
arriving at the depot in the middle of the afternoon in what was
becoming something of a raging blizzard. Upon arriving, I was greeted
by the manager of the depot who informed me that because many of
the ceramic pipes were stored outside in the depot yard and due to the
impending snowstorm, they had done the stock take that morning.
After finishing the stock take, the rest of the depot staff had gone to the
local pub to get an early jump on New Year’s Eve celebrations. This
presented an obvious problem for this erstwhile junior auditor.
Undaunted, I explained to the depot manager that I really needed to
get some audit assurance on the accuracy of the stock take, so I told
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him that I would need do a sample of test counts, recounting particular
items of inventory myself and comparing my count with that noted on
the count sheets done by the depot staff. Somewhat grudgingly, the
depot manager, a rather crusty Scotsman, acceded to my request. So I
proceeded to do my test counts, finding that the depot staff had in
almost every instance properly tallied up the number of items. After
approximately one hour, the depot manager, quite impatient with all
this, asked me in a sharp tone of voice, “Had enough yet, lad?”
I politely told him, “Almost done, sir,” and pointing to a large pile of
s-bend pipes that were stacked up in the yard, I said I would make that
pile my final count. Just one minor problem: the pile was covered in
snow, and many of the pipes were partially frozen together. So I asked
that we brush off the snow and try to lay out the individual pipes to
facilitate my count. We began doing that. Inevitably, as we tried to
separate pipes, some of them cracked. The depot manager was not
amused, expressing his anger in words I shall not repeat here. In the
end, I counted 220 s-bends in the pile, a total that exactly matched that
in the stock take sheets. I did, however, note in my working papers that
approximately 50 of the pipes appeared damaged and should be evaluated for write-off. An early lesson in the law of unintended
consequences!
In 1977, I passed the final parts of the exams and became a CA. I had
steadily risen through the staff ranks and was now an assistant
manager. I also spent some time working in London, principally as a
part-time computer auditor in what were the very early days of
computer auditing.
Soon after I passed the exams, Louise and I vacationed in Fuengirola,
Spain. It was there I asked her to marry me, and she said “Yes.” At that
time, I was making the princely sum of £4,500 per year. Louise was
earning a bit less working at a freight forwarding firm. Taxes took
much of what we earned. I was keenly aware that in the United States,
accountants at my level of experience were making multiples of what I
was earning. So, after discussion with Louise, we agreed we would
move to the United States—the land of opportunity—once we were
married. For Louise, it could not have been an easy decision to leave
her homeland, family, and lifelong friends. I am forever in her debt.
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Hello Miami, Goodbye Miami (and
PW), and Hello Boston (and Coopers
& Lybrand)
We were married on April 2, 1978, in Manchester and left England a
few days later for Miami. I had asked PW for a transfer to the United
States, stating New York or an office in the Northeast as my preference.
PW offered me Miami because it needed bilingual people there, and I
spoke Spanish. The Miami office of PW was a relatively small one. Its
largest clients were Eastern Airlines and Dade County. I worked on the
audits of Dade County, Eastern Airlines Credit Union, and some
smaller clients. We rented a small but nice apartment in North Miami,
and Louise went to work for a small freight forwarding firm.
We were to be in Miami less than 9 months. I was a qualified English
CA, but the Florida professional licensing laws were such that not only
would I have to take the CPA exam, but I would have do over much of
my university education because it was not accredited in Florida. The
prospect of spending 5–7 years in night school did not appeal to me, so
I asked the folks at PW Miami for a transfer to another office in a state
that recognized a British college education, so I could take the CPA
exam without the need to take additional classes. When the local
leadership of the Miami office refused to facilitate such a transfer, I
wrote 7 letters, one to each of the other Big Eight accounting firms.
Within a few weeks of writing those letters, I had agreed to join the
Boston office of Coopers & Lybrand (C&L) as an audit supervisor. I
recall the disbelief and disdain of the personnel partner of PW Miami
when I told him I was leaving to join C&L, a firm he clearly regarded
as inferior to PW. Little did we both know that 20 years later, the 2
firms would merge and that I would be higher in the ranks of the
merged firm than he.
In fact, the Boston office of C&L was a powerhouse. It was almost as
large as the New York office and had a dominant position in most segments of the marketplace. There was a clear “work hard, play hard”
ethos and an overriding sense of pride in being there. Louise and I
moved into a townhouse in a development in Norwood, a suburb of
Boston.
Despite my U.K. training and work at PW, C&L welcomed me, and I
got some very good assignments and experience, including the audits
of Stone and Webster, Hills Department Stores, and several “Route 128”
technology firms. In November 1979, I took the CPA exam. I not only
passed all parts, but I got the Gold Medal for the highest score in Massachusetts and the Elijah Watts Sells award nationally from the AICPA.
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Unsolicited job offers began pouring in. One intrigued me: an offer to
join the FASB, the U.S. accounting standards setter.
I went down to Stamford, CT, spent a day interviewing, and the FASB
offered me a job as an assistant project manager. I was about to take the
job, but when I informed the powers that be at C&L Boston, they
quickly responded. In particular, two senior partners, Don Moran and
Vin O’Reilly, seemed to recognize my potential and took me under their
wings, counseled me, and persuaded me that if technical accounting
work was my primary interest, a better option would be for me to join
the C&L national office in New York City. They would promote me to
manager and I would have a larger salary than I would at FASB. It
would also allow me to move back to New Jersey, which was an
important consideration because Louise was pregnant with our first
child and my parents were living in Hackensack.

Return of the Prodigal Son
We bought a lovely three-bedroom colonial in Maplewood, my
hometown, and we moved there in October 1980. I worked in the
national office in the Exxon building on Avenue of the Americas in
midtown Manhattan. Like my father before me, I became a commuter
into New York City. The work was great. I was involved in following
projects at the FASB, often observing their public meetings and writing
up minutes that were then distributed to the practice. I was involved in
writing comment letters to the FASB and SEC and I wrote alerts,
practice guidance, and firm publications on accounting developments.
The partners in the national office were some of the finest professionals
I have worked with—Jim Quinn, Ron Murray, Fred Spindel, George
Fritz, Bob Mooney, and Rick Steinberg to name a few, all leaders in the
profession. I was soon able to gain a reputation within the firm as an
expert in some subjects, most notably in accounting for foreign currency
transactions and financial instruments. In 1981, I also took on some
audit assignments in the New York office, including the audit of Dun &
Bradstreet (D&B).
Our son, Michael, was born in February 1981. We would frequently
visit my parents and periodically travel back to Manchester to visit
family and friends, and our English friends and Louise’s family would
visit us in Maplewood. Life was good, but then, in January 1982, my
father suddenly died of a heart attack. It was a blow to me but more so
to my mom. After my father’s passing, we spent most Sundays with
my mom.
In early 1983, I moved full time into the New York practice office of
C&L and expanded my range of clients as an audit manager. I also
began to have other assignments. Perhaps the most notable of these
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was doing “preacquisition reviews”—due diligence reviews of a
company that a client was looking to acquire—with clients such as
Citicorp Venture Capital, the private equity arm of Citicorp. The partner
on these engagements was Louis (Lou) Moscarello. Lou was a legend in
the firm, and deservedly so. He had been the audit partner on a
number of the firm’s largest clients, had written books on accounting,
and had broadened the range of practice activities and clients. The most
memorable thing about Lou was his personality, that included a huge
capacity for work, his demanding but fair treatment of all who worked
for him, and his witty and penetrating one-liners. To this day, many of
us who had the opportunity and good fortune to work with Lou will
recount the adventures and one-liners. As an example of his quips, one
day when I was balding fast and furious, I was in the men’s room
combing what was left of my hair when I heard Lou’s voice from
behind me proclaiming, “Robert, you’re combing a memory!”
Working for Lou was a rite of passage into the partnership for a
number of us at C&L. Some passed, and some failed. I guess I passed
because in 1985 and with the support of Lou and a number of other
senior partners in the New York office, including Art Simon, Tom
Fitzpatrick, Harvey Bazaar, Ken Marshall, and Sy Jones, I made partner.
An even more important event that year was our daughter’s birth.
Nicole was born in September 1985 and by then we had moved to a
larger house in South Orange.

The Roaring ’80s and Bad Bob
At the ripe old age of 32, I was now a partner in one of the major
accounting firms. My portfolio of clients and assignments included
being an audit partner on a number of major engagements—AT&T
Information Systems, D&B, Shearson Lehman Brothers (Shearson), and
several other clients. On each of the big jobs, I was one of the partners.
We had very large teams, which made for a great esprit de corps.
Though most of us have since left the firm, I continue to see many of
my colleagues from those days: Barry Winograd and Denis Salamone
from the Shearson team; Ray Pitek, Frank Tanki, Nelson Dittmar, Dick
Stolz, Jerry Kelley, and Linda Ianieri from the AT&T team; and Howard
Weiser and Linda Bergen from the D&B engagement.
In addition to auditing, we were involved in helping sell and, in some
cases conduct, a growing range of other services, including management consulting projects, preacquisition reviews, and other attestrelated services. In particular, Barry, Denis, and I were able to extend
the range and size of nonaudit projects for Shearson during the late
1980s, to the point that Shearson became one of the largest C&L clients
in terms of overall billings. This was quite an accomplishment given
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that Shearson was a subsidiary of American Express, an Arthur Young
audit client. We had some very interesting audit experiences (for
example, in the wake of the stock market crash on October 19, 1987,
and the sharp losses suffered by some of our Wall Street audit clients).
I was also put in charge of a small but growing practice—Corporate
Finance Advisory Services. This was a band of partners and staff with
particular technical expertise that provided accounting and tax advice
on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate finance transactions
and new financial products. In effect, we provided help in structuring
transactions and financial products to maximize accounting and tax
opportunities. Initially, most of our clients were from the Wall Street
houses: investment bankers and corporate finance people working on
deals and financial products. C&L was the leading accounting firm on
Wall Street in those days, with clients such as Goldman Sachs,
Shearson, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Dillon Read, Brown Brothers Harriman, L.F. Rothschild, and many other securities firms and investment
banks. We had an on-call service through which the “deal people” at
these firms could directly access our partners and staff. Eventually, the
practice grew to include a number of major corporate clients who
wanted help in evaluating the accounting and tax aspects of M&A and
corporate finance transactions Wall Street firms were pitching.
The Corporate Finance Advisory Services work was interesting but also
demanding. We often worked on major transactions with high-powered
investment bankers and their teams. Successfully serving their needs
required people who were smart, creative, and knowledgeable in
corporate finance and M&A and in the technical accounting and tax
rules. We needed people like Warren Wintrub and David Goodrich,
who were veterans of this activity, and younger, rising stars in the firm,
including Woody Wallace and John Bishop on the accounting side and
Phil Clements, Jules Reich, and Ed Abahoonie from the tax practice. It
was a gilded age of the leveraged buyout, junk bonds, and financial
engineering. Clients expected immediate answers, around the clock
accessibility to us, and a can-do attitude on our part. I could recount
many experiences, but the following one epitomizes the environment in
which we operated.
One evening, I received a phone call from a well-known financial
product developer at a major Wall Street firm. Over five minutes, he
outlined a new corporate financing technique that he and his team had
begun developing. He ebulliently enumerated the potential advantages
of this technique to companies in terms of cost of capital and tax
advantages and told me why this could be a major homerun for his
firm (and him personally). He was calling me to verify the treatment
for accounting and financial reporting that his team had come up with.
When I told him that a particular aspect of the accounting treatment
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would not be as favorable as his team had described, he erupted,
saying, “What? You have just managed to potentially kill one of the
most revolutionary advances in corporate finance in decades! I am
going to call you back in an hour and you better have a solution to the
problem you just created!”
I quickly checked and double- and triple-checked the relevant
accounting rules and called one of our national office partners at home
to make sure I was on the right track. Approximately five minutes
before the hour had elapsed, my phone rang. It was the investment
banker’s executive assistant calling to remind me that her boss would
be calling in five minutes and that he was expecting to hear good news.
Sure enough, on the strike of the hour, he called and said, “Well, have
you found a way around the accounting issue?” I told him no. I
apologized and said the rule was the rule. He asked, “Are you
absolutely certain?” I told him “Yes.” He replied “OK, I just wanted to
make sure you were certain. Thanks.” I went home that night several
pounds lighter knowing I had given our client the best possible advice.
In the rather sparse free time between my audit assignments and the
Corporate Finance Advisory Services work, I also managed to author
and coauthor several monographs and articles on M&A and corporate
finance topics, explaining the ins and outs of the latest techniques and
products. As the securitization market grew, I also became involved
with, and eventually in charge of, our services to the major commercial
and investment banks in that arena.
It was heady stuff. I did it from the mid-1980s through 1993, a period
of great innovation and expansion on Wall Street. The practice grew
substantially, and we were involved in advising on numerous major
transactions and new financial instruments and financing techniques. I
became known as “Bad Bob” internally and by some of our clients for
my structuring expertise, a moniker that later would sometimes be
resurrected in my standard-setting role when, in considering potential
accounting alternatives, I would raise the possibility for abuse through
structuring.
Moreover, my experiences in transaction structuring taught me that the
areas that were most ripe for designing transactions and arrangements
to achieve desired accounting outcomes were those where the
accounting rules departed from basic principles of economics and
finance and areas where, because of the detailed requirements and
many exceptions and bright lines present in the accounting rules, minor
changes in the form of a transaction or arrangement could produce a
large change in the resulting accounting treatment. Some of these
transactions were
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• arrangements designed to boost reported earnings by triggering
gain recognition on appreciated assets carried on a historical cost
basis while retaining the underlying risks and rewards of those
assets;
• financing techniques involving the issuance of debt-like securities
that were treated as equity under the accounting rules;

• financings involving equity securities and hybrid securities that
were accorded favorable treatment in computing earnings and
earnings per share;

• transactions designed to obtain off-balance sheet treatment, for
example under lease accounting and the rules applying to special
purpose entities;

• techniques designed to minimize the dilutive effects of M&A
transactions through the use of pooling of interests accounting
and other structures that qualified under the accounting rules as
common control mergers, joint ventures, and partial combinations; and
• transactions that arbitraged the lack of discounting of future cash
flows in accounting for insurance loss reserves and deferred tax
assets and liabilities.
Indeed, together with colleagues at C&L, I coauthored various articles
and monographs explaining the ins and outs of a number of these
transaction structuring techniques.1
In short, during my years in transactions structuring, I learned that
there were many ways to use the accounting rules to design and
employ techniques to achieve desired accounting and financial
reporting outcomes. In many cases, these techniques did not require
significantly altering the underlying substance of the transactions and
arrangements. But they did significantly change the resulting
accounting in ways that might not be readily apparent to the readers of
a company’s financial statements. The corollary of this is that if one
views such transaction structuring as an activity that runs counter to
sound and transparent reporting to investors and the capital markets,
then curbing such activity would require changes in accounting
standards to bring them closer to economic and finance concepts, the
elimination of exceptions and bright lines, and greater disclosure
requirements around structured transactions. These lessons were to
later affect my thinking as an accounting standard setter.
1

For example, see Robert H. Herz and Edward J. Abahoonie, “Alphabet Stocks and CPUs:
Innovative but Complex,” Mergers & Acquisitions, November/December 1986, pp. 24–29; Robert
H. Herz and Edward J. Abahoonie, “Innovations to Minimize Acquisition Goodwill,” Mergers &
Acquisitions, March/April 1990, pp. 35–40; and Robert H. Herz and Raymond L. Dever, John M.
Bishop, and P.G. Mikael Winkvist, Accounting for Joint Ventures and Partial Business Combinations,
Coopers & Lybrand LLP, 1995.
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Poacher Turned Gamekeeper
By 1993, I had quickly risen within the ranks of the C&L partnership. In
addition to the Corporate Finance Advisory Services, I continued to be
an audit partner on numerous accounts and had led or been involved
in many other assignments. A few years prior, the New York-based
accounting firm of Oppenheim Appel & Dixon (OAD) had collapsed.
OAD had a large client base in the hedge fund industry. Herman
Schneider, a senior C&L tax partner and recognized expert in the tax
rules and regulations relating to securities transactions, and I aggressively marketed C&L to the former OAD hedge fund clients, and we
were successful in acquiring many of them for the firm. I became the
audit partner on several of these accounts.
My Spanish came in handy from time to time. For example, I traveled a
number of times to Mexico City in the early 1990s in connection with
the privatization and initial public offering of Telmex, the state-owned
Mexican telecommunications company. We had a large team working
on this major project that included people from C&L Mexico; Bill
Decker, who headed the rapidly growing practice in C&L that worked
on cross-border offerings; a number of other U.S. partners and
managers with technical accounting and SEC expertise, including Jack
Parsons, Steve Derrick, John Glynn, and myself; and Steve Heindel, a
partner in on our benefits consulting practice, to help deal with the
pension accounting and actuarial issues relating to the offering.
Around 1990, I participated in a U.S. business delegation to Argentina.
Louise accompanied me on this trip. Our visit to Buenos Aires included
an official state dinner, hosted by Argentine President Carlos Menem. At
the start of the event, there was a long reception line to meet the
President. Upon reaching the front of the reception line and being
greeted by Menem in English, I responded in Spanish (Castellano).
Menem, perhaps somewhat surprised, exclaimed “Oh, you speak Castellano!” Continuing our conversation in Castellano, I explained that I had
spent my teenage years in Argentina. The president then turned to
Louise (who, with long brown hair and dark eyes, could probably be
mistaken for an Argentinian girl) and started chatting with her in Castellano. I quickly interjected, telling the President that Louise was from
England and did not speak Spanish. The President chuckled and said in
Castellano, “Oh, English. Notwithstanding our recent differences (probably referring to the Falklands War of 1982), I actually love the English.
They invented so many wonderful sports and are not particularly good
at any of them!” Louise nudged me and whispered “what did he say?”
Not wishing to cause an international incident, I whispered back “he says
he loves the English.” Later that night back in our hotel I informed
Louise of President Menem’s full quip about the English.
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In the early 1990s I was elected to the governing body of C&L, which
was called Firm Council. Comprising approximately 10 percent of the
total number of partners, it was sort of a group of tribal elders. At the
time of my election to Firm Council, I was the youngest member.
What’s more, once elected, I would remain a member for the rest of my
career at the firm. Within a few years, however, the partners voted to
reform firm governance, and the self-perpetuating Firm Council was
dissolved, and elections were held for a new, smaller U.S. Board of
Partners. I was elected to that first Board of Partners and subsequently
reelected again after the merger between C&L and PW. Ultimately, I
also served on the Global Board of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
I had also been serving as a member the Investment Committee of the
C&L Partner Investment Funds. In essence, these were a series of
annual closed-end investment pools for the benefit of the active and
retired partners of C&L. Each year, beginning in the mid-1980s, we
raised money from our partners, partly on a mandatory basis and
partly through additional voluntary contributions by partners, and
invested the funds in a variety of venture capital, private equity,
operating real estate, and oil and gas investments. I served as a member
of the investment committee for more than a decade until we stopped
taking in new money after the merger with PW. It was a labor of love
for those of us on the committee, which included Herman Schneider
and several other senior partners of the firm, such as Nick Moore who
went on to be the CEO of C&L and the first Global Chairman of PwC.
Overall, the funds did pretty well, with our fair share of winners, but
also some big losers, particularly among the real estate investments.
This is all background leading up to my appointment as the senior
technical partner of the firm. In late 1993, Gene Freedman, then CEO of
C&L, asked me to transition into the role of technical partner. In the
world of the major accounting firms, the CEOs were “the gorillas,” and
the senior technical partners were “the chimpanzees” or “the chimps.”
Ron Murray, then senior technical partner, was nearing the mandatory
retirement age. I had worked with Ron while I was in the national
office in the early 1980s and afterwards in addressing technical issues
on my audit clients and in connection with our Corporate Finance
Advisory Services work. He had been something of a mentor, and I
greatly respected his technical capabilities. I had also worked very
closely over the years with several of the national office partners, such
as Ray Dever and Steve Lis, whom I counted as some of my closest
friends in the firm.
Becoming the senior technical partner was a great honor and a great
responsibility. It involved heading up the firm’s functions relating to
accounting and SEC matters. This included working with the FASB, the
SEC, and other standards setters and regulators; developing and issuing
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firm policy and practice guidance on these matters; working on a daily
basis with our practice partners to address and resolve often difficult
accounting, auditing, and SEC issues for their clients; and visiting many
clients to discuss financial reporting issues and developments. In effect,
I was going from being a bit of a “poacher” in terms of the work
advising investment bankers and corporate clients on accounting
structuring to being the head “gamekeeper.”
Before leaving the New York practice, I needed to find a successor to
lead the Corporate Finance Advisory Services. I was able to entice Ray
Beier, a partner at Deloitte & Touche, who headed up the practice in
this area, to join C&L. It was a good move, and to this day, Ray and I
remain very good friends. Ray continued to build the practice, eventually transforming it into more of a client and practice support activity
on major M&A and financial transactions. Later, while I was at the
FASB, he would assume a senior role for thought leadership on
accounting and financial reporting in the national office of PwC.
Although Gene Freedman had been the person to ask me to take on the
national office role, other senior partners, including Tom Fitzpatrick, who
I worked for and with on a number of nonaudit assignments, and
Harvey Bazaar, the managing partner of the New York office, were also
very supportive of my undertaking the national office role. Perhaps the
most important person in my coming to the national office was Pat
McDonnell. He had recently been appointed to head the business assurance (BA) line of service. Starting around 1993, the firm went through a
major reorganization of its operations. Until then, the U.S. firm had been
largely organized on a geographical basis, in terms of regions with
regional managing partners and offices with office managing partners
who reported to the regional managing partners. These territorial barons
were responsible for all services delivered to clients in their geography.
For decades, audit had been the dominant service, followed by tax
services. However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, C&L and the other
major accounting firms rapidly grew other service lines, most notably
management consulting but also various advisory services. Responding
to this change, the firm’s operations and management structure were
reorganized into distinct lines of service: BA, tax, management consulting
services (MCS), and financial advisory services (FAS).
When I rejoined the national office in early 1994, my good friend Barry
Winograd was also there. He had been recruited from the practice to
head the auditing side of the effort, with a particular focus on
revamping the firm’s audit methodologies and supporting systems,
processes, and tools. Pat also had a right-hand man: Rich Baird.
Together, the four of us (Pat, Rich, Barry, and me) spearheaded a major
transformation in the firm’s audit and assurance practice, increasing
both the size and overall quality, efficiency, and profitability of the BA
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line of business. Pat had been a Marine and was a master at executing
major campaigns and motivating the troops. The BA leadership team
implemented the transformation of the BA business across the country.
In addition to the four of us, the team included the geography heads of
the BA line of service and the leaders of various nonaudit assurance
services. Denis Salamone, Barry’s and my compatriot from the Shearson
days, was on the leadership team as the head of BA for the New York
Metro area.
For our part in the accounting and SEC area, we significantly revamped
a number of our national office processes; instituted enhanced outreach
and communication programs to the practice, clients, and the academic
community; and established a number of Centers of Excellence around
the country to provide more hands-on assistance to the practice in
addressing technical issues. Although many of the ideas behind these
changes may have been mine, most of the credit for transforming them
into reality rests with my fellow partners in the national office,
including Ray Dever, Steve Lis, Randy Vitray, Ken Dakkduk, Nelson
Dittmar, Mike Johns, John Gribble, Brett Cohen, and, very importantly,
Jim Harrington, who served as my right-hand man on a lot of these
initiatives. A number of partners around the country who led regional
Centers of Excellence in accounting and SEC matters were also heavily
involved with these projects. As well, our work involved frequent
interaction with many other parts of the firm, including senior management and the Office of the General Counsel led by David McLean,
Michael Garrett, and Walter Ricciardi.
On the family front, we made periodic visits to Manchester and took
many other vacations in the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean.
In 1994, we toured Israel with Louise’s parents, my mom, and her first
cousin from Argentina, ending in Jerusalem for Michael’s Bar Mitzvah
at the Western Wall. I am glad my mom and Louise’s parents were able
to be with us because in 1995 my mother fell ill and went through a
three-year, gut wrenching process of dying, Louise’s mother died in
1998, and Louise’s father died in 2002.

Professional Affairs
Part of being the senior technical partner of one of the major accounting
firms is getting involved with all sorts of professional committees and
activities. I relished these opportunities. For a number of years, I had
already been a member of the FASB’s Financial Instruments Task Force
that periodically met with the board and FASB staff to provide input
and advice on the FASB’s many projects dealing with various aspects of
accounting for, and disclosures relating to, financial instruments. In
1996, I also became a member of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF),
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the body that addresses a variety of emerging and often contentious
accounting and reporting issues. Members of that body included
leading technical accountants from the major accounting firms and from
industry. Some of those I served with during my years on the EITF
were John Stewart of Arthur Andersen, Ed Trott of KPMG (later to be
one of my fellow FASB board members), Norman Strauss of Ernst
&Young, Bill Mooney and John Dirks of PW (soon to become my fellow
partners at PwC), Phil Ameen of General Electric, David Sidwell of J.P.
Morgan (who I later worked with on the 2007–08 SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting and, since June 2011, on
the board of directors of Fannie Mae), John Smith of Deloitte & Touche
(who later became a member of the IASB), Susan Bies of the First Tennessee National Corporation (who later served as a member of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve), Ed Nussbaum of Grant
Thornton, Lee Graul of BDO Seidman, Ray Krause of McGladrey &
Pullen, and Ernest Baugh of Joseph Decosimo. Also participating as
official “observers” were the chairmen of the AICPA’s Accounting
Standards Executive Committee (now known as the Financial Reporting
Executive Committee), who during my term on the EITF were Mike
Crooch of Arthur Andersen (who was later my fellow FASB Board
member) and Dave Kaplan of PW (soon to be my fellow partner at
PwC), and the Chief Accountant of the SEC, who during my term on
the EITF were Michael Sutton and Lynn Turner (who had been my
partner at C&L and who I have known since we were both managers in
the national office of C&L in the early 1980s).
I also became the Chairman of the SEC Regulations Committee of the
AICPA that periodically meets with the SEC staff to discuss current SEC
reporting issues, provides guidance to the profession on these matters,
and holds the largest annual financial reporting conference in the
United States; a member of the executive committee of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA; and a member of the (governing) Council of the
AICPA. I was also a member of the International Capital Markets
Advisory Committee of the New York Stock Exchange. In addition, I
became a member of the National Steering Committee, a group
comprising the technical heads (“the chimps”) and leaders of the
governmental affairs functions of each of the major firms, that provided
policy advice to the CEOs of the major accounting firms (“the gorillas”)
on major issues and developments affecting the profession.
In the years leading up to the year 2000 (Y2K), there were significant
concerns about the potential for widespread computer systems malfunctions on January 1, 2000. Leaders of the accounting profession were
concerned that companies were not taking the steps necessary to ensure
continuity of their computer systems and that auditors would be
blamed for not having warned the investing public of the potential for
widespread problems or of the very significant costs companies were
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incurring or would need to incur to address the potential problem. So,
we reasoned that additional disclosures by companies might both alert
investors and the capital markets to these issues and pressure
companies to undertake the actions necessary to avoid a shutdown of
their systems.
At the urging of the National Steering Committee, at the start of the
Annual AICPA Conference on Current SEC Developments in December
1997, I used my position as Chairman of the AICPA SEC Regulations
Committee to briefly speak about the issue and to urge the SEC to
require enhanced disclosures by companies on their preparedness and
planned actions relating to Y2K. With the help of former SEC General
Counsel James Doty (who at that time was with the law firm of Baker
Botts and is now Chairman of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board), we drafted potential language for an SEC release,
held discussions with senior SEC staff members, and I, together with
AICPA Chairman Stuart Kessler, sent a letter to SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, Jr., and SEC Commissioner Isaac Hunt, Jr., on the need for
enhanced disclosure requirements. The SEC quickly responded by
issuing Staff Legal Bulletin No. 5 in January 1998 requiring additional
Y2K disclosures by issuers. Readers will remember that the predicted
Y2K computer problems never occurred in any great measure.
Although I would like to think our effort to spur better disclosures and
attendant actions by companies to avoid the potential problem had
something to do with Y2K turning out to be a nonevent, I don’t think
that would be an honest assessment of what transpired.
At C&L, I was working internally on additional matters. My U.K.
counterpart, Roger Davis, and I coheaded an international committee that
established the firm’s global positions on major professional matters. One
of the members of that group was Bob Muter from Canada, who I would
also work with on the Accounting Standards Oversight Council of
Canada starting in 2011. As well, I became president of the C&L (and
later the PwC) Foundation that supported university education in terms
of funding curriculum development, academic research, endowed chairs,
and bricks and mortar. In addition, I served on the American Accounting
Association’s Financial Reporting Standards Committee.
All this put me in regular contact not only with leaders of the major
accounting firms but with policymakers and thought leaders, including
those in Washington, D.C. I began to have a sense of storm clouds on
the horizon threatening the profession and major accounting firms.
Much has been written about the years leading up to the reporting
scandals in 2001–02 and the demise of Arthur Andersen and about how
the profession and, in particular, the major accounting firms lost their
way in terms of serving the public. For me, that could be the subject of
another book based on my experiences from the mid-1990s through
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early 2002. Suffice it to say that, in my role as the senior technical
partner of C&L and then of PwC, I never felt pressured to do the
wrong thing and we regularly took tough stands on client accounting
and reporting matters. Pat McDonnell and then Dennis Nally, who I
reported to at PwC, always supported the national office decisions, so I
did not worry about the partners who called us for assistance on issues.
Rather, what I worried about were those who didn’t call, either because
they didn’t spot a big issue or because they were afraid they might
anger an important client. In that regard, I believe the system for
evaluating and compensating audit partners may have sent some mixed
messages. On the one hand, partners were told that doing a good audit
was job number one, but on the other hand, they were measured and
rewarded based in part on their success in growing firm services at
their audit clients and on the results of client satisfaction surveys.
I also think it was clear during those years of booming stock markets
(what Alan Greenspan famously termed irrational exuberance) that the
Wall Street “earnings game” had an effect on corporate behavior.
Feeling constant pressure to meet or just beat Wall Street’s quarterly
earnings estimates for their company, some corporate managers would
try to find ways, either through altering the timing of transactions or
through accounting maneuvers, to get to the desired level of quarterly
earnings. We experienced some of this in the national office around
quarter-ends, with audit partners calling in with quarter-end reporting
issues on clients looking to boost reported earnings and earnings per
share to the meet consensus forecasts (what I termed “dialing for pennies per share”).
So it was that during this period of a booming economy and capital
markets and significant growth and change in the profession and at the
major accounting firms that the merger between PW and C&L, the two
firms I had worked for during my entire career, was announced.

A Merger of Equals and “the Dream
Team”
The merger was publicly announced in mid-September 1997. Nick Moore
had called the members of the C&L board earlier that month to bring us
into the loop. Internally and externally, it was billed as a merger of
equals, and indeed, in rolling out the new organizational structure,
leadership of the merged functions came from both firms. From my
vantage point, the premerger process went remarkably smoothly, except
that I was naturally disappointed that Pat McDonnell would not continue
to lead the audit and assurance line of service. In course, it was
announced that I would be the Americas leader of what was to be called
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Professional, Technical, Risk and Quality (R&Q). I would be reporting to
two people, Dennis Nally, a U.S. PW partner who was to head the assurance line of business across the Americas, and a U.K partner, David
Morris, who would be the global head of R&Q. In a twist of fate and
good fortune, I had worked with David some 20 years earlier at PW in
Manchester, and indeed, we had some common acquaintances and had
lived on the same small street in Didsbury.
I would now have a significantly larger portfolio of responsibilities,
covering not only the United States but all of the Americas and
including audit policy and risk management of the audit and assurance
practices. In terms of the U.S. functions, I inherited what I can only
describe as a “dream team.” From C&L, I had the national office group
of Ray Dever, Jim Harrington, and others, plus Jim Gerson on audit
policy and Rick Steinberg on corporate governance. Jim was a leader in
the profession and Chairman of the Auditing Standards Board at the
time of the merger. The PW side also had leaders in their fields,
including Dave Kaplan and John Dirks; Jay Hartig, Rick Muir, and
Wayne Carnall, leading SEC practitioners; Jan Hauser, a highly
respected expert in various technical accounting areas; and Jay Brodish
who had long headed PW’s risk management function. Likewise, the
merger brought together many experienced lawyers in the Office of the
General Counsel, including Larry Keeshan and Erica Baird from the PW
side and David McLean and Walter Ricciardi from C&L. My group
worked closely with General Counsel on legal, SEC enforcement, and
litigation matters involving the audit practice.
I will always count the quick and successful integration of the PW and
C&L R&Q groups as one of the proudest accomplishments of my
career. It would not have been possible without the shared sense of
mission, professionalism, and enthusiasm among the two groups; the
leadership of certain senior partners from each group; and a lot of very
hard work. Within the first year of the merger, we had issued a
complete set of PwC policies and guidance and had effectively
integrated our national office processes. We then managed to move
everyone from our two legacy national offices to a new office in
Florham Park, NJ, without losing anyone, despite many people having
to relocate their families.
I continued on in many of my firm and professional roles. For me, the
merger was a good thing, perhaps in part because it brought together
the two firms I had worked for and enabled me to broaden my
international activities, which, based on my background, was something
I enjoyed. More importantly and with the benefit of hindsight, I think it
also made sense in terms of the developments that were about to
impact the profession and the resulting profound effects on the major
accounting firms.
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Could You See It Coming?
By 1999, it started to become clear that the major accounting firms (or,
as they called themselves, professional service firms) were entering a
challenging period in their dealings and relationship with the SEC. SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt and Chief Accountant Lynn Turner had spoken
publicly about the many accounting practices that companies were
using, with the apparent blessing of their auditors, to inappropriately
manage reported earnings. At PwC, we were in the midst of a
wrenching investigation by the SEC of apparent violations of auditor
independence rules that, in the end, did not come up with many
serious violations but led to a needed strengthening of our internal
systems (and those at other major accounting firms and across the
profession) to monitor compliance with the independence requirements,
as well as some revisions in the independence rules by the SEC. It was
becoming evident from the meetings of the newly created
Independence Standards Board that there were major, perhaps
irreconcilable, differences in view between the SEC and major
accounting firms on key issues relating to scope of services by the
firms. Sensing the changing landscape, Ernst & Young sold its management consulting arm to Cap Gemini, and at PwC, we negotiated a deal,
which fell through, to sell our MCS business to Hewlett Packard. (PwC
later sold the MCS business to IBM, albeit at a much lower price.) We
sold other businesses, including our valuation practice and parts of our
human resources consulting business. I was involved in these activities,
both as a member of the board and in addressing some of the technical
accounting issues that arose in these transactions.
All of this was a prelude to the major shocks that were coming in the
wake of the reporting scandals that began to surface in late 2001 at
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other companies. These shocks
included the federal indictment, and rapid disintegration and demise of
Arthur Andersen and the passage of the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in July 2002. My role as Chairman of the FASB would be profoundly
affected by all of this; but again, I’m getting ahead of myself. I must
recount a few more key events in my career and life that led up to my
becoming Chairman of the FASB.

International Bob
Postmerger, we had a global R&Q leadership team. In addition to
David Morris and me, there were the leaders of R&Q for the EMEA
(Europe, Middle East, and Africa) and the Asia-Oceania “theaters.”
Mary Keegan, who headed the firm’s activities relating to international
accounting and policy matters, was also a member of the global R&Q

23

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

team as was David Scott, a partner from Canada who headed the global
risk management over our audit and other assurance services. Mary,
now Dame Mary Keegan, later left PwC to chair the U.K. Accounting
Standards Board and then went on to become a senior Treasury official
in the United Kingdom. Mary and I, together with another London
PwC partner, David Phillips, joined Professor Robert Eccles of Harvard
in coauthoring the book The ValueReporting Revolution: Moving Beyond
the Earnings Game that was published in early 2001 and attracted a fair
amount of attention in accounting and public policy circles. The book
was essentially an exposé of some of the deficiencies in the corporate
reporting system, including the whole earnings game that pervaded
quarterly reporting, and a call for reforms to enhance the content,
organization, and methods of delivery of corporate financial and
nonfinancial information. Certainly, it reflected my view of financial
statements and financial reporting as products that need to be customer
focused and properly serve the marketplace, a view and passion that
has driven and continues to drive much of my thinking about
accounting and financial reporting.
All this, plus serving on the Global Board of PwC, kept me crossing
oceans frequently. To those international activities, I added other
important ones that extended beyond PwC. In 2000, I became the first
Chairman of the Transnational Auditors Committee (TAC). This committee was a joint undertaking between the International Federation of
Accountants and a newly constituted group called the Forum of Firms
(FOF) consisting of the major global accounting firms and
approximately 25 other international networks of accounting firms. The
role of TAC was and continues to be to promote the enhancement of
cross-border audits around the world through the development and
implementation of consistent policies and practices by FOF member
firms. Serving with me on TAC were senior partners from the major
accounting firms and some of the international networks. Our meetings
occurred in various parts of the world.
During 2000 and 2001, I also chaired a working group of the FASB’s
business reporting research project (BRRP). Consistent with the theme
of The ValueReporting Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings Game, the
BRRP was formed to examine and assess the growing range of financial
and nonfinancial information that companies were providing to investors and the means for delivering such information. A number of BRRP
working groups focused on particular industries and electronic delivery
of corporate information. The group I chaired examined ways to better
coordinate GAAP and SEC disclosures and potential approaches to
reorganize and streamline the information in SEC Form 10-K filings.
Our working group issued a detailed report in March 2001 with
numerous recommendations.
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Perhaps of greatest significance to my future role at the FASB was my
appointment at the beginning of 2001 to the newly established
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In August 2000, I was
with Jim Leisenring of the FASB at the annual meeting of the American
Accounting Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Jim, a good
friend, asked me to write a letter supporting his candidacy to become a
member of the new IASB and suggested that I might also want to
consider throwing my hat into the ring. My immediate reaction was
“no way” because I was happy at PwC. When Jim informed me that
there were up to 2 spots on the IASB for part-time members, I thought
about it some more and eventually, with the blessing of PwC,
submitted my name as a candidate, was interviewed by the selection
committee, and was chosen as one of the original 14 members of the
IASB. I served on the IASB as a part-time member until July 2002 when
I joined the FASB.

Unforgettable Events and a Fork in
the Road
The final confluence of a number of events and some difficult choices
on my part led to my becoming Chairman of the FASB. In the year or
so preceding my selection for that role, I, by necessity, became a master
multitasker. I still had my many day jobs at PwC, I was a part-time
member of the IASB, and I was Chairman of TAC. I very much enjoyed
TAC and being on the IASB, probably because I believed both had
important public policy missions and because of the international
nature of the work. My colleagues on both groups were interesting,
dedicated, and accomplished individuals. I still vividly recall the first
gathering of the original IASB members in February 2001 at a small
country hotel in Streatley-on-Thames outside of London. It was
essentially a get-to-know each other meeting combined with some
initial brainstorming about the potential agenda and priorities of the
new board. There was a sense of excitement among us of being at the
start of something that could potentially transform international
accounting and the global capital markets. My fellow IASB Board
members were Sir David Tweedie (Chairman), Thomas Jones (Vice
Chairman), Mary Barth, Hans-Georg Bruns, Anthony Cope, Robert
Garnett, Gilbert Gelard, James Leisenring, Warren McGregor, Patricia
O’Malley, Harry Schmid, Geoffrey Whittington, and Tatsumi Yamada.
We came from nine different countries and diverse backgrounds that
collectively represented a wealth of experience in accounting, financial
reporting, and business. More than 11 years later in August 2012, many
of us were again together at a reunion of the original IASB board
members and spouses/significant others in Bellagio on Lake Como in
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Italy. In addition to enjoying the beautiful surroundings and catching
up with one another, we reflected on the many changes in the world of
accounting and financial reporting in the intervening years, and on the
broader developments and major events that had affected virtually all
aspects of life. After that first meeting in February 2001, the IASB
started official monthly meetings in April 2001, mostly in its office in
London, but a couple times per year, we had the meetings in other
major foreign capitals.
I think most people in the world who were over the age of three
remember where they were and what they were doing on September
11, 2001. I was in London at an IASB meeting. It was early afternoon
there when Jim Leisenring, who had been called out of the boardroom
for a phone call, returned and informed us of the attacks on the World
Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington,
D.C. Our meeting stopped. I called home, and Louise told me what she
knew about the horrific events that were unfolding. Soon afterward, we
were asked to evacuate the IASB’s offices in the City of London because
there were fears of potential terrorist attacks on the financial district of
London. I remember making several phone calls that afternoon to
Louise and friends and colleagues in New York and New Jersey. I also
recall receiving e-mails that PwC staff members had been on the planes
that crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon. A group of
about 20 of us who now found ourselves stranded in London, got
together for an impromptu dinner on the evening of September 11 at
the Chancery Court Hotel. Our group included some of the IASB board
members and members of other accounting standards boards from
various countries who had been meeting with the IASB that morning
and the prior day. Ed Jenkins and Mike Crooch were there from FASB.
They had gone out to Heathrow Airport to fly back to the United States
but their flight had, of course, been cancelled. Indeed, all the flights to
the United States from London were cancelled for several days, and it
was not until September 15 that I was able to fly home. On the one
hand, I was very frustrated with not being able to return home and see
my loved ones and friends at this time of tragedy for our country. On
the other hand, I also recall the kindness and deep expressions of
sorrow and empathy for the United States and Americans from many
people in London.
Certainly, the world changed after September 11, and other events were
occurring that would also change my career and life. At PwC, both
Nick Moore and Jim Schiro retired. They had led the firm since the
merger as the global chairman and global CEO, respectively. Sam
DiPiazza, who had been the U.S. CEO, became the global CEO, and the
need arose to elect a new U.S. leader in early 2002. A number of my
fellow partners urged me to run for that job. Before throwing my hat
into the ring, however, I consulted with both Sir David Tweedie,
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Chairman of the IASB, and Paul Volcker, who chaired the trustees of
the foundation that had oversight of the IASB, to ensure that my
becoming the U.S. CEO of PwC would not, in their view, present a
problem with my continuing on the IASB in a part-time role. I received
the green light from both of them and decided to go for it.
To select the U.S. CEO, a committee of partners solicited the names of
potential candidates, vetted those candidates, and came up with one or
more names to submit to the U.S. partners for a vote. My understanding
is that the committee narrowed the field down to two candidates who
seemed to have broad support and relevant experience: Dennis Nally and
me. We were both interviewed by the committee. They asked me
whether, if elected, I would step down from the IASB so that I could
devote full-time attention to PwC. I responded that I believed I could do
both roles and that, in my view, it was important for the senior partner of
the firm to be directly involved in major activities affecting the profession
and the firm. I harkened back to the days when in the early 1970s, the
head of C&L, Phil Defliese, also chaired the AICPA and the Accounting
Principles Board, which was the accounting standard setter at that time.
Apparently, the committee did not agree because I was informed that
unless I would agree to leave the IASB, it could not go forward with
submitting my name to the vote of the partners. At the time, I did not
agree with that decision or point of view, but in retrospect, I understand
and respect it: it came right at the time Arthur Andersen was in free fall
and the profession and C&L were facing great uncertainties and challenges. So, the committee went forward with Dennis, who became the
U.S. CEO, a job that, by most accounts, he did well for many years. He is
now the global CEO of PwC.
I occasionally wonder about the road not taken and what might have
been, but I made my decision and have no regrets. As it turned out, it
enabled me to take on another role that suited my interests and experience, that of FASB Chairman.
In late 2001 then-FASB Chairman Ed Jenkins announced he would not
seek a second term. In early 2002, right around the time I was involved
in the PwC U.S. CEO process, people, including Chairman of the SEC
Harvey Pitt and SEC Chief Accountant Bob Herdman, asked me to
consider becoming a candidate to succeed Ed Jenkins. I was flattered but
informed them of the ongoing process at PwC to elect a new U.S. CEO.
When I did not go forward in that process and after consulting with both
the leadership of PwC and Sir David Tweedie and Paul Volcker, I became
a candidate for FASB Chairman. In April, the Appointments and Evaluations Committee of the Trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation
interviewed me and soon thereafter I was informed that I had been
selected as the new Chairman of the FASB, effective July 1, 2002.
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Between April and July 1, I spent some time at the FASB in Norwalk,
CT, getting up to speed. Louise and I decided not to take up permanent
residence in Connecticut. (Nicole was still in high school in New Jersey
at the time.) Instead, we bought a townhouse in Stamford,
approximately a 15-minute drive from the FASB’s office. Ed Jenkins was
terrific in helping me transition, including introducing me to key
people in Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, right on the eve of my
assuming the chairmanship, the massive WorldCom reporting fraud
came to light. This triggered a renewed spotlight on corporate financial
reporting and a flurry of activity in Washington, D.C., that would result
in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley within a month. In the midst of all
this, my becoming the new FASB chair received a fair amount of press
coverage. An article at that time in The Economist was headlined “Bob
Herz Faces the Daunting Task of Restoring Confidence in American
Accounts.” The first paragraph rather dramatically stated
“ARE you nuts?” was the response of close friends of Bob Herz
when told that he was accepting the job of chairman of
America’s Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Mr.
Herz, after all, was leaving a safe position as a senior partner at
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the world’s largest accounting firm, to
step into the heart of the current crisis of confidence in corporate
America. Only last a week, Worldcom and Xerox announced the
two largest profit restatements in history. This week, on July 1st,
Mr. Herz took up the job of steering accounting standards in a
safer direction. Nuts? Probably not. Brave? Certainly.2

So it was that on July 1, 2002, I became Chairman of the FASB.

Some Basics About the FASB
The chapters that follow are based on information in the public domain
and chronicle the major initiatives and standard-setting activities of the
FASB during the more than eight years I was Chairman. I will explain,
in what I hope is an understandable and interesting way, what I viewed
as key issues behind some of the more noteworthy and controversial
subjects we addressed and will offer my perspectives on those issues. I
will also discuss what I recall as some of the key factors affecting our
work during these years, including the effects of changing economic,
financial, and business environments on financial reporting and our
standard-setting activities.
First, though, it’s important for readers to understand some basics
about the FASB, its role, and how it operates. This will give context to
what I will discuss in subsequent chapters. For those readers already

2
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well acquainted with the FASB and accounting standard setting, feel
free to skip this section.
FASB, FAF (FASB’s parent organization), and the Financial Accounting
Standards Advisory Council (FASAC) (FASB’s main standing advisory
group) were born in 1973 out of dissatisfaction with the prior U.S.
accounting standard-setting body: the Accounting Principles Board
(APB) of the AICPA. Criticisms of the APB included that it was
dominated by the accounting profession, in particular the major
accounting firms. Those criticisms reflected concerns that the APB’s
composition (18 part-time members), processes, and resulting
pronouncements lacked due regard for the public interest and the
broader constituency for financial reporting. Accordingly, the report of
the Wheat Committee, a commission that examined these issues in the
early 1970s, recommended the establishment of a new structure to
provide greater independence and improved public due process in
establishing the financial accounting standards that govern the preparation of financial reports by nongovernmental entities.
Since its founding in 1973, the FASB has been the designated organization in the private sector for establishing these standards in the United
States for public companies, private companies, and not-for-profit entities. The stated mission of the FASB is “to establish and improve
standards of financial accounting and reporting that foster financial
reporting by non-governmental entities that provides decision-useful
information to investors and other users of financial reports.” That mission is viewed as critical to the proper functioning of the capital
markets and the economy.
For public companies, the FASB’s authority and role is delegated by the
SEC. The SEC has officially designated the FASB as the recognized
standard setter and the standards issued by the FASB as authoritative.
For private companies and not-for-profit entities, the FASB’s standards
are recognized as authoritative by the AICPA and state boards of
accounting. Independence and thorough public due process were
guiding principles in establishing the FAF and FASB in 1973 and
continue to be so. The FAF is a separate organization, independent of
other business and professional organizations. The trustees appoint the
members of the FASB and the FASAC (and since 2012, the members of
the Private Company Council that, as further discussed in chapter 6,
work with the FASB on private company reporting matters) and are
responsible for protecting the independence and integrity of the
standard-setting process. (The FAF trustees have similar duties with
respect to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, which
establishes accounting standards for state and local governments, and
the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council, GASB’s
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principal advisory group.) However, authority for the determination of
the FASB’s agenda and standards establishment rests with the FASB.
FASB board members are all full time and sever their prior employment
connections. For most of its history, the FASB has been a seven-person
board, with members drawn from the various constituencies in the
financial reporting system: public accounting, corporate financial executives, investors and other users of financial information, and academia.
The mission is accomplished through a thorough and open public due
process that involves and actively encourages broad participation by all
stakeholders in the financial reporting system and careful consideration
by the FASB of the views of stakeholders. Input is obtained through a
variety of means, including through discussions with the FASAC and
other advisory groups; regular meetings with many other constituents;
issuing discussion documents and exposure drafts of proposed
standards for public comment; and public roundtables, field visits, and
field tests on proposals. The input is carefully analyzed and evaluated
by the FASB and its staff of more than 60 full-time professionals. Meetings of the board are “in the sunshine,” open to public observation and
available via Internet and, as needed, telephone. In comparison with
some other legislative and rule-setting bodies, the public meetings of
the FASB often include extensive open discussion and debate among
board members on the matters being addressed.
Funding of the FASB and FAF is now largely derived from a mandatory
levy under Sarbanes-Oxley on all SEC registrants and registered mutual
funds. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, much of the funding came from
voluntary contributions, most notably from the accounting profession.
The change under Sarbanes-Oxley was meant to bolster the
independence of the FASB and the FAF. The FAF also derives revenues
from the publication and licensing of FASB and GASB materials, but
FASB standards are available to the public free of charge on the Internet.
Although the work of FASB is meant to be independent, objective, and
unbiased, the FASB is accountable to the trustees of FAF for effectively
fulfilling its mission. In regard to their impact on public companies,
both the FASB and the FAF are accountable to the SEC, which
maintains oversight over their activities, and, ultimately, to the U.S.
Congress. Both the SEC and Congress have the power to block or
overturn standards issued by the FASB, but they have rarely done so.
However, the SEC and committees of Congress have often held hearings related to accounting standards and FASB proposals, and the SEC
has been periodically asked to examine and report back to Congress on
specific accounting and financial reporting issues.
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The structure of, and approach to, accounting standard setting in the
United States has served as something of a model for other countries
and for the IASB and its parent foundation.
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Clearly, the events of the past year have shaken confidence in
our reporting system and in our capital markets. While it would
seem that many or most of the problems stem from outright
violations of rules and fraud by greedy and unscrupulous executives, apparent audit and corporate governance failures,
structuring of sham transactions by investment bankers, and
research analysts conflicts, I also think the problems have
prompted broader questions about virtually every aspect of our
corporate reporting system, including accounting standards and
accounting standard setting. I think those questions are
appropriate, are healthy, and, quite frankly, I think they were
overdue. As with crises in other areas of business or life, this
prompts reflection, introspection, a better understanding, and
then rebuilding, change, and renewal. So it must be with our
corporate reporting system.1

Like most new leaders of an organization, I arrived at the FASB with
lots of ideas. Certainly, in the wake of the reporting scandals of
2001–02, it could not be business as usual for anyone involved in
accounting and financial reporting. As noted by Manuel Johnson,
Chairman of the FAF, in the 2002 FAF Annual Report:
In the wake of the widely reported corporate scandals of last
year, the entire U.S. financial reporting system was put under the
microscope of the nation’s leaders, including the President and
Congress—as well as the public and media.... The public’s
interest in accounting issues soared in 2002 as newspaper
headlines blared, almost daily, about corporate financial

1

Robert H. Herz, on December 12, 2002, at the 2002 AICPA National Conference on Current
SEC Developments.
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misdeeds. As a result, investor confidence suffered and cries for
reform were raised in many circles.

In order to get a better handle on the challenges and opportunities
facing the FASB, in the period between being appointed as the new
chairman and assuming that role and during my first months as
chairman I spoke with many constituents: current and former FASB
members and senior staff; FAF trustees; members of the Financial
Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC); many members of
Congress; officials at the Government Accountability Office, the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the SEC, and other regulators; and many others familiar with
the FASB and financial reporting.
Not surprisingly, there were a variety of perspectives and, in some cases,
significant differences in views. For example, many in the corporate community believed that the FASB had not been sufficiently responsive to
their concerns about disclosure overload, operationality, and cost-benefit
and particular accounting approaches that, in their view, did not properly
portray the operating realities of their business. On the other hand, users
and many in Congress seemed to believe the opposite. Rightly or
wrongly, they seemed to believe that the FASB and the SEC had been
overly accommodative to the corporate community and had permitted
too many exceptions in standards and rules and too much flexibility that
had enabled off-balance financing, inadequate disclosure, and form-oversubstance transactions. Implicit in these comments was a view that
standard setters may have been too focused on the views and needs of
preparers and auditors and should become more attune to the needs of
investors and other users of financial information.
On the positive side, just about everyone I spoke with agreed that the
FASB should be independent. However, members of Congress and users
I spoke with seemed to emphasize independence more in terms of
freedom from undue influence from the corporate and auditor communities, while the corporate and auditor communities were fearful that the
FASB might effectively become an arm of the federal government and
subject to all the attendant political pressures. In that regard, I think the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 struck an appropriate balance. Although
providing for mandatory funding of the FASB, the legislative history
behind Sarbanes-Oxley clearly emphasized that such funding was not
intended to federalize the organization or put it in a position that would
subject it to political pressures. As I noted at the time in major speeches,
“Time will tell whether that balance is achieved in practice.”
Sarbanes-Oxley significantly altered many aspects of the U.S. financial
reporting system, including the creation of the new Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee auditors of SEC
registrants and assume responsibility from the AICPA’s Auditing
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Standards Board for establishing auditing standards in that arena.
However, it is noteworthy from a historical perspective that when it came
to accounting standard setting, a principal focus of Sarbanes-Oxley was
on strengthening the FASB by buttressing its independence through the
establishment of a mandatory funding mechanism. This replaced the
need for (and ability of) the FAF to obtain voluntary contributions from
the business community and accounting profession to finance the FASB’s
operations. I feel that a lot of credit for this goes to my predecessor, FASB
Chairman Ed Jenkins, and others at the FASB and FAF. Their proactive
efforts helped ensure that key policymakers understood the importance
of preserving, protecting, and enhancing the FASB’s ability to operate in
an independent manner in a period when all aspects of the financial
reporting system were subject to intense scrutiny.
In commenting on two bills recently introduced in Congress that
include provisions concerning the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”), Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman of the
FASB stated, “The commitment to the FASB’s independence and
open due process that is expressed in the two bills is very
important as we address issues related to the Enron matter.”
“The standards developed by the FASB over the past quarter
century have provided the backbone for our nation’s vibrant
capital markets because of the transparent, credible and reliable
nature of the information that results from their proper application,” Mr. Jenkins stated. “Impairment of the FASB’s
independence by legislation could have a negative impact upon
the quality of that information and, consequently, the
longstanding competitive advantage of the U.S. capital
markets.”2

The importance of the FASB’s ability to conduct its standard-setting
activities in an independent, objective, and unconstrained manner was
also specifically noted and explained in an April 2003 SEC Policy Statement redesignating the FASB as the U.S. accounting standard setter for
public companies. It stated
While effective oversight of the FASB’s activities is necessary in
order for the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under
the securities laws, we recognize the importance of the FASB’s
independence. By virtue of today’s Commission determination,
the FASB will continue its role as the preeminent accounting
standard setter in the private sector. In performing this role, the
FASB must use independent judgment in setting standards and
should not be constrained in its exploration and discussion of
issues. This is necessary to ensure that the standards developed

2

March 19, 2002, news release FASB Chairman Comments on Proposed Legislation. www.fasb.org/
news/nr031902.shtml.
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are free from bias and have the maximum credibility in the business and investing communities.3

This SEC Policy Statement was issued soon after William Donaldson
succeeded Harvey Pitt as Chairman of the SEC in March 2003. I very
much welcomed the inclusion of the preceding paragraph in the SEC
Policy Statement. Moreover, the issuance of the SEC Policy Statement
redesignating the FASB as the recognized accounting standard setter
was necessary for us to begin obtaining funding under Sarbanes-Oxley.
As previously noted, Sarbanes-Oxley ended the FAF’s ability to fund
FASB with voluntary contributions from the private sector and
instituted a mandatory funding mechanism. However, the mandatory
funding could commence only after the SEC had redesignated the FASB
as an official accounting standard setter. As discussed in some press
articles at the time,4 we had encountered a bit of a challenge with
Harvey Pitt over the conditions for SEC redesignation:
An article in the Wall Street Journal (“FASB Recognition Stalled
Amid Fight Over Control,” February 21, 2003) reveals that in the
weeks leading up to his departure, Harvey Pitt pushed for and
failed in an attempt to establish greater SEC control over the
Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Mr. Pitt’s plan was for the SEC to hold tighter control over FASB,
the make up of the membership of the Financial Accounting
Foundation, the selection of the members of the FASB, and the
standard-setting agenda of the organization. His proposal would
have given the SEC a greater representation at FASB meetings
and would have given the SEC access to confidential FASB documents. According to the article, Mr. Pitt withheld crucial SEC
recognition of the FASB pending acceptance of the greater
control, essentially blocking the ability for the independent
accounting standard setter to receive the critical funding it needs
to survive.
As part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, funding for the FASB is to be
changed so that operating funds come from fees imposed on
listed corporations, instead of the current funding model, which
generates much of the revenue from public accounting firms and
publication sales. Lawyers believe that the FASB cannot impose
fees on public corporations unless it receives SEC recognition.
In the end, FASB lobbying to assert and maintain its
independence won out. “We need to be able to do our thing in
an independent, objective and thorough way,” FASB Chairman
Robert Herz to the Wall Street Journal. “We don’t want to be
subject to constant interference or domination of our agenda.”

3

April 25, 2003, Securities and Exchange Commission Policy Statement Reaffirming the Status of
the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter.
4
“Pitt’s Final Days Reveal Move to Assert More Control Over FASB,” AccountingWeb, February
23, 2003.
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According to the Journal, FASB has enough cash on hand to last
through the fall. The new SEC Chairman William Donaldson is
in a position to quickly recognize the FASB with no additional
strings attached, allowing it to get the funding it needs to
increase staffing and continue its duties.

As noted in chapters 3, “Stock Option Controversies—Take Two,” and
5, “The Financial Crisis,” there would be attempts during my years as
Chairman of the FASB to intervene in our standard-setting activities
through political means, requiring actions to defend and protect the
independence of the FASB. Nonetheless, despite these episodes, overall,
I believe the FASB’s independence was maintained and generally
respected by most constituents, the SEC, and Congress.
With regard to international convergence of accounting standards, most
people I spoke with at the time seemed to support that goal, and many
also supported moving toward a more principles-based accounting
system, believing that U.S. standards had become too complex and too
detailed with too many rules issued from too many bodies. However,
many were also quite skeptical about whether a principles-based
approach could work in the United States. Finally, many were critical
that the FASB had been too slow in identifying and dealing with
emerging problem areas, and there was a general urging of the FASB
that as the independent and primary accounting standard setter in the
United States, it needed to take more responsibility and control of the
overall situation.
So, informed by these discussions with stakeholders from the investment, business, and government sectors and with my own ideas on
potential initiatives, I assumed the role of Chairman of the FASB with
no shortage of challenges and opportunities. However, although the
Chairman of the FASB has a number of specific responsibilities,
including developing the technical agenda, the official operating
procedures of the FASB are such that the chairman cannot effectively
accomplish things without the buy-in and cooperation of other Board
members. For example, until 2008, all changes to the FASB technical
agenda had to be officially voted on, and approved by, a voting
majority of Board members. Although from 2008 and onwards I could
make changes to the technical agenda, that could only be done after
consultation with the rest of the Board. Moreover, any changes to the
FASB’s official operating procedures must be approved by a majority of
the Board members. Ultimately, the issuance of exposure drafts and
final standards requires a majority vote of the Board. So, obtaining
input and buy-in from my fellow Board members was necessary to
effecting change. It was also the wise course of action and consistent
with the way I had operated in leading other groups and efforts.
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At the request of the trustees of FAF, the Board and senior staff launched
a series of wide-ranging reviews in July 2002 to address these issues,
challenges, and opportunities. The reviews lasted into the fall of that year
and covered such matters as our approach to standard setting (including
agenda setting and project management); the feasibility of a more
principles-based approach to standard setting in reducing the level of
detail and complexity in U.S. standards; options for more actively
fostering international convergence; ways to increase the level of investor
and user involvement in our activities; and other internal organizational
issues relating to human resources, internal processes, and constituent
relations. As part of these reviews, we considered whether modifications
to the existing structure of U.S. accounting standard setting, including the
roles of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) and the Accounting
Standards Executive Committee (now known as the Financial Reporting
Executive Committee [FinREC]) of the AICPA might improve the overall
quality and effectiveness of U.S. accounting standard setting. Although
these reviews were spearheaded by FASB board members (Mike Crooch,
Neal Foster, Gary Schieneman, Katherine Schipper, Ed Trott, John Wulff,
and me) and our staff directors (Sue Bielstein, Kim Petrone, and Larry
Smith), we also actively sought input and advice from others inside and
outside the organization.
As I have found throughout my career, when one person opens the
door for new thinking, others join in with additional ideas. So it was
with these meetings. Not only did I get buy-in for most of my key
ideas and initiatives, but the group added new ones to the mix and
carefully considered these in the context of the many points of information and stakeholder perspectives. What emerged from these reviews
and discussions and with support from the FAF trustees was a set of
strategic objectives and action steps that were to guide many of our
activities over the coming years. Commenting on these reviews in the
2002 FAF Annual Report, FAF Chairman Manuel Johnson noted,
the FAF asked the FASB Chairman to undertake an extensive
review of the FASB’s operations, process and people to determine
where greater efficiencies might be gained. This covered a
spectrum of technical activities the FASB has had in progress and
includes the new course it is charting for accounting standards in
this country. I am pleased to report, as can be noted elsewhere in
this publication under the FASB Chairman’s Q&A, that much of
the work on that project is now complete. The FASB has embarked
on a continuous improvement effort in its standard-setting work
and is implementing changes, where appropriate, to enhance the
overall effectiveness of the organization.

The reviews had three overarching strategic objectives: (1) improving
the standards and the standard-setting process, (2) simplifying the
structure of U.S. accounting standards setting and making the
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accounting standards more understandable, and (3) converging U.S.
standards with those of the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB). I viewed these three objectives as somewhat interrelated in that,
ideally, the convergence effort with the IASB might also help improve
and simplify GAAP. The following sections offer more details about
these objectives.

Improving Standard Setting
In the wake of the reporting scandals of 2001–02 that led to SarbanesOxley, a number of specific accounting and disclosure issues required
standard-setting action. FASB was already working to address some of
these issues before I joined the board, specifically the rules relating to
consolidation of special purpose entities and the accounting and
disclosure requirements relating to guarantees. They had issued
exposure drafts5 of new standards on these subjects that would form
the basis of FASB Interpretation Nos. 456 and 46.7 However, the
reporting scandals brought to light other accounting areas that some
thought needed prompt standard-setting attention. Most notable among
these was accounting for employee stock options, which I will discuss
in the next chapter. Issues stemming from the reporting of large unrealized gains by Enron and others related to trading in illiquid energy
derivatives were addressed in EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in
Accounting for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and
Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities,” that was finalized in early 2003.
Beyond specific technical issues, some important process improvements
needed attention. Prior to my arrival at the FASB, the FAF Trustees
changed FASB’s decision-making voting requirement from the previous
5-2 super majority to a simple majority of 4-3 in an effort to enable the
FASB to speed up the development and issuance of standards without
compromising their quality. Also, just prior to my joining the FASB, the
Board had reorganized the staff, splitting the role of director of
technical and research activities into three director roles: one with
responsibility for major projects, another with a focus on technical
application and implementation activities, and the third to work on
strategic, process, and staffing matters.

5

May 2002 exposure draft Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees,
Including Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others and June 2002 exposure draft Consolidation
of Certain Special-Purpose Entities—an interpretation of ARB No. 51.
6
Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees, Including Indirect Guarantees of
Indebtedness of Others—an interpretation of FASB Statements No. 5, 57, and 107 and rescission of
FASB Interpretation No. 34 (now codified in FASB Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 460,
Guarantees).
7
Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—an interpretation of ARB No. 51.

39

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

I believed other process issues needed consideration, the most of
important of these being the apparent lack of significant involvement of
investors and other users of financial information in the FASB’s
standard-setting activities. Although the stated mission of the organization focused on investors and other users as the intended primary
beneficiary of the accounting standards (that is, as the main customer
for the FASB’s product), I felt that constituency was underrepresented
in the standard-setting process. One of seven Board members came
from the investor community; few if any of the FASB staff had such a
background; none of the EITF members were users; and although there
were some users on the FASAC and other advisory groups, those
groups seemed to me to be dominated by public accountants and
financial executives.
Trying to focus accounting standard setting and the broader realm of
financial reporting on the needs of the users of the product was
certainly not a new idea. As noted, it is core to the FASB’s stated mission and was, I believe, supported by many, if not most, prior FASB
Board members. Also, the CFA Institute advocated for it in its 1993
white paper Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond: An Executive
Summary. In addition, this was the focus of the 1994 report Improving
Business Reporting—A Customer Focus: Meeting the Information Needs of
Investors and Creditors issued by the AICPA Special Committee on
Financial Reporting (also known as the Jenkins Committee after its
chairman, Ed Jenkins, who later went on to become the Chairman of
the FASB); of the book The ValueReporting Revolution: Moving Beyond the
Earnings Game that I coauthored; and of other notable works, such as
the 2002 book Quality Financial Reporting by Paul B. W. Miller and Paul
R. Bahnson.
Prior to the reporting scandals of 2001–02, most investors and users of
financial information were not that interested in accounting standard
setting and were reluctant to get involved in the FASB’s activities.
However, that seemed to change in the wake of the reporting scandals,
so I and others at the FASB believed we were now in a better position
to advance this important aspect of our accounting standard-setting
process. Accordingly, we went about trying to systematically and
proactively increase the direct involvement of investors and other users
in our standard-setting activities. First, and with the leadership of Gary
Schieneman, who was the FASB Board member from the investment
community, we created a new FASB User Advisory Council.
Comprising approximately 25 senior people from a cross-section of
users representing equity and fixed income investors and analysts, buy
side investors, sell side analysts, pension funds, mutual funds,
individual investors, and credit rating agencies, this council provided
the Board with perspectives on major reporting issues and trends. Later,
based on the suggestion by Don Young and the efforts of Don and Tom
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Linsmeier, we established an Investors Technical Accounting Committee
to provide the Board with detailed technical input on specific standards
under development. Don also led the creation of a facility through
which our staff could solicit input on specific accounting and reporting
issues from portfolio managers and analysts at many of the country’s
largest mutual fund groups. We also recruited two experienced people
from the investment community to serve as full-time liaisons with
investors and other users, who, together with Board member Marc
Siegel further broadened and intensified the FASB’s direct engagement
with users on each major project and its communications with the user
community on standard-setting developments.
Starting at the beginning of 2003, we reconstituted the EITF to include 2
users, which has since been increased to 3 of the 14 EITF members. As
a matter of due course, users are represented on virtually all project
advisory groups, including the FASB’s Small Business Advisory Committee, Private Company Financial Reporting Committee (and now on
the new Private Company Council), and Not-for-Profit Advisory Committee. The number of users on the FASAC has been steadily increasing
in recent years. Very importantly, the 7-member FASB now includes 2
board members who were professional financial statement users. The
Board also meets annually with the accounting committees of the CFA
Institute and the New York Society of Securities Analysts. As a result of
all these changes and activities, I believe that FASB is now better able to
obtain relevant and timely input from a broad range of users on virtually all its standard-setting activities. Although that input often reflects
a diversity of views among users on particular issues, I believe that it
does affect the Board’s standard-setting decisions. In recent years, the
IASB, the SEC, and the PCAOB have also established investor advisory
committees.
There have been other important process improvements. Early on in my
tenure at the FASB, we thoroughly mapped all our processes in order to
identify and eliminate redundant and nonvalue-adding processes. We
also expanded the FASB’s public due process. In the past, not all FASB
documents that changed or interpreted U.S. GAAP were exposed for
public comment, including consensuses of the EITF and Technical Bulletins and questions and answers issued by the FASB staff. Now,
everything that changes or interprets the official literature, including
consensuses reached by the EITF, are issued for public comment, so the
Board is able to obtain and consider such input prior to finalizing new
guidance. Prior to 2002, FASB standards were not available to the
public free of charge. Since then, they have been available free of charge
through the FASB website and, more recently, through the FASB
Accounting Standards Codification. Also, public meetings of the FASB,
once available only by telephone, have now, for a number of years,
been webcast.
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We also broadened the range of standing advisory groups providing
input and counsel to the Board and FASB staff. That included
establishing a number of new groups, including the Small Business
Advisory Committee, the Private Company Financial Reporting Committee, the Not-for-Profit Advisory Committee, and the Valuation
Resource Group. Also, very importantly, in order to better meet the new
and increasing demands on the organization resulting from the
heightened focus on financial reporting and from international
convergence, FASB staff numbers were increased, and new positions
were created and filled, including the aforementioned investor liaisons,
an academic fellow, and a valuation fellow. In 2006, under the leadership of Board member Tom Linsmeier, the FASB created a Financial
Accounting Standards Research Initiative to promote relevant
accounting research on major issues being addressed by the Board.
So, starting in 2002 and continuing throughout my 8 years at the FASB,
a number of changes came about that I believe have enhanced the
overall quality of the FASB’s standard-setting process. Very importantly,
further process improvements continue to be made since I left,
including the commencement by the FAF of a formal program for
postimplementation review of major standards and, as discussed
further in chapter 6, actions by the FASB and the FAF Board of Trustees
relating to standard setting for private companies.

Can We Make Things Simpler?
Coming out of the strategy meetings we held in 2002, there were also
some very important changes aimed at reorganizing and rationalizing
the structure of accounting standard setting in the United States and at
simplifying and making the U.S. GAAP literature more useable. The
following excerpt from the book The ValueReporting Revolution: Moving
Beyond the Earnings Game that I coauthored encapsulated my view of
the problem in the year 2000:
The chairman and the chief accountant of the SEC often proclaim
that the United States has the best financial reporting system in
the world. If quality is measured by the sheer volume of
pronouncements, rules, and regulations and by their level of
detail and complexity, then America certainly leads the rest of
the world. The U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
represents a vast array of official pronouncements made over the
past 40 years by various bodies, including the FASB and its
predecessors, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and the
Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP), the FASB Emerging
Issues Task Force (EITF), and the Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) of the AICPA. These pronouncements
appear in various forms: FASB statements, interpretations,
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technical bulletins, and implementation guides, EITF
consensuses, AcSEC Statements of Position, and industry
accounting and audit guides, just to name the principal ones.... If
this weren’t sufficient, for public companies, there is a whole set
of rules and regulations that interpret and supplement the GAAP
rules. Those interested will find them in the SEC’s core rules
such as Regulations S-X and S-K, as well in more than 100
specific Staff Accounting Bulletins, almost 50 Financial Reporting
Releases, and hundreds of Accounting Series Releases.
Had enough yet? In order to stay fully current with GAAP, it is
not sufficient to know and understand just the official
pronouncements; the SEC staff regularly deems it appropriate
and important to proclaim their latest views on particular
reporting and disclosure matters through speeches and comments at EITF and other professional meetings, which, although
not official, effectively carry the same weight for anyone trying
to comply with all the rules. All this effort ends up as an
extraordinarily detailed set of rules about what companies can
and cannot do in their external financial reporting. These rules
are have become so complex that a rapidly decreasing number of
CFOs and professional accountants can fully comprehend and
apply all the rules and how to apply them.8

I wrote those words, and clearly, I felt strongly about what I viewed as
a major issue. When I got to the FASB, I was in a position to try to do
something about it. Through discussion with my fellow Board
members, we identified the following four core issues that had
contributed and were continuing to contribute to the overall problem:
1. Many different bodies were issuing U.S. GAAP.
2. The various pronouncements issued by these bodies were written
in differing formats, styles, and levels of depth and only loosely
interconnected.
3. Some of the pronouncements and related guidance were too
complex in terms of the level of detail and number of exceptions
and bright lines.
4. The style of writing and format of the pronouncements made
them hard to understand by anyone not steeped in the technical
accounting literature.
Attacking these issues would not be easy and would need to be done in
a systematic manner. The approach would need to include rationalizing
the overall structure of U.S. accounting standard setting, reorganizing
and codifying the mass of pronouncements that comprise U.S. GAAP,
8

Robert G. Eccles, Robert H. Herz, E. Mary Keegan, and David M. H. Phillips, The
ValueReporting Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings Game. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2001, pp.
110–111.
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addressing the rules-based approach, and improving the understandability of the proposals and standards issued by the FASB.

Rationalizing the Structure of U.S.
Accounting Standard Setting
The first step was to try to reduce the number of organizations issuing
U.S. GAAP pronouncements. In effect, new U.S. GAAP was flowing out
of three different organizations: the FASB, AICPA, and SEC. Further,
although the EITF was, in name, a task force of the FASB, over the
years, it had taken on something of a separate life of its own.
1. First, we approached the AICPA to try to stop it from issuing
new U.S. GAAP requirements through AcSEC. In my view, over
the years, the AICPA, through AcSEC and industry committees,
had done a lot of very good work in developing and issuing
Statements of Position (SOPs) and industry Audit and
Accounting Guides on a variety of accounting subjects. However,
the FASB, not the AICPA, was the official accounting standard
setter. This position was bolstered by the SEC’s redesignation of
FASB as the recognized standard setter for public companies,
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley. Initially and quite understandably,
the AICPA leadership did not seem to enthusiastically embrace
our point of view and request. However, after further discussions
and to the AICPA’s credit, we agreed that AcSEC would finish
up some work in progress and would then would cease issuing
SOPs or embedding new U.S. GAAP requirements in industry
Audit and Accounting Guides. However, I also personally and
publicly encouraged the AICPA to continue updating,
developing, and publishing industry Audit and Accounting
Guides because I have always viewed these as particularly valuable learning and reference tools for those involved in the
accounting and auditing of companies in particular industries,
and the AICPA continues to publish these guides.
2. Next, we took more ownership of the EITF by becoming more
involved in the agenda and deliberations of that body. Board
members are expected to attend the meetings of the EITF and, as
appropriate, to express their views and concerns on particular
issues being discussed. Moreover, the EITF’s official procedures
were revised to require that the FASB Board formally ratify (or
reject) all EITF consensuses before they became U.S. GAAP. A
few years later, we began requiring exposure for public comment
of all proposed EITF consensuses and consideration of comments
received prior to the consensuses being finalized by the EITF and
ratified by the FASB.
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3. Finally, we went to the SEC staff and asked them to consider,
wherever possible, referring issues to the FASB that they believed
required standard-setting action, instead of issuing a formal
pronouncement or trying to change U.S. GAAP via other means.
In this way, such matters could be addressed through the FASB’s
public due process. They agreed to try to do this. Although on a
few occasions since then the SEC staff have felt compelled, in the
interest of timeliness, to issue accounting guidance, I believe the
understanding and arrangement by which they refer issues to the
FASB has generally worked well.
Through these steps, we were able to rationalize the overall accounting
standard-setting structure in the United States. We also believed we
needed to reduce the number of types of pronouncements issued by the
FASB and to ensure that all proposed changes to U.S. GAAP were
exposed for public comment. We started issuing a new type of document: FASB Staff Positions. FSPs generally contained implementation
and application guidance on specific matters or were issued to defer the
effective date of a pronouncement. They replaced FASB Technical Bulletins, Implementation Guides, and Staff Q&As that, although not
subject to formal due process, did have the force of official U.S. GAAP.
Although the name Staff Position may have conveyed that they were
only staff documents, they were subject to due process by the Board,
including discussion and voting on by the Board at public meetings
and exposure of the draft FSPs for public comment.

The Accounting Standards Codification—
Reorganizing and Codifying U.S. GAAP
So, we had reduced the number of standard setters and the number of
types of pronouncements that would be issued, but we still had the
problem that the existing U.S. GAAP literature consisted of more than
2,000 separate, loosely connected documents. In our view, that
negatively affected the overall usability of the U.S. GAAP literature,
including hampering the ability to efficiently and effectively do research
on accounting issues. It also complicated our efforts to identify and
describe the effects new proposals and standards would have on the
existing literature. In discussing these issues, the strategic review group
birthed the idea of what was to become the “Codification” or, formally
the FASB Accounting Standards Codification™ (ASC). The idea was a
simple one: let’s reorganize this mass of literature into a single document organized by major accounting topic. However, we also realized
that translating this idea, or vision if you will, into reality would be a
major undertaking. I asked Larry Smith, our new director of technical
application and implementation activities, to give it some thought. We
were also in for a great stroke of luck. Tom Hoey, who had led the
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development of Arthur Andersen’s accounting research platform, was
available. We hired Tom to be the project manager on the development
of the Codification under the oversight of Larry Smith and the Board.
We also needed to obtain approval of the FAF trustees and buy-in from
the SEC for what would likely be a multiyear, multimillion dollar
undertaking. We needed to prove the business case for such a major
project. Tom’s first task, under Larry’s and my oversight, was to
develop the specifications for the project in order to size the likely costs
and to conduct surveys of users of the accounting literature to better
assess the potential benefits. Tom developed a comprehensive blueprint
for the project and the resulting product that included estimates of the
timing and costs. We conducted an extensive survey of users of the
accounting literature, including accounting practitioners and financial
statement preparers. The results of the survey strongly confirmed the
problems with the existing structure of U.S. GAAP. For example, of the
1,400 survey respondents, 80 percent believed that the structure of U.S.
GAAP was confusing, and 85 percent believed that accounting research
took an excessive amount of time. There was also strong support for
the development of the Codification with 95 percent of the survey
respondents agreeing that the FASB should undertake the project.9
The Codification project was the accounting version of a national works
project. In addition to involving many of us at the FASB and members
of the FAF staff, we recruited scores of professionals to work on the
project as mappers and authors. Consistent with their titles, the mappers mapped the existing literature into the approximately 90 Codification topics and subtopics under each topic. The authors would then
develop the topics and subtopics, adhering to a set of strict guidelines
to ensure they did not change existing U.S. GAAP, just reorganize it,
and that there was a consistent structure and format across the
Codification. The development process incorporated numerous controls
to ensure completeness and accuracy. There were also processes to
identify potential conflicts and redundancies in the existing literature,
which then required resolution by the Board, as well as instances of
literature that, although not authoritative, were nevertheless widely
relied upon and should be included in the Codification. The Codification also includes, by topic, the relevant SEC guidance and requirements. The authored topics and subtopics then went through several
levels of review, including by designated reviewers at the major
accounting firms and in industry; by members of the FASB staff; and,
ultimately, by FASB Board members. The Codification was housed on a
state-of-the art database that was specifically developed for the purpose
and that incorporates many different functionalities.
9

For example, see the presentation by Thomas Hoey at the 8th Annual Financial Reporting
Conference at Baruch College on April 30, 2009, and available at http://
zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/centers/zcci/zcci-events/downloads/2009-frc/hoey.ppt.
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The development phase was completed in late 2007. In January 2008 we
launched it to the public for trial use, or “verification,” at the same time
conducting FASB ASC webcasts and launching online training modules
to familiarize people with FASB ASC and its capabilities. People were
encouraged to provide feedback on their user experience, enabling the
core development team to address issues and further refine
functionalities. On July 1, 2009, after formal approval by a vote of the
Board, FASB ASC became the official source of U.S. GAAP, replacing the
thousands of pronouncements from which it was derived. In announcing
this in a FASB news release on July 1, 2009, I stated, “Today’s launch of
the Codification represents a milestone in U.S. accounting standards.
After years of development, this much more efficient, user-friendly
method of researching up-to-date solutions has become a reality. I want
to thank the many people at the FAF, the FASB, and the hundreds of
constituents that contributed to the successful completion of this very
major endeavor.” As also noted in that news release, in order to prepare
constituents for the change, the FASB had provided a number of tools
and training resources prior to the official launch, including an online
tutorial in using FASB ASC, extensive Q&As and background materials,
and various webcasts, presentations, and alerts.
FASB ASC has changed the way accounting research is done, and it has
also, presumably, affected how the literature is taught. It also changed
the form and format of all new standards issued by the FASB. No
longer are FASB pronouncements issued as FASB Statement No. X,
FASB Interpretation No. Y, or FASB Staff Position No. Z; rather, they are
now issued as documents that amend, add to, or replace the relevant
sections of FASB ASC. The same goes for consensuses of the EITF that
have been ratified by the Board. FASB obtains ongoing feedback on the
Codification, including suggestions for improving its usability, from
constituents in order to continue to enhance the content, search
capabilities, and overall user friendliness.
The FAF and FASB codification team performed the additional important
step of linking the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) U.S.
GAAP Taxonomy to FASB ASC. This link facilitates cross-referencing
between specific U.S. GAAP requirements and defined terms and the
related XBRL data definitions. Starting in 2010, the FAF and FASB
assumed responsibility for the ongoing development and maintenance of
the XBRL U.S. GAAP Taxonomy, proposing and issuing periodic updates
to the taxonomy in order to keep it up to date with changes in
accounting standards and to improve the usability of the taxonomy.
Access to the FASB ASC is available free of charge through the FASB’s
website. A “Professional View” version of FASB ASC that incorporates
more sophisticated search capabilities and functionalities is available on
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a subscription basis but is free of charge to accounting faculty and
students at qualifying universities and colleges.10
Clearly, the development and launch of FASB ASC as the single source
of U.S. GAAP represented a major and important milestone in the history of accounting standard setting in the United States. It was a huge
undertaking, it came in largely on time and on budget, and I believe
everyone involved in the project can take great pride in helping
transform what was an ambitious vision into reality. My special admiration and thanks to Larry Smith and Tom Hoey and his core team who
did a masterful job guiding and shepherding this large and challenging
endeavor from conception and design to successful completion.

Addressing Complexity and Improving the
Understandability of Standards
Thus far, in this section, I have described how we addressed the first
two issues relating to the complexity of the U.S. accounting literature:
the too many standard-setters issue and the mass of loosely connected
pronouncements issue. What about the second two issues: the
complexity of the standards themselves and improving the readability
and understandability of the standards? In my view, the complexity of
accounting standards (in particular, U.S. accounting standards) reflects,
at least in part, broader issues in our financial reporting system that I
will discuss at length in chapter 6, including the subject of principlesbased, or objectives-oriented, standards. Nevertheless, in recent years,
the FASB has made a number of efforts to try to reduce the complexity
of its pronouncements and improve their overall understandability.
These have included format changes, such as putting the objectives and
principles in boldface font and having the summary at the front of the
standard specifically address why the FASB is issuing the pronouncement; the scope of the document; how it will improve current
accounting practices; how it will change current practice; its effect on
convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS);
and the effective date of, and transition method(s) for, the new requirements. In developing standards, the Board has tried to avoid the use of
exceptions, bright lines, and overly prescriptive guidance, and there
were other efforts to write the documents in plain English.
Although I believe all these efforts have improved the understandability of proposed and final standards issued by the FASB, I also
believe there is room for continued improvement. I believe that the joint
development of major standards with the IASB has been a positive in
that regard. It forces both boards to try to ensure that the joint
10
Access to, and information about, Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards
Codification™ can be found at http://asc.fasb.org.
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standards are understandable both in the United States and across
many other parts of the world. However, fitting the new standards into
the FASB ASC format can be challenging and requires a continuing eye
by the FASB staff and Board about readability and understandability.
Finally and as discussed later in this book, I believe that progress on
the Conceptual Framework and Disclosure Framework projects could
help lead the way to enhancing the overall understandability and
usefulness of financial statements.

International Convergence
The third strategic objective we agreed upon in the summer of 2002
was trying to foster convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. This
was not a completely new initiative because, previously, the FASB had,
for many years, pursued efforts at harmonization or internationalization
of accounting standards. For example, during the mid-1990s, the FASB
undertook a major project to systematically catalog, describe, and
explain the differences between the structure, standards, and processes
of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and those
in the United States. The FASB had also been an active member of the
Group of Four Plus One (G4+1) accounting standard setters that met
periodically and published a series of discussion documents on major
accounting topics and had worked with certain other national standard
setters to develop common standards (for example, with Canada on
segment reporting). Both the FASB and the SEC had long supported the
concept of a single set of high quality international accounting
standards as a means for improving international comparability of
financial information and reducing the costs to financial statement
preparers, auditors, and users. However, as I will discuss in greater
depth in chapter 4, “International Convergence,” a larger portion of the
FASB’s activities since 2002 has been devoted to the convergence
program with the IASB.
A driving force behind this movement has been the continuing
globalization of capital markets and capital flows, including increased
investment by U.S. investors in foreign securities. Looking at the world
of accounting and financial reporting in 2002, there were two sets of
widely accepted standards in use across the world: International
Accounting Standards (formerly IAS now IFRS) and U.S. GAAP. IASs
had been developed by a body called the IASC and were used by
companies in a number of countries. The establishment of the IASB in
2001 to replace the IASC and the announcement by the European Commission that it planned to require the use of IASs by all listed
companies in the European Union starting in 2005 provided added
impetus to the IASs and their potential future use around the world.
U.S. GAAP was widely used, not only in the United States, which is the
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largest national economy and capital market in the world, but also
around the world. This was due to two things: the spread of U.S.
corporations across the globe and the requirement that foreign
companies seeking to raise capital in the U.S. public markets either use
U.S. GAAP or reconcile key financial statement items to U.S. GAAP.
So, it made sense that achieving a truly global set of accounting
standards would require the IASB and FASB to work together. Also, the
reporting scandals of 2001–02 led some to question the long-held belief
in this country that our standards were the best in the world. Some
called for a movement to more principles-based standards along the
lines of IASs, a view supported by both Paul Volcker, who chaired the
trustees of the IASB’s oversight body, and Harvey Pitt, the thenChairman of the SEC. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley called for the SEC to
study whether the United States should move to more principles-based
accounting standards and specifically required the U.S. accounting
standard setter to consider the potential benefits to U.S. investors and
the public interest of international convergence.
For my part, I considered this a labor of love. It was in keeping with
my international background, experience, and interests. I had just been
a member of the IASB and chair of the Transnational Auditors Committee. I had done a lot international assignments at Price Waterhouse,
Coopers & Lybrand, and PricewaterhouseCoopers and served on the
Global Board and in other international roles. My training in U.K.
accounting and reporting and my knowledge of both U.S. GAAP and
IASs had led me to conclude that there were relative strengths and
weaknesses among the various sets of accounting standards.
So, as discussed in chapter 4, starting with the Norwalk Agreement in
October 2002, international convergence between the FASB and the
IASB became an important part of both board’s efforts. That, together
with pursuing the improvement and simplification objectives, was to
guide a good part of the FASB’s activities during my years as chairman.

Setting Course
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the key strategic objectives we set in 2002 and the initiatives and actions we then took in
pursuit of those objectives in the ensuing years. I believe it is important
for any organization to have a vision and set of strategic objectives to
guide its actions and overall direction, particularly in turbulent and
changing times. I was fortunate to join the organization at a moment in
history that, although presenting many challenges, also provided
significant opportunities for new ideas and new directions. As well, I was
blessed with having terrific colleagues at both the FASB and FAF. Once
charted, we set course, guided by the strategic objectives, the action steps
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we had mapped out, and the FASB’s constant mission of developing and
issuing high-quality standards through an independent, thorough, and
open due process. As chronicled in the chapters that follow, in changing
and sometimes rough seas, the sailing was not always smooth, and we
were not always able to stick to the course that we had charted. Some
changes in course were needed in response to changes in the broader
environment in which the FASB operates. Overall, I believe the plans,
initiatives, and actions we developed in my early months at the FASB
and that we then subsequently implemented have had an important,
lasting, and beneficial impact on accounting standard setting and
financial reporting, both in the United States and internationally.
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Chapter 3: Stock Option
Controversies—Take
Two
An assault is underway to convince Congress that it should
block the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s proposed rule
requiring companies to expense employee stock options ... some
have responded to this pronouncement with renewed legislative
efforts to undercut FASB’s authority and politicize the rulemaking process. These are counter to the health of our financial
markets. The preservation of FASB’s independence is
fundamental to maintaining transparent, competitive and liquid
markets. If the U.S. is to retain its credibility in the global
marketplace, Congress must resist the temptation to interfere
with FASB.1

In chapter 2, “Charting Course,” I noted that two of the three strategic
objectives we set after I arrived at the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) were improvement of standards and international
convergence. The subject of accounting for employee stock compensation and, in particular, for employee stock options represented the
confluence of these two objectives. It was an area requiring improvement in the existing standards, and it was a subject of a major ongoing
project by the IASB. As I discuss in this chapter, it was also a very
controversial and politically charged subject that the FASB had
addressed in the not too distant past.
In 1995, the FASB issued FASB Statement No. 123.2 That statement was
the result of a FASB project to reconsider the accounting for stock-based
1
2

Senator Richard C. Shelby, “Cut It Out, Congress,” Wall Street Journal, 6 May 2004.
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.
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compensation, including stock options issued to corporate executives
and employees. The project lasted more than 10 years and generated an
immense amount of controversy. Many, if not most, constituents
opposed the FASB’s proposal to require the recording of compensation
based on the fair value of stock options granted to employees. As
explained in the following paragraphs, under the then-existing
accounting standards, companies were able to avoid recording
compensation expense for so-called “fixed price” stock options. In
contrast, the accounting rules required that the fair value of restricted
stock granted to employees be recorded as compensation expense.
Because of this and other anomalies in the accounting rules, the
compensation plans of many companies included fixed-price stock
options. That practice was particularly prevalent among high-tech
companies and venture capital-backed companies.
The opposition to the FASB’s proposal was fierce and politically
charged, attracting the attention of Congress and other policymakers in
Washington, D.C. The FASB had few allies. Even institutional investors,
believing that the granting of stock options helped align the interests of
management with those of shareholders, generally opposed the FASB’s
proposal. Under pressure from Congress, Arthur Levitt, the thenChairman of the SEC, urged the FASB to withdraw the proposal, an
action he would later describe in his book Take on the Street as his worst
decision as SEC Chairman. Levitt said the following in the June 20,
2002, PBS Frontline episode “Congress and the Accounting Wars”:
When I came to the SEC, this new FASB rule to expense stock
options had galvanized the American business community and
brought literally hundreds of CEOs to my office in Washington
to urge me to prevent the FASB from going ahead this
proposal.... But what happened during the course of this fierce
debate and dialogue was that the Congress changed, and Newt
Gingrich brought to power a group of congresspeople who were
determined to keep FASB from enacting this rule proposal. My
concern was that if Congress put through a law that muzzled
FASB, that would kill independent standards setting. So I went
to the FASB at that time, and I urged them not to go ahead with
the rule proposal. It was probably the single biggest mistake I
made in my years at the SEC.

Ultimately, in issuing FASB Statement No. 123, five of the seven FASB
Board members agreed to a compromise under which companies were
encouraged but not required to adopt the fair-value-based method of
accounting for employee stock options. If they chose not to adopt, they
could continue to use the existing accounting and provide disclosures
in the footnotes relating to the fair value of the options granted and
what reported earnings and earnings per share would have been had
the options been accounted for as a compensation expense under the
fair-value-based method. I can imagine that this must have been a very
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difficult decision for each of the FASB Board members. Paragraphs
60–62 of FASB Statement No. 123 address the decision not to require the
fair value-based method:
60. The debate on accounting for stock-based compensation
unfortunately became so divisive that it threatened the Board’s
future working relationship with some of its constituents.
Eventually, the nature of the debate threatened the future of
accounting standards setting in the private sector.
61. [T]he Board decided that the extent of improvement in
financial reporting that was envisioned when this project was
added to its technical agenda and when the Exposure Draft was
issued was not attainable because the deliberate, logical
consideration of issues that usually leads to improvement in
financial reporting was no longer present. Therefore, the Board
decided to specify as preferable and to encourage but not require
recognition of compensation cost for all stock-based employee
compensation, with required disclosure of the pro forma effects
of such recognition by entities that continue to apply Opinion 25.
62. The Board believes that disclosure of the pro forma effects of
recognizing compensation cost according to the fair value based
method will provide relevant new information that will be of
value to the capital markets and thus will achieve some but not
all of the original objectives of the project. However, the Board
also continues to believe that disclosure is not an adequate
substitute for recognition ... in the financial statements.... The
Board chose a disclosure-based solution for stock-based
employee compensation to bring closure to the divisive debate
on this issue—not because it believes that solution is the best
way to improve financial accounting and reporting.

Virtually no companies chose to adopt the preferable fair-value-based
approach and, as a result, were able to continue to avoid recording any
compensation expense related to fixed-price employee stock options.
During the bull stock market of the 1990s and into 2001, the use of such
employee stock options by many companies grew significantly. Executives at many companies and employees at companies with broadbased stock option plans experienced a significant increase in their net
worth. However, some began to question the soundness of this trend.
AFL-CIO, the main American trades-union federation, points out
that, thanks largely to share options, the average American chief
executive now takes home 419 times the wage of the average factory worker. In 1980, he made 42 times as much.
But put to one side questions of justice and inequality. Force
down the thought that the chief executive’s enormous share
options may demoralise the deputy chief executive and make the
company harder to manage. Ignore the bleating bondholder, who
sees his risk rise as companies borrow to buy back shares to give
to executives. The fundamental question is whether share-option
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schemes are doing what they were designed to do: aligning the
interests of managers with those of owners, motivating bosses to
do their level best by shareholders.
Are share options working? Are other shareholders seeing gains
from handing over so much equity to their managers? Or are
bosses receiving the largest peacetime transfer of wealth in history simply for being in the right job at the right time—namely,
during America’s strongest equity bull market ever? Indeed,
could share options be encouraging bosses to behave in ways
that are contributing to a bubble in share prices which, should it
pop, will leave everyone worse off? ...
First, it is hard to tell whether profits have, in fact, risen all that
much, for the cost of most executive share-option schemes is not
fully reflected in company profit-and-loss accounts. Attempts by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to require
firms to set the cost of options against profits were killed by
corporate lobbyists in 1995. They argued that if the cost of option
schemes were treated in that way, fewer of them would be
awarded, fewer people would have reason to maximise
shareholder value and the economy would suffer.3

However, as required under FASB Statement No. 123, companies now
did have to calculate the value of stock options issued to employees
and provide disclosures of the pro forma effects on reported earnings
and earnings per share. Although I believe that was an important step
forward, there is an old saying in accounting, backed by extensive
academic research: “disclosure is not an adequate substitute for bad
accounting.” The accounting for fixed-price employee stock options
was, in my view, a prime example of that saying because, as to be
discussed, allowing companies to not recognize compensation cost
relating to these instruments in computing earnings resulted in
significant distortions in reported results, in the design of executive and
employee compensation plans, and in corporate governance at many
companies. In turn, such distortions can give rise to potential misallocation of capital across the economy.

What’s the Problem?
The then-existing accounting rules relating to employee stock
compensation were issued in 1972 as APB Opinion No. 25.4 Those rules
generally required the recognition of compensation expense for grants
to employees of stock, stock options, and other forms of stock-based
compensation, such as stock appreciation rights. However, stock option
grants were exempted from the rule if they met certain conditions of
3
4
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vesting and strike price. Options could have no vesting requirements
other than continued employment through a certain period (so-called
“time vesting”). Also, the strike price of the option (that is, the price the
employee had to pay to exercise the option) could be no lower than the
market price of the stock on the date the option was granted. A typical
example of an employee stock option meeting these conditions is one
that has a 5-year life (that is, it expires 5 years from the date of grant);
vests 3 years from the date of grant, provided the employee was still
with the company; and has a strike price equal to the market price of
the stock at the date of grant—say $20. In this example, the option is
issued “at the money” and has no intrinsic value at the grant date (that
is, there is not a positive difference at the grant date between the value
of the stock and the strike price that has to be paid to buy the stock).
So why does such an option have value at the date it is granted if, as in
the example, the employee would have to pay $20 to get a share of
stock that right now is also worth $20? The answer lies in the holder’s
right to exercise the option at future dates when there might be a positive pay-off. Stock prices go up and down. In our example option, if the
employee continues to work for the company for the next 3 years, the
option will vest, and he or she will be able to buy the stock for $20 at
any time during the succeeding 2 years. During those 2 years, the stock
may trade at various levels above and below $20. It might go as high as
$50, in which case the option would be $30 “in the money,” and the
employee would have a $30 gain if he or she were to exercise the
option at that point in time. Therefore, the value of the option depends
on the probabilities and amounts of potential future positive pay-offs.
Various option-pricing models have been developed over the last 40
years to value all sorts of options, and there are markets for many different types of options, including options on the stocks of individual
companies and on indexes based on baskets of stocks, such as the S&P
500. These models provide a means of valuing an option at any point
during its life.
Intuitively, one can understand some of the key factors that drive the
value of an option. For example, the longer the life of an option, the
higher its value. Let’s take the sample option in the previous paragraph
and assign a 10-year rather than a 5-year life. When that option vests in
3 years it could be exercised at any time during the next 7 years. This
makes the option more valuable than an option with a 5-year life
because there would be more chances in 7 years than in 2 years for
positive pay-offs and potentially higher positive pay-offs during that
period. Similarly, the more volatile the price of the stock, the higher the
value of an option to purchase that stock because the higher the
volatility, the greater the chances and amounts of potential positive payoffs. Accountants have debated and accounting standard setters have
extensively discussed whether the compensation expense related to
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employee stock options should be based on the value of the option at
the date it is granted or the date it vests or on the ultimate pay-off to
the employee if and when it is exercised. There are conceptual
accounting arguments for and against using each of these. For various
conceptual and practical reasons, accounting standard setters have
decided that it should be measured at the date the option is granted,
and that amount is then charged to compensation expense over the
time period the employee works to vest in the option. So, in our
example, assume the value of the option is $6 at the date it is granted.
Because the employee has to work 3 years for the option to vest and
become exercisable, compensation expense of $2 would be recognized
in each of those 3 years. The same accounting approach is used for
grants of stock to employees. For example, if the employee had been
granted a share of stock worth $20 at the grant date and it vested if the
employee continued to work for the company for 3 years, $6.66 of
compensation expense would be recognized in each of 3 years following the date of grant.
The exception under APB Opinion No. 25 that was allowed to continue
under FASB Statement No. 123 enabled companies to compensate
employees at no accounting cost. As such, it created an accounting bias
for using such options and against using other forms of compensation,
including cash, grants of stock, stock appreciation rights, and stock
options with performance requirements, all of which resulted in the
recognition of compensation expense. Some of the resulting accounting
seemed perverse and counterintuitive. Let’s look again at our sample
option for an example of this. The employee has to continue to work
for the company for 3 years for the option to vest. Now let’s add an
additional requirement: the option vests only if the company also
increases its net income by at least 50 percent over that period. In that
case, the accounting rules under APB Opinion No. 25 required that
compensation expense be recorded based on the intrinsic value of the
option over the 3 years. Yet, because the option contained an additional
condition for it to vest, it would likely be less valuable to the employee
and potentially less costly to the company than the one that required
only continued service by the employee. Further, the exception applied
only to stock options granted to employees. The accounting rules have
long required that stock options granted to suppliers or providers of
debt financing to the company be valued and expense be recognized
based on those values. As Warren Buffett had famously quipped, “If
stock options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they? If
compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn’t
go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they go?”5

5
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In summary, the existing accounting rules created an incentive for
companies to use a particular form of compensation based on the
impact on reported earnings, not underlying economic, financial, business, corporate governance, or human resource considerations. As
Donald Delves, a well-known compensation consultant, put it in his
book Stock Options & the New Rules of Corporate Accountability:
Measuring, Managing, and Rewarding Executive Performance,6
Executive stock options are a problem for two reasons. First
companies have granted too many of them. Second they are ineffective incentives and rewards at most companies. This has been
exacerbated by accounting rules that contributed directly to the
untenable mess that all of us involved in executive compensation, including executives, board members, and compensation
consultants must address.... Under current accounting a very
narrow definition of a derivative security—specifically an at-themoney call option granted to an executive receives a very special
accounting treatment. These options have no expense whatsoever
associated with them.... Through this strange but very tempting
little loophole, truckloads of options have been delivered to
executives with no expense to the companies granting them.
Because of this same loophole, hundreds of billions of dollars of
shareholder value has been transferred to executives with virtually no controls or limitations.... More importantly because of this
loophole, approximately 95 percent of public companies pay
their executives in exactly the same way, using exactly the same
specific derivative security. And they have blindly granted them
in substantial and ever-increasing numbers.... There is no way
that if every company in America started with a blank sheet of
paper, virtually all of them would simultaneously conclude that
this particular form of incentive is precisely the best one for
them. That is absurd.

In addition to the favorable accounting treatment of employee stock
options, there were also tax motivations to use them as a form of
compensation. First, although no cost had to be recorded for accounting
and financial reporting purposes, companies were able to take a deduction in computing taxable income, generally based on the spread
between the value of the stock issued to the employee upon exercise of
an option and the strike price paid by the employee to exercise the
option. Second, stock options were generally exempt from Internal
Revenue Code Section 162(m) that was enacted by Congress in 1994
and capped an employer’s annual tax deduction for compensation to an
employee at $1 million. Therefore, the use of stock options became a
preferred method of compensating senior executives.

6

Donald P. Delves, Stock Options and the New Rules of Corporate Accountability: Measuring,
Managing, and Rewarding Executive Performance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004, pp. 6–7.
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So, given these accounting and tax incentives, it is not surprising that
there was an explosion in the use of stock options by companies.
According to professors Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Aaron
Bernstein, authors of In the Company of Owners: The Truth about Stock
Options, from 1992 to 2001, the top 5 executives of the largest 1,500 U.S.
companies made $67 billion in gains from stock options. The authors
also reference a study by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System that found that if stock options had been expensed between
1995 and 2000, annual corporate earnings growth would have been 5
percent, not the reported 8.3 percent.7 Merrill Lynch estimated that had
options been expensed, earnings for the S&P 500 would have been 21
percent lower in 2001 and 39 percent lower in the IT sector.8
The use of stock options could result in reducing the reported earnings
per share of a company because the stock issued by a company to
satisfy stock option exercises or issuable to satisfy outstanding “in-themoney” stock options is counted in the denominator of the earnings per
share calculation. However, in order to eliminate or reduce this dilution
of earnings per share, some companies would engage in large-scale
purchases of their stock in the market, purchases of so called “treasury
stock” that reduce the number of shares counted in the earnings per
share calculation. In doing so, some companies, particularly some major
high-tech companies that made heavy use of stock options, were
expending a significant portion of their operating cash flow to purchase
treasury stock to meet stock option exercises.
Moreover, the failure to recognize compensation expense relating to
fixed-price employee stock options in determining reported earnings
had a number of harmful effects on investors and shareholders, in the
design of executive and employee compensation arrangements, on
corporate governance surrounding executive pay, and, perhaps most
importantly, on the efficient allocation of capital across the capital
markets and between companies and industry sectors. I summarized
these in a letter to Congressman Barney Frank, “Letter to Representative Barney Frank: May 10, 2004,” shown here in exhibit 3-1.

7

Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Aaron Bernstein, In the Company of Owners: The Truth
About Stock Options, Basic Books, 2003.
8
See Justin Lahart, “Bracing for an Earnings Hit.” CNN/Money. July 17, 2002, http://
money.cnn.com/2002/07/11/news/options/index.htm.
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Exhibit 3-1: Letter to Representative Barney
Frank: May 10, 2004
Via Facsimile
May 10, 2004
The Honorable Barney Frank
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Representative Frank:
At the May 4, 2004, hearing before the Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee of the Committee on
Financial Services you asked me a very appropriate and relevant
question—Who’s harmed by the current situation under which certain
employee stock options are not required to be expensed? The purpose
of this letter is to provide you with a more complete and yet concise
response to your question.
Investors and Shareholders
Many prominent investors, and financial, economic, and accounting
experts agree that the fixed plan employee stock option accounting
anomaly results in an absolute and relative distortion of profitability
and other key financial metrics. The greater the use of those instruments the greater the distortion. The distortion may mislead investors,
particularly, but not limited to, less sophisticated investors, and
footnote disclosures are not an adequate remedy.
Many also agree that the anomaly and related distortion was a
contributing factor to the stock market bubble, the severity of the
subsequent crash, and some of the recent high profile corporate
reporting scandals and subsequent bankruptcies. Those events resulted
in significant investor losses and an overall loss in investor confidence.
Many also agree that the anomaly encourages some companies to issue
an excessive amount of fixed plan employee stock options resulting in
an opaque transfer of economic value from shareholders to employees.
In order to maintain their stock price in the face of such dilution,
studies have shown that companies expend large amounts of cash on
stock buybacks that have absorbed much of their free cash flow. The
result is that there is less cash available for other purposes, such as
research and development or employee training, which may be more
beneficial to the long-term value of the company and its shareholders.
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Many, including prominent compensation experts, also agree that the
anomaly discourages companies from utilizing other forms of equitybased compensation that may be more beneficial to the long-term value
of the company and its shareholders, and that may have better incentive properties in terms of attracting, motivating, and retaining
employees, than fixed plan stock options. Examples often cited include
performance based-options and restricted stock.
Misallocation of Capital Across the Capital Markets and Between Companies
and Industry Sectors
Many prominent investors and financial and economic experts contend
that the fixed plan employee stock option accounting anomaly can result
in a misallocation of capital across the capital markets and between
companies and industry sectors. In effect, the biased and distorted
accounting creates an unlevel playing field that inappropriately favors
those companies that are the greatest users of fixed plan employee stock
options over other companies that have either chosen to compensate their
employees in different ways (including different forms of equity-based
compensation) or use fixed plan employee stock options but have
voluntarily elected to expense them. Thus, the overall effect may be a
diversion of investment and capital resources away from their most
efficient employment. As Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan recently
noted in commenting on this subject “we’re getting a distorted view as to
what the profitability of a particular operation is and you will get a
distortion in the allocation of capital.”
I hope this letter is responsive to your question. The attachments
include excerpts from articles and other materials addressing the above
points and other related points in more detail. I would be happy to
discuss any of those points with you or your staff, or provide
additional explanatory materials, at your request.
Sincerely,

Attachments
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Addressing the Accounting Issues in
the Face of Pressure Politics
One of the initial projects undertaken by the IASB in 2001 was the
accounting for stock-based compensation, or, as we called it (I was
member of the IASB at the time), accounting for share-based payment.
There were no existing International Accounting Standards in this area
at that time. In exploring the issues, the IASB concluded that employee
stock options should be accounted for as compensation and viewed the
fair-value-based method previously proposed by the FASB and used in
the United States for the footnote disclosures under FASB Statement
No. 123 to be a reasonable approach. The heightened focus on financial
reporting in the United States stemming from the reporting scandals of
2001–02 led a number of parties to question whether the existing
accounting for stock options had been a factor behind some of the
scandals and a causal factor in what was perceived by some as undesirable and reckless behavior by corporate executives seeking to reap a big
personal payday through the exercise of their stock options at inflated
prices for their company’s stock. So, there were calls from investors,
financial analysts, and others for changes in the accounting for
employee stock options.
During the second half of 2002, a number of U.S. public companies
announced they would start recognizing compensation cost for
employee stock options, including many major companies in the
financial services industry. Very notably, Microsoft, which had long
made heavy use of employee stock options, announced on July 8, 2003,
it would begin recording compensation expense relating to option
grants and would be moving more to the use of restricted stock instead
of options in its compensation plans. Then-Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Alan Greenspan spoke publicly about why he believed
compensation expense should be recorded for employee stock options,
stating the following in a May 3, 2002, speech to the Financial Markets
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta that was entirely
devoted to the subject of expensing of stock options:
The seemingly narrow accounting matter of option expensing is,
in fact, critically important for the accurate representation of
corporate performance. And accurate accounting, in turn, is
central to the functioning of free-market capitalism—the system
that has brought such a high level of prosperity to our country....
The estimation of earnings is difficult enough without
introducing biases into the calculation. I fear that the failure to
expense stock option grants has introduced a significant distortion in reported earnings—and one that has grown with the
increasing prevalence of this form of compensation.... To assume
that option grants are not an expense is to assume that the real
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resources that contributed to the creation of the value of the
output were free.... The particular instrument that is used to
transfer value in return for labor services is irrelevant. Its value
is not.... With an accounting system that is, or should be,
measuring the success or failure of corporate strategies, the
evolution of accounting rules is essential as the nature of our
economy changes. As the measurement needs change, rules must
change with them.

I remember thinking at the time that the fact that the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve had specifically chosen to make this accounting matter
the focus of a major speech evidenced the broader significance of
addressing this issue to the capital markets and economy.
At the same time, a number of other parties, principally from the hightech, biotech, and venture capital industries, continued to strongly
oppose a potential change in the accounting for employee stock
options. In November 2002, the IASB issued an exposure draft, Sharebased Payment, that proposed the expensing of stock options. That same
month, FASB issued Invitation to Comment, Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation: A Comparison of FASB Statement No. 123, and Its Related
Interpretations, and IASB Proposed IFRS, Share-based Payment, soliciting
input from constituents on whether the FASB should undertake a
project to reconsider the accounting for stock-based compensation,
including employee stock options. Although a majority of companies
that responded did not favor the FASB undertaking such a project,
many other parties, including most users of financial information,
believed that a second look was warranted and changes were needed.
Accordingly, in March 2003, the Board voted unanimously to add a
project to reconsider the accounting for stock-based compensation.
The Board did so expecting that the FASB would again likely face very
strong opposition from members of the high-tech, biotech, and venture
capital industries. Indeed, senior representatives of those industries
quickly made their views known to us, the SEC, and members of
Congress. They argued that the existing accounting was appropriate
and that recording compensation expense for fixed-price stock options
was flawed for a number of reasons, including that the real cost of
employee stock options was already captured via their potentially dilutive effect on earnings per share calculations and that it was impossible
to accurately value an employee stock option at the date it is granted.
They also maintained that their ability to grant employee stock options
without recording compensation expense was essential to the successful
operation of their business model, attracting and retaining key people,
and their ability to successfully innovate. As such, any changes to
accounting that discouraged the use of employee stock options would
have severe negative consequences on companies and industries that
were vital to the growth and vibrancy of the U.S. economy and on the
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competiveness of the United States in global markets. In other words, it
was very bad public policy. For example, the website of Cisco Systems,
a leading high-tech company that actively opposed the recognition of
compensation expense for employee stock options, included the following “Key Messages” on these public policy issues:
Broad-based stock option plans give employees at all levels a
chance to own a “piece of the rock” and increase productivity for
the company.
Options programs keep companies competitive in recruiting and
retention—especially needed in time of global competition for
engineering talent.
As other countries are graduating many more engineers and
math and science PhDs than the US—which lead to innovative
new technologies and research—stock options must remain a key
tool for recruitment and retention for companies.
Employee stock options fuel innovation and the entrepreneurial
spirit.
More countries are also recognizing that the promise of company
ownership motivates all workers. China, for example, has the
utilization of stock options at the center of its five-year economic
expansion plan.
Expensing stock options could lead to elimination or curtailment
of broad-based options plans.9

I had visited Silicon Valley many times and, while I was a member of
the Coopers & Lybrand (C&L) Boston office, worked on the audits of
“Route 128” technology companies. We had invested in venture capital
funds and start-ups in the C&L Partner Investment Funds. This had
given me an appreciation for the spirit of entrepreneurialism and
innovation among the players in these industries. I also gained genuine
admiration for the success of venture capital-backed companies in
developing many high-tech and biotech breakthroughs that have
greatly benefited our country and mankind and for their ability to grow
these companies into major corporations that have contributed to
overall job and wealth creation. So, I was not dismissing the public
policy arguments about the importance of employee stock options to
these sectors and, by extension, our economy and country. However, I
was deeply committed to the role of the FASB and accounting
standards in fostering financial reporting that faithfully reflects the
economics of transactions, to “tell it like it is” as best we can and
within cost-benefit constraints. That objective is aimed at fostering more
efficient and effective allocation of capital, a public policy goal that is
critical to a sound economy. Financial reporting is meant to be as
unbiased as possible and not to be purposefully skewed to favor or
9

See www.cisco.com/web/about/gov/archive/stock_options.html.
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disfavor a particular type of arrangement, specific companies, or
particular industries. Another way of stating this principle is that
accounting should not be used as a way of providing either a subsidy
or penalty for particular transactions, companies, or industries. So, I
believe my fellow Board members and I were determined, consistent
with our mission and public policy role, to continue our systematic,
careful, and thorough reconsideration of the accounting and financial
reporting issues relating to employee stock options and other forms of
stock-based compensation. That required us to carefully examine the
arguments for and against various potential accounting treatments of
employee stock options, including reviewing a number of alternatives
that would be presented to us by companies, academics, and others
during what became a very thorough and extensive two-year examination of these matters.
Just as the Board had experienced back in the 1990s, there were virtually constant efforts to discredit, delay, and derail our project. These
efforts were spearheaded under the rubric of the International
Employee Stock Options Coalition, “the Coalition” as they referred to
themselves. It was well-funded, included a number of industry groups
comprising the high-tech and other sectors, and employed various lobbyists and public relations professionals. They walked the halls of
Capitol Hill meeting with members of Congress, organized “fly-ins” of
CEOs and executives to lobby legislators, and helped place numerous
articles and op-ed pieces opposing our efforts.
Just prior to our public meeting in March 2003 to vote on whether to add
the project, we received the letters shown in exhibit 3-2, “Letters From
Senate and House of Representatives to the Financial Accounting
Standards Board on Employee Stock Options.” One of these letters was
from 15 members of the Senate urging us to proceed with caution in
undertaking a reconsideration of the accounting for employee stock
options. The other letter, similar to the first, was from 40 members of the
House of Representatives, and it also urged us to proceed with caution.
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Exhibit 3-2: Letters From Senate and House
of Representatives to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board on Employee
Stock Options*
March 7, 2003
Financial Accounting Standards Board
MP&T Director — File Reference 1101-001
401 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, CT 06856
Dear Board Members:
We are writing in response to the FASB’s Invitation to Comment on
accounting for stock options to express our concern that the process is
basically flawed because the Invitation to Comment specifically directed
respondents not to comment on whether stock options granted to
employees result in compensation expense for the issuing company.
As many of the comment letters that have been submitted make clear,
that is precisely the threshold question about which many experts
disagree. It seems quite odd to us that you would want your
respondents to pass over that crucial question. We would therefore urge
the FASB - consistent with the historical commitment to due process to carefully weigh the comments of those who nonetheless chose to
address it.
Investors need accurate, reliable and meaningful information to make
informed investment decisions. Accounting rules should reflect
accounting principles that are generally accepted within the accounting
profession, especially those that promote the disclosure, transparency,
comparability and reliability of financial statements.
We believe a mandatory expensing standard - such as that proposed by
the International Accounting Standards Board and apparently which is
under consideration by the FASB - may not meet these important tests.
Indeed, the comment letters submitted to the FASB thus far, as well as
other materials on the public record, strongly suggest that a mandatory
expensing standard will mislead investors with inaccurate information,
skew the financial picture of companies (particularly those with volatile
stock prices) and eviscerate broad-based stock options plans that are
vital to economic productivity and employee advancement.
...
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A recently published book, In the Company of Owners: The Truth About
Stock Options (And Why Every Employee Should Have Them) includes
extensive research showing that broad-based stock option plans, over
the past 20 years, enhanced productivity, spurred capital formation and
enhanced shareholder value. The authors, Rutgers University Professors
Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse and Business Week senior writer Aaron
Bernstein, describe the extraordinary degree to which high-tech
companies have “shared the wealth” with their employees, terming this
“partnership capitalism.” Their study of what they call the High Tech
100 - the 100 largest public companies that derive more than half their
sales from the Internet - shows that employees hold a 19 percent
ownership stake, which is more than the ownership stake held by
senior executives.
This study and others demonstrate that the widespread employee
ownership that defines broad-based stock option plans is good for
workers, good for investors and good for the economy. As Staples
wrote in its recent comment letter, “the role of stock options in the
phenomenal growth and success of Staples cannot be overstated. From
its founding, Staples has issued options as compensation for employees
deep into the organization. These options, and in particular this
egalitarian way of issuing them, were instrumental in providing the
entrepreneurial incentive to create a $12 billion company in only 15
years.” We encourage the FASB not to adopt accounting standards that
are likely to destroy this valuable tool.
...
In sum, timely, accurate and meaningful disclosures, coupled with
shareholder approval of all stock option plans, are the accounting and
corporate governance reforms that, in our view, will best serve investors. They are far better than mandatory expensing which will
effectively end the use of broad-based stock option plans and their
ability to contribute to increases in productivity, the expansion of
employee ownership, and to growing the economy.
Thank you for considering our views.
Sincerely,
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
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Mike Enzi, R-Wyo.
George Allen, R-Va.
Barbara Boxer, D-Calif.
Joe Lieberman, D-Conn.
John Warner, R-Va.
Patty Murray, D-Wash.
John Ensign, R-Nev.
Harry Reid, D-Nev.
Larry Craig, R-Idaho
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Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
Sen.

Maria Cantwell, D-Wash.
Conrad Burns, R-Mont.
Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich.
Pete Domenici, R-N.M.
Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.
Gordon Smith, R-Ore.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
January 30, 2003
Financial Accounting Standards Board
MP&T Director — File Reference 1101-001
401 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, Connecticut 06856
Dear Sir or Madam:
In response to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s recent Invitation to Comment on accounting for employee stock options, we write to
express our strong opposition to any proposal which would mandate
the expensing of broad-based stock option plans. We appreciate the
opportunity to provide our comments and request that FASB give its
highest consideration to them.
Events of the past year have eroded investor confidence and
contributed to significant concern about the adequacy of our laws, rules
and policies governing corporate oversight, financial reporting, and
accounting practices. Restoring investor trust, revitalizing our capital
markets, eliminating corporate fraud and abuse, and growing America’s
economy are objectives each of us shares.
We do not wish to set accounting standards. However, in light of the
proposed International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) standard
that would mandate the expensing of employee stock options, and
FASB’s close coordination with IASB, we believe it is important to
express our strong concerns about an approach that would limit
transparency, truthfulness and accuracy in financial reporting, precisely
at a time when America and its investors need these qualities the most.
The public interest will not be served by an accounting standard that
results in the disclosure of inaccurate corporate financial information
and a flawed picture of company performance.
It is apparent to us that a mandatory expensing standard lacks a clear
and widely accepted accounting rationale. Accounting experts have
vastly divergent views as to whether employee stock options should be
69

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

accounted for as a cost to be deducted from earnings. Many respected,
independent experts find that the “cost” of employee stock options is
already accounted for and disclosed to investors through diluted earnings per share. Investors would be better served by full and complete
disclosure of this diluted earnings per share number.
Additionally, pricing models currently available, such as Black-Scholes
or slight variations on it, were designed for entirely different kinds of
options that have little in common with employee stock options. The
same model can produce widely differing results depending on the
particular guesstimates a company decides to use. Highly subjective
numbers that are not reliable or meaningful are of no use to investors,
and in fact, hurt their ability to make informed decisions. We concur
with the view recently expressed by one expert that “[i]f anything,
expensing options may lead to an even more distorted picture of a
company’s economic position and cash flows than financial statements
currently paint.” (William Sahlman, Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, “Expensing Options Solves Nothing,”
Harvard Business Review, December 2002.)
Moreover, mandatory expensing would effectively destroy broad-based
stock option plans, which enhance financial opportunities for workers
at all levels, stimulating economic growth and productivity. Broadbased employee stock options plans play a vital role in America’s
economy, helping employees, shareholders, and companies alike. A
recent study found that broad-based plans - which grant options to
most, if not all, employees - have bestowed significant economic benefit
on tens of thousands of “rank and file” workers over the past two
decades, enhanced productivity, spurred capital formation, and fueled
the growth of some of our nation’s most innovative companies. The
Rutgers University researchers make a compelling case that such plans
are a form of “partnership capitalism,” that “makes most companies
more competitive and creates more wealth for shareholders.” (Blasi,
Kruse, and Bernstein, In the Company of Owners)
Commendably, FASB has just recently required more timely and
extensive disclosure of information about employee stock options. In
light of the serious negative consequences and dislocation likely to arise
from mandated expensing, it seems more prudent to allow the new
disclosures to work and perhaps, supplement them further with
additional and more investor-friendly information. Accurate, timely and
rigorous investor-friendly disclosures would do more to inform investor
decision-making than new overlapping mandates hastily applied.
Accounting principles that foster transparency, truthful and accurate
financial reporting, and meaningful disclosure are critically important
to help investors make informed investment decisions, and to foster
efficient and growing capital markets. We support accounting principles
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that serve the public interest in this way, and we do not think a mandatory expensing standard meets this test.
At a time when our government is searching for new ways to stimulate
the economy, we need a clear vision about the importance of broadbased stock option plans to the nation’s entrepreneurial soul and the
workers and investors who are part of it. We should adopt policies that
encourage and expand the availability of broad-based stock option
plans, not destroy them.
Sincerely,
Reps. David Dreier, Anna G. Eshoo, Darrell Issa, Jay Inslee, Joseph
Crowley, Adam Smith, Dennis Moore, Zoe Lofgren, Carolyn McCarthy,
Gary Miller, Cal Dooley, Jerry Weller, Pete Sessions, Ron Kind, Jennifer
Dunn, Mike Honda, Rick Boucher, Bob Goodlatte, Lamar Smith, Tom
Davis, J.D. Hayworth, Jane Harman, Doug Ose, David Wu, Joe Barton,
Rick Larsen, Amo Houghton, Dennis Cardoza, Steve Israel, George
Nethercutt, Darlene Hooley, John Boehner, Mike Simpson, Greg Walden,
C.L. “Butch” Otter, Jeff Flake, Chris Cannon, John Carter, Heather
Wilson, Bob Etheridge
*

http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2003/3/enzi----fasb-stock-options-process-isflawed; Office of Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA).

Soon after we began our deliberations on the issues, I was asked to
participate in a roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C., on May 8,
2003. Although not an official Congressional hearing, the event was
sponsored by Senators Michael Enzi, George Allen, and Barbara Boxer
and was titled “Partnership Capitalism Through Stock Options for
America’s Workforce.” I recall Senators Enzi and Allen and Representative Anna Eshoo being at the event and making strong statements
against any expensing of stock options. I was accompanied by my
fellow Board member Mike Crooch, and apart from us and Acting SEC
Chief Accountant Jack Day, most of the other participants were from
the Coalition or parties that opposed stock option expensing: John
Doerr, a well-known venture capitalist from Kleiner Perkins, senior
executives from technology companies, a NASDAQ official, and some
lobbyists. At one point, Tom Stemberg, the CEO of Staples, made a
cameo appearance, extolling the virtues of stock options. In short, the
event seemed to have been carefully staged to try to attack and embarrass FASB. Mike and I, with the help of Jack Day, attempted to explain
the reasons behind the project and our planned thorough due process
and to respond to some of the inaccurate assertions made about our
process and motives. For example, in response to Senator Allen’s
contention that nobody knew how to value employee stock options, I
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pointed out that for many years, they had been required to be valued
and those values reported in the audited footnotes to the financial statements of public companies.
The May 9, 2003, article “Lawmakers, CEOs Criticize FASB for Options
Move” in Accountancy reported, “It was billed as a roundtable, but
seemed more like a boxing ring Thursday as lawmakers and CEOs
rained verbal blows on America’s accounting rulemaker for moving
towards a requirement to expense stock options. Robert Herz,
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, left the Capitol
Hill hearing room bloody but unbowed, saying he would proceed with
the effort to develop new rules on stock option expensing.”
Many Congressional hearings10 by various committees in the House
and Senate were to follow, and we continued to receive letters
regarding the stock compensation project from individual members of
the House and Senate and from groups of Representatives and Senators. A list of all open letters about this project can be found on the
FASB website.11
During the course of our project, various bills drafted by the Coalition
were introduced into the House and Senate that were aimed at blocking
or delaying us in issuing a requirement to record compensation expense
for employee stock options. One of the first of these bills, the BroadBased Stock Option Plan Transparency Act of 2003, was introduced into
the House of Representatives in March 2003. Although this bill would
have required a number of new disclosures in SEC filings relating to
employee stock options, it would also have prohibited the SEC from
recognizing as generally accepted accounting principles any new
accounting standards regarding the treatment of stock options for a
period of more than three years. This would give the Department of
10

5/8/03: “Preserving Partnership Capitalism through Stock Options for America’s Workforce.”
Senate Roundtable (Enzi, Allen, Boxer).
6/3/03: “Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options.” House. Financial Services Committee. Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee
(Baker).
11/12/03: “The Financial Accounting Standards Board and Small Business Growth.” Senate.
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. Securities and Investment Subcommittee
(Enzi).
4/20/04: “Oversight Hearing on Expensing Stock Options: Supporting and Strengthening the
Independence of the FASB.” Senate. Governmental Affairs Committee. Financial Management,
the Budget and International Security Subcommittee.
4/28/04: “The Impact of Stock Option Expensing on Small Business.” Senate. Small Business
and Entrepreneurship Committee (Snowe/Enzi).
5/4/04: “The FASB Stock Options Proposal: Its Effect on the U.S. Economy and Jobs.”
House. Financial Services Committee. Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises Subcommittee (Baker).
7/8/04: “FASB Proposals on Stock Options Expensing and HR 3574, the Stock Option
Accounting Reform Act” House. Energy and Commerce Committee. Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection Subcommittee.
11
See www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&
project_id=1101-001.
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Commerce time to conduct a study on the economic impacts of the new
standard, particularly on the high-tech and other high-growth
industries, of broad-based employee stock option plans on job creation
and employee retention, innovation, and U.S. competiveness. In other
words, the bill would have imposed a lengthy moratorium on any
changes in accounting for employee stock options. In my testimony on
June 3, 2003, before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House Committee on
Financial Services, I explained why we strongly opposed the BroadBased Stock Option Plan Transparency Act of 2003:
First, the moratorium would unduly intervene in the Board’s
independent, objective, and open process to make unbiased decisions on the substance and timing of improvements to the
accounting for stock-based compensation. Such intervention
would be in direct conflict with the expressed needs and
demands of many investors and other users of financial
reports.... Second, the moratorium would have an adverse impact
on the FASB’s efforts to achieve timely convergence of highquality international accounting standards on stock-based
compensation. The FASB is actively working with the
International Accounting Standards Board and other national
standard setters to achieve convergence in this important area
and in other areas.... Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
moratorium would establish a potentially dangerous precedent
in that it would send a clear and unmistakable signal that
Congress is willing to intervene in accounting standard setting.
That signal would likely prompt others to seek political intervention in the future activities of the FASB. We have all witnessed
the devastating effects and loss of investor confidence in
financial reporting that have resulted from companies intentionally violating or manipulating accounting requirements. What
impact then on the system, and on investors’ trust in financial
reports, might there be if it were perceived that accounting
standard setting was being biased toward the pursuit of objectives other those relating to the fair financial reporting or that the
FASB was being blocked from pursuing improvements in
financial reporting?

This was one of many bills introduced into Congress designed to stop
our efforts on improving the accounting for stock-based compensation
and one of the many Congressional hearings that would be held on this
subject. Notwithstanding all these ongoing pressure tactics, we carried
on with our thorough, public due process on the project. Between
March 2003 and March 2004, when we issued the exposure draft of the
proposed standard for public comment, we systematically discussed the
issues relating to accounting for stock-based compensation arrangements at a total of 39 public Board meetings and met with many
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companies, industry organizations, employee benefit plan consultants,
auditors, investors, and other interested parties to discuss the issues.
We issued the exposure draft Share-Based Payment on March 31, 2004,
with a comment period ending June 30, 2004. It provided an overall set
of principles in accounting for share-based payments and included a
significant amount of specific guidance covering a variety of arrangements, including employee stock options. As the Board had done back
in the 1990s (and consistent with the IASB’s new standard issued in
February 2004), the March 2004 FASB exposure draft proposed
eliminating the no compensation expense exception for the fixed-price
employee stock options. We received more than 14,000 comment letters,
the vast majority of them form letters. There were thousands of form
letters from employees of companies opposed to the expensing of stock
options and also thousands of form letters from trade union members
supporting our proposal. Exhibit 3-3, “March 2004 Financial Accounting
Standards Board Exposure Draft Comment Letter Samples,” shows a
sample form letter in support of our efforts and a sample form letter
opposed to the project. The business press abounded with articles and
commentaries on the subject. The FASB website has a list of all letters
concerning this project.12

12

See www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&
project_id=1102-100&page_number=1.
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Exhibit 3-3: March 2004 Financial
Accounting Standards Board Exposure Draft
Comment Letter Samples
Form Letter: Make Companies Put Stock Options on the Books.
Letter of Comment No: 5903
File Reference: 1102·100
June 27, 2004 2:51 PM
Director, Major Projects and Technical Activities Financial Accounting
Standards Board
File Reference No. 1102-100
Share-Based Payment; an amendment of FASB Statements No. 123 and
95
Norwalk, CT 06856-5116
Subject: Make Companies Put Stock Options on Books
Dear Director, Major Projects and Technical Activities Standards Board:
I strongly support your proposal to require companies to expense stock
options. Not expensing stock options has promoted their overuse in
CEO pay against the long-term interests of shareholders. For example, I
believe stock options provided a financial incentive for Enron executives to cook the books.
The retirement savings of America’s working families depend in part
on all companies, including small businesses and start-ups, having
honest accounting practices. Companies that do not expense stock
options are hiding their true cost from investors, creditors and other
consumers of financial reports. In my opinion, stock option compensation should not receive preferential accounting treatment.
In conclusion, I urge you to require stock option expensing as soon as
possible. Independent experts, such as the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, should set the standards on stock option expensing,
not the politicians in Washington. Stock options are a compensation
expense, and this cost can be reliably estimated using your proposed
accounting method. I believe corporate executives should be ashamed
for trying to hide the cost of stock options from their investors.
cc:
Senator Richard Shelby
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Form Letter: Silicon Valley Bank
Letter of Comment No: 5599
File Reference: 1102-100
Dear Mr. Director,
I’m writing today to request that you reject the expensing of Stock
Options as a FASB policy.
75% of my colleagues at Silicon Valley Bank participate in either our
employee stock option program or our Employee Stock Purchase Plan
(ESPP). It’s no wonder why we often refer to ourselves not merely as
employees, but as the “employee-owners” of Silicon Valley Bank[.]
Like many innovative companies in Silicon Valley and across the
country, SVB has long embraced the ideal of employee ownership—via
options or an ESPP—as a way for individuals to benefit directly from
their contributions to the company’s success.
Having said that, today the future of such broad-based employee
ownership stands in jeopardy. It’s for that reason that I’m writing today.
In response to the March 31, 2004 Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s Exposure Draft, the Share-Based Payment and Amendment of
FASB Statements No. 123 and 95, I respectfully request the FASB to
reconsider its position.
Employee stock options and Employee Stock Purchase Plans make me
feel like I have a stake in the success of Silicon Valley Bank, and they
motivate me to work harder. I believe that if SVB is forced to expense
all employee stock options and ESPPs, my company might no longer
offer such programs to the majority of employees. This would
negatively impact morale, productivity, and innovation.
In addition, expensing stock options and ESPPs is bad accounting. The
potential dilution of each investor’s share of company ownership is the
real cost of employee stock options. It’s a cost that is already reflected in
“diluted earnings per share” estimates in company financial statements.
In fact, there is no accurate, reliable, and consistent way to value
employee stock options. Many leading economists believe that investors
will not be well served by the misleading “guesstimates” produced by
current option valuation formulas.
In closing, I’d like to once again urge the FASB to reconsider its position on this important issue. Broad-based stock option plans and ESPPs
enhance productivity, increase shareholder value and benefit employees.
Broad-based plans should be encouraged, not eliminated.
Respectfully,
[Names omitted]
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Congress held four separate hearings related to the proposal between
April 2004 and July 2004. I testified at each of these hearings, in some
cases together with a fellow board member. In July 2004, the House of
Representatives took up consideration of the Stock Option Accounting
Reform Act. It proposed that compensation expense be recorded only
for stock options granted to the company’s CEO and the four other
most highly compensated employees and then only to the extent of the
intrinsic value of the options granted to those five people. I testified at
a hearing on July 8, 2004, of the Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, explaining the many reasons we opposed the Stock Option
Accounting Reform Act. Rick White, a former member of Congress,
Chairman of the International Employee Stock Options Coalition, and
then president and CEO of TechNet, a group of executives from
technology companies, testified in support of the Stock Option
Accounting Reform Act, stating the following in his testimony:
One issue that has come up and several members have
mentioned it, and I also think Chairman Herz mentioned it
several times in his testimony, is whether it is appropriate for the
Congress even to be involved in this effort. I want to make sure
that people understand how important it is that Congress should
be involved. There are some things that we let experts decide in
our society, but there are some things we don’t let them decide.
There are some good reasons for that. We let engineers decide
how to get a spaceship to the Moon, we let lawyers decide how
a contract should be written, but we don’t let them decide
whether we go to the Moon, we don’t let them decide whether a
contact should be formed. Those are decisions that we reserve to
others. The reason is that experts are great in their specific area
of expertise but sometimes that high expertise may prevent them
from focusing on the bigger picture. I would submit that is really
the problem we have here ... and I think it reveals a flaw at least
in the way that Chairman Herz looks at our system.... The point
of accounting standards are to accomplish things that this committee thinks is important, not just to further accounting theory. I
would submit to you that if the FASB came up with an
accounting theory that made sense to accounting professors but
has a really negative impact on the economy, that is something
the committee would want to look at.

In other words, because of the broader economic significance of this
issue, Congress should intervene and ensure that the accounting for
stock options continues to be distorted to favor companies in particular
industries. This kind of public policy argument is often raised by
opponents of proposed changes in accounting standards. They argue
that their industry is vital to the U.S. economy and that the proposed
accounting change will negatively affect the ability of the companies in
their industry to successfully grow and employ more people—
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arguments that understandably find support in Congress. As I previously explained, sound, “neutral” accounting standards that are not
purposefully skewed to favor particular arrangements or specific
companies and industries are also a very important public policy objective, one that I and others involved in accounting standard-setting work
hard to articulate, protect, and defend.
Shortly before the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act was to be voted
on by the House, Warren Buffett wrote an op-ed piece ridiculing the bill
and pointing out the absurdity of its provisions, stating
Until now the record for mathematical lunacy by a legislative
body has been held by the Indiana House of Representatives,
which in 1897 decreed by vote of 67 to 0 that pi—the ratio of the
circumference of a circle to its diameter—would no longer be
3.14159 but instead be 3.2 .... What brings this episode to mind is
that the U.S. House of Representatives is about to consider a bill
that, if passed, could cause the mathematical lunacy record to
move east from Indiana. First the bill decrees that a coveted form
of corporate pay—stock options—be counted as an expense
when these go to the chief executive and the other four highestpaid officers in a company, but be disregarded as an expense
when they are issued to other employees in the company. Second
the bill says that when a company is calculating the expense of
options issued to the mighty five, it shall assume that stock
prices never fluctuate. Give the bill’s proponents an A for
imagination ... and a flat-out F for logic.... The House’s anointment of itself as the ultimate scorekeeper for investors, it should
be noted, comes from an institution that in its own affairs favors
Enronesque accounting.... If the House should ignore this logic
and legislate that what is an expense for five is not an expense
for thousands, there is reason to believe the Senate—like the
Indiana Senate 107 years ago—will prevent this folly from
becoming law. Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), chairman of the
Senate Banking Committee, has firmly declared that accounting
rules should be set by accountants, not by legislators. Even so,
House members who wish to escape the scorn of historians
should render the Senate’s task moot by killing the bill
themselves.13

Nevertheless and notwithstanding an April 2004 report by the Congressional Budget Office supporting our proposal, on July 20, 2004, the bill
passed the House of Representatives by a 312-111 vote. I was disappointed but not surprised. It was an election year, and by all accounts,
the lobbyists for the Coalition had mounted a full-court press on
members of the House of Representatives.

13
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The Coalition then focused on the Senate. In early September 2004, the
Stock Option Accounting Reform Act was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (the Banking Committee), but the Banking Committee never took any action on that bill
or on other bills designed to block our efforts. I believe that was due in
large measure to the strong support we received from Chairman of the
Banking Committee, Senator Richard Shelby, and Ranking Member of
the Banking Committee, Senator Paul Sarbanes. Both were quite clear in
their support, not only for our project but, most importantly, on the
importance of our being able to conduct our due process in an
independent and unbiased way. I recall going to see Senator Shelby to
discuss our work, and I recall his saying in his rich Southern accent
words to the effect, “I agree with you, and I will not budge in my support.” Indeed, he did not budge in his support. For example, in an
op-ed piece, Chairman Shelby stated the following:
An assault is underway to convince Congress that it should
block the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s proposed rule
requiring companies to expense employee stock options.... On
Capitol Hill, some have responded to this pronouncement with
renewed legislative efforts to undercut FASB’s authority and
politicize the rule-making process. These are counter to the
health of our financial markets. The preservation of FASB’s
independence is fundamental to maintaining transparent,
competitive and liquid markets.... The success of FASB depends
on its ability to remain insulated from the political process. If
attempts are made to negate the long-term benefit of its rules by
focusing on short-term consideration, then investors and our
markets will suffer. Our markets are the envy of the world in
large part because investors trust the financial information they
receive. Congress should preserve this trust, stay out of FASB’s
rulemaking, and let the experts do their job.14

We also received strong support from others in the Senate, including
Senators McCain, Durbin, Levin, and Fitzgerald. Throughout the course
of the project and the attacks on us and our due process, Bob Denham,
Chairman of the Financial Accounting Foundation trustees; SEC
Chairman Bill Donaldson; SEC Chief Accountant Don Nicolaisen; and
SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Scott Taub stood shoulder to shoulder
with us. We also received public support from much of the accounting
profession and from a number of prominent figures—including Alan
Greenspan, Paul Volcker, Warren Buffett, and then-U.S. Comptroller
General David Walker—from many organizations, including the
Council of Institutional Investors, the CFA Institute, the Investment
Company Institute, Financial Executives International, the AFL-CIO and
many trade unions, and AICPA. Along with that support, several other
factors were crucial in our ability to conduct the project in a thorough,
14

See footnote 1.
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systematic, and objective manner. For one, the IASB had been able to
issue a standard15 requiring the recognition of expense relating to
grants of employee stock options without the same type of opposition
we faced in the United States. Also, very importantly, was the
determination of all my Board members to properly fulfill our mission
and the excellent work of our staff, including Michael Tovey, the FASB
manager on this project, and Sue Bielstein, FASB director of major
projects. As well, Jeff Mahoney, our Washington, D.C., representative,
was tireless in his efforts to keep policymakers informed about the
project and our due process. That included holding 4 public
roundtables on the exposure draft, including 2 in Silicon Valley, and 21
public Board meetings and meetings with our advisory groups and
with groups of constituents to discuss the exposure draft and other
input on the project, resulting in the issuance of FASB Statement No.
123 (revised 2004).16 It required the recording of compensation expense
relating to all forms of stock-based compensation and became effective
starting in 2005. As part of the process, we spent a considerable amount
of time and effort examining potential alternatives for nonpublic entities and developing a simplified method that they could use to estimate
the value and resulting compensation cost for equity instruments
granted to their employees. For public companies, our standard was
supplemented by guidance issued by the SEC staff in Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 107 based on some very good work done by the Office of
the Chief Accountant with the Office of Economic Analysis.17
I devoted an entire chapter to this subject for a couple of reasons. First,
at the technical accounting level, the subject of accounting for stock
options is an interesting and important one. Second and more
importantly, because I believe that in order to preserve the integrity of
accounting standard setting and public confidence in it and in reported
financial information, it was very important that we saw the project
through to issuing a new standard requiring that compensation cost be
recognized for all forms of employee stock awards, including stock
options, and that we were able to maintain our thorough and open due
process, even in the face of what were very strong attempts to achieve a
different outcome through political means. Those results were
important ones for the U.S. financial reporting system, for investors and
the capital markets, and for the FASB being able to sustain the
convergence effort with the IASB. As Professor J. Edward Ketz observed
in the “Accounting Cycle” column on SmartPros.com in January 2005
about the importance of FASB prevailing in this matter,
15

International Financial Reporting Standard 2, Share-based Payment.
Share-Based Payment, in December 2004 (now codified in FASB ASC 718, Compensation—Stock
Compensation).
17
See also Office of Economic Analysis Memorandum, Economic Perspective on Employee Option
Expensing: Valuation and Implementation of FAS 123(R).
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If Congress does indeed pass the bill [referring to the Stock Option
Accounting Reform Act] and the president signs it into law, then
one wonders about the future of FASB. Other managers and directors and their professional advisers might rise up on other
subjects, those that are disconcerting to them. Congress might pass
even more legislation.... FASB might as well close its doors. On the
other hand, the Congress might not overturn Statement 123. FASB
might then grow a bit bolder and begin to think about some other
issues that need attention. The investment community would be
well served with improvements dealing with pensions, leases and
special purpose entities, to name a few. While the disclosures of
off-balance sheet items have improved of late, good disclosures do
not substitute for bad accounting.

I also believe that some other good things came out of this episode,
including the establishment of a Small Business Advisory Committee.
The idea of creating such a group was posed to me by Senator Enzi at a
Senate hearing in November 2003. It was a good suggestion that we
quickly implemented, establishing a Small Business Advisory Committee that I believe has provided and continues to provide excellent
input and advice to the FASB on reporting issues and concerns relating
to small and privately held businesses. So, although I disagreed with
Senator Enzi’s views on accounting for employee stock options, I very
much admire his passion for the small businesses of this country.
Perhaps most importantly, I think the intense debate surrounding this
controversial topic and our ability to withstand the strong attempts at
political intervention into our standard-setting process helped create a
greater awareness and appreciation of the importance of sound
accounting and financial reporting and broader support for
independent accounting standard setting. So, when we tackled other
important and controversial issues, such as requiring in FASB Statement
No. 15818 that the unfunded status of defined pension and retiree
medical plans be shown squarely on the sponsoring company’s balance
sheet, although there were parties that strongly opposed the change,
they did not seek to try to block it through political means. Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 5, “The Financial Crisis,” the independence
of accounting standard setting was again to be tested during the
financial crisis of 2008–09.

18

Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans—an amendment
of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R), issued in 2006 and now codified in FASB ASC
715, Compensation—Retirement Benefits.
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The Urge to Converge and Wherefore
IFRS?
Clearly, the growth of cross-border investing and capital flows
and a growing endorsement of international standards in many
parts of the world mean that, on the one hand, the U.S. cannot
go it alone in terms of development of accounting standards,
and, on the other hand, the development of international
accounting standards across the major capital markets of the
world requires that the U.S. be a very active participant in the
process, for there can be no truly international accounting
standards if the largest capital market in the world, the U.S., is
not part of their development.1

As I briefly discussed in chapter 2, “Charting Course,” international
convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS was one of the three strategic
objectives we pursued following my joining the FASB in 2002. However,
the question was, “How should we pursue this objective?” There were
many possibilities. For example, should it be a unilateral effort on the
part of the FASB to try to move U.S. standards toward the existing
international standards? Should we try to get the IASB to consider
moving its standards toward U.S. GAAP? Should we try to agree on
some sort of bilateral program of convergence between the two boards? If
so, should it mainly involve trying to converge our existing standards, or
should it look more to developing new joint standards?
1

Robert H. Herz in a November 5, 2002, speech at the Financial Executive International’s
annual conference on Current Financial Reporting Issues.
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What Does the Law Require?
Here, I believe the wording in Section 108 of Sarbanes-Oxley provided
some guidance in addressing these questions. That section of SarbanesOxley stipulates that, among other activities, the designated U.S.
standard setter “considers, in adopting accounting principles, ... the
extent to which international convergence on high quality accounting
standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors.” There are a number of important words and
phrases in this clause, including “considers,” “extent to which,” “high
quality accounting standards,” and “in the public interest and for the
protection of investors.” Clearly, although the language in Section 108
requires the U.S. accounting standard setter to consider international
convergence as part of its standard-setting activities, it does not require
the achievement of international convergence. Rather, it requires the
U.S. standard setter to consider the merits of convergence. In doing so,
it places that consideration in the context of the standards being of high
quality and necessary or appropriate to the public interest and for the
protection of investors. Because this is U.S. law that applies to the SEC
and any standard setter the SEC designates as a source of authoritative
U.S. GAAP for SEC registrants, it seems that the words “in the public
interest and for the protection of investors” should be considered in the
U.S. context (that is, in the context of the U.S. public interest and for the
protection of U.S. investors). Of course, that does not mean that
international convergence and the resulting converged standards could
not also be a good thing for global investors and international capital
markets. They could be good both for the United States and the
international community.

Views of Standard Setters on
International Convergence
Beyond that, the words in Sarbanes-Oxley do not appear to specify how
the U.S. standard setter should go about its consideration of the merits
of international convergence. The legislation appears to leave that to the
standard setter, with oversight from the SEC. In that regard, the SEC,
FASB, and FAF had publicly supported the goal of developing a single
set of high-quality international accounting standards. In 1999, the
FASB and FAF had issued International Accounting Standard Setting: A
Vision for the Future. Although clearly supporting the objective of a
single set of high-quality accounting standards, it also conveyed the
FASB’s and FAF’s intention to maintain a leadership role in standard
setting to ensure that the standards used in the U.S. capital markets,
whether developed by the FASB or an international body, would be of
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the highest possible quality. That document also identified what the
FASB and the FAF viewed as essential functions and characteristics of a
high-quality global accounting standard-setting organization. The document identified a set of eight essential functions that the FASB and FAF
believed should be embodied by a high-quality international accounting
standard setter:
1. Leadership
2. Innovation
3. Relevance
4. Responsiveness
5. Objectivity
6. Acceptability
7. Understandability
8. Accountability
It also identified a set of minimum characteristics needed for an
international accounting standard setter to achieve the eight essential
functions, including having an independent decision-making body,
adequate due process, adequate staff, independent fund-raising, and
independent oversight. As noted in the introduction,
Financial reporting and accounting standard setting are not
immune to the changing times. We are beginning to see the
emergence of a truly international accounting system—the
emergence of international-level organizations and cooperative
ventures among national organizations in the areas of accounting
standard setting and financial statement preparation, auditing,
regulation, and analysis—to deal effectively with the merging of
national and international financial reporting issues.

The FASB-FAF document was issued at a time when the future
structure of international accounting standard setting was under
broader discussion. IASC—which since its establishment in 1973 had
developed and promulgated a set of international accounting
standards—had formed a Strategy Working Party in 1997 to develop
recommendations on potential changes and reforms to the existing
IASC structure and process. In December 1998, that group issued a
discussion paper, Shaping IASC for the Future, proposing a number of
reforms to the IASC structure and process. There was also ongoing
discussion between major capital markets securities regulators, most
notably the SEC and the European Commission, about the structure
and process for international accounting standard setting. All of this
ultimately led to the establishment in 2000 of the new IASB and its
oversight body of independent trustees that reflected a number of the
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ideas set forth in the 1999 FASB-FAF document on the future of
international accounting standard setting.
I was one of the members of the IASB when it commenced operations
in 2001. A key element of our strategy was to promote and facilitate
international convergence of accounting standards by working with the
national accounting standard-setting bodies of major countries. In
appointing the initial members of the IASB, the IASC trustees
designated seven of the new Board members to act as official liaisons to
the national standard-setting bodies of Australia and New Zealand,
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. The role of each of these liaison members was to enhance
cooperation between the IASB and the national standard setter. Jim
Leisenring, who had been a long-time FASB staff and Board member,
was appointed as the IASB liaison with the FASB.
Consistent with the 1999 FASB-FAF vision document, the FASB
recognized that as the accounting standard setter for the world’s largest
capital market and national economy, its support of, and participation
in international convergence efforts were important to and made sense
for both the United States and the goal of achieving common, highquality accounting standards around the world. Following the establishment of the IASB (and before I arrived at the FASB), the FASB formed
an internal strategic planning group to evaluate how best the Board and
staff could work with the new IASB. One result of that effort was that
in 2001, the FASB revised its operating procedures to require, in addition to the existing criteria for evaluating potential agenda projects,
assessment of the extent to which a potential new project would
provide opportunities for convergence with the IASB and other national
standard setters.
Very importantly, the strategic planning group also concluded that the
best way to maximize the FASB’s ability to simultaneously meet its U.S.
responsibilities and participate in international convergence in a
meaningful way would be through coordinating the agendas of the
FASB and the IASB as much as possible and, as appropriate, to
undertake joint projects with the IASB. By doing so, the FASB might be
able to both improve U.S. standards and achieve convergence between
U.S. GAAP and internationals standards. In cases when it was not possible to undertake a project jointly, the FASB would decide on a caseby-case basis whether other methods of international cooperation might
be feasible and desirable. For example, in the case of projects on the
FASB agenda but not on the IASB agenda, the FASB could specifically
seek input from the IASB, and vice versa.
As part of the cooperative arrangements between the IASB and its
partner standard setters, including the FASB, a framework for
monitoring IASB projects was established. From the FASB’s perspective,
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monitoring IASB projects could help the FASB better consider
international perspectives in its projects. Additionally, this monitoring
would facilitate earlier identification of possible areas of convergence
and divergence with international standards and could enhance FASB
staff knowledge of international standards and help strengthen relationships between the staffs of the two boards. Accordingly, when the initial
monitoring assignments were made, FASB staff were assigned to
monitor a number of the IASB’s projects.
The various partner standard setters also agreed to monitor the activities of the IASB’s International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) to try to promote convergence between the guidance
promulgated by IFRIC and interpretative guidance issued by national
interpretive bodies, such as the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) in
the United States, through cross-monitoring by IFRIC and the national
interpretative bodies. That would be particularly important in the case
of converged standards in order to avoid divergence in application of
such standards. However, it was also recognized that there might well
be differences in interpretations and application guidance in cases
where the national standard and IFRS were not converged.

The Norwalk Agreement
All these matters had been discussed and agreed upon between the
FASB, IASB, and major national standard setters by the time I joined the
FASB in July 2002 and before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. However, I
believe my arrival at the FASB and our strategic planning discussions
that summer lent extra momentum to the cooperative efforts between the
FASB and the IASB. In September 2002, the two boards held their first
joint meeting in the FASB’s office in Norwalk, Connecticut. At that
meeting, the FASB and the IASB both publicly affirmed their commitment to developing high-quality, “compatible” accounting standards that
could be used for both domestic and cross-border financial reporting.
Both boards also committed to using their best efforts to make their
standards compatible as soon as practicable and, once achieved, to work
to maintain the compatibility of those standards. Following the meeting,
in October 2002, the FASB and the IASB issued a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), referred to as the Norwalk Agreement (exhibit
4-1), formally documenting their mutual commitments to work together
in developing high-quality compatible accounting standards.2 The
Norwalk Agreement focused on four key points: (1) eliminating a
number of targeted differences between existing U.S. GAAP and IFRS, (2)
2

Financial Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting Standards Board
Memorandum of Understanding at www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&
blobwhere=1175819018817&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&
blobtable=MungoBlobs and reprinted as exhibit 4-1, “The Norwalk Agreement,” of this chapter.
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coordinating the future agendas of the two boards, (3) continuing the
existing joint projects and undertaking new ones on substantive topics,
and (4) encouraging coordination of activities between the EITF and
IFRIC. In a joint FASB and IASB news release, we commented on the
need for such a partnership:
Robert H. Herz, Chairman of the FASB, commented, “The FASB
is committed to working toward the goal of producing highquality reporting standards worldwide to support healthy global
capital markets. By working with the IASB on the short-term
convergence project—as well as on longer-term issues—the
chances of success are greatly improved. Our agreement provides
a clear path forward for working together to achieve our
common goal.”
Hailing the agreement, Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the
IASB, remarked, “This underscores another significant step in
our partnership with national standard setters to reach a truly
global set of accounting standards. While we recognize that there
are many challenges ahead, I am extremely confident now that
we can eliminate major differences between national and
international standards, and by drawing on the best of U.S.
GAAP, IFRS and other national standards, the world’s capital
markets will have a set of global accounting standards that
investors can trust.”3

3

October 29, 2002, news release, FASB and IASB Agree to Work Together toward Convergence of
Global Accounting Standards. www.fasb.org/news/nr102902.shtml.
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Exhibit 4-1: The Norwalk Agreement
Memorandum of Understanding
“The Norwalk Agreement”
At their joint meeting in Norwalk, Connecticut, USA on September 18,
2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) each acknowledged
their commitment to the development of high-quality, compatible
accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and crossborder financial reporting. At that meeting, both the FASB and IASB
pledged to use their best efforts to (a) make their existing financial
reporting standards fully compatible as soon as is practicable and (b) to
coordinate their future work programs to ensure that once achieved,
compatibility is maintained.
To achieve compatibility, the FASB and IASB (together, the “Boards”)
agree, as a matter of high priority, to:
a) undertake a short-term project aimed at removing a variety of
individual differences between U.S. GAAP and International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, which include International
Accounting Standards, IASs);
b) remove other differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP that will
remain at January 1, 2005, through coordination of their future
work programs; that is, through the mutual undertaking of
discrete, substantial projects which both Boards would address
concurrently;
c) continue progress on the joint projects that they are currently
undertaking; and,
d) encourage their respective interpretative bodies to coordinate
their activities.
The Boards agree to commit the necessary resources to complete such a
major undertaking.
The Boards agree to quickly commence deliberating differences identified for resolution in the short-term project with the objective of
achieving compatibility by identifying common, high-quality solutions.
Both Boards also agree to use their best efforts to issue an exposure
draft of proposed changes to U.S. GAAP or IFRS that reflect common
solutions to some, and perhaps all, of the differences identified for
inclusion in the short-term project during 2003.
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As part of the process, the IASB will actively consult with and seek the
support of other national standard setters and will present proposals to
standard setters with an official liaison relationship with the IASB, as
soon as is practical.
The Boards note that the intended implementation of IASB’s IFRS in
several jurisdictions on or before January 1, 2005 require that attention
be paid to the timing of the effective dates of new or amended
reporting requirements. The Boards’ proposed strategies will be
implemented with that timing in mind.

The September 2002 meeting was the first of what would be many joint
public meetings between the two boards. At first, the meetings were
held twice per year for two or three days at a time. Then, in 2006, that
was expanded to three times per year. Since October 2009, the boards
have been meeting jointly most months and sometimes multiple times
during a month, either in person or via teleconference. The boards also
have held numerous joint public roundtables and other meetings, and
there are frequent meetings between groups of board members and staff
on joint projects.
My recollection about the particular wording of the Norwalk Agreement is that the word compatible accounting standards, instead of joint,
converged, or common accounting standards, was used in recognition that
what mattered most was that the standards should result in the same or
similar financial reporting outcomes. It also recognized the practical
challenges in producing identical standards. Nevertheless, the objective
was refined at our joint meeting in April 2004 when the boards agreed
that, ideally, the FASB and IASB would work together to develop any
major future accounting standards, with both boards issuing the same
standard or very similar ones.

Short-Term Convergence Projects
The first aspect of the Norwalk Agreement involved the boards
undertaking a number of projects aimed at removing a variety of
specific, more narrow differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. They
were dubbed short-term convergence projects, reflecting the belief at the
time that they could be completed relatively rapidly. Although the areas
included in the these projects did not represent major areas for
potential joint projects between the two boards, they nevertheless
presented challenges to those using, preparing, auditing, or regulating
cross-border financial reporting.
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The approach to removing the differences in each area generally
involved selecting between the existing U.S. GAAP and IFRS treatments
of the item in question to decide which provided the higher-quality
accounting. Thus, for example, if it was decided that the IFRS treatment
was superior, then the FASB would propose changing U.S. GAAP to
adopt the IFRS approach, and vice versa.
So, toward the end of 2002, the FASB and the IASB began deliberating a
number of narrow differences. Initially, the FASB focused on potential
changes to U.S. GAAP in the following areas: balance sheet classification, exchanges of nonmonetary assets, inventory costs, earnings per
share, and voluntary changes in accounting policies. The IASB started
looking at potential changes to IFRS in the areas of discontinued operations, restructuring costs and termination benefits, and postemployment
benefits. The boards decided to jointly address a number of specific differences between their income tax accounting standards.
As a result of this effort, the FASB issued standards changing U.S.
GAAP for certain aspects of inventory costs;4 exchanges of
nonmonetary assets;5 and changes in accounting principles and error
corrections.6 In 2007, FASB issued Statement No. 159,7 allowing a fair
value option in accounting for financial assets and financial liabilities,
similar to that in IFRS. With regard to balance sheet classification,
consideration of those issues was moved into the major project on
financial statement presentation. As the Board deliberated the issues
relating to earnings per share, it became apparent they were more
complex and numerous than had been expected when the short-term
project was added to the FASB agenda. As a result, FASB issued
exposure drafts with proposed changes in 2003, 2005, and 2008. Further
consideration of these issues has been put on hold pending completion
of major joint convergence projects.
For its part, in 2004, the IASB issued IFRS 5, Non-current Assets Held for
Sale and Discontinued Operations, amending its requirements relating to
discontinued operations, and amendments to International Accounting
Standard (IAS) 19, Employee Benefits, that brought IFRS closer to U.S.
GAAP in certain areas relating to the accounting for pensions and other
postretirement benefits. The IASB also made significant changes to its
standard on segment reporting by issuing IFRS 8, Operating Segments, in
2006. With these changes, the IASB essentially adopted the U.S.
4
FASB Statement No. 151, Inventory Costs—an amendment of ARB No. 43, Chapter 4, issued in
2004, which is now codified in FASB Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 330).
5
FASB Statement No. 153, Exchanges of Nonmonetary Assets—an amendment of APB Opinion No.
29, issued in 2005, which is now codified in FASB ASC 845.
6
FASB Statement No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections—a replacement of APB
Opinion No. 20 and FASB Statement No. 3, issued in 2005, which is now codified in FASB ASC
250, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections.
7
The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an amendment of
FASB Statement No. 15, which is now codified in FASB ASC 825, Financial Instruments.

91

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

approach to segment reporting. The IASB also amended IAS 23, Borrowing Costs, its standard relating to capitalization of borrowing costs,
and in May 2011, it issued IFRS 11, Joint Arrangements, that aligns the
accounting for joint ventures under IFRS with that under corresponding
U.S. GAAP.
Achieving convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS on accounting for
income taxes proved to be quite challenging. Although the basic
approach to accounting for income taxes is the same under both sets of
standards (that is, comprehensive deferred tax accounting for all
temporary differences between reported amounts in the financial statements and in tax returns), both the U.S. standard (FASB Statement No.
1098) and IFRS standard (IAS 12, Income Taxes) contain a number of
exceptions to the basic approach, but the exceptions are not the same.
The boards deliberated these differences for several years, tentatively
agreeing on a common approach to dealing with some, but not all, of
them. The effort to converge was further complicated by the FASB
needing to address, at the request of the SEC staff, issues relating to
accounting for uncertain tax positions. That FASB project resulted in the
issuance of FASB Interpretation No. 48.9 Although FASB Interpretation
No. 48 resulted in greater clarity and consistency in accounting under
U.S. GAAP for uncertain tax positions, the approach is quite different
than that under IFRS. Accordingly, in 2009, both boards put this project
on hold and have discussed whether a better course of action might be
to undertake a major joint project to more comprehensively reconsider
the accounting for income taxes. However, no action has been taken yet
on this matter by either board or as a new joint project.
In summary, although the short-term convergence projects resulted in
eliminating or narrowing differences between U.S. GAAP in a number
of areas, several of them proved to be more complicated and a lot less
short-term than originally envisioned. Moreover, constituents of both
boards, particularly preparers of financial statements, very understandably questioned the cost and benefit of making such changes to
accounting standards that, although seemingly narrow, required
companies to make potentially costly changes to their financial data
systems and processes. As I will discuss further in connection with the
2006 FASB-IASB MoU, we concluded that a better approach would be
to focus on achieving convergence through the boards working together
to develop common standards on broader areas of accounting.

8

Accounting for Income Taxes, which is now codified in FASB ASC 740, Income Taxes.
Accounting for Uncertainty in Incomes Taxes—an interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109, in
December 2006, which is now codified in FASB ASC 740.

9
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Undertaking Major Joint Projects
In that regard, at the April 2004 joint meeting, the boards agreed to
undertake three major joint projects: business combinations, revenue
recognition, and financial performance reporting by business enterprises
(later renamed financial statement presentation).
Both boards viewed achieving common accounting for business
combinations as a priority, given the increasing importance of crossborder merger and acquisition activity. Differences between U.S. GAAP
and IFRS in this area were also the most frequent cause of reconciling
items reported in SEC Form 20-F filings by foreign registrants. The
boards had already begun coordinating their work in this area. In 2001,
the FASB had issued major standards on accounting for business
combinations and accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets10
that eliminated the pooling-of-interests method and generally required
all business combinations to be accounted for under the purchase
method. Similarly, in 2001, the IASB started work on a project that
would eliminate use of the pooling method in favor of the acquisition
(purchase) method and amend its standards on accounting for
intangible assets. (The IASB completed that project in 2004 by issuing
IFRS 3, Business Combinations, and amendments to its standards on
intangible assets and impairment of long-lived assets.) At the April 2004
joint board meeting, the boards agreed to try to develop common
standards on purchase method procedures (that is, on how to apply
purchase accounting) and the related area of accounting for noncontrolling interests (what were generally called minority interests in the
United States). That joint project resulted in the issuance of new
standards in December 2007 by the FASB (Statement No. 141 [revised
2007]11 and No. 160),12 and similar standards by the IASB. Although not
fully converged, the accounting for business combinations under U.S.
GAAP and IFRS is now much more closely aligned on a major subject
of great importance to companies all around the world and to crossborder investing and capital flows.
Revenue recognition was another natural candidate for a joint project.
Revenue is arguably the most important line item in the financial statements of most companies, so it made sense to try to converge standards
in this area. Additionally, the existing revenue recognition standards in
both U.S. GAAP and IFRS needed improvement. U.S. GAAP has
extensive and very detailed revenue recognition guidance covering
specific industries and particular transactions and arrangements, but
10
FASB Statement No. 141, Business Combinations, and No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible
Assets, which is now codified in FASB ASC 350, Intangibles—Goodwill and Other.
11
Business Combinations, which is now codified in FASB ASC 805, Business Combinations.
12
Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial Statements—an amendment of ARB No. 51,
which is now codified in FASB ASC 810.
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the guidance was developed piecemeal over many decades and can
result in inconsistent reporting for economically similar transactions. In
contrast, IFRS contain only high-level guidance on revenue recognition
that can also result in inconsistent reporting. Accordingly, the boards
have been working together since 2005 to develop a joint standard
aimed at improving the consistency and comparability of reporting
across a broad variety of revenue transactions. To that end, the boards
issued a joint discussion paper, Preliminary Views on Revenue Recognition
in Contracts with Customers, on revenue recognition in December 2008
and a joint exposure draft, Revenue from Contracts with Customers, of a
comprehensive standard on revenue recognition in June 2010 and a
revised exposure draft with the same title in November 2011.
Both boards had also been working on projects on financial
performance reporting prior to 2004, in the IASB’s case in conjunction
with the U.K. Accounting Standards Board. The April 2004 decision to
conduct a joint project in this area reflected a recognition that it would
be important to try to achieve both improvement and international
convergence in the form, format, and content of the primary financial
statements. Differing formats across the world in, for example, the
income statement, hampered international comparability. Perceived
deficiencies in the organization and level of aggregation in the financial
statements were viewed as contributing to the growing use of pro
forma presentations by companies and requests for different reporting
formats and more disaggregated information by professional users of
financial statements. Accordingly, the boards decided to rename this
project Financial Statement Presentation. This project resulted in the
issuance of a joint discussion paper, Preliminary Views on Financial Statement Presentation, in October 2008.
The boards had been working toward publishing a comprehensive
exposure draft of a proposed standard on financial statement presentation, but that has been put on hold as the boards work toward
completing other major joint projects. In the meantime, they have been
working to improve and converge their respective financial statement
presentation requirements relating to reporting of discontinued operations and to reporting of comprehensive income, issuing, in June 2011,
converged standards on the second of these in FASB ASC No. 2011-05,
Comprehensive Income (Topic 220) Presentation of Comprehensive Income.
In addition to full joint projects, the boards undertook what we termed
“modified joint projects.” Under this approach, one board took the lead
in a project, developing and issuing a discussion paper for public comment describing that board’s preliminary views on the subject. Then,
based on the work to date and constituent input, the other board would
decide whether to join the project such that it would then become a full
joint project through the development of a common exposure draft and,
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ultimately, a common final standard. Two projects were designated as
modified joint projects: accounting for insurance contracts, which the
IASB was already working on, and distinguishing liabilities from
equity, which FASB was already working on. Both of these projects
would later become full joint projects. The project on accounting for
insurance contracts became an ongoing joint project. The project on
distinguishing liabilities from equity, which was renamed as the project
on accounting for financial instruments with characteristics of equity, is
currently in inactive status as the boards focus on completing other
major joint projects.

The 2005 SEC Staff “Roadmap” and
the 2006 FASB-IASB MoU
Starting in 2005, listed companies in the European Union and in several
other countries began having to prepare their consolidated financial
statements using IFRS. The fact that IFRS were now being used by
thousands of companies around the world, many of them major
publicly traded multinationals, enhanced the credibility of IFRS as an
international standard and added impetus to calls for its adoption in
other countries. The European laws adopting IFRS allowed for
continued use of U.S. GAAP through 2009 by U.S. companies and their
European subsidiaries raising capital in the European capital markets.
However, the reverse was not true in the United States because the SEC
required all foreign registrants in their Form 20-F filings either to use
U.S. GAAP or, if they used another set of accounting standards in
preparing their financial statements, to reconcile the net income and
stockholders’ equity reported in those financial statements to U.S.
GAAP.
Those requirements were aimed at, among other considerations,
providing U.S. investors with more comparable financial information
relating to companies whose securities are traded in U.S. capital
markets. However, it was also perceived as creating an uneven playing
field by some in Europe who began to question this nonreciprocal treatment whereby U.S. GAAP was allowed to be used in Europe, at least
for the time being, but IFRS, Europe’s new standard, was not allowed
in the United States. A near-term leveling of the playing field might be
accomplished by the European authorities requiring U.S. companies
and their subsidiaries to use IFRS or reconcile their U.S. GAAP financial
statements to IFRS or by the SEC eliminating the Form 20-F requirements to use U.S. GAAP or reconcile to it for foreign registrants that
prepared their financial statements using IFRS.
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The expanding use of IFRS, both by foreign registrants filing with the
SEC and other major corporations around the world, coupled with the
uneven playing field issue being asserted in Europe, provided both a
challenge and an opportunity for the SEC in fulfilling its mandate in
terms of U.S. investors and capital markets and its long-stated support
for the development of a single set of high-quality international
accounting standards. Those challenges and opportunities and the
changing international landscape of financial reporting were addressed
by SEC Chief Accountant Don Nicolaisen in an April 2005 article in the
Northwestern University Journal of International Law and Business.13 The
article laid out what became referred to as the SEC staff “roadmap” (see
figure 4-1). It was not a roadmap for adoption of IFRS in the United
States or for complete convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Rather,
it laid out a process and set of conditions and related activities for the
SEC staff to consider whether to recommend that the SEC eliminate the
reconciliation requirements for foreign registrants using IFRS. These
conditions included the continued progress by the FASB and the IASB in
their convergence efforts, review by the SEC staff of the quality and
consistency of implementation of IFRS by foreign registrants, and
continued education and sharing of IFRS implementation experiences
among investors, practitioners, standard setters, regulators, and others.
The roadmap also contained a possible timeline for these activities,
noting that the decision by the SEC staff about whether to recommend to
the SEC that it eliminate the U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirement for
foreign filers using IFRS could come in 2009 or possibly sooner.
Don Nicolaisen and I had been partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers.
Our working relationship continued through his tenure at the SEC from
2003 to 2005 and on the 2007–08 Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, which Don cochaired. Now, we are
fellow members of the board of directors of Morgan Stanley, and our
friendship and mutual respect continues today. We were, I believe, likeminded on a number of important issues related to financial reporting.
For example, we had similar opinions on the stock option controversy
discussed in chapter 3, “Stock Option Controversies—Take Two.” And,
as discussed in chapter 6, “Complexity,” we agreed that the U.S.
reporting system needs to be made less complex. Finally, we were both
strong proponents of the important benefits of international
convergence of accounting standards. The publishing of the roadmap
and the thinking it forwarded, although not representing official SEC
policy, was important in guiding both the SEC’s actions in this area and
our convergence efforts in the period following its publication.

13

Donald T. Nicolaisen, “Statement of the SEC Staff: A Securities Regulator Looks at
Convergence,” Northwestern University Journal of International Law and Business, 25, no. 3 (2005).
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Figure 4-1: SEC Staff Recommendation
Roadmap
Start
The infrastructure (standard setting,
application, interpretation, regulation,
etc. ...) needed to keep IFRS viable and
functioning effectively is and remains
in place.
2002 and
beyond
Companies in Europe and elsewhere
apply IFRSs.

2005 and
beyond

2005 and
beyond
Investors, practitioners, auditors,
standard setters, regulators and others
share IFRS implementation
experiences.

SEC staff reviews faithfulness and
consistency of foreign private issuer 2005
IFRSs financial statements and the
accompanying reconciliations to U.S.
GAAP.

2007

2007
SEC staff reviews faithfulness and
consistency of additional foreign
private issuer IFRSs financial
statements and accompanying
reconciliations to U.S. GAAP as well as
progress on IFRSs and U.S. GAAP
convergence work.

SEC staff works to identify changes
which will be necessary to SEC rules
upon elimination of U.S. GAAP
reconciliation requirement.

2006

20062007
SEC staff discusses the implications of
its review of 2005 IFRS filings and
accompanying reconciliations to U.S.
GAAP with investors, practitioners,
auditors, standard setters, regulators
and others.

Investors in Europe and elsewhere gain
additional knowledge about and
experience with IFRSs.

2005 and
beyond

2005,
2006,
2007
Approximately 300 foreign private
issuers are expected to file with the
SEC their 2005 financial statements
prepared using IFRSs.

The IASB and FASB carry out work to
enable convergence between IFRS and
U.S. GAAP.

2007,
2008,
2009

2009; or
possibly
sooner
Finish

SEC staff reviews the status of IFRS and
U.S. GAAP convergence work.

SEC staff decides whether and when it is
in a position to recommend to the
Commission that it eliminate the IFRSs
to U.S. GAAP reconciliation
requirement.

In the article, Don discussed the convergence of IFRS and U.S. GAAP as
the enabler in ultimately achieving a single set of globally accepted
accounting standards. The article also discussed continued progress in
the convergence effort as one of the factors the SEC staff would consider
in deciding whether to recommend elimination of the reconciliation
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requirement. The lifting of the SEC reconciliation requirement was
viewed as important by the European Commission in continuing to allow
U.S. companies to use U.S. GAAP in their filings in Europe.
In support of these objectives, the FASB and IASB went about
developing a work plan for their continuing convergence activities.
That work plan, which was published in February 2006 as the 2006
MoU, sets forth a number of specific milestones that the boards were
looking to achieve by the end of 2008.14 Perhaps more importantly, it
laid out the following three interrelated principles regarding
convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS:
Convergence of accounting standards can best be achieved
through the development of high quality, common standards
over time.
Trying to eliminate differences between two standards that are in
need of significant improvement is not the best use of the FASB’s
and the IASB’s resources—instead, a new common standard
should be developed that improves the financial information
reported to investors.
Serving the needs of investors means that the boards should seek
convergence by replacing standards in need of improvement
with stronger standards.

Accordingly, the focus of the 2006 MoU was on major areas of
accounting that both boards believed were in need of improvement.
The process to develop the list of major areas to be included in the 2006
MoU was extensive and iterative, with each board developing a list of
priority areas and consulting with its respective advisory groups, the
staffs of the SEC and the European Commission, and other national
standard setters. The MoU included seven major areas that were
already on the active agenda of one or both boards:
1. Business combinations
2. Fair value measurement
3. Liabilities and equity
4. Consolidations
5. Performance reporting
6. Postretirement benefits, including pensions
7. Revenue recognition
Four other major areas not yet on the active agenda of either board were
also addressed—derecognition, accounting for financial instruments,
14

FASB and IASB document, A Roadmap for Convergence between IFRS and US GAAP—2006-2008
Memorandum of Understanding between the FASB and the IASB, 27 February 2006.
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intangibles, and leases—with a description of the progress expected to be
achieved in each area during 2006–08. It is important to note that the
2006 MoU did not envisage completion of any of the major projects by
the end of 2008, except for business combinations and fair value
measurement. The boards did issue common standards on accounting for
business combinations in late 2007 and early 2008. With regard to fair
value measurement guidance, the FASB issued Statement No. 157, Fair
Value Measurements, in September 2006, which is now codified in FASB
ASC 820, Fair Value Measurement. That FASB standard was later exposed
by the IASB for public comment. The two boards then jointly redeliberated the issues and issued converged standards in May 2011 based
largely on FASB Statement No. 157 and additional implementation guidance that the boards issued during the financial crisis.
The 2006 MoU also listed a number of areas for potential short-term
convergence, including the aforementioned topics of the fair value
option, segment reporting, borrowing costs, and joint ventures.
The 2006 MoU, as updated periodically since 2006, has served as the
boards’ joint work plan for convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP
and has also been a very important part of each board’s efforts to
improve its respective standards. As mentioned in the key principles in
the 2006 MoU, the convergence program between the FASB and IASB
was undertaken not just for the sake of convergence but also as means of
jointly developing improved, high-quality accounting standards. Because
of the importance of the MoU to the development of global accounting
standards, national accounting standard setters and others from around
the world wanted to meet with the IASB and also the FASB to exchange
views on international convergence and the major projects included in
the 2006 MoU. Accordingly, we started meeting biannually with
representatives of the Accounting Standards Board of Japan and with
members of the Accounting Regulatory Department of the Chinese
Ministry of Finance who establish the accounting standards used in the
People’s Republic of China. We also had various meetings with
representatives of other national standard setters and participated in (a)
the periodic meetings of the National Accounting Standard Setters group
(now called the International Forum of Accounting Standard Setters) that
provides input into the development of international standards and (b)
the IASB’s annual World Standard Setters meeting. I found those meetings to be interesting, enjoyable, and valuable to our efforts.
The meetings provided me with a sense of the commonality of many
issues across the globe and of the perspectives, environments, and challenges faced by standard setters in different parts of the world. On the
one hand, standard setters in different parts of the world often face
similar challenges and issues when dealing with the reactions and
impacts on their constituents of the changes resulting from new
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accounting standards and can they can often learn from one another’s
experiences. On the other hand, because of the differing economic, business, governmental, regulatory, and legal environments in which different national standard setters operate, different subjects may be of
greater importance to some national standard setters than to others. For
example, the subject of accounting in highly inflationary environments,
a priority for standard setters in countries experiencing high rates of
inflation, is of less relevance currently to the United States and most of
the developed world. The accounting for mining operations, although
highly relevant to countries such as Canada, Australia, and South
Africa, is of less significance to many other countries. An important
challenge for the IASB as an international standard setter is how to balance these competing priorities among the many countries that now use
its standards. Conversely, a challenge arises for each national standard
setter in countries that use IFRS in trying to ensure that its needs and
priorities are properly considered in the formulation of the IASB’s
agenda of standard-setting projects and in the IASB’s process for
developing new standards.

Conceptual Framework
The boards also decided that they should work together to develop a
single conceptual framework. The FASB’s Conceptual Framework was
developed principally in the 1970s and 1980s. Intended to help guide
the FASB in developing standards on particular topics, it consists of a
series of documents that address key concepts relating to the objectives
of financial reporting, qualitative characteristics of financial reporting,
the elements of financial statements (for example, assets, liabilities,
revenues, and expenses), and recognition and measurement of items in
financial statements. The IASB has a similar, but much shorter document, Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements, that it inherited from its predecessor body, the IASC.
Although these documents have been helpful in guiding standardsetting decisions, experience has shown that they need further work
and improvement to address gaps in certain areas and to refine some of
the core thinking on other key conceptual matters. Accordingly, and
consistent with the boards’ commitment to convergence, it made sense
to develop a single, improved conceptual framework. So, near the end
of 2004, the boards began that effort. The initial areas of focus for
improving and converging the conceptual guidance were the objectives
and qualitative characteristics of financial reporting by business
enterprises, the elements of financial statements of business enterprises,
and on what is termed the reporting entity (that is, what are the
boundaries of the entity that is the subject of the financial statements).
In addition to having a joint team comprising FASB and IASB staff
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members, certain national standard setters, most notably Canada and
New Zealand, contributed staff to this project.
Progress on the conceptual framework project was slow and did not
come easily. In September 2010, the boards issued a new converged
conceptual framework chapter on the objective and qualitative
characteristics of financial reporting by business enterprises. An
exposure draft addressing the reporting entity was issued in 2010, but
further work on this phase of the conceptual framework project has
been put on hold for now as the boards focus on completing major 2006
MoU projects. Although considerable work was performed for several
years on trying to improve the current definitions of assets and liabilities,
that work has also been put on hold for now as the boards focus on
completing major joint standards. The boards also began work on the
very key area of measurement, a subject that was not fully developed in
the existing framework of either board and that continues to be a
subject that generates differing views among board members on specific
standard-setting projects as well as disagreement and controversy
among various constituents. Substantive progress has not yet been
achieved on a measurement framework. Perhaps this is a result of
fundamental differences in perspectives among board members at both
FASB and the IASB, the need to address reporting issues from the
global financial crisis, as discussed in chapter 5, and the current focus
on completing the major MoU projects.
In September 2012 the IASB decided to restart work on the Conceptual
Framework project. The decision reflected the very strong support the
IASB received from constituents for the project in response to the
IASB’s 2011 public consultation on its agenda. However, it is not clear
whether the FASB will participate in this work, for example, through
membership in the new Accounting Standards Advisory Forum that the
IFRS Foundation Trustees have established, or whether the FASB will at
some point separately resume work on the Conceptual Framework.
Another phase of the planned joint framework project is to develop
guidance that would assist the boards in establishing disclosure requirements. In 2009, the FASB began work on a disclosure framework project
that, among other objectives, would include developing such
conceptual guidance. The FASB issued the Invitation to Comment
Disclosure Framework in July 2012.
As I discuss further in chapter 7, “Looking Back and Moving Forward,”
reflecting back on my years chairing the FASB, one of my greatest
disappointments is not making more progress on improving the
conceptual framework.
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The SEC Eliminates the Reconciliation
Requirement and Explores Potential
Adoption of IFRS in the United States
The 2005 SEC staff roadmap for considering elimination of the reconciliation requirement for foreign registrants using IFRS contemplated a
decision by 2009 or earlier. It turned out to be earlier: November 2007
to be exact.15 In July 2007, the SEC issued a release that proposed lifting
the reconciliation requirement and a concept release exploring the
potential use of IFRS by U.S. public companies.16
Conrad Hewitt, the chief accountant at the time the reconciliation
requirement was eliminated, was a strong supporter of that action and
of expeditious movement toward a single set of high-quality
international accounting standards. In speeches, he would say words to
the effect that when he got to the SEC in 2006, he carefully reviewed
the roadmap that Don Nicolaisen had developed, that he liked it, and
that removing the reconciliation requirement was an important step in
the journey toward a single set of high-quality international standards.
Then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox also seemed to share these views.
The November 2007 SEC release that eliminated the reconciliation
requirement for foreign registrants using “full” IFRS as published by
the IASB states
The Commission has long viewed reducing the disparity
between the accounting and disclosure practices of the United
States and other countries as an important objective both for the
protection of investors and the efficiency of capital markets....
Towards this end, the Commission has undertaken several
measures to foster the use of International Financial Reporting
Standards (“IFRS”) as issued by the International Accounting
Standards Board (“IASB”) and fully supports the efforts of the
IASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) to
converge their accounting standards.... As part of our efforts to
foster a single set of globally accepted accounting standards, we
are now adopting amendments to accept from foreign private
issuers financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as
issued by the IASB in filing with the Commission without
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.17
15
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) release, Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of
Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.
16
July 2007 SEC proposed release, Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, and August 2007 SEC concept release, Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards.
17
SEC release, Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.
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This was a very important action by the SEC, one that many parties
supported as a necessary step on the road to a single set of standards
and as a goodwill gesture by the United States to avoid Europe and
other jurisdictions imposing a counter-reconciliation requirement for
U.S. companies raising capital in their financial markets. Indeed,
reacting to the SEC’s action, then-EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy
stated, “Now it will be Europe’s turn to accept accounts in U.S. GAAP.
This decision will have to be taken next year. And it is certainly my
intention to propose that no reconciliation to IFRS will be needed for
companies filing their accounts under U.S. GAAP. This is the only
sensible way forward.”18
I also recall that other U.S. parties, including our major stock
exchanges, supported the SEC’s lifting the reconciliation requirement
because they believed it would help ensure that our capital markets
remained competitive by making it easier for foreign companies to
obtain listings on U.S. stock exchanges. They also believed that the SEC
should allow U.S. issuers to use IFRS. For example, at an SEC
roundtable in March 2007, Catherine Kinney, president of the NYSE
Group, said “a number of large global issuers” had told the New York
Stock Exchange that they would “welcome having a choice” of
reporting standards and were considering moving to IFRS if the SEC
were to allow that. Many of the other panelists at that roundtable also
supported allowing U.S. issuers to switch to IFRS.19
However, others, including some institutional investors and financial
analysts, believed it was important to maintain the reconciliation
requirement until greater convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS
had been achieved, such that there would be sufficient comparability
without a reconciliation and that it would be premature to allow U.S.
issuers to adopt IFRS. Concerns were also raised over a number of
perceived structural weaknesses with the IASB, including issues
relating to governance arrangements and the adequacy and stability of
funding. Some of the comment letters to the SEC expressed concerns
that eliminating the reconciliation requirement might prompt European
companies and the European Commission, satisfied with a mutual
recognition regime, to call for a halt to any further convergence
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Exhibit 4-2, “Differing Views on
International Financial Reporting Standards Adoption,” shows an article
and excerpts from two comment letters to the SEC covering various
views on IFRS convergence at the time.

18

Press release from European Federation of Accountants’ Conference on Audit Regulations.
Brussels, November 27, 2007.
19
Lawrence M. Gill, “IFRS: Coming to America,” Journal of Accountancy, June 2007.
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Exhibit 4-2: Differing Views on International
Financial Reporting Standards Adoption
Cheryl Rosen, “SEC, Users Voice Support for IFRS at Roundtable” in
Lawrence M. Gill, “IFRS: Coming to America.” Journal of
Accountancy. June 2007. http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/
2007/Jun/IfrsComingToAmerica.htm
Never mind convergence—why not just report in IFRS and forget about
U.S. GAAP altogether?
It didn’t take long for the question to come up in March at an SEC
roundtable on its International Financial Reporting Standards Roadmap,
where the very first panel raised the issue—and the panelists seemed to
applaud the idea.
Chairman Christopher Cox opened the door in his opening remarks,
noting that “virtually everyone—issuers, investors and stakeholders
alike—agrees that the world’s capital markets would benefit from the
widespread acceptance and use of high-quality global accounting
standards.” Replacing the “Babel of competing and often contradictory
standards” would improve investor confidence, allow investors to draw
better conclusions, and simplify the process and cut costs for issuers,
Cox said.
Soon enough, Ken Pott, head of Morgan Stanley’s capital markets
execution group, followed that argument to its logical conclusion,
noting that “the dramatically increasing acceptability of IFRS may move
U.S. companies to decide they’re better off reporting in IFRS if that’s
allowable by the SEC.”
Catherine Kinney, president of the NYSE Group, said “a number of large
global issuers” already have told the stock exchange that they would
“welcome having a choice” of reporting standards and are considering
moving to IFRS. If U.S.-based issuers listed abroad continue to report in
U.S. GAAP, she noted, European regulators “will have the
opportunity—and maybe even the obligation” to question their
financials, just as the SEC asks questions of companies that report in
IFRS.
“Every change in regulations has unexpected side effects,” she said.
“And I think regulators will have to allow U.S. companies to report in
IFRS. That will be a further spur to convergence, and a positive
development.”
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It also would be in keeping with two SEC aims: a more transparent
global financial reporting environment and more principles-based
accounting standards.
Panelist David B. Kaplan, who leads the international accounting group
of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, said he hoped the question of allowing
U.S. companies to report in IFRS would not delay the road map’s
timetable but otherwise did not object to the idea. Converting U.S.
companies to IFRS would mean large-scale educational efforts,
knowledge transfer and system changes for the accounting profession,
but CPA firms already have begun the process. “At the end of the day,
we wouldn’t be asking people here to do any more than what Europe
has just done in changing to IFRS,” he said.
KPMG’s partner in charge of professional practice, Samuel Ranzilla,
also on the panel, noted that “this complexity discussion is absolutely
the right place to put this issue on the table” and that he “supports the
elimination of U.S. GAAP reconciliation in accordance with the road
map and would ask the SEC to take on front and center the issue of
whether international standards are something we ought to be moving
toward here in the United States.”
With that discussion on the table, any question about whether IFRS was
going to happen seemed moot. Summing up the first panel, Morgan
Stanley’s Ken Pott called IFRS “a terrific idea that can’t come fast
enough,” and Brooklyn Law School professor and former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel said it “can’t come soon enough.” In fact, she
advised the commission not to wait until it has solved every little question, but rather to “take the plunge.”
In the end, Citigroup Global Markets’ Managing Director J. Richard
Blackett noted that allowing foreign issuers filing in IFRS to come into
U.S. markets will “at the margin and perhaps theoretically” raise the
cost of capital for U.S. issuers—but “certainly U.S. companies having
the option to adopt IFRS will help.”
The SEC announced in April it is planning to publish a concept release
about providing U.S. issuers the alternative to use IFRS. Comments
would be due this fall.

Gaylen R. Hansen, CPA, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/
s71307-108.pdf
The core concern is the underpinnings of the international standardsetting structure and its relative lack of independence vis-à-vis the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The observations below

105

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

are relevant to the Commission’s publicly stated goals that Release No.
33-8818 implicitly re-articulates.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is a private sector
creation, meaning that it answers primarily to a non-regulatory
constituency. That constituency includes much closer ties to accounting
membership trade associations, international accounting firms, and
large corporate, institutional and governmental organizations than does
its FASB counterpart. These alliances are manifest in IASB participation
and funding, which raises questions about its actual independence.
In the shadows of the Enron and WorldCom collapses, passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by Congress in 2002 was a cornerstone event
enhancing independence of both accounting firms and also the private
sector standard-setters that the SEC looks to for leadership within the
accounting profession. Given the long and well documented history
that ultimately led to an independently financed FASB, it is remarkable
that the Commission would so quickly conclude that shifting this
critical role to a foreign-controlled body is in our national interest
without public analysis and discussion of the pros and cons. Such a
dialogue should be unfettered by one-off questions—e.g. “Should IFRS
to U.S. GAAP reconciliation be discontinued?” or, “Should domestic
issuers have the option of electing IFRS versus U.S. GAAP?” Those
questions have leap-frogged a more relevant question: “Does the IASB
stand up to public scrutiny particularly when it may be subject to
external pressures from its funding sources?”
The subtle focus on peripheral issues is particularly troubling since the
SEC is solemnly charged by Congress with the final responsibility to
establish national accounting principles and practices. *
...
Aside from autonomy and structural concerns, there is also the practical
aspect of IFRS implementation. It is highly likely that if the SEC were to
agree to adopt IASB standards that U.S. practitioners would need
significantly more time to become get up to speed on IFRS. ...
There may be a subconscious tendency to regard IFRS as an easy fix for
the many shortcomings of U.S. GAAP. A more realistic expectation
would be that the IASB may solve only a few of those problems in
exchange for accepting other risks. Even if the structural and practical
problems noted above are satisfactorily addressed, there are a myriad of
others, such as the impact of reconciling IASB standards to the U.S.
federal income tax system. Also, there are serious differences and gaps
between U.S. GAAP and IFRS—e.g. accounting for leases, derivatives,
insurance and income taxes.
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U.S. GAAP has been discussed, debated and interpreted for decades
and has stood the test of time. By contrast, for all practical purposes—
IFRS financial statements have been issued in any large number only
for the past three years.
* See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C §§ 77g, 77s(a), 77aa(25) and (26)

Lee S. Ainslie, III, Managing Partner, and Jane B. Adams, Managing
Director, Maverick Capital, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/
s71307-73.pdf
While we are supportive of the SEC’s goal ultimately to eliminate the
reconciliation requirement for foreign private issuers who prepare
financial statements in accordance with IFRS and to progress to one set
of global standards, we believe the current proposal is premature. The
reconciliation provides incremental information to investors that would
be lost if the reconciliation requirement were eliminated. Many of these
reconciling items arise because IFRS is not yet comprehensive and
because it is not uniformly applied across regions. As auditors and
preparers become more expert in applying IFRS, as IFRS becomes a
more comprehensive set of standards, and as companies comply with
recently issued standards whose implementation was delayed by IASB’s
moratorium, we would hope that the incremental information provided
by the reconciliation diminishes significantly. Until then, we believe that
the removal of the reconciliation harms investors and removes relevant
information not available through other sources.
In addition, the multiple versions of “endorsed” IFRS pose real hazards
to the investor. The current poor disclosure as to which IFRS requirements have been selectively excluded imperils all investors.
Consequently, we support the proposal’s requirement that issuers be
required to state in a prominent footnote to the financial statements
unreservedly and explicitly that its financial statements are in compliance with IFRS as published by IASB (excluding the IASB’s proposed
IFRS for Small and Medium-sized Entities).

For our part, the FAF-FASB comment letter dated November 11, 2007,
to the SEC on the proposing and concept releases expressed qualified
support for lifting the reconciliation requirement, stating, “The removal
of the requirement that foreign private issuers reconcile their reported
results to U.S. GAAP is a difficult and sensitive issue that could have
important implications for the continued development of a truly

107

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

international financial reporting system.”20 It went on to suggest that
before the SEC removed the requirement it should ensure two things:
1. The development of a detailed “blueprint” setting forth the key
issues, necessary actions to address those issues, and target dates
for a transition by U.S. public companies to IFRS and commitment by key parties in the United States to the blueprint
2. A commitment by international parties to undertake the steps
necessary to strengthen the IASB as the independent
international accounting standard setter
The letter included an appendix that provided a detailed discussion of
the many issues we believed would need to be included in the
blueprint for U.S. transition to IFRS, our views on the importance of
improving IFRS through the continued convergence program between
FASB and the IASB, and our views on actions needed to strengthen the
IASB as a global standard setter.
The SEC concept release also raised the possibility of allowing U.S.
registrants to choose between using U.S. GAAP and IFRS. In our comment letter, we expressed our strong opposition to creating a twoGAAP system for U.S. public company reporting for any prolonged
period of time because we believed it would decrease comparability
and could increase overall costs in the reporting system.
In my opinion, and based on subsequent developments, the elimination of
the reconciliation requirement gave significant additional impetus for the
adoption of IFRS by many countries around the world. IFRS now became
something of a passport for companies to raise capital in the major world
capital markets. It was already the standard recognized in Europe and
many other parts of the world, and no longer would a non-U.S. company
need to either use U.S. GAAP or reconcile to it in raising capital in the U.S.
markets. Although U.S. GAAP also continues to be allowed in many
capital markets, I believe it is generally viewed by non-U.S. companies as
more difficult and costly to implement and as providing management with
fewer options and room for judgment than IFRS. Further, many outside
our country view U.S. GAAP as an overly detailed and prescriptive set of
standards developed in the highly litigious U.S. environment, a view that
is also shared by some in the United States. So, it is not surprising that
soon after the SEC lifted the reconciliation requirement, a number of
countries that may have been on the fence about whether to adopt IFRS
announced plans to do. Those included the major economies of Brazil,
India, South Korea, and Mexico.

20

See www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818772343&
blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
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Improve and Adopt IFRS
The FAF-FASB November 2007 comment letter reflected our view at
that time that IFRS could and would likely become the globally
accepted international standard. However, we also believed it was not
yet a comprehensive set of standards and that, like U.S. GAAP, a
number of existing standards needed improvement. We also shared the
concerns of others about some of the perceived structural weaknesses in
the IASB and its oversight body, including the need for the organization
to obtain adequate, stable, and secure sources of funding to ensure its
long-term viability and ability to operate independently. Additional
concerns included ensuring that the IASB was adequately staffed and
the need to eliminate national and jurisdictional endorsement
approaches that could result in variations of IFRS being adopted in different parts of the world. We also advocated what became known as
the “improve and adopt” approach to achieving a single set of highquality international standards that could be adopted in the United
States. Under the improve and adopt approach, the FASB would
continue working with the IASB to develop major standards that
improved both U.S. GAAP and IFRS and that filled in major gaps in
IFRS, such as in the accounting for insurance contracts, to the point
where IFRS represented a comprehensive, high-quality set of accounting
standards. At that point, provided that appropriate actions had also
been taken to address the structural issues around the IASB, we
believed it would be appropriate to begin an orderly and well-planned
transition in the United States from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. The blueprint
would provide a detailed plan of the many issues that would need to
be addressed in a successful transition.
My speeches and press interviews at the time and my testimony in an
October 2007 U.S. Senate hearing reflected that view.21 My fellow Board
members and I also believed it would take a number of years of further
work between the two boards, pursuant to the MoU and potentially in
other areas, to get to the point where adoption of IFRS in the United
States would be cost beneficial. In my testimony before the Subcommittee
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs on October 24, 2007, I stated
We expect that the myriad of changes to the U.S. financial
reporting infrastructure would take a number of years to
complete. During that time, the FASB and the IASB should
continue our cooperative efforts to develop common, high-quality
standards in key areas where neither existing U.S. GAAP or IFRS
provides relevant information for investors. Those common
21

For example, see interview of Robert Herz in the article “FASB Chairman Advocates
‘Improving and Adopting’ IFRS for U.S. Companies” in the September 2008 issue of Financial
Executive magazine.
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standards, issued by both the FASB and IASB, would be adopted
by companies in the U.S. and internationally when issued. In other
areas that are not the subject of those joint improvement projects,
we envision that that U.S. public companies would adopt the IFRS
standards “as is” over a period of years. The adoption of those
IFRS standards by U.S. companies would complete the migration
to an improved version of IFRS.... Under this approach, new
standards or existing IFRS will be gradually adopted over a period
of several years, smoothing the transition process and avoiding
the capacity constraints that might develop in an abrupt mandated
switch to IFRS.

Indeed, in October 2007, I also stated that it would probably take at
least five more years to complete the convergence program.22 I recall
that I used the words at least because I believed it would take a
minimum of five years, assuming there were no other events and
pressing areas requiring the attention of either or both boards.
Although that was not intended as a prediction of the financial crisis
that was soon to engulf much of the world and the impact it would
have on our standard-setting activities, experience had taught me to
expect the unexpected. Accounting standard setting, like many other
fields of human endeavor, rarely progresses in a straight line.
I also believe the decision by the FAF trustees in early 2008 to reduce
the size of the FASB Board from seven to five members reflected, along
with other considerations, a view at that time that the United States
might well be moving to IFRS in the foreseeable future and that the
efficiency and effectiveness of the FASB’s work on convergence might
be enhanced though having a smaller Board. Although the FASB had
always had a seven-person Board, other rule-setting bodies and agencies, including the SEC, the PCAOB, and many other U.S. agencies and
commissions, have five-member boards.23

The SEC Proposes a New Roadmap
for IFRS Adoption; the FASB and IASB
Update the MoU
Not surprisingly, lifting the reconciliation requirement in November 2007
led to some major U.S. corporations and other parties to call for the SEC
to also allow the use of IFRS by domestic registrants. The major U.S.
accounting firms were also urging clients to start planning for the change
to IFRS. There were also international calls for the United States to move
22

Sarah Johnson, “The Divergence of Convergence,” CFO, 26 October 2007. www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/10046246.
23
Marie Leone, “FASB Parent; Five Is More than Seven,” CFO, 26 February 2008. www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/10756502?f=search.
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more quickly to adopt IFRS. In August 2008, the SEC approved
proposing a release regarding potential adoption of IFRS by U.S. issuers24
This proposal was then issued for public comment in November 2008. In
the press release on this, then-SEC Chairman Cox stated
An international language of disclosure and transparency is a goal
worth pursuing on behalf of investors who seek comparable
financial information to make well-informed investment decisions.
The increasing worldwide acceptance of financial reporting using
IFRS, and U.S. investors’ increasing ownership of securities issued
by foreign companies that report financial information using IFRS,
have led the Commission to propose this cautious and careful
plan. Clearly setting out the SEC’s direction well in advance, as
well as the conditions that must be met, will help fulfill our mission of protecting investors and facilitating capital formation.25

The press release stated that the SEC would make a decision in 2011 on
adoption of IFRS by U.S. issuers. It set out a number of milestones that
would factor in the decision, including the degree of convergence that
had been achieved and resolution of the issues relating to the funding
and governance of the IASB and the IASC Foundation. Assuming a
positive decision to require mandatory use of IFRS by U.S. issuers, the
release proposed mandatory use starting in 2014. It also proposed
permitting a limited group of major U.S. multinationals to adopt IFRS
early, starting with 2009 calendar year-end filings. In order to qualify
for early adoption of IFRS, a U.S. issuer would have to be among the
largest companies worldwide in its industry, and within that industry,
IFRS would have to be used as the basis of financial reporting more
than any other set of accounting standards. The thinking behind
allowing a limited early adoption of this sort was that it could increase
the comparability of reporting by major U.S. corporations with major
non-U.S. companies in the same industry.
In September 2008, following extensive discussion within and between
the two boards and consultation with advisory groups and others, the
FASB and the IASB issued an updated MoU,26 that provided a status
report on each of the projects included in the 2006 MoU, an explanation
for changes in the joint work program, and estimates of forward
milestones and targeted completion dates. At that point, most, but not
all, of the projects were targeted for completion in or before 2011.
Why had the year 2011 become an important one in our thinking? Was it
based on the writings of Nostradamus or something divined from the
Mayan calendar? No, 2011 was viewed as a potentially pivotal year for a
24

Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance With International
Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers.
25
SEC press release 2008-184, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting Standards to Help
Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily.
26
Completing the February 2006 Memorandum of Understanding: A progress report and timetable for
completion.
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number of reasons. First, the SEC had committed to make a decision in
that year on IFRS adoption in the United States. Also, a number of major
countries had announced plans to adopt IFRS in 2011 or 2012, so the
IASB’s intent, if possible, was to have issued major new standards in
time for companies in these countries to adopt them to avoid having to
first adopt the old IASB standards in these areas and soon thereafter
make a second change to the new standards. Also, at the IASB, there was
a concern that the required board turnover in the 2009–11 period could
complicate and delay completion of projects. When the IASB was created,
the initial 14 Board members had staggered terms ending in 2009–11. For
example, the terms of 3 board members ended on June 30, 2010, and 3
others, including Chairman David Tweedie, ended on June 30, 2011.
These board members had been heavily involved over the years with the
various MoU projects, and that, coupled with the IASB’s super-majority
voting requirement to approve documents, was often cited by the IASB
as another reason to try to expeditiously complete the projects.
A number of events were soon to affect our work plan and the environment surrounding our convergence efforts. The most significant of these
was the global financial crisis that I discuss at length in chapter 5. In
addition, support for the November 2008 SEC roadmap was mixed, at
best, with many commentators citing a host of issues in transitioning
U.S. issuers to IFRS. Leadership of the SEC changed in early 2009, with
Mary Schapiro becoming the new chairman and James (Jim) Kroeker
becoming the acting chief accountant (and then chief accountant in
August 2009). Also, the composition of the IASB and FASB and their
trustee oversight groups were changing because members’ terms ended,
and new people joined, including John (Jack) Brennan, who succeeded
Bob Denham as Chairman of the FAF in early 2009.

Mixed Responses to the SEC
Roadmap
Also very important were comment letters on the SEC’s November 2008
proposing release. The SEC received more than 200 comment letters on
the proposing release from a variety of market participants and
stakeholders. Although certainly not an inconsequential number of
comment letters, it was, in my opinion, a somewhat surprisingly low
number of comment letters given the potential significance of what the
SEC was proposing. The FASB often receives more than 500 comment
letters on particular proposals and has received thousands of comment
letters in the case of very major or highly controversial proposals. In
any event, I believe the letters did enable the SEC and the SEC staff to
better understand the wide range of views on the subject.
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Although commenters on the proposal generally expressed support for
the goal of a single set of high-quality globally accepted accounting
standards, many expressed concerns with various aspects of the
proposed roadmap. These concerns included questions regarding the
readiness of IFRS to serve as the standards in the United States, the
need for continued convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, and
inadequate lead time to implement what many perceived would be a
difficult and costly transition to IFRS. Some commenters questioned
whether the use of IFRS was actually achieving a sufficient level of
comparability in financial reporting across the world in light of the
existence of jurisdictional variations in IFRS and perceived inconsistencies in application, auditing, and enforcement of the standards
internationally. Some commenters supported the proposed early adoption option and believed it should be broadened to include a wider
group of U.S. issuers. However, many other comment letters expressed
concerns with the proposed option, believing it would reduce
comparability of reporting within the United States and that few
companies would elect early adoption until they were certain that the
use of IFRS would become mandatory.
In developing the FAF-FASB comment letter to the SEC on the
November 2008 roadmap proposal, we carefully considered the
extensive input we had received on the subject, including from our
various advisory committees and the diverse group of stakeholders that
participated in our June 2008 roundtable on the potential adoption of
IFRS in the United States.27 We had also specifically engaged two sets
of independent researchers to examine the potential economic and
public policy implications of the United States moving to IFRS, and
their reports were attached to our comment letter. The reports of the
independent researchers raised questions about the overall level of
macroeconomic benefit to the United States of adopting IFRS and also
raised the possibility of potential alternative paths to achieving a single
set of high-quality global accounting standards, including continuing
for a longer period the process of convergence between IFRS and U.S.
GAAP. Our letter expressed continued support for the goal of a single
set of global accounting standards but urged the SEC to conduct a
thorough study on the implications for investors and other market
participants of implementing IFRS for U.S. issuers. The letter also urged
the SEC to consider potential alternative paths to a single set of global
accounting standards before making a decision in 2011 about whether
to mandate IFRS adoption. We recommended that the SEC establish a
broad-based advisory committee to provide input into the study and, if
a decision was made to mandate IFRS for U.S. issuers, to help develop
and implement a transition plan, or “blueprint,” to minimize the cost
27

See www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818992147&
blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
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and disruptions to investors, companies, and other market participants.
We also reiterated our opposition to the SEC permitting an early adoption option prior to deciding whether to mandate the use of IFRS by
U.S. issuers.

Some Begin to Question America’s
Commitment to Global Accounting
Standards
We tried to make it clear in our letter that our recommendation that the
issues be further studied did not, in any way, reflect a withdrawal of support for the goal of worldwide use of a single set of high-quality
accounting standards or of our commitment to continue to work collaboratively with the IASB on converging and improving IFRS and U.S.
GAAP. However, I believe our letter was perceived by some parties
outside the United States as a softening of our support for the IASB and
for IFRS as the global set of accounting standards. Moreover, the fact that
many commenters on the SEC’s November 2008 roadmap proposal had
raised numerous issues and concerns over potential IFRS adoption in the
United States, inevitably led many parties to question whether the United
States would ever truly embrace the goal of global accounting standards.
In January 2009, Mary Schapiro became the new Chairman of the SEC.
At that point, the SEC roadmap proposal was still out for public comment. In commenting on it in her Senate confirmation hearing, she
stated “I will tell you that I will take a deep breath and look at this
entire area again carefully and will not be bound by the existing
roadmap that is out for comment.”28 In the United States, I believe most
interested observers viewed this as a measured and very understandable statement by an incoming SEC Chairman on a proposal she had
not participated in issuing. In the wake of the financial crisis and
Madoff scandal, the SEC was facing numerous challenges and many
pressing issues it needed to address. However, in other parts of the
world, particularly Europe, I believe Mary’s statement was viewed by
some with alarm as an indication of waning support by the SEC for
IFRS. That, in turn, led to some calls for the IASB to halt the
convergence program with FASB.
However, I think it is interesting to note that in January 2009, a new
Monitoring Board was established to provide enhanced oversight and
accountability over the trustees of the IASC Foundation.29 The
28

See www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg50221/html/CHRG-111shrg50221.htm.
SEC press release 2007-226, Authorities Responsible for Capital Market Regulation Work to Enhance
the Governance of the IASC Foundation.
29
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Monitoring Board was created to establish a formal link in terms of
oversight and accountability between the IASC Foundation and the
IASB to public authorities, akin to the relationship in the United States
between the FAF and FASB and the SEC. The Monitoring Board
comprises leading officials from the Emerging Markets and Technical
Committees of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the European Commission, the Japan Financial Services
Authority, and the SEC. So, Mary Schapiro, as Chairman of the SEC,
became a member of the new Monitoring Board over the IASC Foundation (soon to be renamed the IFRS Foundation).

The G20 Leaders Push for Rapid
International Convergence of
Accounting Standards
It is also noteworthy that the official declarations coming out of meetings of the G20 that were held in response to the global financial crisis
included comments urging expeditious international convergence of
accounting standards and exhortations to international standard setters
to work together and with regulators and supervisors to quickly
develop common responses to financial reporting issues emanating
from the financial crisis. For example, the communiqué issued following the April 2009 G20 meeting in London called on accounting
standard setters “to work urgently with supervisors and regulators to
improve standards on valuation and provisioning and achieve a single
set of high-quality global accounting standards.”30 That communiqué
also included a number of recommendations on specific accounting
standard-setting actions, calling for them to be achieved by the end of
2009. These recommendations seemed to largely mirror those made by
the Financial Stability Forum (which then became the Financial Stability
Board of the G20).31 Although these recommendations were very
important, it was not, in my view, realistic to expect resolution of these
complex and controversial matters within the nine-month timeframe
contemplated in that communiqué.
In contrast, the communiqué issued following the September 2009 G20
meeting in Pittsburgh, PA, called upon “international accounting bodies
to redouble their efforts to achieve a single set of high-quality, global
accounting standards within the context of their independent standard

30

Paragraph 15 of the April 2009 G20 Leaders Statement, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform.
See the “Accounting Standards” section of the April 2, 2009, G20 Declaration on Strengthening
the Financial System.
31
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setting process, and complete their convergence project by June 2011.”32
We took the words “convergence project” to mean our work plan under
the MoU. For the reasons previously noted, the June 2011 target for
completion was viewed as important, particularly by the IASB. I believe
it is fair to say that the IASB and its trustees viewed June 2011 as a
deadline for completing all the major projects on the MoU, but we
viewed it as providing an important target, not an absolute deadline.
Issuing sound standards that would improve financial reporting was
the overriding objective. Further, although successful completion of the
MoU projects would bring U.S. GAAP and IFRS into convergence in a
number of major areas, there would still be many remaining differences
between the two sets of standards. So, any notion that completion of
the MoU would achieve complete convergence between U.S. GAAP and
IFRS was not, in my view, consistent with the facts.

The FASB and IASB Respond to the
G20 Call by More Than Redoubling
the Convergence Effort
Prior to the G20 call to redouble our convergence efforts, the FASB and
the IASB had been meeting three times per year in multiday, full boardto-board meetings. More frequent meetings had been occurring between
small groups of board members, and our staffs had been working
closely together for several years on major joint projects. In this way, by
September 2009, we had been successful in jointly issuing a number of
important documents on major projects, including discussion documents on accounting for financial instruments, revenue recognition,
lease accounting, and financial statement presentation.
Responding to the call from the G20 would require us to meet more
frequently. Additionally, differences in approach and project timelines
between the IASB and FASB on the major project on accounting for
financial instruments and SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s perceived
ambivalence toward use adoption of IFRS had led some observers to
question the commitment of both boards to the overall convergence
program. For example, an article in Accountancy Age33 reported
the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens, which
represents more than 500,000 accountants across Europe, said that
International Accounting Standards Board should cut its losses
and walk away from its US-GAAP convergence strategy.... FEE
32

Paragraph 14 of the “Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory System” section of
the September 25, 2009, G20 Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit.
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2009.
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believes the IASB should change direction and instead
“concentrate exclusively on major improvements and simplifications in International Financial Reporting Standards over the
medium term.”

The article called this “the latest blow to the IASB’s convergence strategy,”
noting that “[i]n January, comments by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
stoked concerns surrounding America’s commitment to global standards.”
The boards discussed these and other matters related to the joint efforts
at length at our joint meeting in October 2009. We came to a number of
agreements regarding the path forward that were described in a joint
communiqué issued November 5, 2009.34 That document provided a
status report on the MoU projects and forward plans for completing
them by June 2011. It noted that in order to expedite the process, the
boards had agreed to begin meeting together each month. Very
importantly, it described a number of shared goals, values, and priorities,
among these that convergence for the sake of convergence was not our
goal and that the standards under development needed to result in
improvements to our respective existing standards. The trustees of the
IASC Foundation and FAF also issued a joint statement on November 5,
2009, in support of the joint communiqué by the FASB and IASB, noting
“both Trustee groups continue to support unequivocally the joint work of
the IASB and FASB aimed at achieving the objectives and convergence
milestones outlined in the February 2006 Memorandum of
Understanding, as updated in September 2008.”35 Supportive public
statements were also issued by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro (November
5, 2009) and the IASC Monitoring Board (November 11, 2009).
So, beginning with the November 2009 meeting, the boards began
meeting monthly for several days each month. A good bit of this was
accomplished by the 5 FASB Board members and key staff flying to
London for multiday joint meetings with the 15 members of the IASB
and its staff. We also held numerous joint board meetings via
teleconference. In embarking on this intensified effort, both David
Tweedie and I (and, I believe, other members of our boards) believed it
would enable us to make more rapid progress toward completing the
major MoU projects within the 2011 timeframe set out by the G20. For
example, in the IASC Foundation Annual Report 2009, David stated
Our work programme is focused on substantially completing the
MoU projects, and insurance, by 30 June 2011. Some commentators have suggested that the scale of the programme and the
timetable are too ambitious. While I agree that the programme is
34
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ambitious, it is certainly achievable. The G20 have urged us to
complete our work by that date and many major economies have
selected 2011 or 2012 as the year to adopt IFRS on the basis of a
completed programme. I want to emphasize that our primary
focus remains on making significant improvements to financial
reporting. The Board will not issue a new standard unless it is an
improvement over its current requirements .... I believe that
defined targets and deadlines impose discipline and enable us to
deliver needed improvements sooner rather than later.

This undertaking was intense and amounted to far more than a
doubling of our efforts. Although I believe that enabled us to make
significant forward progress on many of the major joint projects, our
deliberations also revealed a number of areas of disagreement among
board members, both within each board and, in some cases, between
the boards, and also identified additional issues requiring further
exploration. For example, differences in views among board members
surfaced about various aspects of the projects on lease accounting,
consolidation, and insurance contracts. The inevitable result was slippage in certain projects. That slippage and revised timetables on certain
projects were reflected in the joint progress report we issued in midApril 2010 covering the first quarter.36 At that point, we were expecting
to issue joint exposure drafts by June 30, 2010, on a number of the
major projects. At the FASB, we were also planning to issue a major
exposure draft on accounting for financial instruments in the second
quarter of 2010. Recognizing the importance of proactively informing
constituents about these important exposure drafts and of obtaining
broad-based input on these proposals, we had developed programs for
enhanced outreach to stakeholders.

A Necessary Change in Plans
However, quite understandably, a number of concerns were voiced at
our advisory council meetings and from others, perhaps more so in the
United States than abroad, over the very significant challenges that
constituents would face in responding to numerous proposals on major
projects if simultaneously released. They very rightly, in my view,
expressed concerns over their ability to properly review, evaluate, and
provide well-developed comment letters on the numerous exposure
drafts that were scheduled to be issued in the second quarter of 2010.
The boards recognized these very valid concerns and the importance to
the development of sound accounting standards of enabling all parties
to properly review, evaluate, and provide well-developed input on
exposure drafts. Accordingly, at our joint meeting in late May 2010 and
36
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as detailed in a joint communiqué in June 2010, we agreed on a number
of significant revisions to the MoU work plan.37 These involved changes
in the timing, scope of, and approach to certain projects to prioritize
our joint efforts in order to better enable the boards to complete highpriority projects by June 2011 while also maintaining proper due
process, including allowing constituents sufficient time and ability to
properly review, evaluate, and provide input on exposure drafts. Four
major projects were designated as priority projects, with a targeted
completion by June 30, 2011:
1. Accounting for financial instruments
2. Fair value measurement
3. Leases
4. Revenue recognition
For the IASB, completion of its project on insurance contracts by June 30,
2011, was also a priority. The boards also agreed to try to issue converged
standards on the presentation of other comprehensive income by June 30,
2011. Issuance of final standards on other major joint projects, including
financial statement presentation and financial instruments with
characteristics of equity, were now targeted for dates beyond June 30,
2011, and there were revisions to the approach to be taken on other
projects, such as derecognition and consolidation. SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro again issued a public statement on June 2, 2010, supporting the
modified plan, emphasizing the importance of the boards issuing quality
standards, and providing reassurance that the SEC continued to be on
schedule to make a determination in 2011 about whether to incorporate
IFRS into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers.
The reworking of the timelines and approach to certain MoU projects
was an important and, in my view, necessary action by the boards. We
had worked very hard to advance the many MoU projects toward
completion by June 30, 2011, but it was proving to be a very challenging
and, at times, downright exhausting effort. As I observed in a speech on
June 3, 2010, at the Annual SEC and Financial Reporting Institute Conference of the Leventhal School of Accounting of the University of Southern
California, about the intensified convergence effort,
I am proud to say that so far my fellow Board members and
our staff (both FASB and IASB) have risen to the occasion.
But I do fear potential burnout, as it’s not easy to be running
a marathon at sprint speed. [O]n our side, the FASB side,
expeditiously completing the projects is important and we
have been working hard to achieve this. But our emphasis
also has been and will continue to be on seeking not only
37
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expeditious completion and convergence but also genuine
improvement in the standards.... We’re also stressing the
importance of maintaining full and proper due process,
including extensive constituent outreach and engagement.

In looking back at the period from November 2009 when we
announced the highly intensified convergence effort to May 2010 when
we reworked the timetable and approach, I think it is clear that I, along
with others, had underestimated the amount of time it would take to
properly and fully examine, discuss, and come to decisions on the
many key issues in each of the projects and had overestimated the
potential effect of significantly increasing our joint meetings on our
ability to expedite progress on so many projects. It was an effort that
had never been tried before, and as we progressed with the many joint
meetings, it became increasingly clear that despite all the hard work
and good intentions, more time would be needed to properly complete
projects. Making sure that constituents would be able to properly
review and comment on major proposals was essential to ultimately
issuing sound standards.
As planned, and by the time I retired on September 30, 2010, we had
issued joint exposure drafts on revenue recognition, accounting for leases,
and presenting comprehensive income.38 At the FASB, we had issued a
major exposure draft on accounting for financial instruments,39 received
very extensive input on that proposal from a wide group of stakeholders,
and begun discussions with the IASB on a plan for jointly redeliberating
the key issues. The IASB had also issued a major exposure draft on
accounting for insurance contracts that was significantly different from
the existing U.S. accounting standards on insurance.40 We decided to
solicit input from U.S. constituents on the IASB’s proposal and alternative
ways of improving U.S. GAAP in this area and, therefore, issued an
Invitation to Comment in September 2010.41
Post-September 30, 2010, both the FASB and IASB made some further
changes to their technical agendas, so they could focus their efforts
through June 30, 2011, on the priority projects. Toward that goal, the
monthly meetings between the boards continued, with the boards
focusing on those projects. However, in April 2011, the boards
announced further revisions to the convergence timetable that included
extending the timeline for completing the projects on accounting for
38
Proposed Accounting Standards Update (ASU) Revenue Recognition (Topic 605): Revenue from
Contracts with Customers issued June 24, 2010; proposed ASU Leases (Topic 840) issued August 17,
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issued May 26, 2010.
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financial instruments, leasing, and revenue recognition beyond June 30,
2011, in order to permit further work and consultation with
stakeholders on these very major subjects.42 The boards also decided to
issue second exposure drafts on revenue recognition and lease
accounting for public comment, reflecting the importance of these
subjects and the fact that in redeliberating issues relating to the 2010
exposure drafts, the boards had agreed on a number of changes to
those proposals. The boards were able, however, to finalize and issue
common standards on fair value measurement in May 2011 and
presentation of comprehensive income in June 2011.
Clearly, and very appropriately in my opinion, the boards are
proceeding in a deliberate and thorough manner on the major projects,
ensuring that there is proper consultation with stakeholders, careful
consideration of all the input that is received, and redeliberation of
issues. Also, the boards are issuing revised proposals for public comment in order to try to ensure that the final standards, when issued, are
high quality, understandable, operational, and cost effective. The G20
continues to issue periodic calls urging the boards to complete the key
convergence projects in support of the goal of establishing a single set
of high-quality global accounting standards.
At this point, it seems likely that the boards will finalize and issue
converged standards on revenue recognition in 2013. They are also
working toward issuing a second exposure draft on lease accounting
and, at this point, hope to issue a final standard in 2013. However, the
prospects for convergence on accounting for financial instruments and
insurance contracts seem less likely. In regard to financial instruments,
the FASB and IASB have taken somewhat different paths to try to
improve the accounting standards in this important area. At times they
have been jointly working on certain aspects relating to accounting for
financial instruments, including on accounting for impairments of loans
and debt securities and, more recently, on the overall approach to classification and measurement. However, in 2011, they were unable to
agree on the criteria for balance sheet netting of financial instruments.
Each board essentially decided to stick with its existing standards and
also require footnote disclosures to help financial statement users
bridge what, for some major financial institutions, can be very major
differences in the size of the balance sheets under IFRS versus under
U.S. GAAP. The boards have also been separately considering potential
changes in the accounting for hedging transactions. The FASB has been
developing new disclosures on liquidity risks and interest rate risks.
And recently, the FASB has also been developing an approach to
impairment of loans and debt securities that is different than the one
they had been previously discussing jointly with the IASB.
42
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As of November 2012, it seems that the two boards have largely agreed
on the overall approach to classifying and measuring financial instruments and will soon issue exposure drafts on this important topic. For
the impairment of loans and debt securities, the boards will issue
exposure drafts with their different proposed models, highlighting the
differences between the two proposals, in order to obtain constituent
input on both models on the differences. In addition, the IASB is finalizing a new standard on accounting for hedging transactions that the
FASB plans to consider once it seems closer to finalizing the model for
classification and measurement of financial instruments.
Progress on the joint project on insurance contracts has also been challenging, both because of the complexity of the issues and also because
there are very understandable differences in perspective between the
two boards regarding the urgency of developing a converged standard
in this area. For the IASB, this has been and continues to represent a
major gap in the body of IFRS, one requiring that it develops and issues
a standard as soon as possible. However, we already have wellestablished standards under U.S. GAAP on insurance, and although
there may be room for improvement, the perceived urgency to do so is
not as great, and the cost-benefit considerations of requiring a major
change are important. So, after several years of joint deliberations on
this project and continuing differences of opinion among board
members and between the boards on certain key issues, it is not
surprising that FASB Chairman Leslie Seidman indicated at the June
2012 meeting of the FASB’s Financial Standards Advisory Council that,
in her opinion, it is not likely that the boards will achieve convergence
on the accounting for insurance contracts and that the FASB is planning
to step back to rethink its approach to this project.43 As of November
2012, it seems that each board is planning to issue an exposure draft in
2013 on accounting for insurance contracts, highlighting the areas of
difference between the two proposals, in order to obtain stakeholder
input as a means for then deciding how best they might proceed either
jointly or separately.
Moreover, beyond the current convergence projects there is uncertainty
at this point about how the FASB and IASB will work together in the
future. In July 2011, the IASB issued for public comment a major
consultation document seeking input on its agenda for the next three
years. With a growing list of potential projects requested by
constituents in countries that have or plan to adopt IFRS and
continuing uncertainty over where the United States stands on IFRS,
joint projects with the FASB may become less of a perceived strategic
imperative for the IASB and its trustees. Other countries want a seat at
43

“In brief: FASB Chairman provides status update on insurance contracts project,” PwC CFO
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the IASB standard-setting table and so it seems that the unique bilateral
partnership between the IASB and the FASB will give way to a more
multilateral standard-setting environment internationally. Additionally,
from reading press accounts and talking with members of the FASB,
IASB, and observers of the accounting standard-setting scene, it seems
that some convergence fatigue has set in on both sides. For example, as
reported on WSJ.com:
In a speech in Australia on Friday, he [referring to IASB Chairman
Hans Hoogervorst] said it’s not in the best interest of U.S. or
global investors for the IASB and the U.S. Financial Accounting
Standards Board to spend another ten years making minor tweaks
to accounting rules to get them exactly the same.... Gradual
convergence between the standards “has served its purpose, but
now it is time to move on,” Hoogervorst told the IFRS Foundation
conference in Melbourne, Australia. [M]any other international
stakeholders won’t support a longer, indefinite period of
convergence between U.S. and international rules.44

As reported in the December 6, 2011, article “FASB, IASB Chiefs Agree
New Convergence Model Is Needed” in the Journal of Accountancy,
FASB Chair Leslie Seidman said the FASB would like to work with the
IASB to complete the current priority convergence projects but that
indefinite convergence is not a viable option practically or politically.
I had made similar observations (for example, as reported in the
CFO.com article “Herz: No Convergence for 10–15 Years”) at a 2009
public meeting of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group [FCAG] in
response to a question from FCAG cochair Harvey Goldschmid, “In a
perfect world, with full resources and free from outside influence, when
could we get convergence?” I responded, “Ten to fifteen years.”45
Although my response may have surprised some, that was my assessment at the time of how long it would take the boards, working
together, to achieve full convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. I
knew, as did other knowledgeable parties, that beyond the joint projects
under the MoU, there were many other differences between the two
sets of standards and that ironing those out through a continued
convergence effort would likely take a long time. That’s one reason I
favored the “improve and adopt” approach under which we sought to
work jointly with the IASB to develop new, improved, and converged
standards in a finite number of major areas, at which point I believed
IFRS would be a high-quality set of standards suitable for adoption in
the United States. Such a process was clearly challenging and would
take a number of years to complete. However, I reasoned that it would
44

Emily Chasan, “IASB Chairman: “Let’s Move Past Convergence,” WSJ.com, 25 November
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45
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be a more expeditious path to achieving common standards than a
continued process of convergence between the boards that would need
to deal with the many remaining differences between the two sets of
standards beyond the completion of the MoU.
The decision on whether and how the United States moves to or
toward IFRS rests with the SEC. Many paths have been suggested and
are possible. Some support a gradual approach that, although not
achieving full convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, would be
directionally consistent with continuing, over time, to move the two
sets of standards closer together. That seems to be the view expressed
in the November 15, 2011, letter of the FAF trustees to the SEC. This
letter proposes a U.S. incorporation commitment “premised on the
belief that although the pursuit of a single set of global accounting
standards is a worthy objective, a more practical goal for the foreseeable future is to achieve highly comparable (but not necessarily
identical) financial reporting standards among the most developed
capital markets that are based on a common set of international
standards.” The FAF letter described this approach as
a model for incorporating into U.S. GAAP independently
developed and investor-focused international standards that
improve financial reporting in the U.S. or that maintain the
quality of financial reporting under U.S. GAAP but also advance
global comparability of standards. Under this recommended
approach, the U.S. would retain sovereign authority over
financial reporting and standard setting for U.S. capital markets,
with influential roles for the SEC and FASB that recognize the
benefit of the global harmonization of financial reporting
standards based on the common platform of IFRS.46

In contrast, the February 2012 report by the trustees of the IFRS
Foundation argues for full adoption of IFRS, stating
Convergence may be an appropriate short-term strategy for a
particular jurisdiction and may facilitate adoption over a
transitional period. Convergence, however, is not a substitute for
adoption.... There is a natural temptation for countries (and
stakeholders within those countries) to argue against full adoption of IFRS, to call for convergence of national standards and
IFRS rather than adoption, or to introduce national exceptions to
IFRS rules. The temptation to pursue convergence rather than
adoption should be resisted. Full adoption must be the goal.47

To me, this difference in views between the FAF trustees and the
trustees of the IFRS Foundation is not surprising given the different
mission and roles of the two groups and the accounting standardsetting bodies they oversee. The mission and responsibility of FAF
46
47
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relates to accounting standards used in the U.S. capital markets, but the
clearly stated mission of the IFRS Foundation since its establishment is
to promote the achievement of a single set of high-quality global
accounting standards.
Some parties on both sides believe the time has come for each board to
go its own way and that each board should instead focus on making its
own standards as good as possible for its stakeholders without
deliberately seeking to bring the two sets of standards closer together. For
example, in an article in Accounting Today, professors Paul Miller and
Paul Bahnson, commenting on the announcement in December 2011 by
SEC Chief Accountant James Kroeker that the SEC would not be making
a decision by the end of 2011 on the future of IFRS in the United States,
on what Miller and Bahnson see as mounting areas of disagreement
between the FASB and the IASB on key issues in major projects, and on
the IASB’s tilt toward continental European interests, state
The quixotic quest to create uniform international standards is
dead and done.... We ask, then, who could think it makes sense
to subjugate U.S. standard-setting to Europe with its perennial
political and economic problems? The present disarray shows
that attaining uniform global standards is an ephemeral
fantasy.... Going forward, incorporation means FASB will treat
both old and new IFRS as potential helpful input to its deliberations. Instead of bending over backward to find common ground
with the IASB, FASB will resolve its issues as it sees fit without
pressure to go along to get along.48

Indeed, I have heard some in the United States analogize a potential
move to IFRS to the likelihood and merits of the United States adopting
the metric system—in other words, the goal of getting to a single set of
global accounting standards is not achievable and that we are doing
just fine with our own U.S. standards. Although all these views are
interesting and help inform the debate, ultimately, the decision on
whether and how reporting by U.S. public companies moves to or
towards IFRS rests with the SEC and could also involve Congress.

In the Meantime, Back at the SEC
In the wake of the Madoff scandal and due to ongoing events relating
to the financial crisis, the SEC certainly had its hands full during 2009.
So, it is not surprising that it would take until February 2010 for the
SEC to issue another release relating to the potential move to IFRS for
U.S. issuers. In the release Commission Statement in Support of
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Convergence and Global Accounting Standards, the SEC reiterated its longstanding support for the development of a single set of high-quality
global accounting standards. It also stated that it planned to make a
decision in 2011 on whether, when, and how to incorporate IFRS into
the U.S. financial reporting system. In recognition of the concerns raised
by commenters on the November 2008 “roadmap” proposal, the SEC
directed its staff to conduct an extensive work plan to address many of
the issues raised in the comment letters, including whether IFRS is sufficiently developed and consistent in application for use in the United
States; whether the IASB is an independent standard setter that sets
standards for the benefit of investors; the degree of U.S. investor
understanding of IFRS and the readiness of preparers and auditors to
make the conversion to IFRS; and assessing the impact of moving to
IFRS on U.S. laws and regulations and on companies in terms of
accounting systems, contractual arrangements, corporate governance,
and litigation contingencies.
The release also indicated that if the SEC were to decide in 2011 to
incorporate IFRS into the U.S. reporting system, the first time U.S.
companies would report under such a system would be no earlier
than 2015.
The use of the word incorporation versus adoption of IFRS was
interesting and suggested the possibility of a partial or piecemeal movement to IFRS by U.S. issuers (for example, by allowing but not
requiring all or some issuers to use IFRS or by requiring or allowing
the use of some but not all existing IFRS). Incorporation could also be
achieved by continuing to have U.S. GAAP as the legal name of the
standards in the United States but with all or some of those of those
standards being the same as, or based on, IFRS. In that regard, in
December 2010, SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Paul Beswick, floated a
possible approach called “condorsement.” This approach involves
continued convergence through an endorsement mechanism, under
which U.S. GAAP would continue to exist and the FASB would decide
on a standard-by-standard basis whether the particular IFRS
pronouncement is suitable for use in the United States.49 Such an
approach was further detailed in the SEC staff paper50 issued in May
2011. The approach has some similarities to the improve and adopt
path we outlined in 2007.51
49
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However, in other important respects, this approach would be similar
to the endorsement processes followed in certain parts of the world for
IFRS. Although aimed at ensuring the suitability and acceptability of
IFRS in those jurisdictions, these can result, and have resulted, in variations of IFRS across the world. That would seem to run counter to the
avowed and often reiterated and reaffirmed goal of a single set of
global standards. So, U.S. adoption of such a process could not only
create a U.S. version of international standards but might also
encourage other countries and jurisdictions to maintain or put into
place IFRS endorsement mechanisms, thereby potentially further
undermining the goal of achieving a single set of international
standards. For U.S. companies and other stakeholders in the U.S.
reporting system, a condorsement approach could result in a lengthy
period of serial changes in U.S. GAAP that could increase the overall
cost and effort involved in moving to international standards.
On the other hand, incorporation of IFRS into U.S. GAAP could avoid
or significantly mitigate a number of legal and regulatory issues that
might arise if IFRS supplanted U.S. GAAP as the legally recognized
accounting standards in this country. Because the terms “U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles” and “U.S. GAAP” are embedded in
many places in our federal and state laws, in U.S. tax rules and regulations, in the rules and regulations of the SEC, U.S. banking regulators,
and those of other regulatory agencies, and in many contracts entered
into by companies, providers of capital, and other parties, changing the
legal name of the standards in use in United States could raise
widespread legal and regulatory issues. In effect, incorporation would
allow IFRS to be embedded in the legal wrapper of U.S. GAAP such
that the actual standards would be IFRS but would, for legal purposes
in the United States, still be called U.S. GAAP.
Incorporating IFRS into U.S. GAAP over time could also mitigate the
challenges to the U.S. reporting system associated with a one-time
complete, or “big bang,” conversion to IFRS. Despite the very significant
progress that has been and continues to be made in narrowing the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, even with successful completion of
major MoU projects, there will still be numerous remaining differences
between the two sets of standards, some of which can have significant
effects on the reported results and financial condition of companies.
Further differences are created as the FASB and IASB issue new
standards that are not the subject of joint projects between the two
boards. Ironing out these differences could be challenging and could take
many years. An endorsement approach would enable the FASB to
continue to be involved in determining the standards used in the United
States and might also facilitate the United States, through the FASB, to
continue to play a significant role in the development of international
standards. Finally and importantly, an endorsement approach would
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seem to be consistent with the previously discussed requirements of Section 108 of Sarbanes-Oxley that require the designated U.S. standard
setter to consider “the extent to which international convergence on high
quality accounting standards is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and for protection of investors.”
The SEC staff continued its execution of the February 2010 work plan
on IFRS through 2010 and 2011, and into 2012. During that period, the
staff accomplished several things. They issued two requests for comment in August 2010, one soliciting input from issuers on incorporating
IFRS into financial reporting by U.S. issuers and the other soliciting
input from investors on this subject.52 They also issued an interim
progress report in October 2010 on their work plan activities53 and three
staff papers (the aforementioned one in May 2011 on the condorsement
approach,54 one comparing U.S. GAAP and IFRS,55 and the third
analyzing the application of IFRS in practice).56 As well, they received
comment letters, held public roundtables, and did an extensive amount
of fact gathering and analysis on the wide range of issues relating to
the potential use of IFRS by U.S. issuers.
Although the SEC had said it intended to make a decision on this
important matter in 2011, in December 2011, Chief Accountant Jim
Kroeker announced the staff would need some more time to finalize
and draft its final report on the work plan. That report57 was issued on
July 13, 2012, which was also Jim Kroeker’s last day at the SEC.
Although it provides a comprehensive summary of the SEC staff’s
work, findings, and observations, it does not contain any recommendations to the SEC on whether, when, and how to incorporate IFRS into
the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers. Moreover, the introductory note to the report states
The Commission believes it is important to make clear that
publication of the Staff Report at this time does not imply—and
should not be construed to imply—that the Commission has
made any policy decision as to whether International Financial
Reporting Standards should be incorporated into the financial
reporting system for U.S. issuers, or how any such incorporation,
if it were to occur, should be implemented.... Additional analysis
52
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and consideration of this threshold policy question is necessary
before any decision by the Commission concerning the
incorporation of IFRS into the financial reporting system for U.S.
issuers can occur.

I will not go over in detail the many findings and observations of the
SEC staff in the July 2012 final report, but will refer interested readers
to the report itself. However, I thought the report did a good job
explaining the many issues associated with direct and full adoption of
IFRS and why some sort of endorsement approach might eliminate or
at least alleviate many of these issues. These include the legal, regulatory, and contractual issues associated with replacing U.S. GAAP, the
cost and effort to U.S. companies that would accompany a one-time
“big bang” approach to the switch, and concerns about ensuring a
proper vetting of IFRS’ suitability for broad use in the United States.
The report also contains some observations on areas in IFRS that are
underdeveloped relative to U.S. GAAP, such as the accounting for
extractive industries, insurance, and rate-regulated activities; the many
areas of continuing difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP; the need
for the IASB to have a more active and effective interpretive process
and to make greater use of national accounting standard setters; the
need for continued improvement in the global application and enforcement of IFRS and for broader and more stable funding of the IASB and
IFRS Foundation that does not include obtaining funds from public
accounting firms; a recommendation that postimplementation reviews
of IASB standards be conducted by the IFRS Foundation rather than the
IASB itself; and the need for greater investor education and engagement relating to the development and use of accounting standards.
None of these findings and observations, in my view, is particularly
surprising from a U.S. perspective. However, to some, if not many, at
the IASB, the IFRS Foundation, and its broader constituencies around
the world, the SEC staff report may have been disappointing and
frustrating. First, because it did not contain any recommendations on a
path forward for IFRS in the United States and seemed to leave that in
limbo for the time being. Also, some seemed to view it as representing
an overly U.S. centric view of financial reporting in increasingly globalized capital markets. For example, Michel Prada, the Chairman of the
IFRS Foundation trustees, was quoted in the July 16, 2012, article “IASB
Takes Swipe at SEC Delay over IFRS” in Accountancy Age as follows:
While recognising the right of the SEC to determine the method
and timing for incorporation of IFRS in the US, we regret that
the staff report in not accompanied by a recommended action
plan for the SEC. Given the achievements for the convergence
programme inspired by repeated calls of the G20 for global
accounting standards, a clear action plan would be welcome.

129

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

European Commission spokesman Stefan De Rynck, in the July 18,
2012, article “EU Queries U.S. Seat on Global Accounting Body” on
Reuters.com, stated that discussions concerning whether the United
States will adopt the IFRS have been going on for a
very long time and, despite repeatedly expressed commitments from the U.S., things are advancing very slowly.... The
lack of a clear vision from the U.S. creates uncertainty and
hampers the IFRS from becoming a truly global accounting
language.... It is also becoming more difficult to justify the
representation of jurisdictions not applying IFRS in the IASB
governance framework.

In October 2012, the staff of the IFRS Foundation issued a report to the
Trustees of the IFRS Foundation analyzing the findings in the July 2012
SEC staff report on IFRS.58 This report provides a status on the findings
and issues in the SEC staff report, discusses actions that have already
been undertaken in regard to a number of the findings in the SEC staff
report, tactfully takes issue with certain findings and observations in the
SEC staff report (for example, in regard to funding of the IASB) by
providing additional information and perspectives on these matters,
questions the sustainability and viability of a gradual approach to
moving towards IFRS on a standard-by-standard basis, and contains an
appendix discussing arguments and evidence in support of the case for
global accounting standards. Overall, the IFRS Foundation staff conclude
While the size of the US economy relative to other jurisdictions
presents significant challenges in transition that are unique to the
US, the experience of other countries suggests that many of the
challenges can be overcome with the appropriate political will to
make a commitment to the mission of a single set of global
standards. Moreover, in many areas the US is better prepared
than other jurisdictions to consider the adoption of IFRS.59

Over the past decade, I have traveled to many parts of the world,
including many countries that have adopted IFRS. These countries have
devoted a lot of time, effort, and cost carefully planning and
implementing the adoption and have done so successfully. In some
countries and jurisdictions, the move from their existing accounting
standards to IFRS has also required the exercise of considerable political
will by the relevant authorities. So, I think it is understandable that
some in the IFRS world have expressed disappointment, frustration,
and criticism over what they seem to view as continued “foot dragging” by the United States. However, I believe it is also clear that the
United States is different from any other country in the world,
including in the size and breadth of our capital markets and in our
58
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financial reporting, regulatory, and legal systems. So, rightly or
wrongly, the perceived benefits of moving to global standards are
viewed by many in the United States as less clear than for most, if not
all, other countries.
In summary, there continues to be considerable uncertainty over when
and even whether the SEC will come to any decisions on this important
matter.

So, Bob, What Do You Really Think
About Convergence and IFRS?
Okay, after reading a lengthy chronicle of the convergence efforts
between FASB and IASB from 2002–12 and of the various twists and
turns in the SEC’s considerations relating to IFRS, readers are probably
wondering about my opinions on the subject. Indeed, I often get asked,
“How was it working with the IASB? Do you think we will ever
achieve complete convergence? Will the SEC really ever approve IFRS
for use by U.S. companies?”
First and foremost, for me and, I believe, for many of my fellow FASB
Board members, despite the many challenges, working with the IASB on
pursuing the goal of developing common high-quality international
accounting standards in support of global financial reporting was a labor
of love. If I did not believe in that goal, I would not have devoted a
chunk of my career and life to it through chairing the Transnational
Auditors Committee, serving on the IASB, and through the joint efforts
between the FASB and IASB. I very much enjoyed working with and getting to know our counterparts at the IASB and other standard setters
around the world, including those in Canada, Europe, Japan, and China,
with whom we met periodically. For me, it reaffirmed the growing
importance of global connections and served as a reminder that not all
accounting knowledge (or issues) reside in the United States.
I won’t reiterate all the many arguments for and against creating a
single set of high-quality international financial accounting standards.
The real goal is having common, high-quality, and comparable financial
information for listed companies and other publicly accountable entities
across the global capital markets. Achieving such a goal would, in the
opinion of many commentators, prove beneficial to both investors and
companies around the world and could provide significant economic
benefits both globally and in the United States. Developing a single set
of, or at least common, accounting and reporting standards is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for achieving this goal. So, although
we may never fully attain the goal of having a single set of high-quality
global accounting standards, I have believed and continue to believe it
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is a goal worth pursuing. The goal helps drive standard setters toward
continuing to narrow differences between national standards and IFRS,
thereby resulting in increasing convergence over time. As stated in the
SEC’s November 2008 proposal Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial
Statements Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting
Standards by U.S. Issuers,
The Commission recognizes that the use of a single widely
accepted set of high-quality accounting standards would benefit
both the global capital markets and U.S. investors by providing a
common basis for investors, issuers and others to evaluate investment opportunities and prospects in different jurisdictions....
Capital formation and investor understanding would be enhanced
if the world’s major capital markets all operated under a single set
of high-quality accounting standards that elicit comparable, highquality financial information from public companies.

Most commentators on the roadmap proposal agreed with this notion.
A major potential benefit then is improving comparability of reported
corporate financial information across the capital markets of the world.
By facilitating cross-border investing, it could also increase liquidity in
capital markets and lower the cost of capital for companies. Better
international comparability of reported financial information might also
improve corporate decision making. For companies operating on a
multinational basis, the ability to prepare their financial reports using a
single set of accounting standards across the jurisdictions in which they
operate would lower costs and could improve quality and consistency
in preparing and communicating such information.
Now, I recognize that some people in the United States pose a number
of important arguments based on a number of considerations against
having a single set of high-quality international accounting standards or
even common, but not identical, standards between the United States
and other parts of the world. Some maintain that the United States, as
the world’s largest national economy and capital market, is a world
unto its own—that U.S. companies can raise all the capital they need
here and that U.S. investors have a cornucopia of U.S. securities they
can invest in. Further, as noted in the March 2009 FAF-FASB comment
letter on the SEC roadmap proposal, the overall macroeconomic benefit
to the United States of moving to IFRS is not clear. Also as noted in the
SEC staff’s July 2012 final report on its IFRS work plan, in the absence
of virtually complete convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, a
switch to IFRS would likely entail significant cost and effort by U.S.
issuers. U.S. companies are very understandably tired from all the
regulatory changes and economic and business challenges they have
gone through in recent years: regulatory changes first from SarbanesOxley and, more recently, from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, and the effects of the global financial crisis
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and the ensuing economic recession, to name a few. So, the prospect of
significant changes in accounting and financial reporting requirements
is not one that is welcomed by many in the corporate community.
Some also argue that our more robust financial reporting system gives
the United States a competitive advantage and that we could lose this
edge if we go to international standards. In their view, the primary goal
should be to maintain and improve our system of financial reporting,
including our U.S. GAAP accounting standards, seeking convergence
only when it would clearly enhance our system and when the benefits
of a change clearly exceed the costs. For these and other reasons, I
believe that significant political challenges could accompany a decision
by the SEC to mandate the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers.
I certainly do not dismiss or underestimate these factors and the
continuing challenges in the United States of moving to or toward IFRS.
The United States is a very large economy, and our capital markets are
large, deep, and liquid. However, I believe the arguments against the
United States moving to international standards may not give proper
weight to what seem to me to be continuing trends in the global
economy and capital flows and to the growing acceptance of IFRS
around the world as the recognized set of international accounting
standards. The fact is that the U.S. share of global gross domestic
product (GDP) and global capital markets has now been steadily
declining for many years. One decade ago, we accounted for more than
50 percent of the global equity markets; that has now fallen to
approximately 30 percent.60 Differential growth rates between the
slower-growing U.S. economy and those in China, India, Brazil, and
other nations in the developing world means that the U.S. share of
global GDP has been decreasing and is likely to continue to decrease
over the next decade. As a result, U.S. investors seeking the potential
for higher returns have been allocating more capital to foreign securities, with overall U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities at
December 31, 2011, totaling more than $6.8 trillion—more than triple
the amount at the end of 2001.61
However, my apparent exuberance for IFRS or any set of international
accounting standards is tempered by three important considerations:
1. First, the standards must be high quality. It’s no good having a
single set of standards if those standards don’t produce sound
financial and transparent information. So, as previously
mentioned, the FASB-IASB convergence program is not just
60
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about convergence; it is also very much about trying to improve
standards for the benefit of investors and other users of financial
information both in the United States and around the world. In
this sense, although there are some continuing gaps in the IFRS
literature and particular standards that, in my opinion, are in
need of improvement (just as there are in U.S. GAAP), overall I
believe IFRS does represent a high-quality set of standards.
2. Second, those standards need to work in the United States with,
for good or bad, all the other institutional and cultural forces
that affect our financial reporting system. So, even though the
U.S. share of global GDP and capital markets is decreasing, we
are still a key force and major player in the global economy and
financial system, such that a set of accounting standards cannot
be truly international if they are not used or do not work in the
United States. For them to work in the United States, additional
implementation guidance beyond that provided by the IASB and
its interpretations committee may be needed in some cases.
3. Third, as previously noted, although having a single set of highquality accounting standards is a prerequisite for achieving the
larger goal of comparable, high-quality financial information
across the global capital markets, it is not a sufficient condition
for achieving that goal. That goal also depends heavily on sound
application of the standards, strong auditing, and proper regulatory review and enforcement across the capital markets of the
world. This point is reinforced by the results of the SEC staff’s
recent review of the consolidated financial statements of more
than 180 companies that use IFRS from 22 countries around the
world. The November 2011 study62 found that, although the
reviewed financial statements generally appeared to comply with
IFRS, there was diversity in practice, in some cases resulting
from what appeared to be noncompliance with IFRS requirements. Continuing and cooperative efforts by all parties,
including companies, the major global accounting firms, securities regulators, and national accounting standard setters are
needed to reduce this diversity in practice over time. But I think
that having a single set of international accounting standards or
at least common standards provides a better starting point for
achieving this goal than having multiple sets of accounting
standards around the world.
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Nobody Said This Would Be Easy
Like most labors of love, this one has had many challenging aspects
and will likely continue to face a number of challenges. Although both
boards shared a commitment to a common goal, and the members of
the boards have generally worked together in a very collegial manner,
the fact that we were starting from different places and that we each
also had to maintain our existing standards, while also trying to
converge, often complicated matters. At times, it was a bit like trying to
ride two horses at the same time because as significant reporting issues
arose relating to existing standards, both boards had a responsibility to
address them, sometimes resulting in short-term fixes that would later
need to be revisited in major joint convergence projects. This was
particularly the case during the financial crisis of 2008–09.
Each board’s existing standards had been developed during the prior 30
years, and although there had been some harmonization efforts, they
were largely developed separately. So there were many areas of difference between the two sets of standards. We were clearly starting from
different places. That has caused, and continues to cause, differences in
the technical agendas and priorities of the two boards. For example, for
the IASB, completing a project on accounting for insurance contracts
has been viewed as very important because IFRS does not have a
standard in this area. In contrast, U.S. GAAP has well-established
standards covering insurance companies. Although these may be
capable of improvement, it’s of less priority for the FASB.
By its very nature, convergence requires change, whether it be through
developing common new standards or through one board agreeing to
adopt the other’s standards in particular areas. Change is not regarded
lightly by the boards or their constituents. The benefits of any change
must be carefully weighed against the costs of the change. So, for
individual board members, balancing the desire for convergence while
also trying to ensure that the resulting changes are cost beneficial is a
very important, but often a very difficult, exercise. Not surprisingly,
because the boards have been starting with different existing standards,
the respective constituents of each board often favor continuing with
the existing standard (that is, U.S. constituents may prefer sticking with
the existing U.S. GAAP approach, and constituents of the IASB may
favor continuing with the current IFRS standard). Thus, the cost-benefit
evaluations by each board can differ. Understandably, we have seen
instances on joint projects (for example, recently with consolidation and
offsetting of financial instruments) in which, after significant joint
deliberation and input from their respective constituents, each board
decided, at least for now, to continue with its existing approach,
thereby not achieving convergence in these areas.
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For very understandable and valid reasons, people do not always
enthusiastically embrace potential change, particularly when they
believe a change may disadvantage them relative to the status quo or
when a change will require significant cost and effort. So, it is not
surprising that both the FASB and IASB have encountered significant
opposition to certain of the proposed changes resulting from the
convergence effort. Those most opposed to particular changes
sometimes attempt to block, delay, or overturn them through political
processes. Politicians are not elected by, or accountable to, a global
constituency. As the old saying goes, “all politics are local.” So, when
lobbied by their constituents asking them to intercede against the FASB
or the IASB on a particular proposed change, they may not be swayed
by the asserted merits of international convergence of accounting
standards. As discussed in chapter 3, we experienced that with the
accounting for stock options. Similarly, the IASB experienced significant
lobbying of the European Commission against IFRS 8 by opponents to
that IASB standard that converged the IFRS reporting of segment
information to that required by U.S. GAAP. Nevertheless, in both of
these instances and notwithstanding the lobbying efforts, converged
standards were issued and adopted.
Challenges in the convergence process also arise from the fact that that
there are significant differences across the world in the cultural,
institutional, economic, business, regulatory, and legal systems that surround the financial reporting system in different countries and jurisdictions. For example, aspects of the U.S. regulatory and legal environment
drive some participants in the U.S. reporting system to demand more
detailed accounting guidance and clear rules than seems to be the case
in other parts of the world. Differences in the cultural, business, regulatory, and legal environments can also result in some proposed changes
being more opposed in the United States than in other parts of the
world, and vice-versa.
Despite all these challenges, the boards have been making progress in
jointly improving and converging their standards. Disagreement within
each board and between the boards on particular technical issues are to
be expected. In my view, that is a normal, healthy part of the standardsetting process. In a number of cases, with further effort, including joint
redeliberation of such issues or by exposing alternative approaches for
public comment, these differences have been successfully resolved, but
it requires persistence, determination, hard work, and a lot of goodwill.
Overall and despite the many challenges, I believe those qualities have
been in plentiful supply by board members and the staffs of the two
boards and that, although it has not achieved all its goals, the FASBIASB convergence effort has been something of a shining example of
international cooperation.
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Now Where?
The effort is a work in process and faces many continuing challenges
and opportunities. First, I believe it is critical that the boards successfully complete the major MoU projects. To me, success means standards
that are either wholly or substantially converged; that improve upon
the existing standards; and that are understandable, operational, and
cost beneficial. The major MoU projects were carefully selected as
representing those broad areas of accounting standards where both
boards, after extensive consultation with stakeholders and regulators,
believed improvement was necessary. Successfully completing them
would be a major step toward achieving a single set of high-quality
international accounting standards. The boards are making progress on
these projects, but there will be continuing challenges in getting agreement among the boards and ensuring that the proposed standards truly
represent cost-beneficial improvements.
The boards will likely continue to face some opposition from affected
stakeholders on some of the more significant changes they propose. For
example, opposition to the new proposed leasing standard that would
significantly change accounting for leasing transactions has arisen, not
surprisingly, from the leasing industry and some companies that are
major users of leased equipment. Further, although politicians in
particular countries and jurisdictions may try to halt or influence the
course of convergence, I believe that powerful geo-economic and global
capital market forces will continue to exert pressure on both boards for
convergence and on the United States and other countries that have not
yet adopted or committed to adopt IFRS. That well over 100 countries,
including many major ones, have already adopted, or committed to
adopt, IFRS is testament to those forces as have been the declarations
coming out of meetings of the G20 leaders from 2009 onward urging
international accounting convergence. Regional groups of national
standard setters in Europe, Africa, Asia-Oceania, and Latin America
have been formed to help provide input to the IASB and foster the
implementation of IFRS across their parts of the world. As well, the
IFRS Foundation has created a new Accounting Standards Advisory
Forum comprising these regional groups plus certain major national
standard setters (which presumably would include the FASB).
However, the three largest countries in terms of national GDPs—the
United States, China, and Japan—have not yet adopted IFRS or committed to adopt it. The SEC will presumably eventually decide on the
course forward in the United States. China developed its own set of
standards a few years ago. Although these are largely modeled on IFRS
and are asserted to produce financial information that is the same as
IFRS, or substantially similar to using IFRS, at this point, China seems
committed to maintaining its own set of accounting standards while
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also continuing to try to maintain substantial convergence with IFRS.
Japan now allows certain of its listed companies to use IFRS and had
indicated that it intends to make a decision in 2012 on whether to
require the use of IFRS by its listed companies starting in 2015 or 2016.
However, few Japanese companies have so far elected to use IFRS, and
many of the largest Japanese multinationals use U.S. GAAP. Further,
following the devastating earthquake and tsunami in 2011 and the
resulting challenges Japan is facing, Japanese officials intimated that
this timeline might be pushed out further. It also seems that Japan is
waiting to see what the United States does about IFRS.
Additionally, as of November 2012, there seems to be some uncertainty
about the adoption of IFRS in India. In evaluating IFRS for adoption in
India, numerous changes to the standards intended to better suit the
Indian environment have been proposed.
So, although the growing use and acceptance of IFRS has been remarkable and has, in my view, greatly enhanced the chances of getting to a
common, if not completely identical, set of global accounting standards,
the journey is far from over. The FASB-IASB convergence effort has
been a very important part of that journey, but that convergence effort
should not, in my view, go on for an indefinite period. The movement
to IFRS in the United States could be accomplished through the
incorporation of IFRS into the legal U.S. GAAP wrapper through
completion of the major MoU projects and some sort of endorsement
approach thereafter.
Successful completion of the major MoU projects would, in my view,
result in IFRS being a high-quality set of standards. It will not,
however, result in IFRS and U.S. GAAP being close to being completely
converged because numerous differences will remain. Some of these differences are well-known and potentially controversial to U.S.
stakeholders, such as the prohibition in IFRS on using last in, first out
as a method of inventory accounting. There are also differences in the
approaches to the impairment of lived-assets, in the treatment of the
costs of developing new products, in accounting by rate-regulated
enterprises, in pension accounting, in the extent of “recycling” between
other comprehensive income and earnings, in consolidation policy, and
in accounting for contingencies. As well, many differences exist in
disclosure requirements. These differences and many others, as well as
areas in which U.S. GAAP and IFRS are converged or substantially
similar, are described in the November 2011 paper63 issued by the SEC
staff, and in their July 2012 final report on the IFRS work plan.64
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Also, at least for now, it seems the result of certain MoU projects,
including accounting for financial instruments, insurance, and
consolidation, may not result in substantially converged standards, and
ongoing projects by each board may result in creating additional differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Other continuing areas of difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP may be more obscure but could
have significant effects on reported financial information, and there are
many differences in disclosure requirements. Ironing all these out
through a joint convergence process between the FASB and IASB could
take many years, such that achieving complete convergence between
U.S. GAAP and IFRS may be not be attainable. Even if it were to be
attained, could it be maintained?
That suggests if we are indeed serious about the goal of a single set of
high-quality international standards, at some point, we will have to
move to a single set of standards. Some believe that at least for now a
more practical and realistic goal would be to try to achieve common,
but not identical, standards that generally produce comparable financial
reporting. For example, in the letter dated November 15, 2011, to the
SEC, the trustees of the FAF recommended a number of refinements to
the condorsement approach that would support “a practical interim
goal to achieve highly comparable high-quality accounting standards”
that are increasingly based on IFRS while continuing U.S. GAAP as the
legally recognized standards in the United States and maintaining U.S.
sovereignty over the accounting and reporting standards used in our
capital markets. Under this approach, the FASB and IASB would
continue to work together to complete projects currently under joint
development. The FASB would develop a process to address substantial
remaining differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS and new standards
issued by the IASB for potential incorporation of IFRS into U.S. GAAP.
Members of the FASB (and perhaps of other major national accounting
standard setters) would participate as nonvoting observers in IASB
meetings and FASB would not separately undertake new standardsetting projects on topics that are on the IASB’s agenda. As envisioned,
the FASB and FAF would continue to undertake due process and U.S.
stakeholder engagement and postimplementation reviews of IFRS following its long-standing criteria of investor primacy, independent
standard setting, robust and participatory due process, benefits
exceeding costs, and the need for clarity and adequacy of guidance in
the standards.
The approach outlined in the FAF letter seems like a constructive,
practical path forward toward continuing convergence between U.S.
GAAP and IFRS. However, those favoring global adoption of IFRS as
the single set of high-quality international standards may view it as
delaying and potentially diluting actual achievement of substantial
convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS and as potentially
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jeopardizing ultimate achievement of substantial comparability in
financial reporting across the major capital markets of the world. These
fears have probably been reinforced by the SEC not having yet made a
decision regarding the use of IFRS in financial reporting by U.S. issuers.
When and if it comes, the SEC decision will be very important to the
United States and the future of an international reporting system.
Whatever the path to incorporating IFRS into U.S. reporting, ensuring
that such standards are high quality and work in the United States and
that the body or bodies setting those standards are viable, capable, sufficiently insulated from undue political interference, and operate for the
benefit of investors and the capital markets is critical. My educated guess
at this point is that the SEC will eventually propose an endorsement
approach under which the FASB, subject to certain criteria, proper public
due process, and reporting protocols, will be charged with reviewing
specific IFRS for potential incorporation into U.S. GAAP. I can also
foresee the SEC asking for certain changes relating to IFRS and the IASB,
including, for example, in the funding arrangements; in the overall
governance and accountability of the organization for accomplishing its
mission; in the IASB filling in major gaps in its standards; in continuing
to enhance the ability of the IASB and its interpretations body, IFRIC, to
provide timely guidance on reporting issues; and in continuing active
participation by the FASB in the IASB’s activities.
I am supportive of an endorsement approach under which the FASB
would be charged with evaluating whether the United States should
adopt the IFRS approach in these areas, providing it is targeted and not
too open-ended in terms of the criteria for evaluating whether a
particular IFRS standard is suitable for use by U.S. registrants. In my
opinion, those criteria should be focused on assessing whether the
application of the IFRS standard provides understandable, decisionuseful financial information to investors and other users at a level
comparable to, or higher than, existing U.S. GAAP and on whether it is
operational and can be implemented in a cost-effective manner in the
United States. In many, if not most, cases, I believe those criteria will be
met. In that regard, I would note that many other countries have been
able to successfully transition to IFRS, including our neighbor to the
north, Canada, which adopted IFRS for its listed companies in 2011.
Although Canada is certainly not the United States in terms of the size
of its economy and depth and breadth of its capital markets or in terms
of its regulatory and legal systems, its existing accounting standards
were often based on or similar to U.S. GAAP, it has quarterly reporting
by its listed companies, and it has capable securities regulators.
As recommended in the FAF letter, continuing proactive involvement
by the FASB in the IASB’s standard-setting projects could also help
minimize the frequency and severity of instances of a new standard
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issued by the IASB getting a thumbs down by the FASB. However,
there may be cases, few in number, I hope, when adoption of an IFRS
standard may prove problematic in the United States, in which case
either the IASB would need to consider changing the standard to
address the U.S. concerns, or there will be continuing long-term differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. I feel somewhat troubled and torn
by the concept of having a permanent standard-by-standard endorsement mechanism by which the FASB, SEC, or some other body in the
United States would decide whether the United States should adopt
each particular standard issued by the IASB. On the one hand, the
longer-term result of such a process could be a U.S. version of IFRS or
“GAAPFRS,” which, in my view, would encourage other jurisdictions to
continue to do likewise, thereby potentially undermining the movement
toward a single set of high-quality international standards. On the other
hand, I recognize the very thorny issues of national sovereignty and
geopolitics under which many other jurisdictions do have IFRS review
and endorsement processes and that, therefore, the United States is
likely to also retain such a mechanism. Moreover, I believe it is very
important for the SEC or the FASB to have the tools necessary to ensure
that the standards issued by the IASB are appropriately investororiented by counteracting the pressure on the IASB that may come from
other parts of the world to gear its standards to other public policy
objectives and, when necessary in the interests of the U.S. capital
markets, to be able to address reporting issues on a timely basis.
So, just as it did in the formation of the IASB over one decade ago, I
believe the United States, in the form of the SEC, FAF, and FASB, needs
to continue to take a proactive role in helping shape the global financial
reporting system. In doing so, they need to be clear on objectives and
desired outcomes and must also be good global citizens by trying to
impart the good aspects of our standard-setting regime and financial
reporting system into the global system while avoiding trying to
impose what may less desirable features of the U.S. system.
Despite protests and threats coming from certain parts of the world
over the IASB continuing to work closely with the FASB and delays by
the SEC in making a decision regarding the path forward for IFRS in
the United States, I believe the United States continues to have a major
opportunity to help shape the future of a truly global financial
reporting system. I also believe others in the world are looking for us to
continue to take an active role in doing so. I think that makes sense
both internationally and for the United States. On the one hand, an
international reporting system is unlikely to work as effectively as possible without the United States being part of it, and we can help ensure
that it works both for us and the global capital markets. On the other
hand, in a world where the U.S. share of global GDP and global capital
markets continues to trend downward, it may be precarious for us to
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try to go completely our own way in terms of financial reporting. Thus,
I believe the U.S. should not be excluded from or marginalized in
actively participating in the ongoing development of the international
financial reporting system, nor in my view should the U.S. be indifferent as to the direction and key features of this system.
My hope is that the SEC will continue to support the goal of getting to a
single set of high-quality international accounting standards and, with
the help of the FAF and FASB, establish a clear process and target
timelines for incorporating IFRS into financial reporting by U.S. issuers.
To do otherwise could either delay or potentially undermine efforts to
develop such a system. It could also result in the United States being on
the outside of a system that includes many of the other major capital
markets of the world and that may not operate in ways that are satisfactory to U.S. investors who have been increasingly investing in foreign
securities. It might also reduce the ability of the United States to influence the future direction of other aspects of the international capital
markets and global regulation. None of these outcomes would be desirable. As previously noted, as part of making a decision on the future of
IFRS in the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers, the SEC might also
stipulate a number of conditions and changes relating to IFRS, the IASB’s
processes, and the funding and governance of the IASB.
Another important issue confronting the SEC is whether and when to
allow all or some subset of U.S. issuers to voluntarily adopt IFRS. I
would be supportive of an early adoption option if and when the SEC
has established a more concrete plan and timeline for incorporating
IFRS into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers. To allow an
option to use IFRS in the absence of a plan to require its use would
result in a dual-GAAP system for U.S. issuers, which I do not support.
Assuming there is a more concrete timeline for getting to IFRS in this
country, an early adoption option would allow U.S. companies wanting
to achieve comparability in reporting with international peers and to
reduce their cost of producing financial information to do so sooner
rather than later. In addition, this could provide valuable information
for other U.S. companies considering moving to IFRS and for our
overall reporting system. It might also enable U.S. companies to get the
change to IFRS behind them rather than going through what could be a
set of serial changes resulting from an endorsement process that could
take many years to achieve complete or substantially complete
convergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. As discussed further in
chapter 6, the potential movement toward IFRS by U.S. public
companies has also raised important questions and issues relating to
the accounting standards used by U.S. private companies and not-forprofit entities.
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If we incorporate IFRS into U.S. public company reporting over time,
we will also need to consider whether and how those standards are
interpreted in the United States and who interprets them. Do we leave
it solely up to the IASB and its official interpretations body, IFRIC, or
will there be a need for the FASB or the SEC to provide additional
interpretative and implementation guidance for U.S. companies? If the
FASB or the SEC do provide additional guidance in the United States
on IFRS and converged standards, might that effectively create new
areas of divergence in how those standards are applied in the United
States with how they are applied in other countries? Achieving
convergence is one thing, maintaining it is another. In that respect,
some of the IASB’s constituents have expressed concern that if the
United States goes to IFRS, we will inevitably feel the need to provide
all sorts of additional complex and detailed implementation guidance
for the U.S. reporting system, the use of which might then spread
beyond the United States, a potential result that they view as highly
undesirable. That led Sir David Tweedie to declare from time to time
that if such were to begin to occur, the IASB might need to officially
“ring fence” the additional U.S. guidance to prevent it from spreading
to the rest of the IFRS world and undermining the IASB’s goal of
having more principles-based standards. So, it would seem to me that a
reasonable and practical approach to dealing with this would be to
establish clear protocols that would require the FASB or SEC to refer
issues to the IASB for resolution, on the understanding that if the IASB
or its interpretations committee chooses not to or is unable to address
them in a sufficiently timely manner, the FASB or SEC would need to
provide guidance.
There is also a question of whether the FASB or SEC should or would
initiate and conduct U.S.-only standard-setting efforts in cases when the
IASB is either unable or unwilling to undertake a project that is deemed
important by U.S. stakeholders. As the number of countries and
jurisdictions served by the IASB increases, it is inevitably facing more
numerous requests to undertake various standard-setting projects that
may be considered less important in the United States. For example, the
subjects of accounting for agriculture, inflation accounting, and
accounting for Islamic transactions and instruments are important in
parts of the world but probably less so in the United States. On the
other hand, there will likely be continuing demands in the United
States for standard setting in other major areas. Again, an approach to
dealing with this would be for the FASB or SEC to refer such matters to
the IASB and embark on major new standard-setting projects only if the
IASB is unwilling or unable to do so. Will the IASB be able to balance
these competing demands and priorities from various parts of the
world in a way that satisfies U.S. stakeholders?
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Conclusion
As I have mentioned now a few times, having a single set of highquality accounting standards, or at least common standards, is just one
part of getting to comparable, high-quality financial reporting across the
global capital markets. Though not a sufficient condition for achieving
the broader objective of high-quality comparable financial reporting
around the world, having common standards is a necessary and critical
aspect of achieving that goal. So, as described in this chapter, a great
deal of time and effort has been devoted by accounting standard setters, regulators, and many other participants in the financial reporting
system in the United States and around the world to the convergence of
accounting standards and adoption of IFRS. Those activities continue,
including major joint projects between the IASB and the FASB, but it
seems the once powerful desire to converge U.S. GAAP and IFRS may
be waning.
In the meantime, stakeholders in the United States and around the
world continue to wait for the SEC to decide on whether, when, and
how IFRS will be incorporated into financial reporting by U.S. issuers
and how this decision, if and when it comes, will affect the future of
financial reporting in the United States and the continued movement to
the IFRS across the globe.
Also, very importantly, the SEC and other major securities regulators and
capital market authorities need to redouble their efforts on these other
fronts to ensure that the potential benefits of having a single set of
international accounting standards are not dissipated because of poor
and inconsistent implementation of the standards, weak auditing, and lax
or nonexistent regulatory review and enforcement. Accordingly, regulatory and other structural changes at both the international and individual
country levels may be needed to foster achievement of these goals.
Nobody said this would be easy. But, I continue to believe these are
very important goals that are well worth pursuing.
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Accounting Did Not Cause the
Financial Crisis, and Accounting Will
Not End It
I spoke those or similar words on a number of occasions during the
financial crisis. For example, in a speech at the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C., on June 16, 2009, I stated,
There is a general consensus that excess leverage at many levels
and lax lending practices fueled the creation of complex and
risky structured securities and derivatives that were spread
across opaque and unregulated markets around the world. When
the risks became evident, the lack of basic supporting
infrastructures in terms of timely and accurate information flows,
clearing mechanisms, and price discovery compounded the
problems, leading to freezing credit markets, plummeting equity
markets, and significant downward pressure on economic
growth. However, one very welcome development arising from
the financial crisis is that a much broader constituency is calling
for greater transparency as a necessary ingredient for recovery
and the rebuilding of investor and public confidence. Included in
this has been the need to improve and strengthen certain
accounting and reporting standards. While accounting did not
cause the crisis and accounting will not end it, it did reveal a
number of areas requiring improvement in standards and overall
transparency. And so, over the past 18 months we have
responded vigorously with a number of new standards and
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enhanced disclosure requirements relating to securitizations and
special purpose entities, credit default swaps and derivatives,
financial guarantee insurance, and fair value measurements and
credit exposures.

That excerpt provides a rather bland summary of what was a hectic,
tumultuous, and unforgettable period for me and my colleagues at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and many, if not most,
people around the world. Although policymakers may not have had an
existing playbook to guide their actions, actions were needed in the face
of the unfolding, unprecedented events of the time. The SEC, FASB, and
IASB needed to take action on financial reporting issues emanating
from these events. Recounting all the events in which I was involved in
my role at the FASB during the crisis would fill many tomes. Those
events and actions included issuing numerous pronouncements,
attending many meetings with the IASB, advisory groups, and a broad
range of stakeholders in the U.S. and international financial reporting
systems, engaging in discussions with senior officials at the SEC and
the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and with bank regulators as
specific accounting and reporting issues arose relating to ongoing
events and governmental actions, and having various dealings with
members of Congress.
In this chapter, I will attempt to recount and provide my perspectives on
some of the key events and our actions during the global financial crisis,
as well as some important lessons learned and, perhaps, relearned.

Were There Warning Signs?
In the January 27, 2011, press release announcing the official report of
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), Chairman Phil
Angelides stated, “Despite the expressed view of many on Wall Street
and Washington that the crisis could not have been foreseen or
avoided, there were warning signs.” I agree with that statement, but as
is often the case, I think the warning signs are now much clearer with
the benefit of hindsight than they were at the time.
As an accounting standard setter, the FASB was, in my view, less wellplaced than some others, including the companies engaged in particular
business and financial activities and the regulators of such entities, to
pick up early warning signs of potential issues in the financial system.
Nonetheless, a warning sign we were aware of and acted on well before
the onset of the crisis related to the rapid growth of nontraditional
loans. These seemed to us to pose additional risks to those originating
such loans, servicing or guaranteeing them, or investing in such loans
or in securities backed by them. So, in December 2005, we issued guidance on disclosure requirements in this area in the form of FASB Staff
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Position (FSP) SOP 94-6-1.1 Paragraph 2 of FSP SOP 94-6-1 states, “The
FASB staff is aware of loan products whose contractual features may
increase the exposure of the originator, holder, investor, guarantor, or
servicer to risk of nonpayment or realization. These features may
include repayments that are less than the repayments for fully
amortizing loans of an equivalent term and high loan-to-value ratios.”
The document then goes on to describe the various types of
nontraditional loans with increased credit risk, including loans with
high loan-to-value ratios, option adjustable rate mortgages with resetting interest rates, negative amortization loans, interest-only, and
deferred payment loans. The FSP also lists and discusses the many
existing disclosure requirements under U.S. GAAP and SEC rules and
regulations in this area. Although that guidance was effective
immediately on issuance of the pronouncement, unfortunately, perhaps
reflecting the overall exuberance at the time, it did not seem to always
elicit the kind of clear disclosures by companies engaging in these
activities that might have better informed investors of the risks these
companies were undertaking.
That was in late 2005, and although there had been some accounting
issues relating to credit issues with commercial mortgage-backed securities, it wasn’t until 2007 that accounting issues appeared with
increasing frequency with residential mortgage-backed securities with
credit problems. Those were a symptom of the emergence of the
potential credit issues foreshadowed in our December 2005 document
on nontraditional loan products. Of course, what we were not aware of
was the alleged widespread lax and fraudulent underwriting practices
around these loans. At the time, I also think we were unaware of the
extent to which certain major financial institutions had been accounting
for these securitizations as sales, thereby removing the underlying loans
from their balance sheets and making them part of the “shadow”
banking system. In the following sections, I discuss these important
issues in greater depth, along with other key reporting issues and
debates that arose during the financial crisis.

The Addiction to Off-Balance Sheet
Accounting
In the wake of the Enron scandal, the FASB had addressed the
accounting for special purpose entities (SPEs) and issued FASB
Interpretation No. 46,2 in 2002 and FASB Interpretation No. 46 (revised
1

Terms of Loan Products That May Give Rise to a Concentration of Credit Risk, which is now codified in FASB Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 825, Financial Instruments.
2
Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—an interpretation of ARB No. 51.
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December 2003).3 Although these interpretations may have put an end
to the types of off-balance sheet structures that Enron engaged in, it
became clear from the financial crisis that they did not stop companies,
particularly certain major financial institutions, from engaging in such
activities. In my opinion, and with the benefit of hindsight, at least
some of these off-balance sheet treatments seemed to have resulted
from a stretching or even a violation of the accounting rules in FASB
Interpretation No. 46(R) and FASB Statement No. 140.4
What caused certain major financial institutions to go to such lengths to
try to get off-balance sheet treatment for securitizations and other
financial structures? From a financial reporting perspective, the treatment of a securitization as a sale of financial assets versus a secured
borrowing can result in recording of gains and a smaller balance sheet
in terms of reported debt and total assets. Those results boost reported
earnings, earnings per share, and returns on assets and lower the
reported leverage and debt-to-equity ratios. However, beyond the
attractions from a financial reporting perspective, getting off-balance
sheet treatment had potentially significant benefits on their regulatory
capital requirements (that is, off-balance sheet accounting lowers the
amount of capital the bank regulators require a regulated institution to
maintain). Having to maintain additional capital is costly and lowers
reported earnings. From a systemic point of view, I believe the offbalance sheet treatments became an enabler in the growth of the
“shadow” banking system. The July 2010 (revised February 2012) Staff
Report No. 458, Shadow Banking, of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York defined shadow banks as “financial intermediaries that conduct
maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to
central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees.” That report
discusses the rapid growth of the shadow banking system in the United
States in the years leading up to the financial crisis and provides
various measures of the size of the shadow banking system, which by
2008 was significantly larger than the official U.S. banking system. Such
entities included securitization vehicles of various types, including
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, structured investment
vehicles (SIVs), and qualifying special purpose entities (QSPEs).
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report of the FCIC describes some of these
motivations and the lobbying by banks of bank regulators to obtain offbalance sheet treatments for regulatory capital purposes. For example,
in discussing the ABCP conduits sponsored by major financial institutions, the report states the following:
3

Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—an interpretation of ARB No. 51, in 2003 (amended by
FASB Statement No. 167, codified in FASB ASC 810, Consolidation).
4
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities—a
replacement of FASB Statement No. 125 (amended by FASB Statement No. 166, codified in FASB
ASC 860, Transfers and Servicing).
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When the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the private
group that establishes standards for financial reports, responded
to the Enron scandal by making it harder for companies to get
off-balance-sheet treatment for these programs, the favorable
capital rules were in jeopardy.... In 2003, bank regulators
responded by proposing to let banks remove these assets from
their balance sheets when calculating regulatory capital. The
proposal would have also introduced for the first time a capital
charge amounting to at most 1.6% of the of the liquidity support
banks provided to ABCP programs. However, after strong
pushback ... regulators in 2004 announced a final rule setting the
charge at up to 0.8%.... Growth in this market resumed.

Additionally, and as discussed in the FCIC report and in other papers
and reports on the financial crisis, in light of some of the accounting
issues that surfaced during the crisis relating to securitization transactions and special purpose entities, I am sympathetic with those who
assert that securitization and structured finance practices went very
awry in the years leading up to financial crisis. Perhaps this view was
best summed up on page 10 of the FCIC report by James Rokakis,
treasurer of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, who stated “Securitization was
one of the most brilliant innovations of the 20th century. It freed up a
lot of capital...It worked for years. But then people realized they could
scam it.”

Off-Balance Accounting 101
So, exactly where and how, rightly or wrongly, did certain major
financial institutions get these off-balance sheet treatments for financial
reporting purposes? Three areas existed where off-balance sheet
accounting was used by major financial institutions: accounting for
securitizations involving QSPEs, accounting for certain variable interest
entities (VIEs), and accounting by Lehman Brothers for the Repo 105
and Repo 108 transactions. Not surprisingly and quite appropriately,
these matters were the subject of Congressional inquiries. Although the
following provides an overview of each of these off-balance sheet
accounting issues, I would refer those seeking a more in-depth
understanding of the first two subjects to my letter dated March 31,
2008, to Senator Jack Reed, then-Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs. Other good resources are FASB
Statement Nos. 1665 and 167,6 both of which are now codified in FASB
ASC 860 and 810, respectively. For additional information on the third
issue, see the March 11, 2010, Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner for
the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York and
5
6

Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140.
Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 46(R).
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my letter dated April 19, 2010, to Chairman Barney Frank and Ranking
Minority Member Spencer Bachus III of the House Committee on
Financial Services.

Did They Qualify?
The concept of QSPE was introduced into the accounting literature by
FASB Statement No. 125,7 which was issued in 1996. It was carried
forward with certain amendments in FASB Statement No. 140, which
was issued in 2000, and replaced FASB Statement No. 125. FASB Statement Nos. 125 and 140 distinguished two types of SPEs: QSPEs and
nonqualifying SPEs. The concept of the QSPE was created to consider,
in certain transactions, that the assets in a securitization entity are
effectively the assets of the investors that hold beneficial interests in the
entity. An SPE qualified as a QSPE only if the beneficial interest holders
in the entity could sell or pledge their interests, and there were
significant restrictions around the powers and activities of the entity.
Accordingly, in order to qualify as a QSPE, the entity had to meet a
number of specific requirements around the types of assets it could
hold and the types of activities it could engage in. These were designed
to ensure that the assets held by the entity would not require the
servicer to make significant decisions or actively manage the assets, the
activities of the entity were very limited and entirely specified in the
legal documents establishing the entity, and that the entity could sell or
dispose of assets only in automatic response to the occurrence of a narrowly defined set of events. Because they were supposed to comply
with these strict requirements, QSPEs were described by some as being
on “autopilot” or as “brain dead” entities. In effect, they were lockboxes
in which the cash flows from the high-grade and passive financial
assets in the entity were collected by the servicer and then remitted to
the holders of the beneficial interests in the entity. The bottom line was
that if a securitization of financial assets was effected using a QSPE,
provided it met certain other criteria, it was treated as a sale, and the
assets transferred into the QSPE were removed from the transferor’s
balance sheet.
Although the FASB received certain implementation and interpretation
questions relating to QSPEs and had a project from 2003 onward to
address these and other issues relating to FASB Statement No. 140, the
requirements relating to QSPEs seemed to generally work as intended
for a number of years. That was the case when the FASB addressed
issues relating to the use of SPEs in the wake of the Enron scandal.
Accordingly, in developing FASB Interpretation No. 46 and FASB
Interpretation No. 46(R) in 2002–03, we decided to carry forward the
7

Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities.
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special provisions relating to QSPEs, effectively exempting such
structures from consolidation.
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, however, trillions of dollars of mortgages and other loans with nontraditional features were
originated and securitized. In addition, it has been asserted in
numerous reports and official inquiries on the financial crisis that many
of these loans had been originated based on lax or even fraudulent
underwriting practices.8 Nevertheless, securitizations of these loans had
often been accounted for as sales of the transferred assets to QSPEs and
accorded off-balance treatment.
What seems clear to me with the benefit of hindsight is that some, if
not many, of these entities were effectively ticking time bombs. As the
loans contained in them increasingly experienced credit problems
during the course of 2007, all sorts of actions and active management
by the servicers became necessary, including attempting to proactively
modify the terms of many of the mortgages held in these entities under
government-encouraged programs and, in a mounting number of cases,
foreclosing on the underlying properties. These actions went beyond
those contemplated by the requirements to qualify as a QSPE and
beyond the activities that had been specified in the documents
establishing the entities. Not surprisingly, we and the SEC staff received
increasing requests to clarify and expand the range of permissible
activities of a QSPE in order to enable these activities to be conducted
without jeopardizing the off-balance sheet treatment of these entities.
To me, it seemed clear by late 2007 that the concept of the QSPE had
been stretched to the point where it was no longer workable. So, as
stated in paragraph A33 of FASB Statement No. 166, which replaced
FASB Statement No. 140,
The Board believes that because the range of financial assets
being securitized and the complexity of securitization structures
and arrangements, the application of the conditions of a
qualifying special-purpose entity have been extended in some
cases beyond the intent of Statement 140, thus effectively
rendering the conditions no longer operational in practice.... As a
result, the Board decided to remove the concept of a qualifying
special purpose entity.

In other words, in light of the evidence of what had been happening,
we decided to “kill the Q.” The exposure draft Amendments to FASB
Interpretation No. 46(R) proposing that and other amendments to FASB
Statement No. 140 was issued in September 2008. FASB Statement No.
166 was issued in June 2009 and effective in 2010. As an important
interim step and in order to quickly increase the transparency around
8

For examples, see chapter 5, “Subprime Lending,” and chapter 7, “The Mortgage Machine,” in
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
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the use of SPEs by companies, we issued new disclosure requirements
that took effect starting with 2008 calendar year-end financial reports.
These new disclosures significantly expanded the information in the
footnotes to a company’s financial statements on its involvements with
QSPEs and other SPEs.
The removal of the QSPE from U.S. GAAP literature was also a step
toward convergence with IFRS in this area because IFRS did not contain
a QSPE concept. In developing FASB Statement Nos. 166 and 167 on
VIEs, we proactively reached out to, and consulted with, many parties,
including the U.S. banking regulators.

SIVs, Conduits, and Other VIEs
So much for QSPEs. Starting in the second half of 2007, significant
reporting issues also began to surface with certain other SPEs that had
not been treated as QSPEs for accounting purposes. These entities,
which included SIVs and ABCP conduits established and run by major
banks, involved the active management of financial assets and the
related (often, short-term revolving) financing of these assets. So, these
entities clearly did not qualify as QSPEs and, accordingly, had been
accounted for under FASB Interpretation No. 46(R). As previously
noted, that standard was issued in the wake of abuses with off-balance
entities by Enron and others under the prior set of rules. The basic
concept in FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) was that for thinly capitalized
entities that did not meet the QSPE requirements, the party holding the
majority of risks or rewards of the entity was deemed to be the primary
beneficiary and had to consolidate the entity. The determination of
which party, if any, was the primary beneficiary was generally
implemented through the use of mathematical modeling techniques to
calculate what were called expected losses.
In some cases, the sponsoring banks had entered into support arrangements as a back-stop for investors in the securities issued by these entities. These included liquidity puts and asset buy-back arrangements.
Some institutions also sought to structure around FASB Interpretation
No. 46(R) by creating and selling so called expected loss notes to hedge
funds and other investors in order to transfer a majority of the expected
losses of an entity to a third party if and when such losses materialized.
By doing so, they asserted they were no longer the primary beneficiary
and, as a result, avoided consolidating such entities in their financial
statements.
Starting in fall 2007, some of these entities began to experience credit
problems with their assets and difficulty in continuing to issue
financing for these assets, which triggered or threatened to trigger the
support arrangements provided by the sponsoring banks. Perhaps the
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most noteworthy of these occurred with entities sponsored by Citigroup
that eventually had to take tens of billions of dollars of problem
financial assets and related financing onto its books.
How had these entities received off-balance sheet treatment under FASB
Interpretation No. 46(R)? Again, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems
the calculations of the expected losses by the sponsoring institutions
either did not always include all the relevant risks or severely
underestimated these risks, including the potential credit risks of the
assets held by these vehicles and the liquidity risk surrounding the
vehicles. A more in-depth discussion of the apparent fallacies in the
assumptions used to model such risks can be found in the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report.9 At the FASB, we did not have any regulatory
review or enforcement powers, but I also wondered whether the
expected loss notes actually transferred a majority of the real risk in
these vehicles to third parties. If not, was this just a case of poor
estimation or was that by design (for example, through reverse
engineering of the terms of these securities to be able to claim they
transferred more than 50 percent of the expected losses)?
All of this, plus the effects of eliminating the QSPE, led us to conclude
that we also needed to revisit FASB Interpretation No. 46(R). So, during
2008 and into 2009 and in conjunction with our development of FASB
Statement No. 166, we also worked on revising and improving the
consolidation rules relating to VIEs. The new standard, FASB Statement
No. 167, was issued in June 2009 at the same time as FASB Statement
No. 166 and also became effective in 2010. FASB Statement No. 167
introduced a more qualitative approach to assess whether an SPE
should be consolidated that requires evaluating both the economics of
the entity and who directs its activities. FASB Statement No. 167
resulted in the consolidation of trillions of dollars of SPEs, perhaps
most notably by the government-sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, for the trusts that issue mortgage-backed securities
guaranteed by the two GSEs.

The Lehman Repo 105 and 108 Transactions
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was one of the many
noteworthy events that shook the global capital markets during that
unforgettable month. In March 2010, the court-appointed examiner
Anton Valukas issued his report, Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner,
on the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That report describes in a fair
amount of detail the accounting and (lack of) disclosure by Lehman
Brothers for Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions (collectively referred
to as Repo 105 transactions in the examiner’s report). According to the
9

For example, see chapter 8, “The CDO Machine,” of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report.

153

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

examiner, Lehman Brothers structured transactions around the ends of
reporting quarters to temporarily remove securities inventory from its
balance sheet, thereby reducing the leverage it reported in its quarterly
financial information. The report states that “Lehman regularly
increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to reporting
periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet”
and that “Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its accounting treatment for these transactions, the considerable
escalation of its total Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and into 2008, or the
material impact these transitions had on the firm’s publicly reported net
leverage ratio.”
When the news broke about this, I was asked by staff of the House
Committee on Financial Services to provide my views on the matter, in
particular whether the accounting for these transactions by Lehman
Brothers prior to its bankruptcy violated U.S. GAAP. My response to
that request is contained in my April 19, 2010, letter to Congressmen
Frank and Bachus III. As noted in my letter, the FASB does not have
regulatory or enforcement powers; so, my views were necessarily based
only on publicly available information at the time. Without further
information, I was not in a position to conclude whether the treatment
by Lehman Brothers had violated U.S. GAAP, which generally requires
repurchase transactions to be accounted for as secured borrowings, not
as sales, which Lehman Brothers had done in this case:
The FASB does not have regulatory or enforcement powers.
However, whenever there are reports of significant accounting or
financial reporting issues, we monitor developments closely to
assess whether standard-setting actions by us may be needed. In
some cases, a misreporting is due to outright fraud and/or violation of our standards, in which case accounting standard-setting
action is not necessarily the remedy. Other cases reveal weaknesses in current standards or inappropriate structuring to
circumvent the standards, in which case revision of the standards
may be appropriate. In some cases, there are elements of both.
At this point in time, while we have read the report of the
Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner, press accounts, and other
reports, we do not have sufficient information to assess
whether Lehman complied with or violated particular
standards relating to accounting for repurchase agreements or
consolidation of special-purpose entities. Furthermore, we do
not know whether other major financial institutions may have
engaged in accounting and reporting practices similar to
those apparently employed by Lehman.
In that regard, we work closely with the SEC. We understand
that the SEC staff is in the process of obtaining information
directly from a number of financial institutions relating to their
practices in these areas. As they obtain and evaluate that
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information, we will continue to work closely with them to
discuss and consider whether any standard-setting actions by us
may be warranted.10

However, as noted in my letter, from the report of the examiner and
press accounts and other public information on the matter, it did seem
to me that Lehman Brothers had purposefully attempted to structure in
the Repo 105 and 108 transactions so as to try to support the sales treatment. My letter discusses the steps Lehman Brothers seemed to have
taken in order to attempt to meet two specific U.S. GAAP requirements
for the transactions to be accounted for as sales, not secured borrowings, and raises some questions about whether those steps achieved
their intended objective. I also noted in my letter that “[w]hen there are
material structured or unusual transactions, disclosure is also very
important” and that according to the examiner’s report, Lehman
Brothers had incorrectly disclosed that it accounted for all repos as
secured borrowings.
Unfortunately, history has repeatedly shown that companies do
sometimes attempt to structure transactions solely or mainly to achieve
desired financial reporting outcomes. I know this all too well from my
“Bad Bob” days. This poses a real challenge for just about everyone in
the financial reporting supply chain: accounting standard setters, auditors, audit committees and boards of directors, regulators and enforcers,
and, most importantly, the investing public. Like outright financial
reporting fraud, reports of attempts to loophole accounting requirements,
particularly in connection with the failure of major companies, sap public
confidence in the integrity of published financial information. I touch
upon this very important topic again in chapter 6, “Complexity.”
Before I left the FASB, we added a project to address one of the provisions in U.S. GAAP that Lehman Brothers seems to have tried to
structure around in the Repo 105 and 108 transactions. That project
resulted in a final standard, FASB Accounting Standards Update No.
2011-03,11 which was issued in April 2011, removing the provision in
question from U.S. GAAP. In March 2012, the FASB added a project to
undertake a broader review of the accounting and disclosure requirements relating to repurchase agreements, in part because of concerns
about the accounting by MF Global that went bankrupt in October 2011
for repo-to-maturity transactions.

10
11

Letter from Bob Herz to Barney Frank on April 19, 2010.
Transfers and Servicing (Topic 860): Reconsideration of Effective Control for Repurchase Agreements.
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Fair Value, Mark-to-Market
Accounting, and Impairment of
Financial Assets
I now move on to discuss the subject of accounting for financial instruments, which is a complex and challenging subject that came to the
forefront during the financial crisis. This subject includes the debate
between amortized cost and fair value accounting and the controversy
about mark-to-market accounting and its role in the crisis. This could
well be the subject of another book that might shed more light than
heat on a very important subject. During the financial crisis, there was
certainly a spotlight on this topic, and it brought a lot of heat on us as
accounting standard setters.
I will certainly not be able to do justice to this subject in the discussion
that follows because it involves one of the oldest, longest-running, most
controversial, and, in my opinion, yet to be properly resolved issues in
accounting and financial reporting: how particular assets and liabilities
should be measured. For purposes of this discussion, I will confine
myself to accounting for financial assets and liabilities, a complex and
controversial topic in itself.

Some History
I could go way back in time, but let me start with the savings and loan
(S&L) crisis from the 1980s and 1990s. Accounting practices by financial
institutions, both under U.S. GAAP and as prescribed by banking regulators, were heavily criticized as having contributed to the crisis. Significant
questions were raised about whether the use of amortized cost methods
of accounting for financial instruments had enabled S&Ls and other
banks to inappropriately defer recognizing losses on underwater loans
and investment securities while also generating reported earnings
through selective gains trading of appreciated securities.
On September 10, 1990, then-Chairman of the SEC Richard Breeden
spoke publicly before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs about the shortcomings of reporting investments at
amortized cost, stating that “serious consideration must be given to
reporting all investments securities at market value” for banks and
thrift institutions. Similarly, in 1991, the GAO issued to Congress the
report Failed Banks: Accounting and Auditing Reforms Urgently Needed.
That report concluded that “[t]he key to successful bank regulation is
knowing what banks are really worth.” The report urged the immediate
adoption for both U.S. GAAP and regulatory reporting of mark-tomarket accounting for all debt securities and rapid study of the
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potential merits of a comprehensive market value-based accounting and
reporting system for banks in order that “banks’ true financial condition could be reported promptly.”
The FASB was already working on a major project on accounting for
financial instruments and accelerated its review of accounting for loan
impairments and accounting for investments in debt and equity securities. This resulted in the issuance of FASB Statement Nos. 11412 and
11513 in May 1993. FASB Statement No. 114 requires impaired loans that
are not held for sale to be measured based on the present value of
expected future cash flows discounted at the loan’s effective interest
rate or, as a practical expedient, at the loan’s observable market price or
the fair value of the collateral if the loan is collateral dependent. Under
this standard, a loan is impaired when, based on current information
and events, it is probable that a creditor will be unable to collect all
amounts due according to the contractual terms of the loan. Under
FASB Statement No. 115, debt securities held as investments can be
accounted for in one of three ways: at amortized cost subject to impairment for debt securities that are being held to maturity, at fair value
with unrealized changes in the fair value of the debt and marketable
equity securities that are available for sale being recorded in other
comprehensive income outside of reported earnings, or at fair value
with the unrealized gains and losses being recorded in earnings for
debt and marketable equity securities classified as being held for
trading purposes.
These different treatments were intended to reflect the different
purposes and business models used by financial institutions in
originating loans and making investments in debt and marketable
equity securities.
The FASB passed Statement Nos. 114 and 115 by a 5-2 vote, with the
dissenting Board members arguing for more use of fair value in
measuring impairments of loans and in accounting for investments in
debt and equity securities. For example, the opening sentence of the
dissent to FASB Statement No. 115 states
Messrs. Sampson and Swieringa disagree with the accounting
treatment prescribed in paragraphs 6-18 of this Statement
because it does not resolve two of the most important problems
that caused the Board to address the accounting for certain
investments in debt and equity securities—namely, accounting
based on intent, and gains trading. They believe that those
problems can only be resolved by reporting all securities that are

12

Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 15,
now codified in FASB ASC 310, Receivables.
13
Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, now codified in FASB ASC 320,
Investments—Debt and Equity Securities.
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within the scope of this Statement at fair value and by including
unrealized changes in fair value in earnings.14

Commenting on FASB Statement No. 115, noted accounting historian
Professor Stephen Zeff stated,
In the first of three successful lobbying sorties (1990–93), the
American Bankers Association (ABA)—abetted by letters sent by
the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and two United States Senators—pressured the FASB
either directly or indirectly. Even though the FASB had strong
SEC support, the ABA pushed the FASB to retreat from a position that it was considering, namely that all marketable securities
be shown at fair value and that the year-to-year change in fair
value be taken into earnings.15

Of course, depending on one’s point of view on a particular accounting
subject, a specific standard may represent either a retreat or
compromise versus a worthwhile improvement.
However, FASB Statement Nos. 114 and 115 would be tested when the
accounting for financial instruments again came under stress during the
financial crisis of 2008–09. In the intervening years, the FASB (before,
during, and after my tenure) issued a number of pronouncements that
affected accounting for financial instruments and improved the
disclosures on a company’s use of, and risks relating to, financial
instruments. Perhaps most notable of these were FASB Statement No.
133,16 issued in 1998 and now codified in FASB ASC 815, Derivatives and
Hedging, and FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, issued
in 2006, and as subsequently amended now codified in FASB ASC 820,
Fair Value Measurement.
In issuing FASB Statement No. 133, which requires derivatives to be
measured at fair value, paragraphs 221 and 222 state
221. The Board believes fair values for financial assets and
liabilities provide more relevant and understandable information
than cost or cost-based information. In particular, the Board
believes that fair value is more relevant to financial statement
users than cost for assessing the liquidity or solvency of an entity
because fair value reflects the current cash equivalent of the
entity’s financial instruments rather than the price of a past
transaction. With the passage of time, historical prices become
irrelevant in assessing present liquidity or solvency.

14

Dissents of Messrs. Sampson and Swieringa to Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities.
15
Stephen A. Zeff, “‘Political’ Lobbying on Proposed Standards: A Challenge to the IASB,”
Accounting Horizons. 16, no. 1 (2002): 49–50.
16
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.
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222. The Board also believes fair value measurement is practical
for most financial assets and liabilities. Fair value measurements
can be observed in markets or estimated by reference to markets
for similar financial instruments. If market information is not
available, fair value can be estimated using other measurement
techniques, such as discounted cash flow analyses and option or
other pricing models, among others.

Contrary to the assertions of some during the financial crisis, FASB
Statement No. 157 did not require any new fair value measurements or
new uses of fair value in financial reporting and did not change the
accounting for loans or for investments in debt and marketable equity
securities, including the requirements relating to impairments of these
financial assets. Rather, FASB Statement No. 157 was issued to provide
a more consistent definition of, and framework for, measuring fair
values of both financial instruments and other items and to expand and
improve the disclosures about fair value measurements included in the
financial statements.
However, at the urging of many parties, including major financial
institutions, in early 2007, the FASB also issued Statement No. 159,17
which is now codified in FASB ASC 825, Financial Instruments, that,
similar to the existing provisions of IFRS, provided a fair option for
financial assets and liabilities. A number of entities, mainly larger
financial institutions, voluntarily chose to begin measuring certain
financial items at fair value starting in 2008.

Then Came the Crisis
Soon thereafter, with the onset and rapid deepening of the financial
crisis during 2008 and into the first quarter of 2009, the fair values of
many, if not most, financial assets fell significantly. For financial assets
accounted for as trading or under the fair value option, these declines
were recorded in earnings. For available-for-sale debt and equity securities, they were recorded in other comprehensive income, subject to an
assessment of whether the decline in value was other than temporary.
For debt securities that had been classified as held to maturity, no loss
was recorded unless and until the loss was judged to be other than
temporary. For loans that were not held for sale, additional impairments, either in the form of additional reserves for loan losses or writedowns in loan carrying amounts, followed the provisions of FASB
Statement No. 114, which, as previously described, does not generally
require a fair value approach to accounting for impairments of loans.

17

The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an amendment of
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With the falling values and growing concerns over the quality of the collateral backing such securities, liquidity in the markets for many assetbacked securities dried up. Securities that had previously been valued
using quoted prices (level 1 valuations under FASB Statement No. 157)
became increasingly difficult to value. FASB Statement No. 157 provided
guidance on valuing assets in illiquid markets (level 3 valuations under
FASB Statement No. 157), involving the use of various techniques,
including discounted cash flows. However, prior to the financial crisis,
these techniques had generally been used for valuing nonfinancial assets,
such as intangibles, and their use in valuing financial assets had generally been confined to valuing private equity investments and illiquid,
long-dated derivatives. As market participants became increasingly aware
of the problems with the loans backing many mortgage-backed and other
asset-backed securities, the markets became less and less active. As a
result, there were hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars of these
“toxic” securities and credit default swaps and other over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives related to these securities for which current trading
prices and quotes became increasingly difficult to obtain. Under these
circumstances, it was probably not surprising that a number of parties,
including financial institutions holding these financial assets, started to
publicly blame mark-to-market and fair value accounting as exacerbating
or even causing the financial crisis.
These complaints reached a crescendo in late September 2008 as
Congress debated emergency legislation in the wake of the near
meltdown of the financial system. Some, primarily financial institutions
and their industry associations, lobbied for a repeal or suspension of
fair value accounting requirements. Vocal support for this came from a
variety of recognized political and economic commentators. For
example, commenting in the September 22, 2008, Washington Times,
Lawrence Kudlow of CNBC stated, “Bad accounting rules like this
(mark-to-market) are sinking the financial system.” In the September 29,
2008, issue of Forbes, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich said,
“Because existing rules requiring mark-to-market are causing such
turmoil on Wall Street, mark-to-market accounting should be suspended
immediately so as to relieve the stress on the banks and corporations.”18
However, many others saw it quite differently. For example, in testimony
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Development on October 16, 2008, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated,
One of the biggest steps we can take to light a fuller picture of
companies’ financial health would be to expand fair-value
accounting to cover all of the financial instruments.... Yet in
recent weeks, fair-value accounting has been used a scapegoat by
the banking industry—the financial equivalent of shooting the
18
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messenger. If financial institutions were accurately marking the
books, they would have seen the problems they are experiencing
months in advance and could have made the necessary
adjustments—and we could have avoided the current crisis.

Many, including investors and investor organizations and the major
accounting firms and Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Chairman
Robert Denham, wrote letters to Congress opposing any legislation that
would suspend the fair-value requirements, warning that it could
severely undermine investor confidence.
Meanwhile at the SEC and FASB, although not inclined to suspend the
requirements, we also recognized the need for additional guidance in
what was clearly an emergency situation. Accordingly, we issued a joint
SEC-FASB press release on September 30, 2008, that provided additional
guidance from our staffs on valuing securities in illiquid and inactive
markets.19 As promised in that release, the Board, following an
expedited comment period, issued additional clarifying guidance on
these matters on October 10, 2008, in the form of FSP FAS 157-3.20 I
recall that some of the comment letters we received on the proposal
that resulted in this document were from individuals making impassioned pleas on both sides of the fair value debate. Exhibit 5-1, “Letters
of Comment,” shows four of these letters, the first two from people
strongly against fair value and the second two urging us to hold the
line on fair value. Many more such letters and e-mails were to follow in
the months ahead, as well as hundreds of lengthier and more detailed
letters addressing the technical accounting aspects of the various
proposals we were to issue on financial reporting matters arising from
the crisis.

19
Securities and Exchange Commission press release, SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and
FASB Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting.
20
Determining the Fair Value of a Financial Asset When the Market for That Asset Is Not Active.
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Exhibit 5-1: Letters of Comment
Letter of Comment No. 10
From: XXX
May the souls of all of those who developed FASB 157 burn in the 7th
circle of Dante’s hell. The statement does not reflect economic reality and
in fact converts statements to liquidation statements distorts periodic
measurement of income, distorts capital and cause bankruptcies where in
fact paper entries create a situation the opposite of cash flow. Perhaps
this was the intended consequence. I am [sic] old CPA and an investor
and I will tell you academic [sic] never done anything but contemplate
your navel types that this statement does not help me evaluate investments because in fact [sic] distorts the most important investor issue
which is earnings and earnings growth. You have made the income statement a garbage dump of no meaning in favor the balance sheet. Rule
bound, every single member of this group and their staff are solely
responsible for this non meltdown, meltdown. You are garbage.
XXX
CPA

Letter of Comment No. 12
From: XXX
I’ve read FAS 157 and your proposed FASB staff position on FAS 157.
I’ve been a CPA for 40 years and I can not [sic] believe what the FASB
has done to me personally and to the country as a whole. You’ve
destroyed the retirement of me and my wife and millions of other
Americans. Your lame attempt to correct the problem is way too little
and way too late. Your arrogance and self righteous approach has cost
millions of Americans their financial independence and their futures. I
hope you can’t sleep at night, because I know I can’t. How do I tell my
wife that our equity income funds that were to provide our retirement
have been decimated because of an accounting rule that makes financial
institutions, on paper, insolvent (essentially bankrupt) and makes their
stock, even if they have positive cash flow, essentially worthless? You
continue to do a great disservice to our country. Shame on you. I hope
you can live with yourselves and all of the destruction you’ve caused.
XXX, CPA (Not very proud of it)
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Letter of Comment No: 8
From: XXX
It is time to draw the line in the sand on the mark-to-market rules. I am
deeply ashamed that you would even consider softening these rules
when you know that the lack of regulations got us into this financial
mess!!!! The lack of enforcement and changes in regulations by the SEC
are to blame: changing the leverage rules for investment banks from 12
to 1 and letting them go up to 40 to 1 that is why there are none left,
lack of enforcement in short selling rules, reversal of the up-tick rule,
reversal of computer program trading restraints on a very bad day, etc.
In my opinion I want to know how all these problems happened to the
banks with SOX in place and what were the public accounting firms
doing????? Why is no one going to jail—no material internal control
weaknesses??? DO NOT GET CAUGHT UP IN POILITCS [sic]—WE
ARE SUPPOSED TO BE INDEPENDENT!!!!! WHAT DO YOU WANT
THE TREASUY [sic] DEPARTMENT TO HAVE AN EXCUSE TO PAY
HIGHER PRICES FOR THIS TOXIC DEBT ON THE F/S ON US AND
FOREIGH [sic] BANKS!!!! THIS IS A DISGRACE!!!!
XXX

Letter of Comment No. 17
From: XXX
I am concerned that the proposed revisions to the rule could further
exacerbate the current financial crisis, rather than help it, by essentially
making the financial health of a company that has non-performing
assets on its books seem better than it actually is. What the rule is
essentially doing is allowing a company to assign a value that is based
on “assumptions” to an asset that has no market and is therefore actually, in the real world, worthless.
Furthermore, if a consumer applied for credit and showed a portfolio of
securities that had no market as collateral, I don’t believe they
[sic]would be extended the same leeway in interpretation.
XXX

In response to the controversy, as part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Congress mandated that the SEC
conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting in conjunction with the
Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The EESA further authorized the SEC to suspend mark-to-market
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accounting if it deemed such a move necessary or appropriate in the
public interest. As part of its study, the SEC received numerous comment letters; held several public roundtables; and reviewed the effects
of the use of fair value accounting on financial institutions. This latter
step included reviewing whether and how fair value accounting might
have affected the 22 banks that had failed during 2008 (including the 3
largest failures: Washington Mutual, IndyMac, and Downey Savings
and Loan) and other major failed or distressed financial institutions
(including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG). During fall 2008,
we, together with the IASB, held public roundtables—one in London;
one in Tokyo; and one in our offices in Norwalk, CT—to gather input
and views from constituents on reporting issues stemming from the
financial crisis that needed standard-setting action.
The report by the SEC staff to Congress,21 was issued on December 30,
2008. Its overall conclusion was
Rather than a crisis precipitated by fair value accounting, the
crisis was a “run on the bank” at certain institutions, manifesting
itself in counterparties reducing or eliminating the various credit
and other risk exposures they had to each firm.... The Staff
observes that fair value accounting did not appear to play a
meaningful role in bank failures occurring during 2008. Rather,
bank failures in the U.S. appeared to be the result of growing
probable credit losses, concerns about asset quality, and, in
certain cases, eroding lender and investor confidence. For the
failed banks that did recognize sizable fair value losses, it does
not appear that the reporting of these losses was the reason the
bank failed.

The report noted that investors generally believed that fair value
accounting increases financial reporting transparency and that the
information it provides helps result in better investment decision
making. Accordingly, the SEC staff recommended against suspending
FASB Statement No. 157 or existing requirements relating to the use of
fair values in financial reporting. However, the report did contain a
number of recommendations for potential improvements to the guidance on fair value, as well as some broader recommendations on the
need (a) to simplify accounting for investments in financial assets and
(b) for enhancements to the accounting standard-setting process.
I would note that other studies22 have similarly concluded that the use
of fair value accounting was a not a contributing factor to the financial
crisis. In that regard, I found a study conducted by an economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and published on January 31, 2010, to
21

Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008: Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting.
22
Another study with similar conclusions was Christian Laux’s and Christian Leuz’s Did FairValue Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?
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be particularly interesting. That study23 looked at whether, as
contended by some, the use of fair value accounting and markdowns of
financial assets to fair value during the height of the financial crisis in
2008 was a major contributory force to the financial crisis. Some had
argued that fair value accounting caused a procyclical contagion effect
that led to a downward spiral in financial asset prices because financial
institutions had to sell these assets at ever-falling distressed prices in
order to prevent a further destruction of regulatory capital. The study
focused on the largest U.S. bank holding companies: those with more
than $100 billion in assets because these were the most prone to such
write-downs and had the highest amounts of the troubled financial
assets. The conclusion of this study states,
Based on this simple analysis it would appear that fair value
accounting had a minimal impact on the capital of most banks in
the sample during the crisis period through the end of 2008.
Capital destruction was due to a deterioration in loan portfolios
depleted by items such as proprietary trading losses and common
stock dividends. These are a result of lending practices and the
actions of bank managements, not accounting rules. Furthermore,
the data suggests that banks were not raising significant capital
through asset sales; rather they were relying on government
programs as well as debt and equity markets. There was no clear
observable evidence to back the assertion that fair value
accounting, linked to regulatory capital rules, caused banks to sell
investments at distressed prices and thus promote a pro-cyclical
effect that accelerated the decline in investment asset prices.

Nevertheless, the assertions that fair value accounting exacerbated or
even caused the financial crisis continued, as evidenced by some of the
comment letters the FASB received on its May 2010 proposed
Accounting Standards Update (ASU)24 and by the dissenting statement
of Commissioner Peter Wallison in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,
who, in discussing his views on factors contributing to the financial
crisis, stated,
The Commission majority did not discuss the significance of
mark-to-market accounting in its report. This was a serious
lapse, given the views of many that accounting polices played an
important role in the financial crisis. Many commentators have
argued that the resulting impairment charges to balance sheets
reduced the GAAP equity of financial institutions and, therefore,
their capital positions, making them appear financially weaker
than they actually were if viewed on the basis of the cash flows
they were receiving.

23

Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent Victim, Exploring the Links Between Fair Value, Bank
Regulatory Capital, and the Recent Financial Crisis.
24
Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to the Accounting for Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities—Financial Instruments (Topic 825) and Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815).
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However, the majority opinion of the FCIC seems to dismiss this view in
a comment in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, “Determining the market
value of securities that did not trade was difficult, was subjective, and
became a contentious issue during the crisis. Why? Because the writedowns reduced earnings and capital, and triggered collateral calls.”
At the time, however, some seemed to have a “shoot the messenger”
approach to trying to address what was a very difficult and challenging
situation. Being the chairman of the body that was at the center of these
assertions and attacks was not always the most comfortable of roles
during this period. I recall my then 23-year-old daughter Nicole, who is
not an accountant or steeped in finance, observed from reading news
accounts and watching cable news shows, “Daddy, there seems to be a
lot of people mad at you and the FASB over this mark-to-market
thing,” and asking, “Why are they so against banks showing what their
assets are worth?” I was buoyed by the professionalism and dedication
of my fellow Board members and our staff and by the support we
received from many quarters, including our trustees, many investors
and investor organizations, the accounting profession, the academic
community, and others, both for maintaining a line on not suspending
the use of fair value and for the importance of independent standard
setting. The support of then-Treasury Secretary Paulson, then-SEC
Chairman Cox, and then-SEC Chief Accountant Conrad Hewitt who
stood firm in favor of these principles was also important in weathering
the storm against fair value and independent standard setting in fall
2008. Paulson would later write in his book On the Brink
Some people have also blamed the use of fair-value accounting
for causing or accelerating the crisis. To the contrary, I am
concerned that had we not had fair value—or as it is sometimes
known, mark-to-market—accounting, the excesses in our system
would have been greater and the crisis would have been even
more severe. Managements, investors, and regulators would
have had even less understanding of the risks embedded in an
institution’s balance sheet.25

However, that was certainly not the universal view, and there was more
to come in this controversy.

The Year 2008 Draws to a Close
Although the problems in the credit markets seemed to have been at
their height during November 2008, neither a rebound in those markets
in December 2008 nor the issuance of the SEC report at the end of 2008
dampened the calls from financial institutions and their trade groups
for major changes to accounting standards relating to the valuation of
25

Henry M. Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial
System. Boston: Business Plus, 2010.
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investments and, in particular, the standards relating to write-downs of
debt securities for what are called other-than-temporary impairments.
Under FASB Statement No. 115 and related guidance issued by the SEC
staff and the EITF, both held-to-maturity debt securities carried at
amortized cost and available-for-sale debt securities carried at fair value
through other comprehensive income need to be written down through
earnings when an other-than-temporary impairment occurs.
Determining what constitutes an other-than-temporary impairment
requires judgment based on an assessment of the length and severity of
the decline in value of the debt security. Rules of thumb had developed
in practice, such as if a security had fallen by more than 20 percent in
value below amortized cost for a period of at least one year, it should
be written down to its current fair value. Until that point, however, no
charge to earnings (and no reduction in regulatory capital) needed to be
made for the decline in fair value in the hope there would be a
recovery in value.
The declines in the values of many debt securities had begun in the
second half of 2007 and continued through much of 2008, with a bit of
rebound in some debt securities coming in December 2008. By
December 31, 2008, many debt securities had been underwater for more
than one year and had significantly declined in value. So, it was not
surprising that pressure mounted on us and the SEC to do something
to mitigate the resulting write-downs that would need to be taken in
the year-end financial statements of financial institutions. The institutions argued that credit markets had become dislocated and
dysfunctional, such that the fair values were not representative of the
underlying fundamental or true values of the debt securities, and that
many of these securities with severely depressed fair values were actually “money good,” meaning they were expected to pay off in full.
They also argued that auditors were taking an overly conservative
approach in forcing their clients to mark these assets down to
unrealistic “fire-sale” prices.
I must admit that I had some sympathy for some of these arguments,
particularly for the one that auditors may have been requiring overly
excessive write-downs based on unrepresentative trades or “nonbinding” broker quotes rather than allowing institutions to use other
techniques to value what had, in many instances, become illiquid debt
securities. In that regard and as we tried to clarify and emphasize in FSP
FAS 157-3, the definition of fair value in FASB Statement No. 157 is the
price that would be received to sell an asset in an orderly transaction and
not what would be received in a forced sale or liquidation. The markets
for many securitized debt securities had become illiquid. I supported and
voted in favor of FSP EITF 99-20-1,26 that we issued on January 12, 2009.
26

Amendments to the Impairment Guidance of EITF Issue No. 99-20.
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This FSP modified the rules relating to determining impairments of
certain securitized debt interests to make them more consistent with the
approach to impairment on other illiquid debt securities by allowing the
use of management’s cash flow estimates instead of market estimates of
cash flows in computing the fair value and resulting impairment of these
interests. The FSP was effective for December 31, 2008 financial statements and passed by a 3-2 vote of the Board, with Tom Linsmeier and
Marc Siegel dissenting to what they felt was an inappropriate change in
the impairment requirements for these assets.

Into 2009—Congress Weighs In
In January and February 2009, we met with many constituents,
including our Valuation Resource Group, to discuss further actions we
might take in light of the SEC staff’s recommendations in their report to
Congress and ongoing requests for additional guidance on determining
fair values and impairments of financial assets. As a result, on February
18, 2009, I announced in a press release that we added two projects to
our agenda: one to provide further application guidance on a number
of areas, including when markets had become inactive and on
determining when a transaction is distressed, and the other on
improving disclosures about fair value measurements used in the
financial statements. We had already issued for public comment certain
proposed enhanced disclosures in interim reports relating to the fair
values of financial instruments. We began work on the two additional
projects, with a goal of finalizing the additional guidance on
determining fair values in inactive markets and distressed transactions
in time to be applied for 2009 second quarter financial reports.
Apparently, that was neither quick enough nor enough of a change for
some financial institutions and their trade groups, as well as for certain
broader business groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (see
exhibit 5-2, “Multi-Industry Letter on Mark-to Market Accounting:
Practices and Implications”). Now, my experience has been that when
companies and business groups oppose particular proposed changes in
accounting standards, they often complain the proposal needs more vetting, that the FASB needs to slow down and conduct field tests and
additional cost-benefit analyses, and so on. However, in this instance,
which was certainly not the ordinary course of business and which, as
many have said, was unprecedented, these groups lobbied for the
changes they wanted to standards to be done on an emergency basis,
with little or no due process by us, the SEC, or Congress.
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Exhibit 5-2: Multi-Industry Letter on
Mark-to-Market Accounting:
Practices and Implications
Release Date: Wednesday, March 11, 2009
March 11, 2009
The Honorable Paul Kanjorski
Chairman
Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Scott Garrett
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Kanjorski and Ranking Member Garrett:
The undersigned business organizations and institutions, which
represent entities from across a broad spectrum of the economy and all
areas of the financial services industry, thank you for holding this very
important hearing tomorrow on mark-to-market accounting practices.
The United States and the global economy have undergone a period
of almost unprecedented strain and challenge. The falling prices of
real estate related assets have ground the securitization markets to a
halt, dried up liquidity, and frozen credit availability. The resulting
illiquid and non-functioning markets and related impacts have
cascaded throughout the economy, causing severe market dislocations and job losses.
While there are many causes for this crisis, the procyclical impacts
of certain mark-to-market accounting principles have exacerbated
the situation. Accounting rules did not cause this crisis. However,
the inability of businesses, investors, and government to properly
value assets in disorderly markets has created uncertainty and a
loss of confidence that has led to a self-reinforcing cycle of writedowns and further economic contractions.
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We recognize that accounting standards should be developed and
governed by the appropriate bodies. Further, we believe the appropriate
course is not the wholesale abandonment of appropriate application of
fair value accounting principles, but rather immediate correction to
better principles-based financial reporting. Each of our organizations
has jointly or individually proposed short-term and long-term solutions
to the unintended consequences that have arisen from the application
of mark-to-market accounting standards. While the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (“FASB”) have taken some incremental action to facilitate the use
of mark-to-market accounting in disorderly markets, the scope of the
changes has not been adequate, nor has the pace been consistent with
the crisis conditions that exist.
With the upcoming subcommittee hearing on mark-to-market accounting,
we write to you today to express our concerns for the need to correct the
unintended consequences of mark-to-market accounting. We do not ask
that Congress write accounting rules. Rather, it is incumbent that the
appropriate bodies understand that a pace of business-as-usual is unacceptable. Let us be clear, real economic losses should be recognized and
are necessary for orderly markets. However, the recognition of losses that
do not have a basis in economic reality is unsustainable in any environment. Appropriate changes in mark-to-market accounting should not
wait until mid-year or near-end. That will only allow the spiral of
accounting driven financial losses to continue.
Our hope is that these hearings ask the tough questions and stimulate
immediate action that makes necessary adjustments in both the
accounting treatment and guidance so that economic recovery is not
impaired by the application of flawed rules. We stand ready to work
with all willing participants to bring about this goal in a rational and
expeditious manner.
Sincerely,
American Bankers Association
American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI)
American Financial Services Association
Certified Commercial Investment Members Institute
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association
NAIOP, the Commercial Real Estate Development Association
The Council of Federal Home Loan Banks
Financial Services Roundtable
Group of North American Insurance Enterprises
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Independent Community Bankers of America
Institute of Real Estate Management
International Council of Shopping Centers
Mortgage Bankers Association
National Association of Home Builders
National Association of Realtors
Pennsylvania Association of Community Bankers
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
The Real Estate Roundtable
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago
Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati
Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas
Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines
Federal Home Loan Bank of Indianapolis
Federal Home Loan Bank of New York
Federal Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco
Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle
Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka
Cc: The Members of the House Committee on Financial Services

Readers may also recall that during January and February 2009 and
into the beginning of March, stock markets precipitously declined. On
March 9, 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood below 6,600, a
more than 50 percent drop from its peak in October 2007. The U.S.
economy also suffered more than 1.4 million job losses in the first 2
months of 2009. There was panic in the air. And, so, it was at this point
that I was asked to testify at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities of the House
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Committee on Financial Services on March 12, 2009, along with others,
including James (Jim) Kroeker, the acting chief accountant of the SEC.
From the outset of the hearing, it seemed clear to me this was not going
to be a neutral discussion of the issues. In his opening statement, the
Chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Paul Kanjorski, said, “We
can, however, no longer deny the reality of the procyclical nature of
mark-to-market accounting. It has produced numerous unintended
consequences, and it has exacerbated the ongoing economic crisis. If the
regulators and standard setters do not act now to improve the
standards, then the Congress will have no other option than to act
itself.” Both my testimony and that of Jim Kroeker tried to explain the
existing requirements, including the extent to which mark-to-market
accounting and fair value measurements were and were not used by
financial institutions, the results and principal conclusions of the SEC’s
study of the subject, and the actions we had already taken and planned
to take to provide additional application guidance for valuing financial
assets in inactive markets. I also provided the following observations:
I would be remiss if I did not briefly comment on the role of
financial reporting and economic and regulatory consequences,
including assertion by some that the use of mark-to-market
accounting and fair value caused banks to fail and has
exacerbated the financial crisis. We agree with the SEC’s conclusion that fair value did not cause banks to fail. We also agree
with the SEC that suspending or eliminating the existing fair
value requirements would not be advisable, would diminish the
quality and transparency of reporting, and could adversely affect
investors’ confidence in the markets. The role of accounting and
reporting standards is to help provide investors and the capital
markets with sound, unbiased financial information on the
activities, results, and financial condition of reporting enterprises.
So, while financial institution regulators may base computations
of regulatory capital on GAAP numbers, [they are able to] and
do systematically make adjustments to reported GAAP figures in
computing regulatory capital.... Of course, good accounting and
reporting can have economic consequences, including potentially
leading to what some term as procyclical behavior. Highlighting
and exposing the deteriorating financial condition of a financial
institution can result in investors deciding to sell their stock in
the entity and lenders refusing to lend to it, to the company
trying to shed problem assets, and to regulators and the capital
markets recognizing that the institution may be in danger of
failing and need additional capital. Indeed, individuals and
families may take such procyclical actions when they see the
falling value of their homes and of their 401ks and decide to
spend less and to sell investments in order to raise cash in
troubled times. But I think few would suggest that suspending
or modifying the reporting to individual investors of the current
values of their investment accounts. Thus, to the extent there are
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valid concerns relating to procyclicality, I believe these concerns
are more effectively and appropriately addressed through regulatory mechanisms and via fiscal and monetary policy, than by
trying to suppress or alter the financial information reported to
investors and the capital markets.

From what I recall, much of the rest of the hearing that lasted several
hours involved certain members of the subcommittee making what I
viewed as inaccurate statements about the actual accounting requirements and urging and demanding that either we or the SEC do
something. At one point, I recall Jim Kroeker indicating that if the FASB
was unable to quickly respond, the SEC might be able to do so. We
already had begun our work, and in response to the demands from one
member of the subcommittee (I believe it was Congressman Gary
Ackerman), I indicated that I thought we could issue additional guidance in three weeks but would have to consult with my fellow Board
members on that. My thinking was that it would be better for the FASB
to provide such guidance through its open, public due process, albeit
on a very fast-track basis, than for the SEC staff to try to do it by
quickly issuing guidance with no public due process. I also recall that
not all of the discussion was hostile, with some members of the
subcommittee asking questions that indicated to me that they were
genuinely interested in better understanding the issues. I recall
Congressman Alan Grayson defending fair value and comparing the
demands to suspend or change it to other ideas, such as changing pi
from 3.14 to 4 in order to relieve congestion on the Beltway (the
highway around Washington, D.C.); increasing the size of an inch so
that Grayson, a tall man, would be shorter and, therefore, more
comfortable in an airplane seat; or making the number 98 larger than
109 so that the loss the Washington Wizards basketball team had suffered the prior night would be counted as a win. In summing up, he
asked his colleagues, “Does it make sense to kill the messenger?”27
I also recall one or more of the members of the subcommittee citing
examples of what they asserted to be the ridiculous results of using fair
value to measure impairments of debt securities. I do not recall the
exact details, but almost one year later, in February 2010, I read a piece
by Bloomberg columnist Jonathan Weil, “Suing Wall Street Banks Never
Looked So Shady,” in which he refers back to some of the examples
cited by members of the subcommittee and the extent of losses that
were subsequently recorded by the specific financial institutions. For
example, Weil reported that, in the hearing, Congressman Ed
Perlmutter cited what he called an example that was really disturbing:
the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle that blamed the accounting
rules for its needing to take a write-down of more than $304 million on
27

Sarah Johnson and Marie Leone, “Congress Members Fume at Fair Value,” CFO, 12 March
2009.
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its portfolio of mortgage-backed securities, claiming this went well
beyond any expected economic losses. According to Weil, in February
2010, the bank said it now expected more than $311 million of actual
credit losses on its portfolio and had sued a number of the Wall Street
underwriters of these securities. Weil also noted that Chairman
Kanjorski pointed to a similar example at the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Atlanta that in the third quarter of 2008 had recorded $87 million of
write-downs to fair value on its mortgage-backed securities but
estimated actual losses would amount to only $44,000. Weil quotes
Kanjorski as saying, “I find that accounting result to be absurd. It fails
to reflect the economic reality. We must correct the rules to prevent such
gross distortions.” However, Weil reports that when the bank released
its results for the third quarter of 2009, it raised its estimate of credit
losses to more than $263 million.
I could say I was shocked by all this, but that would not be true. First
and perhaps foremost, the hearing came at a point when, as I previously suggested, there was clearly a sense of deep concern, if not panic,
over the state of the financial markets, financial system, and economy.
Second, I had previously learned, particularly during the controversy
over stock option expensing, that members of Congress and their staffs
are bombarded by industry lobbyists who supply them with arguments
in support of their desired objectives, including potentially erroneous
and misleading data, scripts to use in hearings, and even draft legislation. Don’t get me wrong, as I noted in chapter 3, “Stock Option
Controversies—Take Two,” I also had the honor and pleasure to work
with many members of Congress and their staffs, particularly on the
Senate side, who cared deeply about the public interest, understanding
issues, and doing what they believed to be the right thing. However, I
also experienced firsthand some of the less positive aspects of our
Congress at work.

Our Response
In any event, later that day and on my return to Norwalk, CT, the next
day, I conferred with my fellow Board members and senior staff about
whether and how we might respond to the demands from the subcommittee. As I have said before and will reiterate many times in this book,
I was very blessed with fellow Board members and staff who, despite
differences in views on particular technical matters, were dedicated to
our mission and properly fulfilling that mission. So, we decided that
with a lot of hard work, we could quickly issue for public comment
two documents: one proposing additional guidance on determining fair
values in inactive markets and another proposing changes in the
accounting for, and presentation of, impairments of debt. We had also
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already exposed for public comment a proposal to increase the
frequency of disclosure of fair values from annually to quarterly.
The next three weeks were to be very challenging, with Board members
and staff working very long hours and through weekends to issue the
proposals, discuss the proposals with many constituents, carefully review
and analyze the more than 700 written comment letters we received
during the two-week comment period, and revise the proposals and issue
three final documents on April 9, 2009, so they were available for 2009
first quarter reporting. It was a real team effort, and I offer special thanks
and my deep appreciation to three members of the FASB staff who
worked tirelessly on these documents: Practice Fellows Adrian Mills and
Diane Inzano and Valuation Fellow Kristofer Anderson.
FSP FAS 157-428 provided guidance on determining fair values when
there is no active market or when the price inputs being used represent
distressed sales. It reaffirmed what FASB Statement No. 157 states as
the objective of fair value measurement: to reflect how much an asset
would be sold for in an orderly transaction (as opposed to a distressed
or forced sale). It also reaffirmed the need to use judgment to determine
if a formerly active market has become inactive and to determine fair
value in such circumstances. FSP FAS 115-2 and FAS 124-229 provided
for a more consistent approach to the timing of impairment recognition
and greater clarity on the credit and noncredit components of impaired
debt securities that are not expected to be sold. The measure of impairment remained at fair value, but it was required to be split into the
estimated credit component, which is charged to earnings, and the
remaining noncredit component, which is charged to other
comprehensive income. Although not one of our specific goals in
establishing this approach, an important practical effect of it for the
banks was to take some pressure off their regulatory capital because
only the portion of the impairments in debt securities relating to credit
would now be charged to regulatory capital. That FSP also expanded
the disclosures sought by investors regarding expected cash flows,
credit losses, and an aging of securities with unrealized losses. Finally,
FSP FAS 107-1 and APB 28-130 extended the annual disclosures of fair
values of financial instruments to quarterly financial reports. All Board
members voted in favor of the first and third documents. Tom
Linsmeier and Marc Siegel dissented to the second document that they
viewed as an inappropriate change in the impairment requirements.
Reaction to the issuance of these three documents was strong but
mixed. Critics of fair value generally said it was a positive step but did
28
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not go far enough. Supporters of fair value saw it as a weakening of the
standards and as allowing banks and other financial institutions too
much latitude in determining fair values and in deciding what portion
of an impairment to charge to report in earnings. We received strongly
worded letters and e-mails from both camps: those who saw fair value
as the root of all evil and those who, having read some press accounts,
believed we had “caved” to the “evil banks” and their water carriers in
Congress.
To me, the documents represented a genuine attempt by us to provide
helpful guidance at a very challenging juncture for the capital markets
and economy while preserving the underlying principles of fair value
and greatly expanding the disclosure of information that professional
investors had been seeking. Most of all, I will remember the sheer hard
work and dedication we put into the efforts, making sure we also
preserved our public due process. I take pride in the effort, but I
certainly do not recommend it as a permanent mode for setting
accounting standards.

The World Goes On, but It’s Not the
Same
Starting from the lows in early March 2009, stock markets began to
rebound. The credit markets also continued to slowly strengthen, with
bond spreads significantly tightening. Some of the most vocal critics of
fair value have attributed all this to what we did in April 2009. As
tempting as it would be to take some credit for the recovery, I do not
believe that would be honest. Other developments, including the
perceived stimulative effects of government fiscal and monetary policies
and supply of cheap funds to the banking sector, along with the stress
tests conducted by the banking regulators on the largest U.S. bank
holding companies, were probably important factors. In any event, it
began to seem that we had collectively averted going over the cliff.
The financial crisis has left an indelible mark on many people and
many aspects of the financial system. I believe this also was true for the
accounting standard setters and our joint efforts. Throughout the
financial crisis, we and the IASB had endeavored both to address
specific reporting issues from the crisis while also moving forward
together on our major joint projects. Achieving the latter become very
challenging, particularly for the areas of accounting and reporting that
were the most relevant in the financial crisis, namely accounting for
financial instruments and accounting for securitizations and involvements with SPEs. As previously discussed, these are key areas in
accounting and reporting by financial institutions and were the areas
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requiring the most attention by us during the financial crisis. In looking
back, I believe the principal challenges arose from the fact that we were
starting from different places in terms of our existing standards;
therefore, necessarily, there were some different fixes we each needed to
put into place. Unfortunately but quite understandably, neither our
regulators nor politicians on either side of the Atlantic were willing to
accept a response in the heat of the crisis that, “We will deal with these
issues over the next few years in our major joint projects on accounting
for financial instruments, derecognition, and consolidation.” Nevertheless, we met frequently, considered each other’s actions, and, whenever
possible, tried to achieve common, if not converged, responses (for
example, in the guidance on determining fair values in inactive markets
and in improving disclosures around fair value measurements). We also
held joint public roundtables and jointly formed a Financial Crisis
Advisory Group (FCAG) that I discuss later in this chapter.
The crisis had an effect on our convergence efforts. Certainly, it delayed
progress on some major joint projects because we each had to devote
significant time and resources to addressing the reporting issues arising
from the crisis.
Also, having each put some fixes to these issues in place, it becomes
more difficult to make another round of changes within a few years.
Thus, for example, having issued FASB Statement Nos. 166 and 167 that
took effect in 2010, it would not be fair to require U.S. companies to
then make another round of major changes in their reporting in these
areas within a few years. The IASB had already issued proposals in
these areas that contained a number of significant differences from
FASB Statement Nos. 166 and 167. Similarly, the exigencies of the
financial crisis caused the two boards to take differing approaches to
addressing accounting for financial instruments. In such circumstances,
bringing things back together requires time and a rational and
systematic approach. The June 2010 revised Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) attempted to do that. Time will tell whether it
and subsequent efforts by the boards prove successful in achieving
converged high-quality standards in these areas.

Some Lessons Learned
For me, many lessons were learned, and some were relearned. I say
relearned because as the title of my June 2009 speech at the National
Press Club states, “History doesn’t repeat itself, people repeat history.”
Clearly, some of the key lessons from this financial crisis are not new,
including the perils of excess leverage and inadequate capital, the
importance of liquidity, particularly in a crisis, and the importance of
incentives in driving the behavior of corporate managers and market
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participants. I also think some other important lessons were learned
from this crisis.
First, as I have already said but cannot say too often, I was often
amazed and constantly uplifted by the sheer dedication, professionalism, and willingness of my fellow Board members and staff to
put in long hours in what sometimes seemed like an endless barrage of
difficult issues we needed to deal with during the crisis. Having had
the opportunity to work with people at the SEC and the Treasury,
particularly during the height of the crisis, I can also attest to their
dedication and tireless work on behalf of our country. People band
together in a crisis in order to try to respond to the challenges and to
try to get through it.
I was also very much impressed by, and learned a great deal from, the
deliberations of the FCAG that we and the IASB formed to consider
and advise us on financial reporting issues stemming from the crisis.
The FCAG was co-chaired by former SEC Commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid and Hans Hoogervorst, the head of the Netherlands
Authority for the Financial Markets. (Hans later became the Chair of
the Monitoring Group over the IFRS Foundation and succeeded Sir
David Tweedie as the Chairman of the IASB starting on July 1, 2011.)
The FCAG consisted of 18 recognized leaders from around the world
from financial institutions and other major corporations. It also
included leaders from the investment, accounting, and regulatory communities, with various official observers from major regulatory bodies
and the FASB’s and IASB’s main advisory councils. It met 6 times
between January and July 2009, addressing a broad array of issues
relating to effective financial reporting, the limitations of financial
reporting, convergence of accounting standards, and standard setters’
independence and accountability. The FCAG provided important
recommendations to us and policymakers.31
Reflecting the global scale of the financial crisis, the FCAG was, by
design, a group comprising senior people from around the world. I
believe the financial crisis clearly demonstrated the many connections
between financial markets and economies around the world and the
increasing need for international cooperation and coordination in
addressing issues that arise in financial markets.
I am very grateful to the members of the FCAG for their willingness to
serve on such a body at a time of crisis and for their candid views and
constructive recommendations. Certainly, I learned a great deal from
listening to and participating in the deliberations of this group. For
example, I think the problems with QSPEs provide a clear example to
standard setters of the perils of creating exceptions, however narrowly
31
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constructed, that confer highly desirable reporting outcomes. I believe
history has shown that in an effort to avail themselves of the exception,
over time, it gets stretched and abused to the point where standard setters or regulators have to shut it down. It happened with fixed-price
employee stock options, pooling of interests accounting for business
combinations, and the QSPEs.
I also believe that the crisis reinforced the importance of understanding
the potential behavioral effects of standards. The rather simple definition of fair value as the price a holder would receive in a sale of an asset
in an orderly transaction may work just fine in normal times. It came
under real stress during the crisis as markets broke down, and
important questions arose over what constituted an orderly transaction
versus a distressed one. Although FASB Statement No. 157 provided
guidance for valuing illiquid assets, it did not contemplate what happened in the financial crisis, so we had to provide several rounds of
additional guidance to help preparers, auditors, and regulators deal
with the situation in order to obtain reasonable valuations that were
consistent with the principles of fair value.
That brings up what I believe to be one of the major lessons learned
from the crisis. We (politicians, regulators, and the private sector)
cannot again allow trillion dollar markets that lack proper
infrastructures in terms of price discovery, clearing mechanisms,
transparency of financial information, and appropriate regulation. Balanced and effective regulation, oversight, and enforcement are also key
ingredients of sound markets as is the appropriate exercise of due
diligence and proper risk management by financial institutions.
Although regulation should not stifle innovation and risk taking, it
should help create needed infrastructures, standards of conduct, and
transparency in markets. Unfortunately, in the years leading up to the
crisis, the exploding markets for asset-backed securities and OTC
derivatives lacked the most basic of infrastructure elements and “rules
of the road” that, as a country, we worked hard to put into place
throughout many decades in our public equity and debt markets. In
modern times, the effective operation of capitalism depends on the
existence of infrastructures that support transparency and the orderly
functioning of markets. Far from constraining markets and capitalism,
these are essential elements in its effective operation and in public trust
in the system. So, it is not surprising and, in my view, is appropriate
that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
contained a number of provisions aimed at addressing these issues.
In terms of financial reporting, some of the most difficult accounting
and reporting issues from the financial crisis stemmed, at least in part,
from the lack of proper information infrastructures around the “dark
markets” for structured credit products and derivatives. Under such
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conditions, accounting and valuation are significantly challenged.
Proper accounting and valuation require that companies and market
participants are able to identify, understand, and reasonably calibrate
risk and returns originating from financial assets and obligations and to
ascertain transaction prices in exchange markets. It is not surprising
that in the financial crisis there were significant issues surrounding the
determination of fair values in inactive and dislocated markets, the
recognition of impairments of financial assets in such markets, and the
quality and timeliness of disclosures of risk.
To me, all this reinforces the fundamental importance of transparency
and accountability. A lack of transparency makes it more difficult to
spot growing problems. Even when the problems become evident, the
lack of transparency and proper information makes it harder to
understand, pinpoint, and address the problem. It also makes it harder
to identify who to hold accountable. In short, transparency is not just a
buzz word or cliché. It is a fundamental and an absolutely essential
attribute of sound financial markets. Relevant, trustworthy, and timely
information is the oxygen of financial markets. It creates trust and
confidence in markets, promotes market liquidity, and reduces costs to
market participants. Depriving markets of relevant, trustworthy, and
timely information, or polluting that information, can have adverse
consequences on individual companies and their stakeholders and on
overall confidence in the financial system.
Now, in regard to the merits of providing greater transparency in a
crisis, what I am about to say may be a big oversimplification of a
complex subject. At times, during the crisis, it seemed to me that the
mindset of some bank regulators was that greater disclosure by banks
could be harmful, whereas the approach of accounting standard setters
and securities regulators was that more public disclosure is important
and helpful. As former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated in testimony
on March 26, 2009, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
& Urban Development, “What serves the health of banks may run
exactly counter to the interests of investors—and we have seen situations where bank regulators have kept information about poorly
performing assets from the public in order to give a bank time enough
to dispose of them.” This difference in perspectives would seem to stem
from, and reflect some fundamental differences in, the role of bank
regulators on the one hand and the role of securities regulators and
accounting standard setters on the other hand. Bank regulators are
charged with overseeing the safety and soundness of the institutions
they regulate and with the stability of the financial system. The role of
accounting standard setters and securities regulators is to provide
investors and the capital markets with the information they need to
make informed investment decisions to promote efficient allocation of
capital across the economy. Both missions are critical to the operation of
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a sound financial system and healthy economy. The work of bank
regulators, securities regulators, and accounting standard setters can be
challenging, all the more so during a major financial crisis.
During the crisis (and perhaps even now) there seemed to be some
confusion in the media and elsewhere between the accounting
standards used for financial reporting to investors and the capital
markets and the regulation of financial institutions. For example,
accounting standards do not prescribe or directly determine the levels
of capital that banks are required to maintain; the bank regulators do.
However, under the laws enacted by Congress in the wake of the S&L
crisis, the determination of regulatory capital by the bank regulators
starts with the U.S. GAAP numbers. The bank regulators have some
discretion to make adjustments in computing regulatory capital, and
they have other tools to address the capital adequacy, safety, and
solvency issues of financial institutions. For example, it has been the
long-standing policy of bank regulators to exclude unrealized gains and
losses included in other comprehensive income from the computation
of regulatory capital.
So, regulators have a natural interest in accounting standards; likewise,
investors have an interest in both accounting standards and the impact
of regulatory requirements and actions on the institutions in which they
invest. In that regard, I publicly commended the U.S. bank regulators
on the transparency they provided on the results of the “stress tests” of
major U.S. bank holding companies in spring 2009. I believe it was well
received by the markets and contributed to help stabilize the financial
system at a critical juncture. I would encourage this type of transparency by prudential regulators on an ongoing basis and applaud the
efforts of the Federal Reserve to provide this under the annual
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review program for the largest
U.S. bank holding companies.
It is important for accounting standard setters and prudential regulators
to work together to share information and to try, whenever possible, to
develop common solutions to reporting issues arising in the financial
system, particularly in times of financial and economic stress. These
common solutions help minimize unnecessary differences between
financial reporting and regulatory reporting and the additional costs to
regulated institutions resulting from such differences. However, because
of the differences in the roles and missions of accounting standard setters and prudential regulators, it is also important that both be able to
conduct their work in an independent manner, without one being
subordinated to the other. In my opinion, the regulators should not be
handcuffed by accounting standards developed with a different
purpose in mind nor should the needs and perspectives of the regulators drive accounting standards because to do so could degrade the
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financial information available to investors and reduce public
confidence in the capital markets.
The importance of maintaining independently established accounting
standards was tested in fall 2009 as the House of Representatives
debated the financial services reform bill. Congressmen Perlmutter of
Colorado and Lucas of Oklahoma planned to introduce an amendment
that would have allowed the new Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) to effectively override and modify accounting standards and
reporting to investors and the capital markets to achieve bank regulatory and financial stability objectives. That possibility generated a
quick, strong, and broad-based response against such a measure from
the FAF trustees and others in the business, investor, and accounting
communities such that it was modified to allow the FSOC to comment
on financial accounting and reporting matters but not override or
modify the standards. In the end, I believe that episode served to
reinforce the importance of independent accounting standard setting.
Certainly, when push came to shove, I felt very good about the level of
support for that principle and for the need for sound financial reporting
and transparency as important public policy goals.

Measuring Financial Instruments—
Amortized Cost Versus Fair Value
I think that the fact that it got to this point also evidenced the continuing
controversy and debates over how to measure and report financial instruments. So, what are my thoughts on that important subject? First, let me
make it clear that I am neither a fair value zealot nor an ardent defender
of amortized cost accounting for most financial instruments. At times,
depending how I voted on a particular document, I was characterized in
some of the business press as caving to the banks and their arguments
against fair value; at other times, I was painted as a champion or strong
advocate of mark-to-market accounting for everything. Neither
characterization accurately captures my perspectives on what I view as a
complex subject. So, I will expound a bit further both on the arguments
for and against the use of amortized cost and fair value for financial
instruments and on my views.
As previously noted, the subject of measurement in accounting is a
complex one and one on which informed and reasonable people can and
do disagree. My own view is that there are pros and cons to both
amortized cost and fair value, depending on the facts and circumstances,
and that other measurement attributes may be appropriate in certain
circumstances. I think most people agree that fair value is the most
appropriate measure of financial assets that are being traded or held for
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sale in the relatively near term, for financial liabilities that are part of a
trading activity, and for derivatives. Where most of the disagreement
seems to focus is on financial assets and financial liabilities with fixed
principal amounts (that is, debt securities and loans) that are being held
for collection or payment of contractual cash flows. For example, banks
and other financial institutions originate loans and, in some cases, debt
instruments as part of their customer lending and financing activities and
will often hold these for collection of cash flows rather than selling or
securitizing them. Companies may invest part of their treasury activities
in fixed income instruments and hold them for collection of cash flows.
Similarly, most companies obtain loans and debt financing for their
operations, making interest and principal payments over the life of the
instruments and either cannot or do not intend to sell or otherwise
transfer such obligations to third parties.

Some Arguments for Using Amortized Cost
In such circumstances, supporters of amortized cost believe it produces
the most relevant and reliable reporting. They argue that showing a
financial asset at what it could be sold for today is not relevant when
the company does not intend to sell it and can result in unnecessary
and misleading volatility and “noise” in reported results and financial
position. For example, if a bank makes a 10-year $300,000 loan at, say, a
5 percent annual interest rate and expects to collect all the contractual
cash flows on the loan for its life, it should carry the loan on its balance
sheet at $300,000 despite any interim changes in the value of the loan
due to changes in market interest rates and other market factors. It will
report $15,000 of interest income each year and the loan at the $300,000
due at maturity. Only credit risk matters such that the carrying value of
the loan should be reduced only to the extent it becomes impaired and
is not expected to pay off in full.
Some also argue that, counter to the efficient market theory, markets are
far from always being rational such that basing values on current
market prices can lead to significant overstatement of underlying
economic values of assets in times of irrational exuberance and
significant understatement of the economic values of assets in times of
financial crisis. Therefore, they assert and are concerned that reporting
based on fair values can have significant procyclical effects that
accentuate market bubbles and market downturns. They view the
recognition of unrealized “paper” gains and losses as distorting
reported income, stockholders’ equity, and other key metrics, such as
leverage. They are also concerned that it can cause undesirable behavior
by financial institutions, including in times of market run-ups to the
payment of excess compensation to management and excess dividends
and stock buybacks. Ultimately, they fear it could potentially cause
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banks to curtail making long-term fixed-rate loans and mortgages in an
effort to avoid having to report volatile financial results arising from
having to fair value their financial assets. When active markets do not
exist for particular financial instruments, as was the case in the financial
crisis for certain debt securities and is the case for many loans, coming
up with fair values is highly subjective, difficult to audit, and costly,
often requiring the involvement of valuation specialists. They also note
the counterintuitive result of reporting gains on financial liabilities
measured at fair value of financially distressed companies, as was the
case with Lehman Brothers in the months leading up its demise.

Some Arguments for Using Fair Value
On the other hand, supporters of using fair value to measure and report
all financial instruments believe it produces the most relevant and useful
reporting because it provides for a more consistent and comparable
approach based on current market and economic conditions, not on past
costs and prices. They point to a number of academic studies that support this view. They also believe that the measurement of financial instruments should not depend on a company’s intent or business model.
Rather, they view fair value as the measure most consistent with the
objective of financial reporting to provide information that is useful to
predicting the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows.
Also, some believe that by showing the opportunity cost of not selling
financial assets, fair value measures are better at holding managements
accountable and, as a result, better accomplish the stewardship role of
financial reporting. Amortized cost measurements, they believe, do not
accomplish this because they are based on past transactions and do not
reflect changing circumstances and opportunities.
They also believe fair value measurements incorporate and, so, better
reflect the various risks that financial institutions face—credit risk,
interest rate risk, and liquidity risk—than do amortized cost measurements. Amortized cost measurements reflect only credit risk and then
only management’s view of credit risk, which history has proven often
lag and underestimate actual credit risks. In that regard, it is interesting
to note that in the recent financial crisis, as was the case two decades
earlier in the S&L crisis, many, if not most, of the hundreds of banks
that failed reported positive net worth and regulatory capital just prior
to their failure. That seemed due, in considerable measure, to the
apparent overstatement of their capital resulting from the use of
historical cost accounting methods and highly subjective, potentially
biased and inadequate loan loss reserves as determined by banks’
managements. The 1991 GAO report on the S&L crisis Failed Banks:
Accounting and Auditing Reforms Urgently Needed stated
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Accounting rules are flawed in that they allow bank management considerable latitude in determining carrying amounts for
problem loans and repossessed collateral. Recognizing decreases
from historical cost to market value has an adverse effect on a
bank’s reported financial condition. This gives bank management
an incentive to use the latitude in accounting rules to delay loss
recognition as long as possible.

Also, because fair value reflects the effect of all risks inherent in
financial instruments, some proponents of fair value believe that
broadening its use would promote better risk management practices by
financial institutions.

So, Who Is Right?
I could further elaborate on the arguments asserted on either side of
this debate, but who’s right? To some degree, I think they are both
right. There are pros and cons to both amortized cost accounting and
fair value measurements and reporting, many of which I believe were
in evidence during the financial crisis. I have been involved in the
accounting and auditing of financial instruments and financial reporting
by financial institutions most of my career and have seen a variety of
issues and problems depending on particular instruments and economic
and market conditions. During the financial crisis of 2007–09, it seemed
to me that amortized cost measures of financial assets with impairments based on management estimates generally lagged market prices
in reflecting the growing breadth and severity of the crisis. The otherthan-temporary threshold also resulted in delays in recognizing impairments of investments in debt and equity securities. However, once the
credit markets started to freeze, it also seemed to me that the fair
values based on exit prices of certain financial assets may have
overstated the extent of impairment. In any event, starting in 2008 and
continuing into 2009, a few things combined to make challenging the
valuation of many financial assets in terms of determining fair values
and the extent of impairments under amortized cost accounting: the
lack of ready price discovery for many asset-backed securities, the sheer
complexity of instruments such as investments in collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) and CDOs squared and derivatives tied to these
assets, and uncertainty about the magnitude of the contagion effects
and about the potential effects of government actions and policies
during the crisis.
The real questions for standard setters are, “What set(s) of information
will be most useful to investors in understanding the performance,
financial condition, and risks and opportunities of reporting enterprises
and can be provided by companies at a reasonable cost and effort? In a
crisis, should the required or allowable measurement approaches
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change, or are additional or special disclosures needed?” It is also
important to understand the inherent limitations of the information that
can be captured by any accounting model that deals with single-point,
point-in-time measurements and the limitations of the information that
can be reasonably provided in financial reports regarding the often
complex and dynamic nature of the risks faced by major financial
institutions, particularly during a financial crisis.32
During the crisis, both the FASB and the IASB made certain targeted
changes in the accounting standards relating to specific types of
financial instruments and added a variety of new disclosures requirements. In our November 2009 MoU update with the IASB,33 we agreed
on a number of principles to guide our broader work on accounting for
financial instruments. The fourth of those principles stated, “For
financial instruments with principal amounts that are held for collection
or payment of contractual cash flows rather than for sale of settlement
with a third party information about amortized cost and fair value is
relevant to investors.” That statement was agnostic and left open how
to present the information on amortized cost and fair value. It could be
done, consistent with current requirements, by using amortized cost in
the financial statements and disclosing fair values either parenthetically
on the face of the balance sheet or in the footnotes, or vice versa. It
could also be done by incorporating both amortized cost and fair value
measurements in the financial statements, which was the approach in
our May 2010 proposed ASU.34 It might be done by providing two sets
of financial statements: one on an amortized cost basis and another
using fair values, which is what some parties have recommended from
time to time. Each of these alternatives has pros and cons and
potentially different costs and benefits.

Another Alternative
Those who closely follow the deliberations of the FASB will know that I
actually favored using a present value of cash flows approach (that is,
projected cash flows discounted at current interest rates) to measure the
value of assets and liabilities with contractual principal amounts that
are being held for cash collection or payment, with the interest income
or expense on such instruments being reported in net income, but with
other changes in the present values of these instruments being reported
in other comprehensive income, not in net income or earnings. Under
32
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this approach, floating rate loans and debt securities and floating rate
liabilities would generally continue to be reported at their principal
amounts, but the carrying value of fixed rate loans and debt securities
being held for collection of cash flows and fixed rate borrowings would
change as market interest rates change. Those changes, however, would
not be included in reported earnings or earnings per share.
To me, at a conceptual level, both amortized cost and fair value,
although providing important information, miss the mark in terms of
measuring the value of financial assets and financial liabilities that are
being held for collection or payment of contractual cash flows.
In reporting the financial condition of an entity or as between entities,
amortized cost fails to properly distinguish between different instruments with different cash flows. For example, consider the following 4
high credit-quality loans that are being held for collection of contractual
cash flows: loan A with $100 principal due in 15 years and annual
interest of $4; loan B, a 30-year loan that was originated 21 years ago at
the then prevailing interest rate, with $100 principal due in 9 years and
8 percent annual interest; loan C with $100 principal due in 6 years and
5 percent annual interest; and loan D, a variable rate loan with $100
due in 3 years.
The total cash to be collected on each of these loans is quite different:
$160 for loan A, $172 for loan B, $130 for loan C, and say $112 for loan D
based on the current 3-year yield curve. The discounted present values of
each of these loans based on current rates is also quite different:
approximately $90 for loan A, $125 for loan B, $103 for loan C, and $100
for loan D. In amortized cost accounting, all 4 loans are measured and
reported at $100, the amount of the principal, even though the 4 loans are
very different in terms of interest rates, total cash flows, present values,
term, and duration because under amortized cost accounting for these
loans, contractual cash flows are discounted at the contractual interest
rates of each loan (that is, for loan A, the cash flows are discounted at 4
percent; for loan B, they are discounted at 8 percent; and so on). Now, it
is also important to note that whether one uses amortized cost or fair
value or discounted cash flows to measure the loans, the 2 financial statements that are intended to present period flows, namely the income
statement and statement of cash flows, will properly reflect the actual
interest income and cash income received on each loan (that is, $4 for
loan A, $8 for loan B, and so on). That’s good and properly reflects the
differences in interest income and cash flows for each of the loans, but
the balance sheet, which is supposed to be a statement of financial condition, does not reflect the fact that each of these loans is very different. It
shows them all at $100. To critics of amortized cost, this seems to violate
basic principles of finance and economics.
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To the supporters of fair value, the preceding suggests that fair value is
the remedy for this problem. In my view, fair value, which represents
the amounts each of the loans could be sold for today, can sometimes
overcorrect for the problems inherent in amortized cost measurements.
To illustrate this, consider the following example that contrasts a
15-year high credit-quality marketable debt security with principal of
$100 and annual interest of $4 with the preceding loan A. The timing
and amounts of contractual cash flows on both instruments are the
same and both are high credit quality, but the fair value of the debt
security is likely to be a bit higher than the fair value of the loan,
reflecting the fact that the debt security is marketable and can be easily
sold in the market, whereas the loan is illiquid and cannot be easily
sold. The fair value of the debt security may also be affected by other
factors and forces in the market. The key question is whether those differences should matter in valuing the 2 instruments if both are being
held for collection of contractual cash flows. At a conceptual level, I
think not because the amounts and timing of cash flows that will be
derived from holding both instruments is expected to be the same.
When we also consider the liabilities that fund interest rate-bearing
assets held for collection of contractual cash flows, further useful
information can be derived from using discounted cash flows versus
amortized costs. For example, consider the following 2 hypothetical
cases involving the funding of the preceding loan A. First, assume loan
A is funded with a fixed-rate borrowing with principal of $100 due in
15 years and requiring annual interest payments of 3 percent. In other
words, the bank has “matched funded” loan A with a borrowing of the
same amount and with the same maturity, effectively locking in a
spread of 1 percent per annum for the next 15 years. Each year for the
next 15 years, the bank will report $4 of interest income, $3 of interest
expense, and net interest income (NII) of $1 under both the discounted
cash flow approach and amortized cost. However, the discounted cash
flow approach to valuing both loan A and the borrowing will also
reveal the value (that is, the present value) of the locked-in spread,
whereas using amortized cost does not capture this. Now, let’s assume
that loan A is funded with a 3-year certificate of deposit bearing 2
percent annual interest. The bank’s current NII is now 2 percent, but
that NII is only locked in for the next 3 years. After that, the bank will
need to find new funding for the remaining 12 years it will be holding
loan A (that is, the bank has a duration mismatch between its asset and
the liability funding that asset). It is therefore exposed to interest rate
risk, and if interest rates have risen 3 years from now, it will report a
lower and potentially negative NII going forward. With amortized cost
accounting, the balance sheet of the bank looks the same in both cases,
with loan A and the funding relating to loan A both shown at $100.
However, using discounted cash flows to measure loan A and the
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funding reflects the differences in the present values of the future cash
flows between the 2 situations and can help reveal the difference in the
sustainability of the current NII and the differences in the exposures to
interest rate risk between the 2 situations.
The preceding examples are very simple ones, and in the real world,
financial institutions may have a myriad of loans and debt securities
they are holding for cash collection and that are funded in various
ways. I think that real-world complication makes the arguments even
more compelling for measuring the value of such financial assets and
liabilities using a common yardstick of discounted cash flows. In my
opinion, discounted cash flows provide a common yardstick without
introducing some of the conceptual issues and practical challenges
associated with developing fair value exit prices for illiquid instruments
that are not being traded or held for sale.
Supporters of fair value note that its use would also help reveal duration mismatches and exposures to interest rate risk. Moreover, they
believe that fair value provides a better a common yardstick for
measuring financial instruments because it captures all the attributes of
a financial instrument, including its liquidity and the impact of other
current market factors on its value. They also believe that in valuing a
financial instrument, it should not matter what a company plans to do
with it or what its business model is, noting these can and sometimes
do change (for example, in response to liquidity needs or changes in
market conditions). They are concerned that allowing the use of
anything short of fair value or mark-to-market for financial assets can
result in “mark-to-make-believe accounting.” (Although it seems that
even a requirement to carry particular financial assets at fair value does
not always result in such accounting, as suggested in the August 4,
2011, letter from Chairman of the IASB Hans Hoogervorst to the
European Securities and Markets Authority about the apparent
accounting, counter to the requirements of the IFRS, by certain major
European financial institutions for holdings of distressed sovereign
debt, including Greek government bonds, classified as available for sale
at values in excess of prevailing market prices.)
In any event, the potential use of discounted cash flows to measure the
current value of financial assets and liabilities an entity intends to hold
for collection of cash flows is discussed in paragraphs BC61–BC68 of
the 2010 proposed ASU on accounting for financial instruments.35 For
the reasons stated in paragraphs BC66–BC67 and based on feedback
from a majority of constituents that current value was not sufficiently
defined, the Board decided not to pursue trying to further develop that
approach:
35

Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to the Accounting for Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities—Financial Instruments (Topic 825) and Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815).
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BC66. The Board obtained feedback from users, preparers, auditors, and others about the potential operationality and usefulness
of a current value measurement method. Although there was
some support for current value, a majority of the input received
was that current value was not sufficiently defined, resulting in
wide-spread confusion about what it was meant to represent.
Overall, there was little support for its use as an alternative to
either fair value or amortized cost.
BC67. The Board believes that to implement current value
measurement, it would need to develop a robust definition for
consistent application, similar to the exercise undertaken in
defining fair value in Topic 820. The Board decided not to
undertake a project to further define current value because of the
perceived limited usefulness of current value as an alternate to
fair value or amortized cost. Therefore, the Board decided that it
would consider only amortized cost as a potential alternative to
fair value measurement for financial instruments.

In other words, I was unable to persuade my fellow Board members of
the merits of doing so, although, as previously noted, there was some
support among constituents for that kind of approach. As I quipped in
public Board meetings when this subject was discussed, “I don’t seem
to be selling many tickets for this approach.” So, reflecting on that
input and the very extensive feedback received on the proposed ASU,36
the FASB has continued to focus on fair value and amortized cost as the
principal measurement approaches in accounting for financial instruments, trying to delineate the circumstances under which different
accounting methods should apply.
And, as discussed in chapter 4 on international convergence, the FASB
and the IASB have been working together to develop a common
approach for classifying and measuring financial instruments that
incorporates both amortized cost and fair value measurements
depending on the type of financial instrument and company business
models. They have also been working together and separately, with the
help of experts, to develop better approaches to accounting for credit
impairments of loans and debt securities than the incurred loss model
under which such impairments are not recorded until they become
probable. Pointing to the financial crisis, critics of the incurred loss
approach maintain it had procyclical effects by inappropriately forcing
banks and other financial institutions to delay recognizing expected
credit losses and to not being able to build a proper level of reserves in
the “good years” as a buffer against the losses they suffered when the
crisis occurred. Thus, the boards have been exploring various potential
approaches to accounting for impairments of loans and debt securities
that would result in earlier recognition of expected credit losses. The
36
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FASB is also working on improved disclosures about interest rate risks
and liquidity risks.

Continuing Conceptual Challenges
Although all this work is very important and will, I hope, ultimately
result in improved and converged standards on accounting for financial
instruments, I believe continuing fundamental conceptual issues need
to be addressed, particularly in regard to measurement. As noted, the
subject of measurement in accounting is a challenging and complex
one, so it is not surprising that informed and reasonable people can and
do differ. That is another important lesson learned or perhaps
relearned. Accounting and financial reporting are not exact sciences.
They are human constructs that attempt to capture and report the
financial effects of transactions and events on reporting entities, as best
we can based on concepts and cost-benefit considerations and with
available tools and technology. Because informed and reasonable people
can differ in their views on particular accounting and reporting matters,
having a conceptual framework to guide the decisions of the accounting
standard setter is important. Otherwise, accounting standards may be
prone to become a collection of ad hoc and inconsistent results based
on the personal conceptual frameworks of the various members of the
standard-setting body. That may confuse constituents and can
undermine the credibility of the standard-setting process and resulting
standards. As stated in the preamble to FASB Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 1,37 issued in 1978,
This is the first in a series of Statements of Financial Accounting
Concepts. The purpose of the series is to set forth fundamentals
on which financial accounting and reporting standards will be
based. More specifically, Statements of Financial Accounting
Concepts are intended to establish the objectives and concepts
that the Financial Accounting Standards Board will use in
developing standards of financial accounting and reporting....
However, knowledge of the objectives and concepts the Board
uses should enable all who are affected by or interested in
financial accounting standards to better understand the content
and limitations of information provided by financial accounting
and reporting.... That knowledge, if used with care, may also
provide guidance in resolving new or emerging problems of
financial accounting and reporting in the absence of applicable
authoritative pronouncements.

The bulk of the existing FASB Conceptual Framework was developed in
the 1970s and 1980s. Although the guidance contained in those concepts
statements has been helpful, experience has also shown that many
37
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cross-cutting issues continue to arise in developing standards for which
the existing Conceptual Framework does not provide clear guidance.
These cross-cutting and recurring issues often involve the subject of
measurement (that is, what measurement attribute to use in a particular
circumstance) because this was an area that was not fully developed in
the existing Conceptual Framework. Certainly, measurement has been a
central, challenging, and controversial aspect in the many years (indeed
decades) of deliberation by the FASB, IASB, and other standard setters
on accounting for financial instruments.
As noted in chapter 4, in 2004, the FASB and IASB agreed to jointly
undertake a project to improve and converge their respective
conceptual frameworks. Measurement constitutes one of the phases of
the joint conceptual framework project. Unfortunately, as discussed in
chapter 4, it is still very much a work in progress; thus, the boards have
been addressing the complex subject of accounting for financial instruments and the measurement issues that are central to that subject
without the benefit of a developed conceptual framework on measurement to guide their decisions.
If I had only one do-over as FASB Chairman, it would be to try to get
the improved conceptual framework completed or at least to have
made more progress on the project. As I will again touch on in chapter
7, “Looking Back and Moving Forward,” wrestling these conceptual
issues to the ground represents a real opportunity to further improve
what I believe is already, overall, a very good process for establishing
accounting standards and, over time, to enhance the conceptual
consistency and logical coherence across the body of accounting
standards. That is one of the more important insights I believe I gained,
not only in terms of the financial crisis and accounting standards but
from my years as a standard setter.
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Does It Need to Be So Complex?
Our reporting system, while probably the best in the world, is
too complex and is capable of providing more transparent, more
understandable, and more useful information to investors and
the capital markets.1

I think few people involved in financial reporting would disagree that
U.S. GAAP and SEC reporting and disclosure requirements are complex
and that, overall, we have a relatively complex financial reporting
system with lots of detailed standards, rules, and regulations. Although
opinions differ about the reasons, sources, and causes of this complexity
and what can and should be done about it, there seems to be general
agreement that the system is complex. That said, many in this country
also believe we have the best financial reporting system in the world, a
system that provides for more reliable, consistent, and comparable
financial reporting than any other in the world. Some in the United
States seem to have a view of financial reporting in other countries as
lacking sufficient rigor, comparability, and transparency.
This is in contrast with what I have sensed in my international travels.
Many overseas see the U.S. reporting system as overly and unnecessarily complex and as reflecting the forces of greed and litigiousness
they believe pervade American society, business, and regulation. For
example, I have found that to be a quite common view among many
accountants, accounting standard setters, financial executives, regulators, and others in the United Kingdom, where I started my career and
have spent a fair amount of time over the years. Indeed, many times, I
1

Robert H. Herz in a speech on December 6, 2005, at the 2005 AICPA National Conference on
Current SEC and PCAOB Developments.
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have been with fellow Chartered Accountants in England, listening to
them espouse the virtues of principles over rules and decry what they
view as the mad world of quarterly reporting that creates a culture of
short-termism. They also perceive that the U.S. has an overly lawyerdriven approach to regulation and enforcement that, in their view,
inevitably results in a rules-based system of accounting and auditing
and “box ticking” that they lament has also begun to overtake their
beloved system of professional judgment, substance-over-form financial
reporting, and true and fair views. They believe the U.S. approach has
undermined professionalism in financial reporting, has produced
accountants who are “rule seekers and template hunters,” and
inevitably fosters the use of structuring to achieve form-over-substance
accounting outcomes.
As stated by Jeremy Hand, Chairman of the British Private Equity &
Venture Capital Association, “It is hard to get useful business information from a set of U.S. GAAP financial statements. In the U.K., the situation is better, but is deteriorating. We support principles based
standards, involving the application of judgments and common sense.”2
From time to time, a similar chorus of laments is heard on our own
shores by those longing for a return to a time when accounting was
simpler, financial statements and SEC filings were shorter and seemed
less complicated, and professional judgment in financial reporting
prevailed. I have some sympathy and empathy with these views
because, perhaps as a result of my training and experience in the
United Kingdom in what now seems like a simpler time, I too
sometimes yearn for a return to those days of accounting and reporting
(and when I had more hair on the top of my head).
For better or worse, the world of business and finance has clearly
moved on and very significantly changed over the past four decades. It
is more dynamic and complex than it was in those days, so it is
understandable that accounting and reporting, in an attempt to
properly reflect and keep pace with these changes, would also become
more complex. But in the process, have the accounting standards and
reporting requirements become unnecessarily complex and led to a
system that has become overly rules based?

The Reporting Scandals and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Enron, WorldCom, and other financial reporting scandals that came to
light in 2001 and 2002 shook our collective confidence in the U.S.
2
Quoted in Getting to the Heart of the Issue: Can Financial Reporting Be Made Simpler and More
Useful?
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financial reporting system. In addition to concerns about the integrity of
corporate managements and the effectiveness of audits of public
companies, some people raised questions about whether U.S.
accounting standards had become too rules based, full of very detailed
implementation guidance on every conceivable situation and arbitrary
criteria and bright lines, which enabled some companies to circumvent
the intent of a standard through structured transactions that achieved
form-over-substance accounting results. In my opinion, these were very
legitimate questions because I had participated in this sort of activity in
my “Bad Bob” days working in Corporate Finance Advisory Services. I
had also continued to address such situations in my role as a
“gamekeeper” in the national office of Coopers & Lybrand (C&L) and
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). All of this had given me an appreciation of the double-edged sword that results from lengthy and detailed
standards. On the one hand, these detailed standards often provide a
ready answer to accounting issues faced by companies looking to
ensure that they are complying with the requirements. This can enhance
reliability, consistency, and comparability of financial statements. On the
other hand, they provide an opportunity, some would say an invitation,
for those desiring a particular reporting outcome to structure
accounting treatments around specific rules and bright lines, which
undermines the relevance, reliability, consistency, and comparability of
reported financial information. Further, as discussed in chapter 2,
“Charting Course,” I had formed strong views about the overall
unwieldiness of the U.S. accounting literature.
So, it was not surprising to me that, among its many other provisions,
Sarbanes-Oxley required the SEC to conduct a study and report back to
Congress on the potential merits and feasibility of adopting a
principles-based accounting system in the United States. For our part,
soon after I joined the FASB, we got to work on responding to the
concerns about the quality and transparency of financial reporting
resulting from the increasing level of detail and perceived complexity of
accounting standards. In October 2002, we issued a proposal3 for public
input. That proposal discussed potential elements of more principlesbased accounting standards, including having few, if any, exceptions
and less interpretive and implementation guidance. It also discussed
some of the possible costs, benefits, and challenges of moving to more
principles-based standards. We held a public roundtable on the
proposal in December 2002, and based on the input received in the
roundtable and through comment letters, we decided to pursue a
number of initiatives aimed at improving the quality of FASB
standards, as well as elements of the standard-setting process. Although
there was general support for our proposal, many commentators also
pointed to the need for additional actions, including moving toward
3

Principles-based Approach to U.S. Standard Setting.
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greater centralization of U.S. accounting standard setting through FASB,
and providing a sounder foundation for a principles-based approach in
the United States by improving the Conceptual Framework and
coordinating the work of the FASB, SEC, and PCAOB.
In July 2003, the SEC staff submitted to Congress its study4 on the
adoption of a principles-based accounting system in the United States.
The core recommendation of the study was that accounting standards
should be neither principles-only nor entirely rules-based. Rather, they
should be objectives oriented by more clearly articulating the
accounting objectives of the standard and avoiding exceptions and
bright lines while also providing sufficient detail and structure, so the
standard can be operationalized and applied on a consistent basis:
In our minds, an optimal standard involves a concise statement
of substantive accounting principle where the accounting objective has been included at an appropriate level of specificity as an
integral part of the standard and where few, if any, exceptions or
conceptual inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further,
such a standard should provide an appropriate amount of
implementation guidance given the nature of the class of transactions or events and should be devoid of bright-line tests. Finally,
such a standard should be consistent with, and derive from, a
coherent conceptual framework of financial reporting.

The recommendations in the SEC study were generally consistent with
the Board’s proposal on principles-based standards and the initiatives
we had decided to undertake. They were “mid-Atlantic” to my way of
thinking, somewhere between the U.K. approach of high-level
principles and relatively little official detailed guidance and the U.S.
approach of supplementing the principles in a standard with reams of
interpretive and implementation guidance.

Conceptual Controversy and
Complexity
I think it is interesting and noteworthy that the SEC report to Congress
on a principles-based accounting system addressed head-on one of the
most fundamental and controversial issues about accounting and
financial reporting: the debate about whether accounting should be
based on an asset and liability view or a revenue and expense view.
This is an age-old debate that I believe is at the center of many of the
controversies and misunderstandings that divide constituents in the
financial reporting system. This debate continues to challenge the
development of a coherent and internally consistent set of accounting
4

Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United
States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System.
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and reporting standards. So, I think it is worth taking a bit of a detour
here to explain further for those who may not be steeped in accounting
theory. The following explanation will not do full justice to what is a
deep-seated controversy and somewhat complex subject.

Asset and Liability View
Under the asset and liability view, income is a measure of the increase
in net resources of an enterprise during a period, defined primarily in
terms of increases in assets and decreases in liabilities. This view is
grounded in the economic theory of wealth and income under which
income is a measure of the change in wealth during a period. Therefore,
the accounting implementation of this approach starts with determining
and measuring the assets and liabilities of an enterprise and the
changes in the assets and liabilities during a period in order to
determine the income for that period.
Critics of the asset and liability view argue that it places undue weight
on determining current measurements of assets and liabilities, which
can often be difficult and subjective; that it results in reported income
that can be highly volatile due to changes in macroeconomic and
market conditions; and that it makes the income statement less useful
in understanding an enterprise’s actual earnings during a reporting
period and over time.

Revenue and Expense View
In contrast, under the revenue and expense view, income is the difference between outputs from and inputs to an enterprise’s earning activities during a period. Therefore, the accounting implementation of this
approach starts with determining the amounts of outputs (revenues)
and inputs (expenses) during a period in order to determine the income
for that period. That often requires allocations of inflows and
expenditures over a number of accounting periods in order to produce
a “matching” of reported revenues and expenses over time (for
example, the cost of a machine that is used in manufacturing a
company’s product is allocated over the useful life of the machine,
resulting in a series of annual deprecation charges over those years).
Critics of such “matching” and of the revenue and expense view argue
that these allocations are often, by necessity, arbitrary and not grounded
in the underlying economics; that it results in inappropriate measures
of certain assets and liabilities that are the result of these interperiod
allocations and that render the balance sheet less useful in portraying
the current financial position of the reporting enterprise; and that it
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adds to the overall complexity of accounting procedures and impedes
an understanding of financial reports.
Although much of accounting practice until the 1970s was based on the
revenue and expense view, since then, the FASB, IASB, and other
national accounting standard setters have generally adopted the asset
and liability view in their conceptual frameworks, viewing it as the
conceptually correct and best way to develop standards that are
coherent and internally consistent. Reed K. Storey, a senior staff
member of the FASB who worked heavily on the development of the
FASB’s Conceptual Framework, and Sylvia Storey summarized how to
apply the asset and liability view (see figure 6-1, “Framework of
Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards”). However, many
stakeholders in the reporting system, particularly preparers of financial
statements do not agree, arguing that the revenue and expense view is
the more conceptually appropriate and practically viable approach.
Some are also concerned that the asset and liability view portends the
expansion of fair value measurements in financial statements, which,
for a variety of reasons, they oppose.
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Figure 6-1: Framework of Financial
Accounting Concepts and Standards*
The result of applying the asset and liability view is an internally
consistent, well-defined system of elements in Concepts Statement 6
that make it clear that in accounting for a transaction or other event,
these are the right questions to ask, and this is the right order in which
to ask them:
What is the asset?
What is the liability?
Did an asset or liability change, or did its value change?
Increase or decrease?
By how much?
Did the change result from:
An investment by owners?
A distribution to owners?
If not, the change must be comprehensive income
Was the source of comprehensive income what we call:
Revenue?
Expense?
Gain?
Loss?

To start at the bottom and work up the list will not work.
*

Reed K. Storey and Sylvia Storey, The framework of financial accounting concepts and
standards. Norwalk, Conn.: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1998. p. 87.

For good or bad, although accounting standard setters have attempted
over time to bring standards more in line with the asset and liability
view, that has by no means been a consistent effort. As a result, I believe
the current set of accounting standards, whether they be U.S. GAAP or
IFRS, reflect a hodgepodge of the two conceptual approaches and views
of the balance sheet and income determination, which, in my opinion,
makes financial statements less understandable and complicates financial
analysis. This mix of the two approaches can be found, for example, in
the U.S. GAAP standards relating to accounting for pensions and other
postretirement costs and obligations and in the various FASB and IASB
standards on accounting for financial instruments.
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In any event, the SEC study5 came down squarely in favor of the asset
and liability view, stating,
the revenue/expense view is inappropriate for use in standard
setting—particularly in an objectives-oriented regime. [H]istorical
experience suggests the asset/liability approach most
appropriately anchors the standard setting process by providing
the strongest conceptual mapping to underlying reality.... FASB
should maintain the asset/liability view in continuing its move
to an objectives-oriented standard setting regime.

That study has not, in my opinion, ended the controversy.

My Opinion
What do I think? Well, at university in England, I was instructed in
economic concepts and theory before I started learning accounting. So, I
was very familiar with the economic theories of wealth and income
before I was taught debits and credits, management accounting,
budgeting, and so on. No doubt, that has influenced my thinking on
this matter, so I am more in the asset and liability camp, believing it is
important to start first with the determination and measurement of
assets and liabilities.
However, I do not think the two views are irreconcilable, just that the
translation of economic theory into accounting concepts and practice
may have become a bit confused and muddled. Observers of FASB
Board meetings will have heard me, on many occasions, talk about the
need in accounting to more clearly define and separate the two
components of economic income: namely, the “flows” for a period and
the changes in the “stocks” during that period. Under the economic
concepts of wealth and income, income (being the change in wealth for
a period, excluding contributions of additional capital and withdrawals
of capital by owners during the period) consists of two components: the
flows to the enterprise (both positive and negative) during the period
and the changes in the stocks (that is, assets less liabilities) for the
period. Although I believe the distinction between these two
components of economic income is somewhat akin to the distinction
between earnings and other elements of comprehensive income (other
comprehensive income), as described in the FASB Conceptual
Framework, I do not find the existing, rather lengthy, explanation in the
Conceptual Framework particularly crisp or conceptually robust.
Existing accounting standards, both U.S. GAAP and IFRS, have not
implemented the distinction in a consistent fashion, and there does not
seem to be a clear concept on what is included in earnings or net
income versus what is included in other comprehensive income.
5

Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United
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An Example
So, let me use an example (albeit a simple one relating to personal
finances, not a large, complex business enterprise) to illustrate the
concepts of wealth, income, stocks, and flows. Let’s suppose, as people
are sometimes asked to do by a prospective lender, to prepare a set of
personal financial statements. You would prepare a balance sheet
showing your net worth. It would show your assets (for example, your
home, your investments, and cash in banks) and your liabilities (for
example, the mortgage on your home and some outstanding credit card
balances). The assets would presumably be shown at their current fair
market value and the liabilities at the balances outstanding. The total of
your assets less your liabilities is your net worth. Your balance sheet, in
an economist’s terms, shows your “stocks” of assets and liabilities, and
your net worth is your “wealth.”
You may also be asked to report your annual sources and amounts of
income and expenditures (to an economist, your annual “flows”). Those
would include what you earn from your job in terms of compensation,
the dividends and interest you receive on your investments and any
interest on your cash in banks, less taxes, interest payments on your
mortgage, and living expenses. Say the value of your investments
increased since last year, and your equity in your home (that is, the
value of the house less the amount owed on the mortgage) also
increased. Those changes in the value of your “stocks” increase your
wealth, or net worth, and to an economist, they are another element of
your income for the period.
I think we would all agree that the two types of income—your “flows”
and the changes in your “stocks”—are quite different in character,
somewhat akin to the tax concepts of ordinary income and capital gains
(though, for tax purposes, capital gains are generally recognized only
when realized). Yet the combination of your “flows” for the year and
the change in the value of your “stocks,” including unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the value of the equity in your home and in the
value of your investments, add up to the change in your net worth
from one year to the next and are needed to reconcile that change.

Back to Concepts
One more important conceptual point: valuation theory says that the
value of an asset at any point in time is based on the discounted
present value of the estimated future cash flows from that asset. Those
cash flows might be realized over time from holding the asset or selling
or otherwise monetizing it. The main point is that the value
encompasses the estimated future “flows,” but the “flows” for a period
are the ones that actually occurred during that period. Determining and
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measuring the “flows” that occur during a period can be done in a
number ways, including on a cash basis or an accrual basis that adjusts
cash flows for amounts payable and receivable at the end of a period.
Thus, for example, if your salary is $10,000 per month, and during the
year ended December 31, you have received payments from your
employer totaling $110,000 (11 months x $10,000) but had not received
your $10,000 for the month of December, your salary “flows” for the
year would be $110,000 on a cash basis but $120,000 on an accrual basis.
That’s easy to understand.
However, accounting for many business transactions involves various
allocation approaches that have been developed to determine what part
of a receipt or expenditure relates to the current period from what part
relates to future periods. Proponents of the asset and liability view
argue that these approaches inevitably involve arbitrary rules that result
in a distortion of both the reported earnings for a period and the
amounts reported as assets and liabilities on a balance sheet. For
example, they would argue that in changing economic, business, and
market conditions, depreciation of a fixed asset based on its historical
cost inevitably results in misstating both the economic expense of using
an asset for a year and the amount shown on the balance sheet for that
asset because it is based on the cost of the asset, not the value of the
future flows to be derived from the asset. Proponents of the revenue
and expense view would counter that the depreciation represents an
appropriate allocation of the cost of the asset that is needed to achieve
proper matching with the revenues generated from using the asset each
year and that the balance sheet at any date correctly shows the
remaining amount of unallocated (that is, undepreciated) cost relating
to future periods.

Theory and Practice
Perhaps because of my training in economics, to me, the key conceptual
questions in developing accounting standards revolve around the
determination and measurement of assets and liabilities (the “stocks”)
and resulting net worth (wealth) and defining, determining, and more
clearly separating the changes in net worth, or wealth, that relate to the
“flows” for the period from those that relate to changes in “stocks” for
the period. Conceptually, these questions and the order in which you ask
them are simple, and if it were possible to accurately and easily answer
each of them, accounting and financial reporting could be much simpler.
Alas, in practice, especially when applied to complex business
enterprises and complicated transactions and arrangements, reality is
often not that simple. I believe that standard setters (including yours
truly) have, for reasons that always seem important and valid at the
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time, developed standards that reflect a myriad of approaches to
recognizing and measuring assets and liabilities. Those reasons have
involved considerations around operationally, auditability, and overall
cost-benefit of alternatives, resulting in what some may regard as
departures from the conceptually correct approach and in the inclusion
in standards of exceptions, options, and bright lines. Over time,
accounting standard setters have also developed various approaches to
defining, measuring, and presenting “flows” and changes in “stocks.”
To me, these approaches sometimes seem to mix or conflate flows for
the current period with changes in the values of stocks that relate to
estimated flows in future periods. For example, loan loss allowances
and certain impairment charges are based on estimations of cash flows
in future periods but are reflected in the earnings for the current
reporting period. Therefore, the resulting financial statements represent
an “intertemporal hodgepodge of approaches” to defining, measuring,
and reporting assets and liabilities on balance sheets and on what goes
into reported net income, or “earnings.”
By more clearly defining “flows” and separately displaying them from
the changes in “stocks,” I think it may be possible to better capture and
report both current performance and estimates of future “flows” in the
financial statements. I believe the FASB-IASB project to improve the
Conceptual Framework and the project on financial statement presentation provide opportunities, but by no means a panacea, to address these
fundamental issues and to begin to try to reconcile the asset and liability
view and the revenue and expense view. As suggested in the SEC study,6
more consistently applying the asset and liability approach as a starting
point would seem to be an important element in moving to a more
principles-based or objectives-oriented accounting system and to more
understandable financial statements. However, as previously mentioned,
other priorities have delayed progress on these important projects.
I offer all this knowing full well that, for many decades, there have
been and continue to be different views and no shortage of suggestions
on what should be the conceptual underpinnings of accounting and
financial reporting.

Suggestions on an Overhaul of the
Accounting Framework
Indeed, some contend that an overhaul of the whole accounting model
and approach to accounting standard setting are needed, both to reduce

6

Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United
States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System.
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complexity and to improve the relevance, reliability, and overall usefulness of reported financial information, but there are differences in
opinions on what would be needed to accomplish that.
On one hand and as touched on in chapter 5, “The Financial Crisis,”
some believe that the increasing use of fair value measurements is
eroding the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. Those
who believe this advocate historical cost accounting, the revenue and
expense view and the “matching” principle, and conservatism as the
proper foundations of accounting theory and practice, particularly for
nonfinancial assets and liabilities and enterprises that produce and sell
goods and services. For example, in the article “Accounting at a
Crossroad” in the December 2005 issue of The CPA Journal, Eugene H.
Flegm, former general auditor for General Motors Corp., discusses what
he views as the perils to the reliability and credibility of financial
reporting and the accounting profession resulting from the increasing
use of fair value measurements. Flegm advocates that the SEC should
“reaffirm the use of historic cost as the measurement base” and
concludes that if “we continue the march to fair value, the result will be
major frauds and probably the end of an independent public
accounting profession.” As discussed later in this chapter, the AICPA is
developing a new financial reporting framework for use by small and
medium-sized private companies that emphasizes the use of historical
cost accounting and the matching principle.
On the other hand, others strongly favor a much broader, across-theboard move to fair value accounting. For example, the July 2007
publication A Comprehensive Business Reporting Model: Financial Reporting
for Investors from the CFA Institute advocates a movement to
comprehensive fair value accounting, stating,
If asset exchanges and financial decisions are based on fair
values, then market efficiency would be enhanced if the information upon which such decisions are made is reported at fair
value. The implication is that items in the balance sheet should
be reported at current fair value. Furthermore, changes in these
values should be reported in the income statement as they
occur.... Currently, financial statements include some items
reported at historical cost while others are measured at fair
value, the so-called mixed-attribute system. Consequently, investors who rely on fair values for decision making must expend
considerable effort trying to restate to fair value those decisionrelevant financial statement items that are measured at historical
cost.... Most, if not all, of this effort would be eliminated if the
financial reporting standards were to require that companies
record assets and liabilities at fair value at inception with
periodic revaluation.
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Similarly, David Mosso, who has had a long and distinguished career
as an accounting standard setter as a member and Vice Chairman of the
FASB and Chairman of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory
Board, has strongly argued that there is an urgent need for a paradigm
shift in accounting and financial reporting to what he terms a wealth
measurement model. In his 2009 book Early Warning and Quick Response:
Accounting in the Twenty-first Century, Mosso strongly criticizes the current accounting model as broken and beyond repair and incapable of
properly presenting an entity’s true financial condition and health. He
proposes that the objective of accounting should be to measure and
present an entity’s wealth and changes in that wealth (income) by
measuring all recognized assets and liabilities at fair value. In this way,
he believes balance sheets would show the real economic worth and
financial health of entities, and income statements would portray the
true change in their financial condition from period to period. Mosso
contends that such a change would set the stage for a new accounting
standard-setting model and process, one based on a set of core
principles that would pave the way for much more coherent, less
complex, and more relevant accounting standards and financial
reporting and that would provide an early warning signal of looming
financial crises. In Mosso’s view, this would better enable regulators,
standard setters, and policy makers to spot developing threats to the
health of the financial system on a timely basis and to respond to them
more quickly.
In my opinion, addressing and trying to better resolve these and other
fundamental conceptual issues surrounding accounting theory and
practice is a necessary and an important first step in getting to a less
complex, more useful, coherent, understandable, and more principlesbased accounting and reporting system. Additional key conceptual
issues include whether and how to distinguish between instruments
that should be accounted for as liabilities from those that should be
treated as equity, when to recognize and derecognize assets and
liabilities, whether and how to incorporate the effects of uncertainty
into accounting and financial reporting, and various other matters
related to recognition and measurement of items in financial statements.
That is why I believed it very important for the FASB and IASB to
revisit and try to improve, complete, and converge our conceptual
frameworks and why, as I note a number of times in this book, I was
disappointed that we did not make further progress toward that goal
during my years in accounting standard setting.
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Can We Handle a More PrinciplesBased System?
Even if standard setters were inclined and able to resolve these issues
and agree on a clear and complete conceptual model for accounting and
financial reporting and to consistently apply it in developing
accounting standards, other thorny issues would need to be addressed
and resolved in adopting a principles-based accounting system in the
United States because accounting standards are part of the financial
reporting supply chain. The ultimate product of that supply chain,
reported financial information, is the result not only of the accounting
standards but also of how they are implemented and how the resulting
information is audited, regulated, and enforced, as well as the corporate
governance and legal frameworks around the system. Writing standards
that are more “principles-based” or “objectives-oriented” does not
ensure that the result will be improved, conceptually consistent, and
principles-based financial reporting. That may not be the result if, for
example, the principles are not implemented faithfully by companies, or
if auditors, in fear of being second guessed, do not accept reasonable
judgments made by companies on reporting matters and create and
impose their own set of accounting rules on the companies, or if regulators create and impose additional rules to facilitate their enforcement of
standards. It would take all key parties in the financial reporting
system, working together, to truly achieve the potential benefits of a
more conceptually coherent, principles-based accounting system.
That necessary harmony was a key theme I emphasized in many of my
speeches and presentations as FASB Chairman. For example, in
December 2003, at the annual AICPA Conference on Current SEC and
PCAOB Reporting Developments, I stated,
The changes under Sarbanes-Oxley and the related reforms have,
in my view, put in place the right kinds of structural and
procedural mechanisms, incentives and penalties that are necessary for us to be able to begin moving forward toward the
promised land of a better reporting system.... But as necessary as
these reforms have been, they will not in and of and by
themselves, be sufficient, in my view, to ensure that as we
embark on this journey we are truly moving in the right direction. Because there are many players in the system—standard
setters, preparers, auditors, Boards and audit committees, regulators and enforcers, legislators, investors, analysts and other
stakeholders and consumers of corporate information—it is not
only necessary that we each attend to our particular role in the
system, but equally important that we have a common
understanding of the role of others and of our collective
responsibilities so that we can move the system forward in an
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orderly and constructive way.... In short, it will take a sense of
partnership and a shared commitment to the importance of
quality financial reporting to the system.

However, it also seemed clear to me that other aspects of the system
were not changing. Indeed, I sensed that the development of a more
principled-based approach was being hindered by the behavior of some
participants in the reporting supply chain in reaction to the legal,
regulatory, and environmental factors that came in the wake of the
reporting scandals. For example, the swift and cataclysmic demise of
Arthur Andersen and the creation of a new organization, the PCAOB,
to regulate and oversee the auditors of public companies surely had an
effect on the operating, risk management, and quality control processes
of the major accounting firms and on the psyches and behaviors of
individual audit partners and partners in the national offices of the
accounting firms. Don’t get me wrong. I am not criticizing those
changes. They were clearly needed, but they also have, in my view,
very understandably, engendered some behaviors that may not be
consistent with moving to a more principles-based system.
So, in my speech at the December 2004 AICPA SEC Conference, I set
forth what I viewed as some key challenges and cross-currents facing
the financial reporting system. In one of these, under the heading “Give
me principles, but make sure there’s no doubt how to apply them (and
make sure they don’t change what I’m currently doing),” I explained,
This is the issue of whether we should be moving to more of a
so-called “principles-based” system or what the SEC staff has
called “objectives-oriented” standards. On the one hand, there
has been lots of talk and calls for the standards to be more
clearly cast in terms of overarching principles, and to get away
from detailed rules, bright-lines and exceptions. On the other
hand, given the very important and in my view necessary
reforms under Sarbanes-Oxley, there is clearly a heightened sense
of attention to getting the financial statements right by
companies, auditors, and audit committees and Boards. That’s
terrific! But there also seems to be a real fear of being secondguessed by regulators, enforcers, the trial bar, and the business
press and that has, at least for now very understandably seemed
to reinforce the demand for detailed rules, bright-lines and safeharbors.... So implementing a more principles-based or
objectives-oriented approach is very challenging and will require
steadfast determination not only by standard setters, but also
some important behavioral changes by others.

In another passage in that speech, under the heading “The heck with
relevance, give me accounting numbers I can nail to the wall!” I said,
We hear this in many guises, mainly from preparers, but also
from some auditors and other parties. Again, part of this no
doubt relates to the fear of second-guessing and the attendant

207

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

desire to be able to point to something exact, something directly
vouchable or verifiable, if called upon to defend one’s
accounting or auditing. And again, that’s very understandable.

So, although I personally favored the adoption of a more principles-based
accounting system in the United States, I was also well aware of, and did
not discount, the hurdles in properly implementing such an approach in
this country. As I would say in a number of speeches, the situation
reminded me of Jack Nicholson’s line in the movie A Few Good Men. Tom
Cruise, who was interrogating Nicholson in the court martial scene,
states, “I want the truth!” to which Nicholson retorts, “You can’t handle
the truth!” The question was (and I believe still is) whether in the United
States we can handle a more principles-based accounting system.
In fall 2003, my friend and former partner at PwC, Don Nicolaisen,
became the chief accountant of the SEC. In addition to our many
discussions about international convergence and our experiences during
the stock option expensing episode, we chatted regularly about many
other matters involving accounting and financial reporting, including
about what would become known as the issue of complexity in the U.S.
financial reporting system. As we discussed this subject with others in
our organizations and among stakeholders in the reporting system, I
think it became clear that something more formal and concerted should
be done to address the issue.

A Call to Action
Although Don left the SEC in fall 2005, then-SEC Chairman Christopher
Cox had also become convinced of the need for action on this front. So,
at the December 2005 AICPA SEC Conference, in his keynote address,
then-Chairman Cox announced a war on complexity in accounting
standards and disclosure requirements, SEC rules, regulations, filing
requirements, and forms, a theme he reiterated a few days later in a
major speech to the Economic Club of New York.
For my part, I devoted my speech at the December 2005 AICPA SEC
Conference to this subject by focusing my comments on a number of
fundamental structural, institutional, cultural, and behavioral forces that
I and others at the FASB believed were continuing to generate
complexity in the U.S. financial reporting system and impeding more
transparent reporting. I pointed to various factors, including
1. the detail and volume of accounting, auditing and SEC reporting
requirements that had engendered a “check the box” mindset.
2. a form-over-substance approach to financial reporting.
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3. the unacceptably high number of restatements of financial statements that were resulting in a lack of transparency and analytical
complexity for users of financial information.
4. the conflicting perspectives and agendas of different participants
in the reporting system.
5. complex accounting methods that departed from economics.
6. gaps in the education and training of accountants.
7. a palpable fear of the potential consequences of being secondguessed by regulators, enforcers, and the trial bar.
In my view, these factors created a constant demand for detailed
rules, bright lines, and safe harbors that deterred preparers, auditors, audit committees, and boards from exercising professional
judgment on reporting issues, that resulted in boilerplate and
overly legalistic disclosures, and that failed to effectively communicate important information.
I ended the speech with a call to action by stating,
I believe it is time to stop observing the problem and start
thinking about how to solve these issues. For I am concerned
that failure to take action will inevitably lead to more complexity,
less transparency, and potentially less relevance of reported
financial information. Accordingly, we have been discussing with
the SEC and the PCAOB the idea that as a first step the SEC, the
FASB, and the PCAOB create a senior level advisory panel
comprising leading representatives of the various constituencies
in the reporting system. I believe such a group is needed to
examine the issues and challenges facing the system and to make
specific recommendations on appropriate actions to reduce
complexity and improve the transparency and overall quality of
the reporting system.... I issue this call to action in full
knowledge that it could result in significant changes in our
reporting system, including institutional and structural changes
some of which could impact the FASB. But from where I sit, I
believe the status quo is neither acceptable nor sustainable. Our
reporting system, while probably the best in the world, is too
complex and is capable of providing more transparent, more
understandable, and more useful information to investors and
the capital markets.

Eighteen months later, in June 2007, the SEC announced the formation
of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting
(CIFiR), which also became known as the Pozen Committee after Robert
Pozen who chaired the effort. Why did it take 18 months to get it up
and running? It was certainly not for lack of broad support for such an
effort among key constituencies in the financial reporting system. I
believe the delay was mainly due to turnover of key people at both the
209

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

SEC and the PCAOB and other priorities that needed to be addressed.
As I noted, Don Nicolaisen left the SEC in fall 2005. Alan Beller, the
director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, had also been
involved in the conception of this initiative, but he left the SEC in
February 2006. Bill McDonough, Chairman of the PCAOB, had also
been involved in these discussions, but he retired from the PCAOB in
fall 2005. It took a while for new people to fill all these roles: John
White succeeded Alan Beller in February 2006, Mark Olson became the
new Chairman of the PCAOB in June 2006, and Conrad Hewitt became
the chief accountant of the SEC in July 2006. However, for the PCAOB
and the SEC, there were other high-priority matters, including revising
the SEC regulations and the PCAOB standard around Section 404
reporting on internal controls by companies and auditors. So, it was not
until spring 2007 that the effort to establish and organize CIFiR began
in earnest.
I also believe that some impetus for the effort and for establishing a
related Department of the Treasury Advisory Committee on the
Auditing Profession (ACAP) came out of the March 2007 Summit on
Capital Markets Competiveness hosted by then-Treasury Secretary
Paulson at Georgetown University. That gathering, attended by such
luminaries of the business and financial world as Warren Buffett, Alan
Greenspan, Michael Bloomberg, Charles Schwab, Paul Volcker, Jeff
Immelt of General Electric, and Jamie Dimon of J.P. Morgan Chase, as
well as leaders of various governmental departments and agencies,
Mark Olson from the PCAOB, and me, included a session to discuss the
issues relating to the financial reporting system.

CIFiR
CIFiR comprised 17 members representing key constituencies in the
U.S. capital markets: investors, public accountants, issuers, members of
audit committees, academia, and securities attorneys. The FASB, IASC
Foundation (now known as the IFRS Foundation), PCAOB, Department
of the Treasury, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
representing U.S. banking regulators had observer seats on CIFiR.
CIFiR’s charge was to examine the U.S. financial reporting system and
provide recommendations to the SEC about how to improve its usefulness for investors and reduce unnecessary complexity. The SEC, the
PCAOB, and the FASB provided staffing for the CIFiR. I served as our
observer, and I and fellow FASB Board members and staff participated
in meetings of the subcommittees of CIFiR.
CIFiR had 8 public meetings between August 2007 and July 2008. It
solicited and received public input and took testimony from more than
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30 witnesses. A good deal of the work was done through 4 subcommittees on substantive complexity, the standard-setting process, the audit
process, and compliance and delivering financial information. That
enabled CIFiR to examine and develop recommendations on a broad
range of areas relevant to its charge.
The final report of CIFiR7 was issued in early August 2008. It contains
25 wide-ranging recommendations, as well as many important and
insightful observations on the U.S. financial reporting system. Although
the report was addressed to the SEC, the recommendations covered
matters relating to accounting standards and accounting standard setting, auditing matters, recommendations relating to SEC rules and
regulations and staff processes and procedures, and delivery of
financial information via eXtensible Business Reporting Language
(XBRL), corporate websites, and earning releases.
The report also contains a number of important observations about the
sources and causes of complexity in our reporting system. Some of
those sources and causes include those relating to increasingly
sophisticated and complex business and financial transactions and
activities, the design and content of accounting standards, audit and
regulatory systems that complicate the use of professional judgment,
shortcomings in the education and training of accountants, and issues
and challenges in the delivery of information to investors and the
capital markets.
In regard to accounting standards, the report makes what I believe is an
important and useful distinction between the unavoidable complexity
in standards that is necessary to properly reflect complex transactions
and activities of reporting entities and the unnecessary, or avoidable,
complexity in standards that creates complexity in accounting and
reporting that goes beyond the underlying business, financial, and
economic complexities. The report contains a number of what I believe
are good recommendations to help reduce avoidable complexity in
accounting standards. In my view, some of the best recommendations
include setting standards on the basis of business activities rather than
for specific industries, trying to use a consistent approach for
measuring all the assets and liabilities of a business activity, avoiding
alternative and optional accounting treatments, and improving the
display of reported financial information in the way the FASB and IASB
were exploring in the joint project on financial statement presentation.
Although I will not go over each of the specific recommendations in the
CIFiR report, I believe they represent the result of a very thorough,
well-organized, and objective look at the U.S. financial reporting system
by a cross-section of knowledgeable and experienced people in financial
7

Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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reporting. As such and as someone who had advocated undertaking
such an effort, I believed it was important that the FASB seriously
consider and, wherever possible, work to implement the CiFiR recommendations addressed to us. In that spirit, around the one-year
anniversary of the issuance of the report, we issued a public status
report on how we were addressing, or planned to address, these matters. In the status report,8 we described
1. our progress in implementing CIFiR recommendations on
enhancing investor input into accounting standard setting.
2. greater field testing of proposals.
3. implementing postadoption reviews of standards.
4. undertaking a project to develop a disclosure framework.
5. linking the XBRL U.S. GAAP taxonomy to FASB Accounting
Standards Codification™.
6. enhancing the Financial Accounting Foundation’s (FAF’s)
oversight over the standard-setting process.
However, we also noted that we had not experienced any significant
change in the demand for detailed implementation guidance, bright
lines, and exceptions to standards, suggesting a possible need for
further changes to the institutional, legal, and cultural factors driving
these demands. Accordingly, we expressed our support for the CIFiR
recommendations for the establishment of a Financial Reporting Forum
(FRF) and for the SEC and the PCAOB to develop and issue policy
statements on how they evaluate the reasonableness of accounting and
auditing judgments (what some have referred to as a professional judgment framework). I (and I believe others who participated in the CIFiR
process) viewed implementation of these two recommendations as
potentially central to the effort to reduce the overall complexity of our
reporting system.
As envisioned by CIFiR’s report,9 the FRF would bring together key
stakeholders from the user, preparer, and auditor communities with
senior representatives of the SEC, FASB, and the PCAOB “to discuss
pressures in the financial reporting system overall, both immediate and
long-term, and how individual constituents are meeting those challenges.” Establishing an FRF would, I believe, help surface issues in the
reporting system more promptly, addressing them in a logical,

8

Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission: A Response by the Financial Accounting Foundation and
the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
9
Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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coordinated, and effective way, and help provide overall strategic direction to the U.S. financial reporting system. It might also help the SEC,
FASB, and the PCAOB decide whether and how best to address other
key recommendations in the CIFiR report. Such recommendations
included those relating to the professional judgment framework, to
continuing to harness the power of technology in making financial
reports more understandable and useful, and to expanding and
enhancing the reporting of information on key performance indicators,
business opportunities, risks, strategies, and plans.
With regard to the recommendation that the SEC and the PCAOB
develop and issue policy statements on the professional judgment
framework, the CIFiR report contains an extensive discussion of the
potential benefits of establishing and clearly articulating such a
framework and the kinds of factors that might be encompassed by it. In
discussing why and how such a framework might contribute to
reducing complexity and improving the quality of U.S. financial
reporting, the CiFiR report states,
While preparers appear supportive of a move to less prescriptive
guidance, they have expressed concern regarding the perception
that current practice by regulators in evaluating judgments does
not provide an environment in which such judgments may be
generally respected. This, in turn, can lead to repeated calls for
more rules, so that the standards can be comfortably
implemented.... Regulators assert that they do respect judgments,
but also express concerns that some companies may attempt to
inappropriately defend certain errors as “reasonable judgments.”
Identifying how regulators evaluate judgments may provide an
environment that promotes the use of judgment and encourages
consistent evaluation practices among regulators.

Some may be concerned that implementation of this recommendation
could open the door for greater leeway on the part of companies and
auditors on accounting and reporting matters and ultimately lead to a
deterioration in the quality of financial reporting. I do not see it that
way because I believe that the steps and considerations in such a
framework, if followed and properly documented, could help improve
the discipline and quality of decision making on accounting and
reporting issues. Perhaps this recommendation should be rebranded as
establishing a framework for robust decision making on accounting and
reporting matters.
Over the past few years, a number of the recommendations of CIFiR
have begun to be implemented. For example, the FAF has established a
formal program for postimplementation review of both FASB and
Governmental Accounting Standards Board standards. Also, in 2011 the
SEC staff announced they would be holding periodic roundtables (the
Financial Reporting Series) that, akin to the FRF envisioned by CIFiR,
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will bring together a cross-section of representatives from the various
stakeholder groups and senior representatives of the SEC staff, FASB,
and the PCAOB to discuss emerging issues and risks arising in the U.S.
financial reporting system. However, as of late 2012, so far only one
roundtable has been held. The SEC has proceeded with the mandatory
phase-in of XBRL-tagged financial information in filings. However,
some other important recommendations of CIFiR, including the
promulgation of professional judgment frameworks by the SEC and the
PCAOB, have not yet been implemented.
To “celebrate” the third anniversary of the CiFiR report, Edith
Orenstein of Financial Executives International (FEI) posted a very good
piece to the FEI Financial Reporting Blog on July 29, 2011, titled “Hey
There Bob Pozen!” with an accompanying music video.10
“Hey There Bob Pozen!” sung to the tune of “Hey There
Delilah”
VERSE ONE
Hey there Bob Pozen
Chairing the SEC Committee
To improve financial reporting
And reduce complexity
That’s you
Union Station has seen a lot of you
I swear it’s true.
VERSE TWO
Hey there Bob Pozen
I am worried about convergence
Should we move from GAAP to IFRS
And a principles-based system
My oh my
Investors don’t like surprise
Neither do I
CHORUS THAT COMES AFTER VERSE TWO:
Oh too much complexity
Oh too much complexity
Oh too much complexity
Oh too much complexity
Too much complexity

The article summarizes the work of the Pozen Committee and the positive influence its recommendations have had on recent developments in
U.S. financial reporting. The article concludes by thanking the members,
observers, and staff of the Pozen Committee for their dedication to the
goal of improving financial reporting and reducing complexity and by
observing that the report of the committee can continue to serve as a
useful reference in this endeavor.

10
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As noted, at approximately the same time CiFiR was formed and
began meeting, the Treasury formed ACAP.11 Co-chaired by Don
Nicolaisen and former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, ACAP focused
on examining and making recommendations on improving
accounting education and strengthening human capital in the
auditing profession, enhancing the governance, transparency,
responsibility, communications, and audit quality of audit firms,
and increasing competition and auditor choice in the market for
audit services. I served as an official observer to ACAP, and
although its charge did not directly involve complexity in the U.S.
reporting system, some of those issues inevitably also came up in
its deliberations.

Disclosure Overload
For many years, some participants in the financial reporting system
have expressed concerns over the growing volume of detailed
disclosure requirements and the increasing length of company financial
reports and SEC filings that, in their view, have negatively affected the
overall understandability and usefulness of these documents. For
example, in 1994, Ray Groves, the CEO of Ernst & Young, commented,
“The sheer quantity of financial disclosures has become so excessive
that we’ve diminished the overall value of these disclosures.”12
A number of groups and special committees have studied this issue and
included various recommendations for addressing it. For example, the
AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting (or Jenkins Committee) issued a 1994 report13 that suggested more flexible disclosure
standards that would be responsive to the particular circumstances of
different companies. During the early 1990s, the FASB had a disclosure
effectiveness project. And, as mentioned in chapter 1, in 2000–01, I
headed a working group as part of the FASB’s business reporting
research project that specifically identified various redundancies
between the disclosures contained in the financial statement notes and
the information contained in other parts of SEC filings. Our working
group also suggested ways to better organize and streamline annual
reports on Form 10-K.
During my years at the FASB, we issued a number of standards that, in
response to the requests of professional investors and financial analysts,
contained additional disclosure requirements relating to matters such as
an entity’s use of, and involvement with, special purpose entities
11
See October 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury.
12
Ray J. Groves, “Financial Disclosure: When More Is Not Better” Financial Executive, May 1994.
13
Improving Business Reporting—A Customer Focus.

215

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

(SPEs), securitizations and other off-balance sheet arrangements, fair
value measurements, derivatives, and credit exposures. Some of these
new requirements resulted from users’ complaints and concerns about
what they viewed as inadequate disclosures of these matters,
particularly during the financial crisis. For public companies, some of
these new disclosure requirements extended to both the annual
financial statements and quarterly financial statements. Although, in
theory, companies are allowed to make materiality judgments in
deciding which of these disclosures to provide in light of their
particular circumstances, in practice, most companies and auditors,
perhaps fearful of being questioned by the SEC, seem to have adopted
a checklist approach to meeting disclosure requirements, regardless of
materiality. The inevitable result has been continued growth in the
length of financial statements and SEC filings, perhaps most notably for
financial institutions.
In partial response to this issue and in order to improve the overall
relevance, coherence, and quality of disclosures, more-recent FASB
standards, including those jointly issued with the IASB, have contained
higher-level disclosure objectives and principles and a list of minimum
disclosures needed to meet these objectives and principles. Additionally,
the boards have required more of the information to be provided in
tables in order to improve the accessibility and usability of the footnote
information to users and to facilitate XBRL tagging of footnote information required by the SEC.
CIFiR’s report14 also addressed the issue of disclosure overload and
recommended that the SEC and the FASB work together to develop a
disclosure framework to “[i]ntegrate existing SEC and FASB disclosure
requirements into a cohesive whole to ensure meaningful communication
and logical presentation of disclosures, based on consistent objectives and
principles. This would eliminate redundancies and provide a single
source of disclosure guidance across all financial reporting standards.”
The FASB had also received requests to develop a disclosure framework
from others, including its Investors Technical Advisory Committee, who
suggested the outline of a potential framework for enhancing the
comprehensiveness, consistency, and usability of information in the
financial statement notes desired by professional users. So, in July 2009,
after consultation with my fellow Board members, I added a project to
the FASB’s technical agenda to develop a disclosure framework. In
announcing the new project, I stated,
Many constituents have expressed concerns about so-called
“disclosure overload.” While clear and robust disclosures are
essential to informative and transparent financial reporting—a
14

Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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critical component in maintaining investor confidence in the
markets—improving the way such disclosures are integrated can
help decrease complexity. The Board will embark on this project
to create a principles-based disclosure framework that will
enable companies to communicate more effectively with investors and also help eliminate redundancy or otherwise outdated
GAAP disclosure requirements.15

I added this project to our agenda believing such a framework could
provide the FASB with a more consistent approach to developing
disclosure requirements and might also help entities make more
coherent and better organized disclosures in their financial reports. I
also hoped it would move financial reporting toward more effective
communication between reporting entities and the users of their
financial information, that it might facilitate the XBRL tagging of
footnote data that the SEC had begun to mandate, and that it might
more generally explore ways to exploit technology to improve the
organization, delivery, and usability of reported financial information.
In short, I believed this project had potential to both improve financial
reporting and reduce complexity.
So it was with great interest that I read the July 2012 FASB discussion
paper Disclosure Framework. This preliminary stage document is a
thoughtful exploration of the issues that raises a number of interesting
and thought-provoking ideas on the approach the FASB might take in
the future to develop disclosure requirements for annual and quarterly
financial statements. It also explores how companies might go about
deciding, based on their particular circumstances, which disclosures to
provide in the notes to their financial statements. In effect, it introduces
the possibility of a more flexible, situationally based, and dynamic
approach to disclosure. As with the concept of principles-based
accounting standards, a key issue will be whether an approach
requiring the exercise of more judgment by preparers, auditors, and
regulators can work in our reporting system. Also, because the scope of
the discussion paper is limited to the disclosures in the notes to
financial statements and does not extend to other financial information
contained in SEC filings, it is not fully responsive to the CIFiR recommendation. Although the discussion paper explores and suggests some
ways to improve the organization and formatting of information in the
financial statement footnotes, I believe these largely reflect a paperbased way of thinking and do not, as I had hoped, contemplate the
potential for technology to make a difference in this area. Nevertheless,
I believe the discussion paper represents a good start on this important
project, and I am hopeful it will lead to the kinds of improvements
envisioned when I added the project to the FASB’s agenda.
15
July 8, 2009, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) press release, FASB Initiates
“Disclosure Framework” Project Aimed at More Useful, Organized, and Consistent Disclosures.
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Can Technology Help?
My answer is, “Yes.” As I more fully discuss in my February 2012
column “Embracing Technology in Financial Reporting” in Compliance
Week, I believe the power of technology can be put to use to improve
the delivery, accessibility, and overall usability of reported financial
information and, in the process, can help solve some of the issues
associated with complexity and perceived disclosure overload. As I note
in my column, financial reporting has been affected by some important
technological advances, including accounting software packages,
enterprise resource planning systems, electronic audit working papers,
and various software tools used in financial analysis. However, I question whether technology has yet had the kind of transformative effects
on accounting and financial reporting that it has had on many other
aspects of life and business.
Certainly, the Internet, social media, smartphones, tablets, and the
proliferation of apps have revolutionized the accessibility and usability
of all sorts of information. In contrast, our official system of financial
reporting continues to reflect a paper-based approach and mindset. For
some time, certain accounting futurists have predicted that our financial
reporting system would evolve from the periodic filing of highly
structured financial and regulatory reports to a system of continuous
reporting and auditing, with corporate financial data stored in
electronic data warehouses into which investors and financial analysts
could plug in their own models. Although that has yet to occur, I
believe that the advent of XBRL-tagged financial information and
interactive data, coupled with the use of other technologies, such as
drop-down menus, click-throughs, and search capabilities, might help
address some of the challenges on the limitations of our current
reporting system, including some of the issues relating to complexity
and disclosure overload.
I can envision how, using XBRL, drop-down menus, click-through
technology, and search capabilities in electronically delivered financial
reports, information could be tiered, structured, and organized to better
cater to the needs of different types of users. For example, the top page
of an electronically delivered financial report might consist of
condensed financial statements and key performance metrics, which
might satisfy the needs of an average investor. For professional users,
more detailed information could be available through drop-down
menus and click-throughs that allow them to drill down several levels.
So, for example, clicking on the “revenues” line in the condensed
income statement might reveal a drop-down menu of more detailed
information about the revenues, such as the accounting policies,
revenues by segment, and management’s commentary on the changes
and trends in sales. In turn, clicking on revenues by segment might
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reveal a secondary drop-down menu with more granular information,
such as revenues by major product line within the segment. Such
technologies could also be used to provide alternative presentations of
reported data to suit the particular needs of different categories of users
(for example, credit analysts versus equity analysts).
So, although a number of critical and potentially very challenging
issues would certainly need to be addressed to transform financial
reporting along these lines, including issues relating to data capture,
legal liability and safeguards, or the possibility of providing potentially
proprietary and sensitive information, I believe we should continue to
actively explore ways to better harness the power of technology to
enhance the quality and usability of reported financial information.

Private Company Reporting
Although CIFiR specifically looked at the issues of improving relevance
and transparency of reporting and reducing complexity in the context
of reporting by U.S. public companies, some of the same concerns and
themes have also been present in discussions over private company
reporting in the United States.
This is a very important topic that could well have been the focus of an
entirely separate chapter. I chose to address it in this chapter because
some of the central issues relate to the subject of complexity in financial
reporting. To put the importance of this subject in context, there are
some 28 million businesses in the United States, but approximately only
14,000 of these are public companies.16 Clearly, private companies are a
very important segment of the U.S. economy and the source of a
majority of job growth in this country. The vast majority of U.S. private
companies are not required to provide financial statements prepared in
accordance with U.S. GAAP. Some prepare financial statements based
on another comprehensive basis of accounting (OCBOA), such as the
income tax basis or cash basis, and many others provide financial
information requested by lenders, suppliers, and other parties through
copies of tax returns and Dun & Bradstreet and other credit reports.
However, many, possibly millions, are still required to provide full U.S.
GAAP financial statements annually by their lenders or other providers
of capital, or for other reasons. Therefore, in establishing accounting
standards that cover private companies, it is important to try to ensure
that they result in financial information that is relevant and useful to
the users of that information and that can be provided in a costeffective manner.
16
January 2011 Blue-Ribbon Panel on Standard Setting for Private Companies, Report to the
Board of Trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation.
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In that regard, some, including many involved in accounting and
reporting by private companies, argue that the needs of users of private
company financial statements sometimes differ from those of public
company financial statements. The users of private company financial
statements, which include lenders, trade creditors, sureties, individual
investors, venture capitalists, and private equity investors, often have
the ability to obtain the information they want directly from management of the company. The capital structure of private companies is
often quite different than that of public companies, with the capital
generally being illiquid and viewed as a long-term investment. Also,
very importantly, private companies often have fewer resources
dedicated to preparing financial information and implementing new
accounting standards than public companies and often have to rely on
their outside accountants for help in this process. So, for many years,
there has been a debate concerning whether there should be a different
or simplified set of accounting and reporting standards, sometimes
termed the Big GAAP/Little GAAP issue. The issue has been studied
many times for the past 35 years by various groups and has been a
challenging one for the FASB and the trustees of the FAF. I think the
following passage from the “Standard-Setting Organizations” section of
chapter 1, “Financial Accounting Regulations and Organization” of the
seventh edition of the Accountants’ Handbook captures the issue well:
One pervasive political problem that just will not go away is
standards overload. Originally, this phrase described the issuance
of numerous detailed standards, but more recently it has come to
encompass the issuance of complex standards that are difficult to
implement, especially by smaller nonpublic companies.... The
FASB’s dilemma is that too much emphasis on SEC registrants
seems to ignore the constraints affecting private companies, yet
too much emphasis on private companies ignores the needs of
the SEC and the public for effective capital markets. Because the
SEC exerts the greatest influence, it seems likely that that the
FASB will continue to focus on the needs of more sophisticated
users and will issue standards that that may be difficult for
private companies to implement. This choice leaves the state
Boards [of accountancy] and the AICPA in a difficult relationship
with some of their constituents and members, but there does not
appear to be any way out of this dilemma.

This passage was from 1990 and, with the benefit of hindsight, seems
rather prophetic. In recent years, this issue has taken on renewed
importance and a sense of urgency due to perceptions of the increasing
complexity of U.S. GAAP and questions about the relevance and cost
effectiveness for private companies of certain accounting standards and
also due to the possibility of the United States moving to IFRS for
public company reporting.
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The Private Company Financial Reporting
Committee, IFRS for Small and Medium
Enterprises, and Other Initiatives
During my years at the FASB, we took a number of steps to try to
obtain greater input from stakeholders representing the small and
private business communities and the not-for-profit community into
our standard-setting activities. In 2004, we increased private company
representation on the EITF by appointing Lawrence Weinstock, the CFO
of a private company, to the group. In 2005, we established the FASB
Small Business Advisory Committee comprised of a cross section of
financial statement users, preparers, and practitioners that focused on
private and small public companies. We met with that group twice a
year and we also met periodically with the Technical Issues Committee
of the AICPA’s Private Company Practice Section to discuss private
company reporting issues. As we issued standard-setting proposals, we
began soliciting specific input on private company considerations.
In 2007, together with the AICPA, we formed the Private Company
Financial Reporting Committee (PCFRC). That committee provided the
FASB with specific recommendations on potential differences in
particular accounting standards that should be made to better meet the
needs of users of private company financial statements or in light of
cost-benefit considerations. The PCFRC was formed in response to the
2006 report of the AICPA Private Company Financial Reporting Task
Force (the Castellano Report) that found that although users of private
company financial statements generally placed value on U.S. GAAP
financial statements, they believed existing U.S. GAAP did not deliver
relevant information for their purposes in a number of areas.
The PCFRC comprised 12 part-time members representing the key
stakeholder groups in U.S. private company financial reporting (4
users, 4 preparers, and 4 CPA practitioners). It was chaired by
Judith O’Dell, a CPA practitioner and owner of a private consulting
business, who was formerly both a member of the AICPA board of
directors and a trustee of the FAF. The PCFRC was staffed by
professionals from the FASB and AICPA.
To provide additional focus by the FASB on the work of the PCFRC, as
well as on private company and not-for-profit reporting issues in
general, we hired staff members with extensive experience in these
areas, including Paul Glotzer, who had been a partner in a small
accounting firm serving private companies. In 2009, I appointed one of
our experienced assistant directors, Jeff Mechanick, to oversee our
efforts in these important areas. Also in 2009 we established a Not-forProfit Advisory Committee.
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The PCFRC met four to five times per year and provided various
recommendations to the FASB on specific modifications it felt should be
made to particular standards to either better meet the needs of users of
private company financial reports or based on cost-benefit
considerations. Based on these recommendations, the Board provided
for a number of differences for private companies, generally involving
different effective dates and, in some cases, fewer disclosures by private
companies. However, in other cases, the Board, based at least in part on
gathering further information and additional outreach, including
outreach to users of private company financial reports, decided against
modifications to standards recommended by the PCFRC. These generally related to proposed modifications that would have created differences in recognition or measurement between U.S. public companies
and U.S. private companies, which I believe some FASB Board members
viewed as conceptually indefensible.
Regardless of whether one agrees with particular recommendations the
PCFRC made to the FASB, I believe the Board deciding not to act on
more of them, particularly those relating to differential recognition and
measurement for private companies, was disappointing to PCFRC
members and many stakeholders in the private company reporting
community. At the FASB, I sensed from comments at Board meetings an
apparent frustration on the part of certain Board members and staff
with PCFRC recommendations that they believed were not sufficiently
supported by evidence of differential user needs or by adequate evaluation of cost-benefit considerations by the PCFRC.
There has also been an increasing use of exceptions to U.S. GAAP
in private company financial statements in which the users of the
reports agreed to accept financial statements with specific
departures from U.S. GAAP (for example, for the nonconsolidation
of subsidiaries holding the real estate used in a family-owned
private company). To some, this demonstrates that the market for
private company financial statements is functioning effectively (that
is, that preparers and users are able to negotiate and agree upon
customizations to the financial statements). To others, however, this
greater use of allowed exceptions threatens to undermine the
general acceptance of U.S. GAAP for private company reporting.
Some in the private company reporting community have also voiced
significant concerns that some of the major proposed standards relating
to the FASB-IASB Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) may add
unnecessary cost, effort, and complexity to accounting and reporting by
U.S. private companies. These included concerns over the perceived
expansion of fair value accounting requirements and the additional costs
and effort associated with developing such measurements. In addition to
these factors, the many issues that could arise for U.S. private company
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reporting if and when we were to move to IFRS for U.S. public
companies also added impetus to calls for a focused look at the subject of
private company financial reporting in the United States. Interestingly,
experience in countries that have moved to IFRS for public company
reporting is mixed. Some of these countries have adopted the IFRS for
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) standards for their private
companies, but others have chosen to retain a version of their existing
national standards for private company financial statements:
It has been over a year now since the new IFRS standard for
non-publicly accountable entities (“IFRS for SMEs”) was issued.
In that time, many governments around the world have been
considering whether to allow or even prescribe the SME
standard for non-listed entities, or whether they would prefer to
continue with local accounting standards....
Like all ready-made solutions, the SME standards may not be
usable straight out of the box in some circumstances. The UK, for
example, is considering adopting the SME standard but has run
into issues regarding compliance with EU Directives.
To get around this, they are proposing to adopt a “tweaked” version (and, like Hong Kong, have replaced the tax section with IAS
12). France, and to some extent Germany, have rejected the SME
because it does not fit with their integrated tax and accounting
frameworks, which have only recently been overhauled. South
Africa on the other hand has embraced the SME with open arms,
adopting the standard while it was still in draft.
The Caribbean and some countries in South and Central America
are very supportive and are considering quick adoption of the
SME standard as their local GAAP. Some of these countries currently apply IFRS as the only standard. Some countries in South
East Asia have already made the step towards the SME standard.
This highlights one of the difficulties that the SME faces—fitting
into local legislation and requirements. You could argue that the
impact is much reduced if we end up with many flavours or
variants of the SME, although the prospect of international
harmony probably falls way down the priority list of those that
are not multinational already.
In any case, there is quite an appetite for the standard, although
not everyone is convinced yet. According to the IASB, some 60
jurisdictions have adopted the SME standard or have made a
public statement that they plan to adopt it. That’s not bad for a
standard that has been in place now for around 15 months only.17

17

“IFRS for SMEs—Gathers Momentum.” PwC IFRS blog. 11 November 2010. http://
pwc.blogs.com/ifrs/2010/11/ifrs-for-smes-gathers-momentum.html.
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Blue-Ribbon Panel
During 2009, the FAF board of trustees and senior leadership of the
FAF conducted a “listening tour” meeting with a diverse range of
constituents to obtain views on U.S. accounting standard setting and
financial reporting. Many stakeholders in the private company community expressed continuing concerns relating to accounting standard
setting for private companies and disappointment with the results of
the efforts between the FASB and the PCFRC. Accordingly, toward the
end of 2009, the FAF, together with the AICPA and the National
Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA), formed a BlueRibbon Panel (BRP) to examine these issues and make recommendations to the FAF. The BRP was chaired by Rick Anderson, Chairman of
the accounting firm Moss Adams LLP and an FAF trustee, and it
comprised a cross-section of constituents involved in private company
financial reporting. It met a number of times during 2010, reviewing
prior studies on the subject, learning about how other countries have
addressed these matters, and gathering input and discussing the issues.
The BRP issued its Report to the Board of Trustees of the Financial
Accounting Foundation in January 2011.
The report of the BRP called for significant changes to the U.S. system
of establishing standards for private companies in order to improve the
relevance and overall cost effectiveness of accounting standards relating
to U.S. private companies. These changes included the creation of a
new board to be overseen by the FAF to specifically focus on making
exceptions and modifications to U.S. GAAP for private companies. In
making this recommendation, the BRP report stated,
Based on both the FASB’s history and the competing standardsetting pressures on the FASB that are emanating from the public
sector, including those related to the FASB’s joint projects with
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a
supermajority of BRP members believe that the FASB will not be
able to fully assess and respond sufficiently and appropriately to
the needs of the private company sector.

The panel also recommended the development of a differential
framework that would provide a set of decision criteria to guide the
new board in making exceptions to U.S. GAAP for private companies.
It is important to note that the panel did not recommend, as certain
parties have advocated, that there be a separate self-contained U.S.
GAAP for private companies. Also, a minority of the BRP opposed the
establishment of a separate accounting standards board for private
companies, believing it to be premature. They were also concerned that
it could lead to too many differences between private company and
public company accounting standards and other unintended
consequences, including increasing complexity in the U.S. reporting
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system. Instead, they proposed structural changes in the FASB and its
processes to better focus on the private company sector, including
having at least one Board member with primarily private company
experience. Additionally, one member of the BRP dissented to the
report on the basis that the panel was not provided with compelling
evidence of a need for differences in standards for private companies or
the need for a separate accounting standards board to establish such
differences. In the words of this member of the BRP, “the Panel has not
been presented with arguments or evidence that private company
financial statements do not meet the needs of users. In fact, the push
for differential reporting has not been driven by users of private
company financial statements, suggesting that the financial statements
are providing decision-useful information.”
Others voiced concerns over the recommendations of the BRP. For
example, PwC issued a public Point of View,18 stating that it believes
the creation of a separate private company accounting standards board
would reduce the quality of information provided to users and create
undue cost and complexity in the U.S. financial reporting system.
Instead, it advocated an approach that would continue the current
single U.S. standard-setting board and complement recent changes in
the FASB’s composition and processes to support greater private
company input into the development of standards.

FAF Working Group and Increased FASB
Focus on Private Companies
In March 2011, the FAF formed a working group of several trustees and
senior FAF members to further consider accounting standard setting for
U.S. nonpublic entities (private companies and not-for-profit entities). The
working group received input from many constituents through various
meetings with stakeholders and unsolicited letters, considered the recommendations of the BRP and relevant academic research on these matters,
and reviewed the FASB’s processes for gathering input from the needs
and concerns of private companies and not-for-profit entities.
In the meantime, the FAF trustees also expanded the FASB Board back
to seven members, and one of the new members, Daryl Buck, was the
CFO of a private company and a member of the PCFRC and the BRP.
Another new FASB Board member, Hal Schroeder, had experience
investing in and auditing private companies. Although that’s not new
because other FASB Board members have had such experience (for
example, throughout my career, I had significant involvement in
investing in and auditing private companies), I think it shows a
sensitivity by the FAF trustees to this issue in appointments to the
18

Setting private company accounting standards: Recent recommendations miss the mark.
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FASB. The FASB also took various steps to improve its focus on private
companies, including holding public roundtables to obtain views from
stakeholders in private company financial reports on specific issues;
stepping up educational efforts with private company stakeholders and
creating methods of obtaining their input on issues; undertaking a
project to reexamine the definition of nonpublic entity in order to more
clearly define what constitutes a private company for standard-setting
purposes; and, consistent with a recommendation by the BRP,
developing a white paper aimed at setting forth criteria in a differential
Private Company Framework that might be used in evaluating
potential differences in accounting standards between public and
private companies
In July 2012, the FASB issued the invitation to comment, Private
Company Decision-Making Framework: A Framework for Evaluating
Financial Accounting and Reporting Guidance for Private Companies, that
contains a set of initial recommendations from the FASB staff on criteria
for determining whether and under what circumstances it would be
appropriate to adjust U.S. GAAP requirements for private companies.

FAF Proposes Establishing a Private
Company Standards Improvement Council
In October 2011, the FAF board of trustees issued a request for comment19 that was intended to improve the U.S. accounting standard
process for private companies. It proposed the creation of a new
Private Company Standards Improvement Council (PCSIC) that
would replace the PCFRC and would be chaired by a FASB member
and comprise 11–15 other people with significant experience in
private company financial reporting. The FASB would provide full
staff support for the PCSIC.
Working jointly with the FASB, the PCSIC would develop criteria for
identifying and evaluating potential exceptions and modifications to U.S.
GAAP for private companies, obtain input from constituents on these
matters, and deliberate and formally vote on them in public meetings
attended by FASB Board members. Changes to U.S. GAAP for private
companies proposed by the PCSIC would then be forwarded to the FASB
for its consideration and ratification, exposed for public comment, and
redeliberated by the PCSIC at public meetings attended by FASB
members. If approved by at least a two-thirds vote of the PCSIC, the final
changes would be sent to the FASB for ratification and codification as
part of U.S. GAAP. The operations of the PCSIC would be overseen by
the FAF board of trustees through periodic in-person reports to a newly
19
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created Private Company Review Committee of certain trustees and
quarterly written reports to the full board of trustees.
Following three years of operation of the PCSIC, the FAF trustees
would assess the overall effectiveness of the new process and whether
further changes were warranted in accounting standard setting for
private companies.
For accounting standards for not-for-profit entities, the FAF working
group concluded that the FASB should continue to fulfill this important
role and continue to seek advice from the Not-For-Profit Advisory
Committee (NAC) it established in 2009. Indeed, in November 2011,
based on input from the NAC, the FASB added two projects to its
agenda. One project is exploring ways to enhance certain presentations
and disclosures in the financial statements of not-for-profits, and the
second, a research project, looks at best practices used by not-for-profits
to communicate their financial story to donors and other users of their
financial information.
In making the October 2011 proposal on private company accounting
standard setting, the FAF trustees seemed to believe it represented a
balanced approach that would put in place important structural and
process changes that would increase and elevate the FASB’s focus on
private companies and strengthen and improve its procedures for
establishing accounting standards that are responsive to the needs and
concerns of stakeholders in private company reporting and to many of
the BRP’s recommendations while avoiding the potential for creating a
Big GAAP/Little GAAP system in the United States. The proposal was
welcomed and supported by the leadership of NASBA, but it was
quickly and strongly criticized by AICPA leaders in a press release
issued on October 4, 2011, the same day the FAF proposal was
published. In that press release, AICPA President Barry Melancon stated
Three thousand private company constituents and a majority of
the state CPA societies, representing more than a quarter million
CPAs, have spoken. They want a separate independent standard
setting board and they have sent letters to FAF asking for
change. Over the years, FASB’s main focus has understandably
been on the needs of publicly traded companies. The pent up
frustration we are witnessing by the private company constituency is a direct result of that public company focus and not
seeing that differences can be and are appropriate for private
companies and their financial statement users.
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The FAF Establishes the Private Company
Council and a New Process for Setting
Private Company Accounting Standards
The FAF’s PCSIC proposal was exposed for public comment. The FAF
received thousands of comment letters on the proposal, the vast
majority of which were form letters following a template developed by
the AICPA. After considering the many letters received and other input
on the proposal, the FAF trustees voted unanimously in May 2012 to
establish a new group called the Private Company Council (PCC) to
improve the process of setting U.S. GAAP accounting standards for U.S.
private companies. The new structure incorporates a number of
significant changes from the proposed PCSIC based on suggestions
made by constituents. These include that the PCC chair will not be a
FASB member and that FASB will follow a formal and transparent
endorsement process for deciding on whether to approve, reject, or suggest changes to the exceptions and modifications to U.S. GAAP for
private companies recommended by the PCC.
The PCC will have 9–12 part-time, noncompensated members selected
and appointed by the FAF, including users, preparers, and practitioners
with significant experience in private company reporting. Members will
be appointed for a 3-year term and may be reappointed for an
additional 2-year term. Working together, the PCC and FASB will agree
on criteria for determining whether and when exceptions or modifications to U.S. GAAP are appropriate for private companies. Using these
criteria and in consultation with the FASB and with input from
constituents, the PCC will, by a two-thirds vote, determine which areas
to consider for possible exceptions and modifications to U.S. GAAP for
private companies. The PCC will also serve as the FASB’s primary
advisory group on the treatment for private companies of technical
agenda items being actively deliberated by the FASB and on the new
Private Company Decision-Making Framework that the FASB has been
developing. During its first 3 years of operation, the PCC will hold at
least 5 meetings annually. The deliberative portions of these meetings
will be open to the public, and all FASB members will be expected to
attend. The PCC will discuss proposed exceptions and modifications to
U.S. GAAP for private companies, vote on them, and, if approved and
endorsed by a majority of the FASB, expose them for public comment.
After the conclusion of the public comment period, the PCC will
redeliberate the proposal and forward its final decisions to the FASB for
endorsement. If the FASB endorses the PCC’s decisions, they will be
incorporated into U.S. GAAP. If it does not endorse the PCC decisions,
the FASB Chairman will provide the PCC with a written explanation,
including potential changes for the PCC to consider in order to obtain
FASB endorsement.
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The FAF trustees will create a special Private Company Review
Committee to oversee the new structure and process to help ensure
that there is adequate consideration of private company issues in
the U.S. accounting standard-setting process. Following its first
three years in operation, the FAF trustees will conduct an assessment of the new structure and process and determine whether
further changes are warranted.
In the May 23, 2012, press release announcing the FAF trustees’ decisions, FAF President Teresa Polley said
The plan approved by the Trustees strikes an important balance.
One the one hand, the plan recognizes that the needs of public
and private company financial statement users, preparers, and
auditors are not always aligned. But at the same time, the plan
ensures comparability of financial reporting among disparate
companies by putting in place a system for recognizing differences that will avoid creation of a “two-GAAP” system.

The AICPA expressed support for the FAF’s decisions, noting the
important changes the trustees had made in response to input received
on the PCSIC proposal. However, the AICPA also announced that it will
develop a separate, stand-alone Financial Reporting Framework for Smalland Medium-Sized Entities (FRF for SMEs) that do not have to prepare
U.S. GAAP financial statements. In effect, the FRF for SMEs will be a
new OCBOA that is intended to be less complex and less costly for
small and medium-sized private companies to implement and that will
meet the needs of the users of such information. In November 2012, the
AICPA issued the proposed FRF for SMEs for public comment. The
proposed FRF for SMEs emphasizes the use of historical cost
accounting and matching of revenues and costs and proposes a number
of differences from GAAP that are intended to increase the relevance of
the information reported by private company SMEs to bank lenders
and other users. The proposed FRF for SMEs is also intended to reduce
the cost and complexity of the accounting by, for example, allowing the
use of certain accounting methods for tax purposes in preparing the
financial statements, not requiring certain derivatives to carried at fair
value, and not requiring consolidation of variable interest entities.
In September 2012, the FAF announced the names of the 10-member
PCC, comprised of experienced private company users, preparers, and
practitioners, and chaired by Billy M. Atkinson. Billy was a long-time
partner and colleague at C&L and PwC with a great deal of experience
in serving private company clients and was a recent Chairman of
NASBA. The first meeting of the PCC occurred in December 2012.
I commend the FAF and FASB, the AICPA, and NASBA, as well as
other stakeholders, for systematically working through what has been a
very important, long-standing, controversial, and challenging issue in
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U.S. accounting standard setting and financial reporting. Although I
believe the new structure and process approved by the FAF trustees
provides a balanced, well-developed approach, time will tell whether it
achieves the stated goals of addressing and satisfying the concerns of
private company stakeholders while also avoiding the creation of a
two-tier Big GAAP/Little GAAP system in the United States. Time will
also tell if the new FRF for SMEs that the AICPA develops gains a
widespread acceptance such that there could effectively be multiple
tiers of financial reporting in the United States comprising public
company U.S. GAAP, private company U.S. GAAP for some private
companies, and FRF for SMEs for other private companies. Certainly, it
will be interesting to see how this all develops, including which kinds
of private companies choose to report under GAAP as modified by the
PCC and FASB and which adopt the AICPA’s FRF for SMEs. The extent
of differences in the financial statements prepared under these two sets
of standards, the level of acceptance of each of these approaches by
lenders and other users of private company financial information, and
their overall branding in the marketplace will also be interesting.

So Where Are We on Complexity?
My short answer to that question is that although I believe we have
made some progress on this front, it continues to be a work in process.
In my opinion, the U.S. financial reporting system has been going
through and continues to go through some very major challenges,
crosscurrents, uncertainties, and changes that have affected and will
likely continue to impact the complexity issue.
The reporting scandals a decade ago shook confidence in U.S. public
company financial reports, revealing a number of systemic issues,
including deficiencies in certain accounting standards, reporting practices
at certain major U.S. companies that, either through fraud or abusive
accounting practices, resulted in reporting misleading financial information to the public, and weaknesses in internal control processes and
corporate governance practices. The reporting scandals also raised
concerns about the quality of independent audits of financial statements.
Congress, through Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted significant reforms in the
U.S. financial reporting system. In terms of accounting standards,
improvement in standards to more faithfully reflect the economics of
transactions and events, trying to make the standards more principlesbased and, when appropriate, seeking convergence with international
accounting standards, was a theme in SOX and follow-up studies by
the SEC mandated by SOX. Two SEC studies—one on the feasibility of
a principles-based accounting system of accounting and the other on
off-balance sheet arrangements—pointed to the need to improve
230

Chapter 6: Complexity

accounting standards in a number of major areas. The results of these
studies were an important source of input to FASB and the IASB in
developing the list of projects included in the MoU.
At the same time, the creation and activities of the PCAOB in overseeing
and regulating auditors of SEC registrants, coupled with expectations of
stronger review and enforcement of reporting practices by the SEC,
greater diligence by auditors and audit committees, and the ever-present
threat of litigation relating to reported financial information, have, in my
view, had both very positive and some unintended negative effects on
the U.S. financial reporting system. On the positive side, the overall
quality of U.S. public company financial reports has improved during the
last decade. That is a welcome and very important outcome.
On the negative side, the increased fear by companies, audit committees, and auditors of being second-guessed on accounting and reporting
matters has, at times, very understandably, been a force creating
resistance to change and inhibiting our country moving toward less
complex and more transparent financial reporting. Similarly, although
the enhanced focus on internal controls has helped raise the overall
quality of accounting and financial reporting, it has also upped the cost
of implementing changes in accounting and reporting requirements,
which affects both the overall receptivity to change and the cost-benefit
analysis on proposed changes in accounting and disclosure standards.
I believe these realities of the U.S. public company financial reporting
system were expressed well in the following excerpts from a letter
dated November 5, 2010, from Marie Hollein, president and CEO of
FEI, a U.S.-based, leading organization of senior financial executives, to
Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB. The letter expressed the
FEI’s concerns on the perceived rapid pace of development of standards
under the MoU and otherwise by the IASB:
[I]t is important to understand that the U.S. regulatory environment is very demanding in terms of its expectations about
application of accounting standards. This includes, but is not
limited to, evaluations of the process followed in interpreting
and implementing new standards, the development of high
quality repeatable and sustainable processes and controls, and
thoroughness and transparency of related disclosures that enable
investors to fully understand the nature and effect of the
required changes. It is also noteworthy that these reporting
processes occur every quarter in the U.S. rather than the semiannual or annual reporting cycles typical in other reporting
regimes. Meeting these expectations and timetables causes
companies to incur significant compliance costs, both in terms of
internal and external technical accounting resources as well as
systems and audit-related costs.... It is important to remember
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that, due to the long lead times necessary to meet U.S. compliance requirements, companies and audit firms will commit
enormous resources to implementing these standards as soon as
they are issued final.

These and other issues relating to complexity and improving financial
reporting were the focus of CIFiR. However, as previously discussed,
although some of CIFiR’s recommendations have been or are in the
process of being implemented, other ones that could be important to
help address the complexity issue have not yet been implemented.
Convergence and the possible move to IFRS have further added to the
crosscurrents and uncertainties in the U.S. financial reporting system. As
I said in speeches and public meetings and discussed in chapter 4,
“International Convergence,” we have been “riding two horses” in terms
of accounting standard setting, working on convergence in major areas
while also responding to U.S. reporting issues relating to existing
standards and to the concerns of private company stakeholders. As noted
in chapter 4, that has been challenging, not only for the FASB but, more
importantly, for many stakeholders in the U.S. reporting system.
The potential move to or towards IFRS for U.S. public company
reporting coupled with concerns over the suitability for private
companies of some existing and proposed standards have added
impetus to renewed calls for differential accounting standards in this
country. In response, the FAF trustees have instituted changes in the
process for developing U.S. GAAP for private companies, and the
AICPA is developing a new reporting framework for small and
medium-sized private businesses that are not required to prepare U.S.
GAAP financial statements.
Some say the solution is to have less complex accounting standards for
both public and private companies. That may well be part of the
answer because I certainly believe, as CIFiR recommended, that
accounting standard setters should strive to avoid creating avoidable
complexity in developing standards. But what constitutes avoidable
versus unavoidable complexity is subjective and may involve some different considerations for public versus private company reporting. For
example, the recent standards on consolidation of SPEs and uncertain
tax positions were developed in response to specific problems in public
company financial reporting and at the urging of the SEC staff. So,
going back to the prior accounting in those areas would not seem
advisable for public company reporting. Yet, those are two of the areas
where many private company constituents have voiced significant
concerns over the relevance and cost-benefit of recent standards, so
reevaluating differences in those standards for private companies
would seem to be in order. Perhaps they can be simplified for both
private and public companies in a way that does not weaken reporting
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by public companies. In that regard, the FASB, in responding to
concerns expressed by private company stakeholders, has recently
issued standards that provide a simplified approach to the testing of
impairments of goodwill and other indefinite-lived intangibles for
impairments that apply to both private and public companies.20
However, as is the case in some other countries, such as Canada and
the United Kingdom, and with International Financial Reporting Standards
for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs), it may be time in the
United States to develop a stand-alone set of accounting standards
specifically for use by private companies. This is the approach of the
AICPA for private companies that do not have to prepare U.S. GAAP
financial statements, but is not the approach adopted by the FAF
trustees for U.S. GAAP for private companies.
Additionally, although the FASB-IASB program to develop common
standards focuses on areas that the boards, users of public company
financial reports, and regulators have cited as requiring improved
standards, the prospect of significant changes in these areas have added
to the concerns voiced in the private company sector. For example, the
FASB and IASB have been working to address perceived deficiencies in
current lease accounting standards that enable lessees to exclude leased
assets and obligations from their balance sheets. That was a significant
issue raised in a 2005 SEC report to Congress on off-balance sheet
arrangements and an area that most users of public company financial
reports seem to believe needs fixing. Doing so will likely add additional
cost and complexity to the accounting by lessees, and that additional
cost and effort could fall disproportionately on small and private
companies. When and if it comes back onto the active standard-setting
agenda, the FASB-IASB project on financial statement presentation
could result in significant changes in the format of the basic financial
statements and in the level of disaggregation in the statements, two
areas of change that seem to be favored by many users of public
company financial reports. However, many stakeholders in the private
company reporting community, including some users of private
company financial reports, generally seem to believe that such changes
to private company financial statements would not be cost beneficial.
In short, there are some important crosscurrents, competing objectives,
and trade-offs in trying to make accounting standards and financial
reporting both more relevant and less complex. As previously noted, I
believe those considerations and trade-offs can and do sometimes differ
between public and private company reporting. This difference creates
potential opportunities to simplify U.S. GAAP for both public and
private companies, as the FASB demonstrated through recent revisions
20
FASB Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2011-08, Intangibles—Goodwill and Other (Topic
350): Testing Goodwill for Impairment, and FASB ASU No. 2012-02, Intangibles—Goodwill and Other
(Topic 350): Testing Indefinite-Lived Intangible Assets for Impairment.
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to the accounting for impairment of goodwill and other indefinite-lived
intangibles. Add to the mix the issues concerning whether, how, and
when to move to, or incorporate, IFRS for U.S. public companies, we
clearly have a rather interesting and challenging situation facing the
U.S. financial reporting system.
So, in the face of these crosscurrents, competing objectives, uncertainties, and overall complexity, is there a path forward to the improved
and less complex accounting and reporting that many, including me,
have called for? Although I have my own thoughts and preferred solutions on paths forward, first and foremost, I think it will require
addressing and resolving all the major crosscurrents and uncertainties
previously discussed. Is this likely to happen? I hope so but probably
not completely in the short term. Understandably, in the wake of the
recent financial crisis and economic recession, many parties have more
pressing issues to deal with. U.S. companies have been working hard to
cope with basic business and financial challenges, and public
companies, particularly those in the financial services sector, face a
plethora of regulatory changes from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). They are understandably not looking forward to the prospect of significant changes in
accounting and reporting requirements, whether as a result of the
completion of major convergence projects or by the SEC deciding to
either adopt or incorporate IFRS into our system.
The SEC has had scores of regulations to promulgate and studies to
conduct under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Jumpstart our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012. So addressing major challenges facing the
U.S. financial reporting system, including recommendations of CIFiR
and providing greater clarity about the path to the potential use of IFRS
in the United States, may not be a priority for the SEC right now. Also,
as I have previously discussed, there is a real need to continue the
Conceptual Framework project to provide a better foundation for
accounting standard setting, including dealing with the fundamental
controversies surrounding the asset and liability view versus the
revenue and expense view and with the controversial subject of
measurement. There is also a need to get on with the FASB’s disclosure
framework project as part of the effort to make the information communicated in financial statements more relevant and understandable.
However, the FASB and IASB clearly have very full plates right now,
working hard to try to complete major convergence projects, so
significant near-term progress on these fronts is very challenging.
For the future of private company financial reporting in the United
States, I view this as a very significant and interesting public policy
issue of national importance. My own experience and leanings suggest
to me that we are better off continuing with a vertically integrated
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system of accounting standards and financial reporting between U.S.
public and private companies. I believe our country has benefitted from
having common accounting standards that, with a few differences for
private companies and not-for-profit entities, apply across the system.
As an economist might say, this approach would seem to result in
significant network externalities (for example, in the education and
training of accountants and in the use of accounting information by
capital providers and financial analysts). Also, there could be important
implications on capital formation in the United States if we were to
have very different accounting and financial reporting for public
companies and private companies.
However, consistent with the recommendations of the BRP and the
October 2011 FAF proposal, the new PCC structure and process
adopted by the FAF trustees in May 2012, and the FRF for SMEs that
the AICPA is developing, I also believe there are more opportunities for
justified differences in accounting standards and disclosure requirements for private companies to better address differences in user needs
and cost-benefit considerations. During my years at the FASB, we
attempted to build mechanisms and processes to better gather input
from constituents in private company financial reporting and to
evaluate potential differences in standards, but those clearly fell short of
the expectations of many private company stakeholders. So, as previously noted, the new PCC structure and process offers the prospect of a
better solution to this long-standing and important issue. We will see
whether that new PCC structure plus the new FRF for SMEs that the
AICPA is developing will provide a comprehensive, satisfactory, and
durable resolution of this issue.

Conclusion
These are all complex and interrelated issues whose resolution will
determine the future of accounting standards and standard setting in
the United States, with potentially significant ramifications for our
financial reporting system, capital markets, and economy. The work of
the SEC staff in considering whether, how, and when to incorporate
IFRS into the U.S. public company reporting system and the new PCC/
FASB/FAF and AICPA FRF for SMEs standards and processes for
private company accounting standard setting and reporting are critical
components of this journey.
Because the issues are interrelated, I believe there needs to be close
coordination by all the relevant parties to ensure that the end result is
accounting standard setting and financial reporting that work
effectively for our country. I can see some danger that we could be
heading toward a rather complex and fragmented system of financial
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reporting in this country, with foreign companies listed on our stock
exchanges and, perhaps, some U.S. companies reporting under full
IFRS; all or most U.S. public companies reporting under U.S. GAAP
that, over time, may incorporate more and more IFRS; some private
companies reporting under U.S. GAAP for private companies that, over
time, contains a growing number of differences with the standards used
by public companies; and other private companies reporting using the
AICPA-developed FRF-SME that could also be quite different than the
U.S. GAAP standards used by other private companies.
So, although there might be a certain richness to such a system that
allows for differential financial reporting that may better fit different
segments of the market, it also carries with it the potential for increased
complexity and confusion and higher overall system-wide costs. I
believe we need to proceed carefully with eyes wide open about the
potential benefits, risks, and costs of having a multitiered financial
reporting system.
I also believe we must continue to seek ways to reduce the overall
complexity and enhance the effectiveness of communication in public
company financial reports and that, although we have made progress
toward these goals, there is still much to do. In that regard, I believe
that resolving some of the long-standing, crosscutting conceptual issues
in accounting standard setting, continuing to move toward more
principles-based or objectives-oriented accounting standards,
developing a disclosure framework, formalizing and promulgating the
professional judgment framework advocated by CIFiR, and continuing
to harness the power of technology in financial reporting all provide
significant opportunities to make meaningful progress toward reducing
complexity and improving the overall relevance and usability of
reported financial information. From my own experience as an
accounting standard setter and my decades of working in financial
reporting, I can certainly attest to the challenges in making progress
along these fronts. It takes vision, leadership, a sense of direction, and
willingness by stakeholders in the system to change. Without change,
there can be no progress and we will continue to confront these issues
over and over again.
However, we must also be careful in making such changes to ensure
that our reporting system continues to meet the needs of participants in
our capital markets and business community for relevant, timely,
understandable, and trustworthy financial information.
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Chapter 7: Looking
Back and Moving
Forward
Robert Herz has had a more interesting career than any
accountant deserves.1

As I write this, it is now over two years since I retired from the FASB
on September 30, 2010. In some ways, that marked the end of a major
chapter in my career and life. For many years, much of my work (and
life) revolved around accounting, auditing, and financial reporting
issues and related policy matters: as the senior technical partner of
Coopers & Lybrand (C&L) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), leading
and serving on various professional committees and groups, as an
accounting standard setter on the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and as
Chairman of the FASB.
Looking back, overall, it was wonderful—demanding but interesting
and engaging, full of opportunities and challenges, working with terrific colleagues, and personally very satisfying. An article in The
Economist on September 30, 2010, on my years at the FASB quipped,
“Robert Herz has had a more interesting career than any accountant
deserves.” Perhaps so, but the time had come to move on, and I was
looking forward to a change and, most of all, being able to spend more
time with my family. I explained my thinking in the following question
and answer session with Mary-Jo Kranacher of The CPA Journal:2
1

“Beancounter there, done that,” The Economist, 30 September 2010.
Mary-Jo Kranacher, “Recollections on Standard Setting, Convergence, and Crisis: An Interview
with Former FASB Chair Robert H. Hertz,” The CPA Journal, February 2011.
2

237

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

The CPA Journal: First, let’s get the 800-pound gorilla out of the
room: Some people were surprised by your sudden departure
from FASB, especially given FASB’s full agenda and the sensitive
timing for IFRS convergence efforts. Why did you choose this
time to leave?
Robert H. Herz: Well, the FASB agenda has been very full since
the first day I started there—or even before, with the Enron and
WorldCom scandals, and of course with the big spotlight on
financial reporting my first month at the FASB, during which the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act took shape and was quickly passed. The
agenda has been very full throughout my eight-plus years as
chairman of the FASB. Certainly, it was really full during the
financial crisis, and we had to vigorously respond to a number
of reporting issues that emanated from that. And the successful
completion of the Codification marked an important milestone. It
was time to move on. To put it in perspective, I was at the FASB
as chairman for more than eight years and before that I was a
member of the International Accounting Standards Board.
Together, that was just about a decade of accounting standards
setting. That’s not counting the years I was on the Emerging
Issues Task Force, chairman of the AICPA SEC Regulations Committee, chairman of the IFAC Transnational Auditors Committee,
or a member of the FASB Financial Instruments Task Force from
the late 1980s on. So, it’s been 20-plus years that I have been
involved in standards setting. It’s been a wonderful experience,
particularly the years at FASB and the IASB—two very good
organizations with terrific people working on a very important
mission. But I’m looking forward to different challenges and new
experiences in life.

As I have discussed in this book, over my career and, in particular,
during the last decade, there have been significant developments and
changes in the financial reporting landscape, both in the United States
and globally. In terms of accounting standards, the objectives of
improvement and international convergence have been the driving
forces behind many of the changes. Responses to reporting issues
emanating from, and revealed by, crises and breakdowns in the
financial system have also been an important source of change in
accounting standards and in broader aspects of the environment in
which financial reporting occurs.
I feel privileged to have been an active participant in these developments. They gave me a deep appreciation for the dynamics of our
capital markets and the broader financial system and for the many,
often complex, challenges that policymakers face. It also reinforced for
me the fundamental importance of sound accounting and reporting and
transparency across the financial system to help foster the health and
vibrancy of our capital markets and economy.

238

Chapter 7: Looking Back and Moving Forward

I also count myself very fortunate to have been able to work with many
talented and dedicated professionals and to have met many interesting
people, not only during my years as an accounting standard setter but
throughout my career. That starts with the people I have worked with
the closest, who, over much of the last decade, were my fellow FASB and
IASB Board members and the terrific members of our staffs, but also
extends to many others who served as trustees of the Financial
Accounting Foundation (FAF) and International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) Foundation, members of our various standard-setting
advisory groups, and countless others who contribute to the accounting
standard-setting process. I had the privilege to work with many at the
SEC, including several SEC chairmen and chief accountants, members
and staff of the PCAOB, several U.S. Treasury secretaries and their staff,
senior officials at the banking regulatory agencies and the IRS, many
members of Congress and their staffs, and many investors and other
users of financial information, financial executives, and public
accountants. The increasingly international aspect of our work also
enabled me to work with and meet many very interesting people from
around the world, including those at other major national accounting
standard setters, foreign governments, and international organizations.
Ultimately, it is the people I have met and worked with that I think I
will remember most about my years in the accounting profession and
as a standard setter. As has been my good fortune throughout my
career, I count many of these people as friends.
I suspect those who know me well would be very surprised if I did not
end this book with some overall thoughts about my years in accounting
standard setting and recommendations on the future of accounting
standards and financial and corporate reporting. Indeed, in the time since
I have left the FASB, I have been interviewed several times and have,
through public speaking engagements and other venues, met with many
people who seem genuinely interested in my thoughts on these matters.
One such interview from October 2010 can be found in exhibit 7-1. The
questions I seem to be asked most frequently include the following:

• What do you think were the most important accomplishments
during your tenure as Chairman of the FASB?

• What were your biggest disappointments, regrets, and mistakes?
• What advice would you give to your successors and other key
players in accounting standard setting and financial reporting?
• What are you doing now, and does that include staying involved
in accounting standard setting and financial reporting?”
Let me try to answer these questions. In doing so, I will try to be brief,
so my answers will reflect those matters that seem the most significant
to me as I look back and as I contemplate the future.
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Exhibit 7-1: Alix Stuart. “After Eight Years at
FASB, Herz Looks Back,” CFO.com, 4
October, 2010. www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
14528858/c_14529070.
On September 30, Robert Herz stepped down as Chairman of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, leaving board member Leslie
Seidman as acting Chairman. Neither FASB nor Herz would comment
on why he retired after more than eight years in the job, but it probably
wasn’t due to any lack of popularity. Nearly all of those who worked
with the 57-year-old Herz commend his blend of intellect and calm.
Herz has done a “terrific job,” says Dennis Beresford, accounting
professor at the University of Georgia’s J.M. Tull School of Business and
a former FASB Chairman himself. “He’s dealt with tough issues and
tough board members—not all of them are easy to work with—and he’s
been able to get the board to resolve some very difficult issues.”
“I don’t think there was ever a raised voice when Bob spoke,” says
Mark Ellis, CFO of luxury goods retailer Michael C. Fina and a sixyear veteran of the FASB small business advisory committee. “He
truly had the intellect to understand both sides of an argument and
explain the reasoning behind decisions made that both sides would
understand and appreciate.”
In an exclusive interview with CFO, conducted via e-mail, Herz
reflected back on his tenure at FASB and speculated about his future.
The following is an edited version of the interview.
As you look back over your years at FASB, what do you think is your
legacy?
I can point to the scores of pronouncements we issued, but I’m also
very proud of many other things we did over the last eight years to
improve accounting standard-setting. Those included rationalizing the
standard-setting structure in our country so that most pronouncements
now come out from the FASB versus the four-legged stool of the FASB,
AICPA, EITF, and SEC before. I’m also very proud of the codification
effort, which has [created] a much better organized and more accessible
set of U.S. GAAP literature.
We also significantly broadened our outreach to various constituencies
through new advisory groups with investors and with small business
and private companies. We strengthened our staff ... and we stepped up
our involvement with the accounting academic community by
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reinstituting an accounting academic fellowship program and through
our Financial Accounting Standards Research Initiative.
We also did things to make the process more transparent and open,
including making our standards available on the Web free of charge
and audiocasting our meetings for free on the Web. Finally, and very
importantly, there has been the whole international convergence effort.
Which accounting pronouncement made the greatest single improvement to the accounting literature during your tenure?
It’s hard to single out any particular one. [One] example of what I think
was [a] good and interesting pronouncement [is] Statement 157. Before
that standard there were many different definitions and approaches to
fair value measurements. What that standard did was to provide a
common definition of fair value, how to approach it in different
circumstances, and standardized disclosures around fair value measurements included in the financial statements.
The second standard I’d mention is Statement 167, which is the recent
changes to the guidance on consolidation of variable interest entities.
What I like about that particular pronouncement is that it sets out clear
principles and then provides a good set of implementation guidance,
particularly in the form of examples.
When comparing U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and
international financial reporting standards, it seems as though some
rules will be impossible to converge, such as those that pertain to
LIFO inventory accounting and revaluation of property, plant, and
equipment [PP&E], among others.
There are a number of specific continuing differences between U.S.
GAAP and IFRS that do pose challenges ... but I believe that with
continued [cooperation], solutions can be found. Sometimes the solutions
may not just involve accounting answers. For example, in the case of
LIFO inventory, the IRS is aware of this issue, and one solution might
involve changes to the tax code. Regarding the revaluation of PP&E,
FASB is now looking at the use of fair value for investment properties.
In 2003, you stated that FASB’s implementation of fair-value
standards wouldn’t outstrip the ability of people to properly implement the concept. In hindsight, considering the liquidity crisis of
2008, do you think FASB met this challenge?
Just as many other parties did during the financial crisis, I’d [note] that
we didn’t have an existing playbook for what many termed an
“unprecedented” crisis. Nevertheless, I believe we dealt pretty vigorously with issuing guidance on how to deal with the challenges of fairvalue measurements and impairments of financial assets.
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You spent quite a lot of time on the hot seat before Congress,
especially during the crisis. Would you say that during your tenure
things got better, worse, or remained unchanged with respect to
political influence over accounting standards and the independence
of FASB?
While I was certainly on the proverbial hot seat during the financial
crisis...I actually appeared many more times in front of Congress during
the debate on accounting for stock options a number of years ago. I feel
that things have gotten a little bit better over the last eight years. I
believe that, overall, there’s been respect for our due process and the
importance of it remaining thorough, objective, and as unbiased as possible.
What was the toughest battle you had to face?
I don’t like using the word “battle,” but the most challenging situation
in terms of trying to improve the accounting in an important area
related to accounting for employee stock options, in 2003-2005.
Members of the high technology and venture capital communities
strongly opposed our proposal to require the recording of compensation
expense related to the granting of executive and employee stock
options. They had many lobbyists and PR firms. It got so far as the
House passing a bill that would have effectively blocked the expensing
of stock options.
Fortunately, we also had very strong support from a number of
quarters for making the accounting change. In the end, we were able to
make that needed change, which was an important outcome for
financial reporting.
Under current GAAP, there are individual revenue-recognition
accounting rules for about 25 different industries. The joint FASBIASB revenue-recognition exposure draft [ED] standardizes many of
those rules. Still, with 25 industries arguing that they need specialized rules, how likely is the ED to remain in its current form?
I think the ED provides a good basis for a broad standard on revenue
recognition. During the development of the ED, we and the IASB held
a number of workshops with companies from around the world to
beta-test a variety of different transactions and arrangements across different industries. [We wanted] to understand whether the model could
be applied, and I think we generally found that it could.
That’s not to say that the exposure draft is perfect. Some challenging
issues revolve around the definition of transfer of control, because that’s
key to revenue recognition under the proposed model. [Another challenge is] around the cost side of the accounting, because we decided it

242

Chapter 7: Looking Back and Moving Forward

was important to address the related costs in order to properly portray
profit margins.
There are a few industries we’ve heard from for which the proposed
model poses some challenges. And we’ve heard from some users that
follow software companies that the model may provide for too much
accelerated revenue recognition. But those are the types of things the
boards will deal with in redeliberations.
Regarding lease accounting, do you think that in your lifetime that
FASB will achieve Sir David Tweedie’s goal of flying on an airplane
that’s on the balance sheet of the airline that owns it?
I think the answer is yes. We recently put out jointly with the IASB an
exposure draft on lease accounting. Under the so-called right-of-use
model proposed in the ED, the right to use the equipment—in this case
the airplane—for a period of time would be shown as an asset, and a
corresponding liability would be recorded for the present value of payments that are to be paid for that right of use.
I think that is a good approach, but again it’s out for comment, and the
boards will benefit from the comments they receive and will carefully
consider those comments in redeliberations.
If you look ahead five years, do you see U.S. accounting standards
converged with the rest of the world’s?
That’s hard to predict. The SEC staff are currently working their way
through a systematic work plan to look at a variety of issues relating to
potential incorporation of IFRS into our reporting system. When they’ve
completed that work plan, they will be able to go to the commission with
recommendations on whether, when, and how to proceed regarding IFRS
for U.S. public companies. In the meantime, I believe it’s up to the two
boards to continue to work together toward developing standards that
foster both convergence and improvement in reporting.
Do you have any plans to rejoin the IASB?
Well, I very much enjoyed my time on the IASB, and I have very much
enjoyed working with our colleagues at the IASB. But right now I’m
looking forward to new experiences and challenges. I’m 57, and as I look
at people I admire, like Paul Volcker and Bill Donaldson, I see that
they’ve contributed in many different ways over their distinguished
careers.
So, while I certainly wouldn’t rule out returning to accounting
standard-setting at some point, right now I’m looking forward to doing
new things. I’d like to do a bit of teaching, I’d like to serve on some
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corporate boards, and I already have been involved with some not-forprofit activities. And I also hope to find ways to continue to contribute
to financial reporting, the capital markets, and the public interest.

Proud Accomplishments
I suppose just about everyone who undertakes public service does so
from a desire to contribute to the public good—to help make things
better. Certainly, that was my reason for spending what has been a sizeable chunk of my career and life in accounting standard setting and
related activities involving financial reporting. I consider accounting
and financial reporting to be a very important part of the fabric of the
capital markets, financial system, and economy.
As I said in a speech at the AICPA 2002 National Conference on Current SEC Developments shortly after becoming Chairman of the FASB,
Throughout my own career as an accountant, I have believed
passionately in the importance of accounting and good financial
and corporate reporting to the overall soundness of our capital
markets.... It matters! Reporting is a bit like the air we breathe ...
as long as it’s clean, we kind of take it for granted. But bad
reporting, misleading reporting, and fraudulent reporting is like
dirty air. It pollutes and clouds—it threatens the health of all
those around it and makes people want to stay away from the
polluted area.

In the same speech, I outlined some of my thoughts about the elements
of sound reporting and key challenges facing the reporting system:
And, we must regard reporting as an exercise in
communication—good communication about performance,
financial condition, prospects, and uncertainties and not as, on
the one hand, an exercise in mere compliance or, on the other
hand, an opportunity to spin, to paint a picture that is more flattering and appealing than the underlying reality. It means
reporting that meets the needs of investors and other key users,
that is operational, and that faithfully reflects the underlying
business and economic realities. It means reporting that satisfies
the key qualitative characteristics described in the FASB
Conceptual Framework—relevance, reliability, neutrality, timeliness, and understandability. In an era of continuing globalization
of business and capital markets, I think it means financial
reporting that is comparable across borders. And I think it means
looking for ways to modernize and upgrade the whole reporting
model to replace some of the traditional but perhaps seldom
used information with more meaningful information on cash
flows, on key performance indicators and business value drivers
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and to better harness the power of technology in the reporting
and data analyses processes.

These are lofty and, I believe, enduring goals. In assuming the role of
Chairman of the FASB, particularly at a moment in history when U.S.
financial reporting was in the spotlight and being criticized, I felt both
responsible and empowered to try to make forward progress toward
these goals, knowing full well it would take a lot of hard work and,
most importantly, a team effort involving my fellow Board members
and our staff, the support of our trustees and colleagues at the SEC,
and many, many other stakeholders in the financial reporting system. In
chapter 2, “Charting Course,” I discussed how we went about charting
a course to try to bring about improvement in accounting standards
and the standard-setting process, simplification of the U.S. standardsetting structure and codification of the U.S. GAAP literature, and
international convergence.
So, a decade later, where are we in achieving those objectives and in
making progress toward the kind of reporting system envisioned in my
2002 speech? By “we,” I do not mean just the FASB but everyone with a
stake in the financial reporting system. The mission and role of FASB,
as important as it is, is limited to the realm of accounting and financial
reporting standards, but many other organizations have key roles in the
financial reporting supply chain.
Overall, I believe we collectively made significant progress in some
areas but not in others. Certainly, through the spread of IFRS around
the world and ongoing convergence efforts in major countries,
including the United States, we have seen significant progress in
achieving greater comparability of reported financial information across
the global capital markets. Although we have a way to go, the vision of
common, high-quality international accounting standards is, I believe,
much closer to becoming a reality than it was one decade ago.
Very importantly, I also believe that new accounting standards and
disclosure requirements in important areas have improved the overall
relevance and transparency of reported financial information. There
have been major new accounting standards on business combinations,
employee stock compensation, consolidation of variable interest entities,
fair value measurements, and pension and other postretirement obligations, and major new standards on revenue recognition and lease
accounting are expected in the near future. There are richer disclosures
in areas of particular interest to professional investors and financial
analysts, perhaps most notably with respect to derivatives and other
financial instruments and involvements with special purpose entities
and other off-balance sheet arrangements.
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I believe both the FASB and IASB have made important improvements
in their standard-setting processes, including expanding and enhancing
their outreach activities to stakeholders on proposals and emerging
issues. I take considerable pride in the many steps we took to
proactively increase and broaden the input that FASB receives from
investors and other users of financial information. If imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery, then the FASB should feel flattered that the
IASB, SEC, and PCAOB also established investor advisory groups. As
well, I take great pride in our successful effort to develop the FASB
Accounting Standards Codification™, which I believe was a major step
forward in improving the overall usability of the U.S. GAAP literature.
We have also seen progress on using technology in financial reporting
through the development and use of eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL).
Although not the subject matter of most of this book, I believe the SEC
and the PCAOB have made significant progress in their areas of
responsibility relating to the financial reporting system. To their credit, I
believe that companies and audit committees have also worked hard to
improve the quality of their financial reports, communications with
investors, and internal controls over financial reporting. Audit quality
has clearly improved from the days before Sarbanes-Oxley.
Perhaps most importantly and notwithstanding the criticisms by some
of accounting, auditing, and financial reporting relating to the recent
financial crisis, the collective result of all these efforts is that overall
public confidence in reported financial information seems to be higher
now than it was after the reporting scandals of 2001–02:
This year’s results suggest that confidence about domestic
markets may have stabilized and perhaps even begun to
rebound. In 2012, investors’ confidence in U.S. capital markets
increased four percentage points, to 65 percent, after declining or
remaining static every year since 2008. Investors’ ratings on two
other key metrics—confidence in investing in U.S. companies
and confidence in audited financial information—remained
steady at 71 percent and 69 percent, respectively.3

With respect to maintaining confidence in financial reporting, I take pride
that we, with the strong support from the FAF trustees and many other
parties, were able to maintain the independence and integrity of
accounting standard setting in the United States in the face of what were,
on occasion, strong attempts to interfere with it through political means.
So, overall, I believe we have seen forward progress and the financial
reporting system is in a better place now than it was one decade ago,
both in the United States and internationally.
3

Center for Audit Quality, “Main Street Investor Survey,” September 2012. www.thecaq.org/
newsroom/pdfs/2012MainStreetInvestorSurvey.pdf.
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Opportunities for Further
Improvement
Even in the areas where progress has been made, there is clearly still
much to do in achieving the goal of common high-quality accounting
standards around of the world, improving the relevance and overall
usefulness of reported financial information and making it less complex
and more understandable, achieving greater consistency across the
global capital markets in the implementation of accounting standards
and the quality of auditing, corporate governance, and regulatory
oversight and enforcement of reported financial information, and in
more fully harnessing the power of technology in financial reporting.
All of these are works in process that I hope will continue to be
pursued with focus and vigor.
In some important areas relating to the reporting system, I don’t believe
there has been much progress during the past decade, including making
financial statements less complex and more understandable and
expanding corporate reporting to systematically include critical information on key nonfinancial performance indicators, business value drivers,
risks, and uncertainties. However, in all fairness to me and my colleagues
at the FASB and IASB, the expansion of financial reporting to encompass
key nonfinancial information was generally beyond our reach. Nonetheless, this type of information is critical to enhancing the wider realm of
corporate reporting. What is in the purview of accounting standard setters, however, is helping to make financial statements more understandable and less complex. With respect to that topic and as discussed in
chapter 6, “Complexity,” the disclosure framework project of the FASB
offers a real opportunity to make meaningful progress.
Similarly, although we have seen a marked and an important increase,
particularly outside the United States, in the number of companies
providing information on the environmental and social impacts of their
activities through triple bottom line, sustainability, and corporate social
responsibility reports that are based on the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) Framework or AccountAbility AA1000 standards, I believe there
are significant opportunities to broaden the extent of reporting of such
information and to make it more consistent, credible, and effective.
Despite the growing use of XBRL in financial and regulatory reporting
around the world, overall, there has been relatively slow progress in
using the power of technology to advance financial reporting when
compared with many other products and aspects of modern life.
So, the dreamer in me continues to envision a future in which we have
a common corporate reporting system for listed companies and other
publicly accountable entities that spans the major global capital markets
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and that, using technology, provides high-quality financial and
nonfinancial information on corporate activities in a systematic,
consistent, understandable, and timely manner. Imagine a global
reporting system in which, for any listed company in the world, you
can quickly access consistently prepared, comparable, and understandable financial and key nonfinancial performance information. In short, I
continue to believe there are significant opportunities to improve the
overall usefulness and usability of financial statements and broader
corporate reporting as products in the marketplace.
Many will say, with some justification, that this was an unrealistic
vision one decade ago and remains so today, and I concede that the
challenges and barriers to achieving such a system are formidable. Yet, I
believe that powerful geoeconomic, geopolitical, and global
environmental, technological, and social forces have been driving, and
will continue to drive, corporate reporting in these directions. The
ongoing work of the International Integrated Reporting Council reflects
these forces and themes.
Regarding my own leadership of and contributions to the FASB and to
broader developments in financial reporting, I look back on these with
an overall sense of pride. These were summed up in the FAF’s 2010
Annual Report by FAF Chairman Jack Brennan and FAF President and
CEO Terri Polley who wrote,
Bob’s vision, leadership, and strong commitment to the goal of
improving and converging accounting standards for the benefit
of the global and US capital markets brought the FASB to a new
level of excellence. His tenure at the FASB set the direction for
the future of financial reporting, and we thank him for his
leadership and considerable contributions to the organization
and its mission during a critical period in the history of the US
capital markets. We will always be grateful for his strong leadership of the FASB.

Commenting in the October 1, 2010, CFO.com article “Herz Closes the
Books on FASB Tenure,” Arnie Hanish, corporate controller at Eli Lilly,
said I had “done a really fine job over the past eight years in leading
FASB through a challenging period.” Mark Ellis, CFO of Michael C.
Fina and a member of the FASB’s Small Business Advisory Committee
said “Part of [Herz’s] legacy is that FASB is [now] such a vibrant
organization and that the other members share Bob’s intellect and
vision.” I appreciate those kind words and those of many others
concerning my years at the FASB.

248

Chapter 7: Looking Back and Moving Forward

Some Regrets, Mistakes, and
Disappointments
That’s not to say that I do not also have some regrets and some areas of
disappointment as I look back. As the Frank Sinatra song “My Way”
goes, “Regrets, I’ve had a few,” and I made plenty of mistakes. So
what, given the chance, would I try to do over? A few things quickly
spring to mind, which I have already alluded to in prior chapters. The
first and, I believe, most important is that I regret our not having made
more progress in our joint project with the IASB to improve the
Conceptual Framework. As I will discuss shortly in my recommendations to those who continue in and will become involved in accounting
standard setting in the future, I believe it is essential that the key crosscutting conceptual issues that have challenged, and continue to challenge, accounting standard setters, be wrestled to the ground. Although
not a panacea to resolve all accounting issues, I am convinced it is
important for standard setters and the whole financial reporting system,
both in the United States and internationally, that there be a more solid
Conceptual Framework. Unfortunately but understandably, our experience was that in an era of having to respond to significant financial
reporting issues from a very major financial crisis and with the push to
complete projects in our Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on
international convergence, the important gave way to the urgent.
In terms of mistakes on my part, perhaps the most significant one was
misjudging, in late 2009, the ability of the two boards to expedite
progress on the many MoU projects by greatly increasing the number
and frequency of joint meetings. As discussed chapter 4, “International
Convergence,” we did so in response to the September 2009 call from
the G20 leaders to redouble our efforts to complete the convergence
program by June 2011. This action was also consistent with the recommendations of our Financial Crisis Advisory Group and with the SEC’s
plan to make a decision in 2011 on the future of IFRS in the United
States. Although I was not alone in expecting (or perhaps hoping) that
this would enable us to make more rapid progress, as the leader of one
of the two boards involved in this effort, I take responsibility for
misjudging what was realistically achievable.
With respect to specific standard-setting decisions and actions, with the
benefit of hindsight, I would probably try to do some over if I had a
time machine. Probably the most important of these relates to the
qualifying special purpose entity. Knowing what I know now about
how the use of this device was sometimes stretched and became an
important element in the growth of the “shadow” banking system
leading up to the financial crisis, I certainly would have worked to
eliminate it from the standards much earlier. As I said in chapter 5,
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“The Financial Crisis,” I think it, along with some other notable
examples in the history of accounting standards, serves as an example
of the perils of creating exceptions that grant highly coveted financial
reporting outcomes. Similarly and also with the benefit of hindsight, I
wish we had accomplished before the onset of the financial crisis the
changes we made in 2009 to the model for consolidation of variable
interest entities.

Changes in Financial Reporting—A
Challenging but Necessary Process
Accounting and reporting are no different from other aspects of human
endeavor; they are all subject to the natural laws of change. I believe
that history teaches us that it is important to adapt and move forward
or risk becoming irrelevant. Certainly, throughout the last 80 years or
so, our reporting system has been subject to many changes that were
made in response to changes in the economy and modes of business
and finance, changes that may have been strongly opposed at the time
but that now, with the benefit of hindsight, most people would view as
progress. For example, before the 1930s, many public companies did
not report sales and cost of sales information, viewing that as highly
proprietary information. Segment reporting was not common or
mandatory until the 1970s. For more than 15 years FASB endeavored to
develop and put into place improved standards on measuring and
reporting obligations and costs relating to defined benefit pension and
other postemployment benefits (OPEBs). This effort was protracted and
strongly opposed by major auto and other industrial companies that
argued the liabilities were not real or too soft to include in financial
statements. Indeed, the September 1989 issue of Business Week captured
the firestorm over FASB’s proposal on OPEBs in the article “First Thing
We Do is Kill All the Accountants”:
Some time in October, a little-understood group in Norwalk,
Conn., will do something that could knock at least 25% off the
annual profits of big industrial companies. It may also wipe out
one-third of the net worth of all of Corporate America. This is no
crazed band of financial guerrillas. This is the green-eyeshade
crowd at FASB—the Financial Accounting Standards Board. And
all it’s really trying to do is to get companies to ’fess up to what
they are likely to owe for retiree health benefits. The likely sum
is more than a trillion—that’s with a T—dollars.4

Yet, some 20 years later, I think most people would agree that the pension and OPEB liabilities were quite real and very significant in
4

James R. Norman and Susan Garland, “First Thing We Do Is Kill All the Accountants,” Business Week, 12 September 1988.
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evaluating the long-term prospects and viability of the very companies
that argued most vociferously against the accounting changes.
I have chronicled some of the major changes that have occurred in
accounting and reporting over the past decade, some of which were
quite contentious. Further significant changes in accounting standards
and other areas relating to financial reporting are in the works,
including new major accounting standards resulting from the FASBIASB projects, new auditing standards from the PCAOB, the use of
XBRL and new technologies in the financial reporting process, and the
potential movement to more integrated reporting that addresses a
company’s performance and prospects across broader financial,
nonfinancial, environmental, social, and governance dimensions.
In short, as the worlds of business and finance change, accounting
and reporting has needed and will need to continue to evolve to
properly reflect these changes. Changes will continue to be made in
response to identified problems and shortcomings in financial
reporting. Moreover, controversy often accompanies change, both
because change can be uncomfortable and disruptive and because
those attempting to fend off or delay change often have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo.
That is not to say that all changes proposed by policymakers, including
regulators and standard setters, are worthwhile or needed. Certainly, that
is not the case. As Winston Churchill said, “There is nothing wrong with
change, if it is in the right direction.” That’s why having a thorough,
open, and objective standard-setting process that includes obtaining and
carefully considering relevant input on the likely and potential costs,
benefits, and unintended consequences of proposed changes is important.
An effective system for postimplementation review of major standards,
rules, and regulations and mechanisms for surfacing and addressing
emerging issues are also important to help ensure that the financial
reporting system progresses in the right direction.
However, the due process should not be so excessive that it unduly
delays needed improvements in financial reporting. As I noted in chapter
2, the FASB has been subject to criticism, particularly in times of crisis,
for being too slow to address issues and improve accounting in key
areas. The word glacial has sometimes been used by critics to describe
what they perceive as an unacceptably slow pace of the FASB (as well as
the IASB and other accounting standard setters). For example, in the
wake of the Enron scandal, the cover story of the November 25, 2001,
issue of BusinessWeek commented, “The pace of change at FASB tends to
be glacial.... The slow pace means the standard-setters sometimes fail to
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react to sudden changes in the market.”5 Similarly, as noted in chapter 5,
we were criticized by some during the financial crisis for not having
responded quickly enough to certain reporting issues. In some cases
these criticisms came from the same people who, in other instances,
argue that the FASB, IASB, or both, are moving too quickly and that
added due process, including extensive field tests, are needed before
finalizing changes in accounting standards, changes that may be favored
by and viewed as overdue by investors.
Finding the right balance is not easy. Narrower issues and practice
problems can be addressed more rapidly, but on major projects that
involve potentially pervasive changes to the existing standards,
extensive due process is usually needed in order to confirm the overall
soundness and cost-benefit of proposed changes in standards. But that
process should not seek to try to address every conceivable issue or
guarantee ease of implementation of every aspect of a proposed new
standard. To do so can unduly delay needed improvements in
accounting standards and financial reporting. It can also result in
introducing exceptions, compromises, and bright lines that add to the
complexity of the standard and the resulting reporting and can dilute
the overall effectiveness of a new standard. I share some of the
concerns of people such as former FASB Vice Chairman David Mosso in
his book Early Warning and Quick Response: Accounting in the Twenty-first
Century. In chapter 7, “Standard Setting: Undue Process,” Mosso
discusses what he views as a number of fundamental problems with
the current accounting standard-setting process, stating, “The first one
is excessive due process. The present form of due process causes delay
beyond reason—it takes far too long to complete a standard-setting
project. Serious accounting practice problems fester for years while
standard setters wrestle with constituents over what is the best way to
solve them.”
During my years at the FASB, I believe we were able to speed up
addressing a number of issues. However, a number of major projects
progressed more slowly, subject to extensive due process, and have
continued to advance at a measured but deliberate pace since I left the
FASB. Many probably view this as quite appropriate, especially on
major projects that involve potentially very significant changes in
financial reporting. However, some no doubt may view this as excessive due process and unacceptable delay in finalizing overdue improvements in key standards. In that respect, Mosso advocates the adoption
of a wealth measurement model as the best way for accounting
standard setting to escape what he characterizes in his book as the
gargantuan maze of the current due process. I have some sympathy
with Mosso’s diagnosis and his proposed solution and believe it could
5
Nanette Byrnes and David Henry, “Confused about Earning?” BusinessWeek, 25 November
2001.
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improve both the process of accounting standard setting and the overall
relevance of the resulting standards and financial reporting. However,
experience suggests to me that such a change is unlikely to occur in the
foreseeable future and that even if it were to occur, it would not
provide a panacea to resolve all current and future accounting issues or
fend off criticisms of the accounting standard-setting process. Nevertheless and as I have tried to emphasize many times in this book, I do
believe there is a real need to get on with the effort to improve the
Conceptual Framework.

Some Words of Advice to Colleagues
and Successors
So, with the benefit of the lessons I have learned from my many years
of involvement in accounting and financial reporting and with a belief
that continuing changes and improvements are inevitable and necessary, what advice would I give to those now charged with these
responsibilities? Again, those who know me well know that I have
some strong views on certain matters regarding accounting standards
and financial reporting. I have already discussed some of these in
earlier chapters of this book and will not expound further on them.
Rather, in the spirit of providing constructive input to those now
charged with key roles in the financial reporting system, I will offer a
few high-level suggestions recognizing full well that the world has
moved on since my time in accounting and standard setting.
First, to my former colleagues at the FASB and IASB, keep going! There
are plenty of opportunities to improve existing standards. It is important
to complete the major MoU projects and to do them in a way that
achieves convergence and genuine improvement in the standards. To me,
that includes the projects on financial statement presentation and
financial instruments with characteristics of equity. Some, if not many, of
the types of changes that were being explored in the financial statement
presentation project were supported by many users and the SEC
Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (CIFiR). In
my view, the issues that were being addressed in the project on
accounting for financial instruments with characteristics of equity
continue to plague financial reporting. So I strongly believe these projects
need to continue to be pursued. If that takes a few more years, so be it.
And I feel that other major areas, including accounting for income taxes
and intangibles, also need improved and converged standards.
Now, I recognize that “the times they are a-changin,” and beyond the
completion of the current joint FASB-IASB projects on revenue recognition, lease accounting, financial instruments, and insurance contracts,
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there is likely to be a change in the way the two boards work together.
I also understand that many stakeholders are coping with lots of other
challenges and priorities. In my opinion, although those considerations
may affect the mode and pace of standard setting, they do not and
should not detract from the need to develop improved accounting
standards on the other major areas previously cited.
Additionally and very importantly, consistent with my prior comments,
I urge you to try to find ways to reenergize and complete the
Conceptual Framework project. Fundamental conceptual issues and
disagreements continue to hamper standard setting and financial
reporting. One thought, certainly not a new one, would be to convene a
separate group, like the Constitutional Congress that drafted the U.S.
Constitution, to work on the project under the oversight of the boards.
Such a group might comprise, for example, former FASB and IASB
members, members of national accounting standard-setting boards, and
senior representatives of key stakeholder groups.6 I am glad that the
FASB, together with other groups, is proceeding with the disclosure
framework project that was started in 2009. Regardless of whether the
United States moves to IFRS, this is a very important effort that is
needed in order to better organize and streamline the financial statement footnotes, improve their content, make them more readable, and
better facilitate the use of XBRL and other technologies.
To the commissioners of the SEC, I offer two bits of advice. First, with
respect to the path forward to potential incorporation of IFRS into the
U.S. reporting system, you need to provide clarity as soon as possible.
The U.S. system should not have to “ride two horses” for an indefinite
or a prolonged period, and the world is watching and waiting. Your
staff has completed a comprehensive work plan and obtained extensive
input that should provide a good basis for making decisions and
assessing what actions are needed to deal with the issues that have
been identified. The FAF has provided input and suggestions on a possible approach, and the staff of the IFRS Foundation has provided a
thoughtful analysis of your staff’s findings. Be clear in your decision. If
it is to transition to IFRS, through, for example, an endorsement
process, be clear on how and when this will occur and outline the
process. If you believe actions are needed by the IASB, the IFRS
Foundation, or others, be clear on what is expected. Whatever the path
forward toward incorporation of IFRS into the U.S. reporting system, I
still like the idea of setting forth a “blueprint” that clearly lays out the
needed steps, milestones, and projected timelines. If the decision is not
6

In that regard, and as noted in Chapter 4 on International Convergence, in September 2012 the
IASB decided to restart work on the Conceptual Framework and has indicated that it intends to
actively involve the new proposed Accounting Standards Advisory Forum in this effort.
However, it is not clear whether the FASB will participate in this work, for example, through
membership in the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum, or whether the FASB will at some
point separately resume working on the Conceptual Framework project.
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to move to or incorporate IFRS, be clear on that and how you see the
U.S. financial reporting system moving forward and whether and how
the U.S. will continue to participate in the development of IFRS and the
international financial reporting system.
Second, to the SEC and its staff, continue to try to implement the major
recommendations of CIFiR. A lot of hard work and worthwhile thought
went into that effort. Of all the recommendations, the one I that
believed should be acted on as soon as possible was establishing
something akin to the Financial Reporting Forum envisioned by CIFiR.
Therefore, I welcomed and applauded the creation of a Financial
Reporting Series of periodic public roundtables by the SEC staff. These
roundtables, similar to the recommendation of CIFiR, bring together
representatives from the preparer, auditor, investor, and user communities with senior representatives of the SEC staff, FASB, and the PCAOB
to, as stated in CIFiR’s Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, “discuss pressures in the financial reporting system overall,
both immediate and long-term.” I believe this type of ongoing forum
can help bring issues to the surface in the reporting system more
promptly and facilitate addressing them in a logical, coordinated, and
effective way that will help provide overall strategic direction to the
U.S. financial reporting system. It might also help the SEC, FASB, and
the PCAOB decide whether and how best to address other key recommendations in the CIFiR report. These key recommendations include
those relating to the judgment framework, continuing to harness the
power of technology in financial reporting to make financial reports
more understandable and useful, and expanding and enhancing the
reporting of information on key performance indicators and elements of
critical nonfinancial information.
To the IASB, their trustees, constituents of IFRS, and all who believe in
a single set of high-quality global accounting standards, I say be patient
with the United States. I recognize the frustration among some that the
United States hasn’t yet signed on to moving to IFRS. Please
understand that without the United States, the system cannot be a truly
global one. Also recognize that for the United States, which has long
enjoyed a high-quality financial reporting system that has been an
important component of our capital markets, a decision whether, when,
and how to move to international standards is a very important public
policy matter. I hope that you should not have to wait much longer to
know where the United States stands and is headed.
To the trustees of the FAF, thanks for your service, and I wish you the
wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job in helping guide U.S.
accounting standard setting through a challenging period. What you
have decided for private company accounting standard setting and the
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AICPA FRF for SMEs initiative, together with the SEC’s decisions
regarding IFRS, may determine not only the future role of the FASB but
the direction of the whole U.S. financial reporting system for many
years to come.
To the countless individuals and many organizations that spend time
and effort supporting and participating in the accounting standardsetting process, I also say, “Thanks.” Broad participation by
stakeholders is a major strength of the U.S. accounting standard-setting
process, one that has served as a model for standard setters around the
world, including the IASB. My only words of advice: keep up the support, input, and participation. The FASB and IASB will need to continue
to draw upon it in addressing the many continuing challenges they
face. Your support is also essential to maintaining private-sector
accounting standard setting that operates in an independent manner in
the public interest in the face of what can sometimes be significant
pressure from special interests and political bodies.
Finally, to everyone involved in the financial reporting system, I
recognize that, collectively, we have been through a lot of change over
the last decade and that the potential for further significant changes in
accounting standards, disclosure requirements, and modes of delivery
of financial and corporate information is not, very understandably, a
thrilling prospect for many. However, I think it is fair to say that
without change, there can be no progress. As Benjamin Franklin said,
“When you’re finished changing, you’re finished.” Jack Welch, former
CEO of General Electric, put it more bluntly in a trailer for CNBC, “If
you’re stagnant, you’re dead.”

So, What Now, Bob?
When I left the FASB, my expectation was that I would continue to
have opportunities to contribute to financial and corporate reporting,
but as I previously explained, I was also very much looking forward to
being able to do some new and different things. First, most importantly
and consistent with my hopes and plans, I have been able to spend
more time with Louise, our son Michael and his wife Heather, and our
daughter Nicole and her husband Cameron. It’s been wonderful.
In terms of other activities, I have had three primary criteria in deciding
whether to take on a particular role. I have to view it as substantive
and a worthwhile expenditure of my time. It has to be something I
believe I will find interesting and enjoyable in terms of subject matter
and the people I will be working with. I want it to be something in
which I believe I can provide some value and also learn some new
things. One of my first decisions after leaving FASB was to join the
faculty of Columbia Business School. It’s a part-time role that has me
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giving some lectures, advising students on course material and career
planning, and working with faculty on research projects, papers, and
symposiums. It’s invigorating and satisfying and connects me back to
my dad, who grew up opposite the Columbia campus on the Upper
West Side of Manhattan and was a proud graduate. It has also reunited
me with Professors Trevor Harris and Stephen Penman, two of the six
members of the accounting academic advisory committee we set up in
the 1990s at C&L. (Katherine Schipper, who would later become my
fellow FASB Board member, was also a member of that academic
advisory committee.) I also continue to serve on the advisory board of
the Manchester Business School in England.
I have also continued my not-for-profit activities as a trustee of the Kessler Foundation, one of the nation’s largest foundations dedicated to
medical research and grant-making in the areas related to rehabilitation
of people disabled by severe brain trauma and spinal cord injuries. I
have also joined various advisory boards and I am a senior adviser to
some promising private companies, including one called WebFilings
whose leading-edge, cloud-based product offering is very much in line
with my view of making more and better use of technology in
corporate reporting. It is a very good product and I work with terrific
people there.
When I left the FASB, I was hoping to serve on the boards of a few
major companies where my experience and skills might add value, so I
was pleased in June 2011 to join the board of directors of Fannie Mae,
an organization at the heart of the U.S. housing finance system and
deeply involved in helping address the challenges currently facing
many homeowners and the overall housing market and in the effort to
build a strong, more stable housing finance system in this country. My
fellow board members include Phil Laskawy, who chairs the board and
who I worked with on the National Steering Committee when he was
CEO of Ernst & Young. Phil served for many years on the IFRS
Foundation so we also worked together while he was in that role. Also
on the board was Denny Beresford (until March 2012), another former
Chairman of FASB and whose wise counsel I sometimes sought in my
years at FASB. Denny and I also worked together on CiFIR. Finally,
David Sidwell, who I have known and worked with when he was at
C&L, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and as a fellow member of the EITF
and CIFiR, also sits on the board.
I also was pleased to join the board of Morgan Stanley in July 2012.
During my career in public accounting, I had extensive experience
auditing securities and investment banking firms, including Goldman
Sachs and Shearson Lehman Brothers, and worked frequently with
investment bankers in my Corporate Finance Advisory Services role.
Joining the Morgan Stanley board has also provided me with the
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opportunity to work again with my friend and former partner and colleague Don Nicolaisen. One of the wonderful things about getting older
is being able to renew working relationships with past colleagues while
also being able to meet and work with new people.
In the realm of financial and corporate reporting, I have been fortunate to
have been sought out as a speaker at numerous conferences, something I
have always enjoyed because it enables me to get out and meet with all
sorts of people and groups around the country. I was appointed in 2012
to the Standing Advisory Group of the PCAOB, whose members include
many former colleagues. I was pleased to be appointed to this group
because I strongly believe that audit quality and public confidence in
independent audits is absolutely critical to the proper functioning of the
capital markets, the financial system, and the economy.
I am also a member of the Accounting Standards Oversight Council of
Canada that oversees the establishment of accounting standards in
Canada. That has reunited me with many colleagues. Trish O’Malley is
a former colleague on the IASB. I worked with Paul Cherry at C&L and
PwC and while Paul chaired the Accounting Standards Board of
Canada, I chaired the FASB. Bob Muter, another colleague and friend
from C&L and PwC, is also on this council. Canada adopted IFRS for
its public company financial reporting starting in 2011 and has gone to
separate “made in Canada” standards for private companies and notfor-profit entities. Thus, the Canadian experience may provide some
important insights for, and a harbinger of, things to come in the U.S.
financial reporting system. I continue as a member of the Financial
Reporting Faculty Advisory Board of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales. I also write a periodic column on
financial reporting matters for Compliance Week.
It is always satisfying and uplifting to have one’s career efforts and
accomplishments recognized. While I was Chairman of the FASB, I was
included on various annual lists of the top 100 people in accounting,
finance, and corporate governance. Although flattering, I think a lot of
that comes with the position, but I was proud and quite touched to be
named an Outstanding Alumnus and to receive an honorary doctorate
from my alma mater the University of Manchester in England. Soon
after I left the FASB in 2010, I received the 2010 Berkeley Award for
Distinguished Contributions to Financial Reporting from the Haas
School of Business at the University of California Berkeley. In 2012, I
was elected to the Accounting Hall of Fame as the 89th inductee into a
group of leaders who helped shape the accounting profession and the
development of accounting and auditing theory and practice over the
past century.
Consistent with my continuing passion for trying to improve the
broader realm of corporate reporting, I have become involved with a
258

Chapter 7: Looking Back and Moving Forward

number of interesting and important initiatives, including what is
known as integrated reporting. In July 2010, as Chairman of the FASB, I
participated in the initial meeting in London of what was then called
the International Integrated Reporting Committee (now the
International Integrated Reporting Council [IIRC]). The IIRC was
established by the Prince of Wales’s Accounting for Sustainability
Project (A4S) and the GRI and includes representatives from major
international corporations, investor groups, nongovernmental organizations, global accounting firms, regulators, and accounting standard setters. The IIRC’s mission is explained on its website as follows:
At present a range of standard setters and regulatory bodies are
responsible for individual elements of reporting. No single body
has the oversight or authority to bring together the different elements that are essential to the presentation of an integrated
picture of an organisation and the impact of environmental and
social factors on its performance. Globalisation means that an
accounting and reporting framework needs to be developed on
an international basis.

In a nutshell, the vision is one of corporate reporting that brings
together in an integrated fashion financial reporting, reporting on key
nonfinancial performance indicators and value drivers, and reporting
on a company’s efforts and impacts relating to corporate responsibility
and sustainable development.
This is very much in line with the next generation of corporate
reporting we envisioned over a decade ago in The ValueReporting
Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings Game, the book I coauthored. Not
surprisingly, this and related efforts have reunited me with 2 of my
coauthors on that book: Dr. Robert Eccles of Harvard and David Phillips of PwC. A primary task for the IIRC and its working groups has
been to develop an overarching framework for integrated reporting and
to develop a strategy and path forward for making it a reality. This
involves a number of ongoing efforts, including a major pilot program
with more than 80 companies from around the world, such as Coca
Cola, Microsoft, and Prudential Financial from the United States, HSBC,
Marks & Spencer, and Sainsbury from the United Kingdom, Volvo from
Sweden, and Tata Steel from India. Also participating in the pilot
program are approximately 25 organizations representing institutional
investors from various parts of the world.
I have been dubbed an “ambassador” for the IIRC, and it has brought
me in contact with many people involved in the burgeoning area of
sustainability reporting, including those from the A4S project, the GRI,
and AccountAbility, an international organization that establishes
standards and provides solutions relating to corporate responsibility
and sustainable development. I also serve on AccountAbility’s Advisory
Council. In addition, I serve on the Advisory Council of the recently
259

Accounting Changes: Chronicles of Convergence, Crisis, and Complexity

established Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, which is
developing industry-based standards for reporting on key
environmental, social, and governance issues affecting corporate
sustainability and whose board of directors is chaired by Dr. Robert
Eccles. These activities have brought me in contact with many other
organizations and individuals concerned with sustainability and the
ongoing depletion and pollution of the world’s natural capital of key
and finite resources. Through these, I have become much more aware of
the potential magnitude and severity of these threats to our ongoing
economic, environmental, social, and planetary welfare; of the need for
better measurement and reporting as part of the effort to address these
critical issues; and of the challenges these issues can pose to the
sustainability of individual business enterprises.
These issues and challenges were very forcefully explained by the
Prince of Wales in his address to the A4S Forum he hosted on
December 15, 2010, at St. James Palace in London:
Experts tell me that though over a billion people have no ready
access to drinkable water and live on less than a dollar a day, we
are still consuming, every year, 50 percent more of the planet’s
natural resources than it can renew. In other words, we are living
way beyond the Earth’s means. My Accounting for Sustainability
project was established to address this issue—to ensure that we
are counting everything that counts and measuring everything
that matters.... It is clearly a daunting task to value and price
natural capital and to broaden our accounting information and
reports to include environmental, social and governance factors,
while at the same time making accounts simpler and more
comprehensible. But it is a task which cannot be ignored or
shirked.... Ladies and gentlemen, if I may say so, if governments,
businesses, the accountancy profession, regulators and standardsetters do not address the present limitations in our accounting
information and reports, then it will be the greatest accounting
failure that the world has ever seen.... If we don’t take the right
decisions now, we will effectively lock our children and
grandchildren into a very grim future and throw away the key....
Many people think that accounts and accountancy aren’t
important, but information is power. And it is the responsibility
of accountants to provide the best systems and information so
that acting with the long-tem in mind, and serving the best
interests of communities and the environment, can also be seen
to be the right financial approach.

In this book, I have chronicled what is now my almost 40 years in the
accounting profession, from my early days as an articled clerk in
England through my years as an auditor and the many other roles I
had at Price Waterhouse, C&L, and PwC. I have also discussed my
many involvements in professional activities, my years as an accounting
standard setter, and the various roles and activities that now keep me
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busy and engaged. During that period, there have been many changes
in the accounting profession and in accounting, auditing, and financial
reporting, and I have had the good fortune to have had a front row seat
for many of these developments and the opportunity to be an active
participant in helping shape some of them. Throughout, I have been
proud to be the member of a profession that serves clients and the
public interest with skill, knowledge, and objectivity. It has afforded me
many opportunities to grow as a professional and person and instilled
in me a deep belief in the importance of sound reporting to the proper
functioning of capital markets and the economy. Moreover, it has also
convinced me that what you measure and report matters—that it affects
behavior, actions, and outcomes—and therefore, that it is critical that
we measure and report on those things that do matter, in corporate
reporting and beyond.
As one who has devoted a good bit of my career to better accounting
and reporting and to an abiding belief in the power of transparency
and that what you measure matters, the Prince’s words ring true, and
his call to action demand attention. I am not a “tree hugger” or an
environmental activist, just a citizen of this planet concerned about the
welfare of future generations. So, as someone with a passion for
helping bring about positive changes in accounting and reporting, the
realm of integrated reporting and accounting for sustainability
represents a new frontier of accounting changes.
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About Bob Herz
By Samuel A. Di Piazza Jr.*

Once in a very long while comes along a very special person. This someone is bright and
curious, yet willing to take a different path in life. This someone has exceptional insight
and a deep sense of integrity and honor. And this someone is committed to intellectual
pursuit while dedicated to the service of colleagues. We are so fortunate to have one
such person, Bob Herz, dedicated to our profession for the last four decades.

Bob is an outstanding leader, an impressive technician, and, of course, an internationalist.
However impressive his accomplishments, I want to mention a far more important
legacy: the enormous impact this special person has had on the people around him.
I have known Bob for more than 20 years, as a partner at PwC, a colleague working
with clients, as a member of the IASC, then the IASB, and finally as the Chairman of the
FASB. I have seen him tackle the most challenging business and technical issues in our
profession with passion and grace. I have seen him use his most unusual background — a
New Jersey kid raised in Argentina who studied in England, worked in London then New
York City, a UK Chartered Accountant and a U.S. CPA — to, as they say, think different.

In the early '80s, I began to hear about a bright young manager, soon to be partner in
1985, in New York City named Bob Herz. Of course, people told me of his technical skills.
But, more importantly, everyone described a young professional who was always there
to help. Who always told it straight, who never left a colleague with a complex problem
without a path forward.
As I got to know Bob, I learned that the respect for his intellect and scope was well
deserved, as was the reputation for his special sense of humor.

Bob took time to invest in those around him. This gave him the chance to change our
profession with his intellect and his passion. Bob left a little of his special nature with
everyone he touched. With those who agreed with him and, more importantly, those
who might have disagreed. It is this special nature and its impact that is his more
enduring legacy, one that will live in our profession for
decades to come in the thousands of people he has
touched and mentored.
*Samuel A. Di Piazza Jr. is Vice Chairman,
Institutional Clients Group Citigroup Inc. Mr. Di Piazza was former
Global CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers and is a former Trustee
of the Financial Accounting Foundation and the IFRS Foundation.
Adapted from a presentation made in honor of the induction
of Bob Herz into the Accounting Hall of Fame.
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